Resumen:
This article analyzes how a licensor's market value varies at the time that it announces a licensing agreement. It posits that licensors¿ appropriation capacity is a function of their bargaining power (determined by their financial situation and information asymmetries when signing the contract) and the potential cost of imitation that the licensors face (determined by their position in the sector). As bargaining power in each situation should determine licensors¿ success, it also should enhance their appropriation capacity in terms of market value. However, the cost of imitation should have a negative effect on licensors¿ appropriation capacity. This study shows that companies with cash constraints appropriate fewer benefits from licensing than do companies that have a ready cash flow (0.87% vs. 2.84%). If companies license out under low information asymmetries (same sector), they also appropriate more benefits from licensing than do companies facing high information asymmetries (different sector) (7.27% vs. 1.53%). Finally, licensors that are leaders appropriate fewer benefits than those that are followers (0.61% vs. 3.86%).
