Detalle Publicación

ARTÍCULO
The Husserlian sources of emotive consciousness in Dietrich von Hildebrand's moral philosophy
Título de la revista: AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN: 1051-3558
Volumen: 91
Número: 4
Páginas: 671 - 686
Fecha de publicación: 2017
Resumen:
In this paper, I would like to show, in general terms, the Husserlian sources of the way in which von Hildebrand understands emotive consciousness, while still recognizing important differences beween the two authors. To carry out this task I will develop four points of contact between the two thinkers: (1) the idea of the existence of a priori laws in the emotional sphere, (2) the defense of spiritual (geistige) forms of affectivity, (3) the idea that affective responses to value can be correct or incorrect, that is, adequate or not according to the value to which they respond, and (4) the existence of a kind of emotive evidence (Gemütsevidenz) that parallels evidence in the realm of judgment.