Tanks vs drones. The war in Ukraine and Gaza: Countermeasures to new enemies

In 2022 the Russian military invaded Ukraine in what many though would be a quick victory, with Russian forces waging a lightning war and ending it in days or weeks. However, a battle of attrition quickly took hold and contrary to what was expected, the tank, considered to be the hegemon of the modern battlefield was outmatched by new, smaller, and cheaper drones. One year later, on October 7, 2023, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas launched a devastating attack upon Israel. The Israeli Defense Forces then began a grueling campaign in the Gaza Strip to flush out the terrorist group. In the brutal urban combat that followed, the ‘Merkava’ tanks of the IDF took loses to Hamas drones as similar tactics to those employed by Ukraine against Russian tanks were used.

These events show that the tank, and other conventional weapons, are facing new challenges on the modern battlefield brought about by cheaper weapon systems. These challenges require new approaches and countermeasures to ensure modern militaries can adapt to the ever-changing battlefield and not only survive but defeat the enemy. The following article seeks to analyze the use of drones against tanks in the Ukraine War and Gaza and what countermeasures have been taken to counter the problem by the Ukrainian, Russian, and Israeli militaries. We will also analyze what measures NATO members and other countries have implemented to counter drones or an in the process of developing.

Background: Basics of armored warfare

To understand the current situation, we must understand the tank and its role on the modern battlefield. Most tanks, such as those of the US, Europe, Russia, and Israel were created with the intent of being used in combat against other tanks or as a support weapon for infantry. These views came to prominence after the lessons learned from WW2, where tanks, such as the M4 ‘Sherman’ were used to act as fire support for infantry, rather than engaging other tanks. The mission of engaging tanks was left to specialized vehicles known as Tank Destroyers. During WW2, said approach was discovered to be greatly flawed as tanks faced the threat of landmines, anti-tank guns, man portable anti-tank systems, and enemy tanks.  All this meant that tanks could not operate alone without infantry and required them to be prepared to challenge the new threats. Another threat that rose for tanks was aircraft, which could target armored vehicles in the open with few opposition if anti-aircraft weapons were unavailable, as the German experience during and after the Normandy campaign showed, as their ‘Panzer’ IV and ‘Tigers’ fell victim to American P-47 ‘Thunderbolts’ and British Hawker ‘Typhoons’.

The only defenses against the threat posed by these anti-tank weapons were infantry accompanying the tank that could escort the vehicle and neutralize threats where the vehicle could not reach. The only defense the tank itself could use was improvised armor.  These were improvised measures taken by crews in the field, placing wooden planks, tank track, cement, sandbags, metal planks and anything they could find to add more armor to the tanks. The efficacy of these measures was a point of controversy to the point that most forms of improvised armor on ‘Shermans’ were prohibited by General George S. Patton, claiming it increased the weight of the tanks without offering protection, as well as affecting mobility.

These lessons influenced tank designs during the Cold War which were developed to be able to engage both as fire support to infantry in combined arms actions and to take on other tanks. During this period, as seen in the Yom Kippur War, the greatest threat to tanks were Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM). The ATGM itself was the evolution of the anti-tank missiles developed during WW2 such as the ‘M1 Bazooka’ or the  German ‘Panzerfaust’. ATGMs became more common in the 1970s, became more portable, and advanced with the introduction of better guidance systems such as the Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided missile or TOW.

The considerable losses suffered by Israel in Yom Kippur led to the creation of Chobham armor by the British and Americans to counter this new weapon. Chobham, better known as ‘composite’ armor is a combination of several layer plates of different materials, including metals, ceramic, and plastic. This was the main focus in the development of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from the 1970s up until today. Another advance came in the form of Reactive Armor. Developed first by the Soviets, and gradually adopted by Western Militaries, the idea was to place a series of brick shaped explosive charges on the tanks with the objective of detonating the projectiles before they hit the tank, by deflecting the shrapnel and molten metal away from the tank, protecting the crew.

Through the Cold War, one of the mayor threats strategists believed the tank would face in the battlefronts was the threat of aircraft, as armored vehicles tend to have weaker armor in the turret and upper area. As mentioned before, a well-placed shot by an anti-tank rocket, missile or even cannon rounds sufficiently strong to penetrate armor can neutralize tanks. It was anticipated that in full scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, massive tank battles would take place, with ground attack aircraft such as the Fairchild Republic A-10 ‘Thunderbolt’ would smash tanks and ground forces with a combination of missiles, rockets, bombs, and cannon fire. This view was validated during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, when A-10s conducted airstrikes Iraqi armored units.

In the 2000s, especially during the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq, Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, two new threats against tanks were discovered by the Coalition: the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and the car bomb, formally known as Vehicle-Borne Improvised Device (VBIED). The IED and VBIED caused severe problems to Coalition forces in Iraq during the invasion and subsequent insurgency, damaging several ‘Abrams’ tanks. The most effective way to deal dealt with IEDs was by the use of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel to disarm bombs or preemptively detonate them before the Coalition forces approached. In the case of the VBIED, the only defense was to destroy them before they reached the tank by gunfire.

Ukraine and Gaza: New threat

In Ukraine and Gaza, the tank must deal with the conventional threats tanks had been designed to face, in addition to the rise of small commercial drones reconfigured to drop mortar shells over enemy positions or reconfigured into suicide drones. In Ukraine, the First Person View (FPV) drones have been used extensively as kamikaze attackers against infantry, vehicles, and tanks. These vehicles are controlled using an onboard camera, which allows them to operate further behind enemy lines, conducting precision strikes on unsuspecting enemies.

There are few defenses to the drone for troops in the field. With an average speed of 37 mph, and thanks to their reduced size, FPV drones are very hard to detect by advanced systems, with the Russian military losing to them considerable numbers of troops and vehicles. The whole world has been surprised by the ability of small, commercial drones to take down some of the most powerful tanks in the world, such as the ‘Merkava’ in Israel or US-supplied ‘Abrams’ in Ukraine.

In Gaza, Hamas has employed similar tactics, using small, commercial drones to drop grenades on the upper part of IDF ‘Merkava’ tanks, neutralizing several units. Furthermore, suicide drones launched by Hamas caused damage to sensitive targets such as observation posts near Gaza on the October 7 attack. Houthi rebels have used suicide drones—most of them of the Iranian ‘Shaheed’ model—to strike deep into Israel in large numbers, with a handful of them breaking through the ‘Iron Dome’ and Israeli Air Force fighters trying to shoot them down.

The rise of the drone has had severe implications for tanks in Ukraine, as drones have become as big of a threat as the man-portable ‘Javelin’ anti-tank missile that inflicted heavy losses in the early years of the war. Up until 2022, the only drones that had posed threats to tanks were the larger military ones equipped with missiles and bombs to neutralize armored vehicles, like the American MQ9 ‘Reaper’, already tested in US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Turkish ‘Bayraktar’ TB2. In the opening stages of the invasion of Ukraine, ‘Bayraktar’ drones helped Ukrainian forces halt the Russian advance.

The introduction of FPV drones has changed the situation. FPV drones are cheaper and less complex to operate than larger UAVs, but no less effective. In Israel, FPV drones were, as mentioned before, efficient in targeting IDF forces such as guard towers, or in hitting tanks on the upper area, their most vulnerable spot. In the way to attack tanks, FPVs follow in the wake of combat aircraft, as seen by during operations in the Middle East. In this, FPV drones are no different to aircraft; however, their size and speed make it harder for the crews of tanks to spot them and get out. Furthermore, drones make less noise, making them stealthier than fighter jets, leaving crews unable to deal with them.

As of 2025, the drone has overtaken the tank as the primary actor in combat in Ukraine, with most of the casualties suffered by both sides in the war being the result of drones.

Countermeasures

The events in Ukraine and Gaza sent shockwaves across the echelons of defense ministries around the world. Fears permeated Western defense analysts over the possibility that such drone attacks could happen to them. In the US, NATO, Israel, Ukraine, and Russia, measures have begun to be devised to counter drones and protect tanks from attacks. Some of these measures are improvisations conducted in the field by the crews to increase their chances of survival. Other countermeasures are standardized by militaries. As a result, these countermeasures vary from advanced technological systems to improvised rudimentary devices created by materials in the field.

Anti-drone mesh or cages

After the appearance of FPV drones in combat, a peculiar image emerged out of Ukraine and Gaza. Russian, Ukrainian, and Israeli tanks appeared to be covered with what appeared to be small metal roofs on the turrets of their tanks. Others appeared to resemble entire cages placed around turrets or large parts of the tanks. These cages are meant to act as a shield to cause the drone to destroy the cage, instead of the tank by prematurely detonating it. In Israel, ‘Merkava’ tanks heading to Gaza appear to have more standardized caging, improved to defend against FPV drones and explosives.

The cages or anti-drone mesh cover the thinnest area of armor in tanks, providing some level of increased security. A more extreme version of these measures involves covering the entirety of the tank, except for the barrel, in what can only be described as a kind of bunker or shed, resembling a turtle shell. These modified T-62, T-72 and T-80 tanks are informally referred to as ‘Turtle Tanks’ in the West. These ‘Turtles’ appear to be improvised modifications made by the troops in the field rather than a standardized practice, based on images showing their haphazard nature. Another type of cage is what appears to be series of metal rods resembling a porcupine’s skin, covering the entirety of the tank. Some of these ‘porcupine’ tanks are also equipped with barbed wires.

These countermeasures remind of the improvised armor M4 ‘Sherman’ tank crews started to apply to their tanks in Europe and The Pacific to better counter the more powerful guns of the ‘Tiger’ tank mentioned before. Like tanks in Ukraine, wood planks and metal sheets were used to try to improve the survivability of tank crews. In a repeat of the story, the improvised armor did not adequately protect the M4 ‘Shermans’ or the T-72 in Ukraine on most occasions from anti-tank weapons.

Russian cage measures, like those of the ‘Sherman’ case, bring several disadvantages. The first one is that these shields raise the tank’s profile, making it a larger target for enemy units, such as artillery and airstrikes. The second disadvantage is that the new protective measures obstruct the line of sight of the tank crew and, in the case of the ‘Turtle’, prevents the turret from rotating, reducing situational awareness. This was a problem faced by the Germans with their late war ‘Sturmgeschütz’ assault guns.

Furthermore, the cages can become death traps, trapping the crews inside their tanks if hit, the worst nightmare for any tanker, besides their tank being on fire. This problem is amplified if the tank takes a hit near the ammunition storage. There is evidence that these measures damage vehicle performance, as Patton had predicted almost eighty years ago.

All this said, the efficiency of cages is unclear, with even the well armored ‘Turtles’ falling victim to drone attacks by FPV drones and other Ukrainian weapon systems. Furthermore, the accuracy of FPV drones, which are controlled via a camera that acts as the ‘eyes’ of the drone, allows skilled operators to bypass the cages. Another problem  that has risen is that these additions are too thin to stop more powerful explosives such as artillery or anti-tank mines dropped by drones. Another issue for the Russians is that Ukrainian forces have adapted their tactics to render cages useless, as losses of caged tanks continue to increase. Despite these limitations, cages continue to be used by Ukrainian and Russian forces, the latter with new additions, likely due to crews trying to find some sort of protection.

Electronic warfare systems

Another defensive measure has been the incorporation on the tanks of jammers to disable drones. This measure has started to appear in larger numbers as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza drag on, with militaries across the world increasing development in anti-drone jammers, systems that cause the drone to either land or crash as they cut the link between it and the operator. In the days after the first FPV drones appeared, Russian tanks started to appear with anti-drone jammers in their turrets to neutralize UAVs.  

These systems have been seen as efficient and cost effective to neutralize drones, if used in conjunction with other weapon systems. Improved radars have been developed to detect small FPV drones.  Systems that can be worn by infantrymen on their vests or carried in backpacks are already being produced, and tanks are likely to receive similar upgrades in the coming years.

Jammers, however, similarly to the anti-drone cages, cannot guarantee survivability to drone attacks, as it depends on the efficiency of the jammer to disable the drone, radio signals, distances, and terrain that can affect jamming. More importantly, FPV operators are developing ways to bypass drone jammers, meaning that the system on its own cannot guarantee success.

Israel is planning to incorporate improved jammers to its newest version of the ‘Merkava’ Tank, the MK 5. The IDF has also developed counter jamming systems to counter HAMAS GPS jamming technologies. Some of the makeshift cages have jammers and electronic systems to counter drones, including the previously mentioned ‘Turtles’.

Active Protection System (APS)

These systems are designed to neutralize drones by destroying them with projectiles rather than disabling them. The most well-known systems are the Rafael ‘Trophy’ and the ‘Bullfrog’ developed by Allen Control Systems. The ‘Trophy’ fires small projectiles to neutralize the threat while the ‘Bullfrog’ is an autocannon. These systems are meant to destroy the drones and projectiles aimed at destroying UAVs.

APS systems have been around since the rise of modern anti-tank missiles. Recent reports indicate that APS systems such as the ‘Trophy’ have been integrated into ‘Merkava’ tanks deployed in operations in the Gaza Strip.  Modernization efforts by the IDF to counter Hamas drones include the improvements of ‘Trophy’systems to neutralize targets from above, which is the angle of attack FPV drones use.

Another APS system is the already existing ‘Bushmaster’ Chain Gun, which is already in use with the US Army and Marines. ‘Bushmasters’ are employed in military vehicles such as Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) for defense and more lightly armored vehicles. More importantly, the US has already incorporated the ‘Bushmaster’ into the Mobile-Low, Slow Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (M-LIDS). These systems are currently being used by Mine Resistance Ambush-Protected (MRAP).

Infantry

Another, less revolutionary defense against drones is the infantry. Infantrymen have been the main defense for tanks against ambushes such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) or hidden enemies, particularly in urban areas. Regarding drones, this is no different. Ukrainian forces have developed new weapons for their infantry to counter drones.  The most notable is a new type of anti-drone round, chambered for the 5.56 round used by NATO and Ukrainian rifles. These rounds will burst after firing, creating a shotgun effect, destroying the drone. The idea is for a soldier to be able to simply switch magazines in his or her rifle, instead of having to carry a second weapon to counter the drones.

Infantry has proven a valuable asset for tanks, particularly in urban combat in places such as Gaza, where rooftops, rubble, and buildings provide multiple locations to ambush vehicles using a variety of weapons. Another development is the introduction of anti-drone adaptations to infantry units;  the most notable being the Israeli made SMASH 2000L fire control system. These systems have proven effective in detecting drones, allowing IDF troops in Gaza to engage them. Critically, the SMASH 2000L can be placed as an attachment to most existing rifles, including the US M4A1, making it a cost-effective solution. The US has already started testing the system in some of their units, with the US Marines already starting to integrate the attachment to their rifles.

Another weapon infantry troops are equipped with are anti-drone rifles, similar to jammers; these resemble a bizarre, futuristic rifle, which sends signals to the drone it is aimed at to force it to land by interrupting the connection between operator and vehicle.

Despite these measures, the infantry remains highly vulnerable to FPV drones, as seen by the many videos in social media showing Russian soldiers in trenches, foxholes and even inside building, hidden from view. As mentioned before, the FPV allows for greater accuracy and said drones can enter a building and strike places where a tank or airstrike cannot reach without massive collateral damage. FPV drones have become a predator capable of hitting infantry no matter where they are hiding or even on the move. Without drone jammers, netting, or anti-drone rounds, infantry units are easy targets for drones, and the other threats of the modern battlefield.

What comes next?

The efficiency of drones in the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza to take on some of the most advanced militaries has shocked many. Modernization efforts have started to prepare to counter UAV threats across major militaries in the West. Ukraine has continued to improve its drone capabilities, including the development of a series of ground drones called ‘Termite’, capable of laying mines, conducting reconnaissance operations, and even mounting a cannon to engage enemies. In Israel, the IDF has increased the use of drones in operations in Gaza in conjunction with tanks and infantry.

The US has started equipping its M1 ‘Abrams’ with ‘Bullfrogs’ to protect against drones. ‘Trophy’ systems have also been added to European vehicles for protection. Russia has also incorporated ‘Arena’ M- APS to counter Ukrainian drones. In Europe, Sweden’s SAAB has started to develop systems such as the ‘Locke’, which is similar to the ‘Bullfrog’. Another development is the ‘Nimbrix’ counter UAS missile. In Spain, INDRA has invested in counter UAS capabilities. Furthermore, modernization of ‘Trophy’ systems has continued as Rafael draws lessons from the Gaza war to improve its system.

In addition to countermeasures, integration of drones into units has accelerated, with training beginning to integrate FPVs with other weapon systems both in the US and Europe. To acquire an advantage in drone warfare over possible adversaries, the use of FPVs is increasing, with training centers being opened in Europe to train troops to use new drones. In the United States, the Marine Corps and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have started to integrate drone teams into their units. In parallel, counter drone units are being deployed to combat units to counter any drone threat that might arise.

For tanks the challenge drones pose will not go away; instead, it will only increase in severity and scale. Ukraine and Russia have avoided as much as possible to send tanks to the frontline near places where FPVs are suspected, relegating the tank from their role as the tip of the spear to that of a support weapon. Attempts to reinforce the armor of tanks are likely to continue. In the future, cages may become more standardized and sophisticated around tanks; electronic and APS systems will take a greater appearance in new, upgraded tank models. Israel has already secured agreements with South Korea for modernization of their K2 tanks with ‘Trophy’ systems.

Ammunition similar to the anti-drone rounds Ukraine has developed is likely to be incorporated into NATO infantry squads, with trials already beginning in the US with the new rounds. In the future, American and European industries might produce similar pieces of equipment in the future.

Another future possibility lies in the development of laser based systems to neutralize drones, a measure on which the United States and others are investing an increased amount of resources. In 2025, Israel unveiled the ‘Iron Beam’ system, which is hoped to be a cheaper and more efficient alternative to the famous ‘Iron Dome’, and is also developing a mobile version of the system for vehicles, though it is unclear if it will be incorporated into tanks. In the US, the Enduring High Energy Laser (E-HEL) is being tested by the US to improve drone defenses. Hand-held energy weapons are also being developed by countries such as India. In the future, some of these systems could be integrated into tanks.  

Conclusions

The use of tanks in war has been forever changed with the war in Ukraine. Tanks will no longer face large conventional battles like those of WW2 or the Gulf War, in which MBTs charged into battle as the tip of the spear. Instead, tanks will face battles of attrition against small, deadly foes they cannot see and against which their advanced armor is useless. This has forced tank crews and military to adapt to new threats.

Based on the experience of the Ukraine and Gaza wars, countermeasures are a mix of improvisation of defenses by local forces and new technologies. The events in these conflicts have led to major military and defense industries adapting to the cheaper and deadly threats that have arisen. Although much has been achieved to protect tanks against this new threat, the truth is that there is not yet in sight a 100% effective solution to protect them from drones. Furthermore, every measure has its drawbacks. However, we can conclude that in future conflicts, drones and anti-drone technology will become more common on battlefields across the world, with new advances continuing to reshape the battlefield.