profesores_e_investigacion_grupos_investigacion_logic_and_substructurality_presentacion

Logic and Substructurality

Traditional approaches to paradoxes reject particular inferences involving logical vocabulary in order to avoid the paradoxical argument. In a Kripke-style theory of truth, for example, the law of excluded middle A or not-A is rejected. With this, other related principles like the axiom of identity If A then A, are likewise rejected. Many recent approaches to paradoxes, however, focus their attention on structural properties: principles that govern the behaviour of the consequence relation itself, without reference to specific items in the logical vocabulary. Among these we can find non-reflexive approaches, non-monotonic approaches, non-contractive approaches and non-transitive approaches. So-called substructural logics are promising solutions to the paradoxes since they provide a way to avoid triviality with a minimal disruption of inferences involving logical vocabulary and, therefore, without modifying the meaning of logical constants (or so the defenders of these approaches claim). The study of substructural logics is nowadays one of hot topics in Philosophical Logic.

The research question that motivates this project is the following: do we have reasonable evidence for the claim that our reasoning is substructural? Our initial hypothesis is that the answer to this question is 'yes'. In order to try to address the question we propose, in the first place, studying the possibilities of a semantic characterization of substructural logics and, in the second place, the philosophical analysis of the arguments against substructurality.

Nested Applications

profesores_e_investigacion_grupos_investigacion_logic_and_substructurality_equipo

People

Pablo Cobreros, Universidad de Navarra

Paul Egré, Institut Jean Nicod

Rosanna Keefe, University of Sheffield

Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe, Universidad de Navarra

David Ripley, University of Melbourne

Robert van Rooij, University of Amsterdam

Lucas Rosenblatt, CONICET - Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Luca Tranchini, Tübingen University

profesores_e_investigacion_grupos_investigacion_logic_and_substructurality_desplegables

2020

  • July 2020. Rosenblatt, L., Logical Deviance, Hypocrisy and Embarrassment, Work in Progress Seminar of the Buenos Aires Logic Group, via Zoom. 

  • July 2020. Rosenblatt, L., Logical Deviance, Hypocrisy and Embarrassment, Seminar of the London Group for Formal Philosophy, via Zoom.

  • January 2020. Tranchini, L. (Keynote speaker) Two approaches to the Russell-Prawitz translation, Days in Logic, Lisbon.


2019

  • December 2019. Tranchini, L. Proof, paradox and the semantic role of hypothetical reasoning, Speaking the Unspeakable. Paradoxes between Truth and Proof, Campinas.

  • November 2019. Cobreros, P. (I can’t get no) Antisatisfaction. The Logic of Paradox, after 40 years, Bochum.

  • November 2019. Cobreros, P. (I can’t get no) Antisatisfaction. IX Meeting of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy, Valencia.

  • September 2019. Rosenblatt, L., Maximal Non-Trivial Sets of Instances of your Least Favorite Structural Rule, Workshop on Substructural Logics, Lisbon.

  • September 2019. Cobreros, P. Classical and non-classical features of Strong Kleene Logics. Workshop on Substructural Logics, University of Lisbon.

  • August 2019. Ripley, D. A typed term calculus for core logic. SADAF (Buenos Aires, Argentina).

  • August 5-10, 2019. Tranchini, L. Harmony, stability, and the intensional account of proof-theoretic semantic, 16th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Prague.

  • July 2019. Ripley. D. Metainferences and the spirit of classical logic. SADAF, Buenos Aires.

  • June 2019. Ripley. D. A typed term calculus for core logic. Keynote, Logica 2019, Hejnice, Czechia.

  • June 2019. Cobreros, P. Inferences and Metainferences in ST. Logica 2019, Hejnice, Czechia.

  • 20 June 2019. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, Workshop on Assertion, Refutation and Meaning, University of Rome "La Sapienza".

  • June 2019. Ripley. D. Position-theoretic semantics and entailment. Bilateral approaches to meaning, EXPRESS project, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam.

  • 28 June 2019. Cobreros, P. Inferences and Metainferences in ST. Logica 2019, Hejnice, República Checa.

  • 20 May 2019. Tranchini, L. Anti-realismo, identità tra dimostrazioni e una concezione intensionale della logica', Workshop Mettere ordine al mondo: prospettive logiche ed epistemologiche su scienza, natura, società, University of Venice.

  • 16 May 2019. Cobreros, P. Substructurality, Non-transitivity and Metainferences. Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Múnich.

  • 30 March 2019. Tranchini, L. The calculus of higher-level rules in modern dress, Third conference on proof-theoretic semantics, Tübingen University.

  • March 2019. Ripley. D. Consequence-theoretic semantics and entailment. Philosophy department, University of Sydney, Sydney.

  • March 2019. Ripley. D. Consequence-theoretic semantics and entailment. Melbourne Logic Group, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

  • 2019. Rosenblatt, L. Work in Progress Seminar, talk: Expressing Consistency Consistently. Buenos Aires.

  • 2019. Rosenblatt, L. Bilateral Approaches to Meaning Workshop, talk: Invalidities. Amsterdam.

  • 2019. Rosenblatt, L. Eight Workshop on Philosophical Logic, talk: Varieties of Classical Recapture. Buenos Aires.


2018

  • 11 December 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, talk for the Programming Languages  research group, Tübingen University, 2018

  • 29 November 2018. Tranchini, L. Proofs and refutation in 2-intuitionistic logic, research colloquium on Logic and Epistemology, Bochum University, 2018

  • October 2018. Ripley. D. Core type theory I: Implication and negation. Melbourne Logic Group, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

  • 10–15 September 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, Refutation Symposium at the Poznan Reasoning Week, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan.

  • August 2018. Ripley, D. What explains the paradoxes?”. 7th Workshop on Philosophical Logic. SADAF (Buenos Aires, Argentina).

  • August 2018. Ripley. D. Containment and analytic entailment. Bradyfest, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

  • July 2018. Ripley. D. Tonk rules and ordering rules. Symposium on draft of Proof Theory and Meaning by Greg Restall. SADAF, Buenos Aires.

  • June 2018. Ripley, D. What explains the paradoxes? Semantic Paradox and Revenge. Universität Salzburg (Salzburg, Austria).

  • 26–27 March 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, Pisa Spring Workshop on Proof Theory.

  • 26–28 February 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic", Second SYSMICS Workshop, Technische Univeristät Vienna.

  • 2018. Rosenblatt, L. Pluralism and Substructural Logics Workshop, talk: On Structural Contraction and Why it Fails. Barcelona.

  • 2018. Rosenblatt, L. Symposium on Greg Restall's forthcoming book, talk: Comment on Proof Theory: Rules and Meaning (with Bruno Da Ré), Buenos Aires, 2018.

  • 2018. Rosenblatt, L. Work in Progress Seminar, talk: On Structural Contraction and Why it Fails. Buenos Aires.

  • 2018. Rosenblatt, L. Seventh Workshop on Philosophical Logic, talk: Maximal Non-Trivial Sets of Instances of your Least Favorite Logical Principle, Buenos Aires.

  • November 2018. Talk "Inferences and Metainferences" by Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarra). Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon.

  • November 2018. Cobreros, P. Inferences and Metainferences. IX Conference of the SLMFCE, Madrid.

  • October 2018. Talk "Truth, proof and consequence as basic concepts of the theory of meaning" by professor Luca Tranchini (Universität Tubingën). 16:00pm. Seminar room (2280) Department of Philosophy. Second floor, Humanities Library.

  • October 2018. Lecture on Natural Deduction by professor Luca Tranchini (Universität Tubingën). 10:00-12:00. Room M6, 1st floor, Edificio de Amigos.