Detalle Publicación


Vagueness, truth and permissive consequence

Libro: Unifying the philosophy of truth
Autores: Cobreros Bordenave, Pablo; Egrè, Paul; Ripley, David; van Rooij, Robert
Lugar de Edición: Dordrecht-Heidelberg-New York-London
Editorial: Ed. Springer
Fecha de publicación: 2015
Página Inicial - Final: 409 - 430
ISBN: 978-94-017-9672-9
Resumen: We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Gamma whenever, if all the premises of Gamma hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a unified treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for truth, it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference