The Institute for Culture and Society organized the seminar 'Moral convictions and scientific arguments' among projects, which consisted of four sessions: 'moral convictions, rationality, science ',' The scientific ethos and moral dimension of a scientific work ',' Scientific objectivity and world life 'and the last session was an evaluation of the last three mentioned above.

Alejandro G. Vigo, Principal investigator of the project 'Natural law and practical rationality' reviews some concerning issues mentioned during the activities.

Is it possible to make science when one has certain moral convictions?

During the seminar we wanted to think about how deep moral convictions are articulated in the same project with the basic moral convictions that are the base of the scientific ethos. While analyzing the integration of these two levels within the same identity, we have seen reasons for and against the various arguments and we have tried to point out that this is a round trip. This determine scientific activity requires for us to adopt certain attitudes that are morally relevant: in dealing with what seems to be true or not, in relation to the rules that demand scientific arguments of a particular field, etc..

During the seminar it was explained that science is in debt with the world of life but has consequences. What is the relationship between the two?

This problem arises particularly during this time because there has been an explosion of scientific knowledge that has led to a proliferation of discourses about reality which is often unmeasured. On the other hand, they all have a closer or more remote common ground with what phenomenology calls the 'life world': the last support of the entire constitution in an experimental sense. How scientific objectivity impacts on the world of life is a present topic because much of what we are today in the world it is determined by the results of science. However, in many occasions these results tend to threaten certain basic presuppositions of our vital installation in our daily routine. This is how an interesting and very productive tension is generated.

Is dialogue possible between different scientific stands and researchers who have different moral convictions?

Both extremes meet. The ideal of a free objectivity of all estimates and the ideal of a complete lack of objectivity in which only one can argue from prejudices often have the same results because they are two forms of non-critical consciousness. In both positions, the immediate result is that each is held without possibility of overcoming their own prejudices capsule. A really critical ideal is dialogic in which criticism always begins with self-criticism and the possibility of dialogue with others. This is part of the critical review on their estimates. In this dialogical context we are able to generate a zone of encounter with the other, which we have a mixed experience: there are many things that one can agree on besides on disagreeing on many others.

Is the academic role the observation or the intervention?

During the evaluation seminar, Professor Alejandro N. García talked about the sociological dimension of the scientific activity, which is regulated and institutionally framed. It is about a human activity like any other which social dimension goes in multiple directions. One of them is how we become aware of what we do when we make science. Professor Garcia presented some current diagrams on relational analysis of social activity in general and in particular a scientific activity that allows us to understand a way of combining observation with intervention. That seems particularly important in the social sciences, but it also applies to natural sciences.

Should knowledge lead a social change?

In my opinion, the short-term bets are myopic. If one interprets that science should lead social change in the following sense, the current concern that scientists should have is how to change society. Naturally, one should first discuss which what direction is used to make such change and which changes seem more desirable. So the question is whether scientists and academics can lead to change. This is where we make the mistake where politics have fallen so many times: confuse the important things with the immediate things, believe to only fund what gives immediate results regardless of a fundamental epistemological fact as no one can predict the relevance of results achieved today in 20 years. To know how the universe started, has no immediate technological application, but no one can say what will happen in 20 years with what was learned by studying those things. And it goes without saying that it would be very important to know everything you can about those things, but there is never an immediate benefit: in my opinion, the greatest imaginable progress for the human being is precisely to know more and better about the fundamental things.

How is looking for funding, following the requirement of publishing papers in a researcher work framed?

We confuse genuine success with short-termism, with immediate success; generating a genuine path, with fleeting prestige; genuine commitment to knowledge, with a superficial commitment recognition. The true recognition diachronically reaches along a path with dark stages, where no one knows what one is doing, where sometimes things do not go as expected ... Another thing is the requirement to provide immediate results certain benefits, usually monetary. While research in the field of medical science is expensive and experimental (laboratory, equipment ...), this does not apply to the humanities, the main expense is salary. In that sense, there doesn't seem to be so many obstacles that justify this short-term pressure.