Javier Gil Guerrero, History scholar at the ‘Religion and Civil Society' Project, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra
Who benefits from Russia's intervention in Syria?
Every war has certain events that open up a new stage in its development and determine its evolution. In the case of Syria, these events include the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the US-led coalition's bombings. In all likelihood, in the future, the Russian military intervention in Syria will also be seen as a turning point.
As is widely known, the conflict in Syria is much more than a civil war. Since its inception, other countries' interests have distorted it. Roughly speaking, there are four sides in Syria: the Assad regime, the Kurdish militia, the rebels (militia along the ideological spectrum) and the Islamic State. In principle, the Kurds and Assad are on the same side, although both operate on their own and the Kurds are relying on the fact that post-conflict they will achieve ample autonomy in their northern region or even independence. The rebels are united in hating Assad and in their enmity with the Islamic State, the only side that has virtually no allies.
At the international level, Sunni Gulf countries and Turkey directly or indirectly support the rebels (also Sunnis), each with a different faction. Russia and the Shiite axis in the Middle East (mainly Iran and Hezbollah) support Assad and his government controlled by the Alawite minority who identify with Shi'ism, although this identification is fairly weak. Finally, the United States, along with several Western countries, has intervened directly against ISIS and has used some rebel Kurdish militias to complement its strategy.
It is important to know the facts leading up to this Russian military intervention in order to understand it. First, Saudi Arabia managed to force a coalition of rebel groups into the so-called "Army of Conquest." This coordination gave the rebels a series of victories over the Assad regime, particularly in the northwest. In August, it seemed that the rebels' next move would advance towards the south and take the seaside town of Latakia, where the Alawite minority, which supports Assad, resides and where the Russian naval base Tartus operates. Finally, there were increasing rumors about possible action supported by the United States, France and Turkey to create a refuge area for the rebels in certain enclaves on the northern border that Syria shares with Turkey. The establishment of such a zone would have given the rebels a safe base from which to reorganize and regroup in their fight against Assad and ISIS.
The surprise Russian intervention put an end to these two dangers threatening the Assad government. Through bombings, Putin is trying to reverse the rebel advances in Idlib and Aleppo, as well as scare off any possibility of a joint, foreign intervention in favor of the rebels. It is not surprising therefore that the majority of Russian attacks (over 90%) have taken place in northwest Syria (where the Islamic State does not operate), which is where the Assad regime is staking its future in the short term. Meanwhile, Russian attacks on the Islamic State have been tempered in nature because, in theory, Obama is responsible for defeating the Islamic State and because the Islamic State's zone is far from strategic areas that are important for the survival of the Assad regime.
Obama has insisted that the Russian intervention has not altered the campaign against ISIS, but statistics released by the Pentagon paint a different picture. Although the American bombing in Syria was not especially intense (an average of 12 a day), Russia's entry into the conflict was followed by a reduction to a minimum of 2.5 attacks per day. Obama's inactivity and apathy came in stark contrast to Putin's hyperactivity, whose planes carried out more than 50 attacks a day.
In short, the Russian intervention has benefited Asad and, indirectly, the Islamic State because, with it, the United States has stepped on the brake of its already anemic campaign against the Islamic State. One wonders if Russian support for Assad will be enough for Assad to impose himself on the rebels. Thus far the Syrian conflict's different sides have all been too weak to win, but strong enough to avoid being defeated. Putin's aim is to alter the balance of powers on the ground and, with an intensive bombing campaign, make the rebels weak enough to lose. The only question is whether Assad will have the necessary strength to move forward to victory on a path paved by Russian bombs.