Authors

• Marina Balboa (marina.balboa@ua.es)
  Department of Financial Economics, University of Alicante
• Germán López-Espinosa (glespinosa@unav.es)
  School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra
• Korok Ray (korok@gwu.edu)
  School of Business, George Washington University
• Antonio Rubia (antonio.rubia@ua.es)
  Department of Financial Economics, University of Alicante

Abstract
This paper analyzes whether the excessive overreliance on non-interest income and wholesale funding, which occurred in the banking industry during the last two decades and led to increases in systemic risk, could arise from the desire of bank managers to increase their variable compensation. Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies during 1995 to 2010, our results show that non-interest income is positively associated to a larger proportion of variable compensation. Also, while exercised options are more sensitive to income trading activities, bonuses tend to be related to the revenues originated from investment banking and venture capital activities. Similarly, a greater reliance on short-term wholesale funding positively associates with higher levels of variable compensation and bonuses. After the financial crisis, variable compensation and bonuses increased with non-interest income, but decreased with the use of short-term wholesale funding.

Classification JEL:C30, G01, G20

Keywords:Non-interest income, executive compensations, financial crisis, wholesale funding

Number of Pages:36

Creation Date:2012-10-03

Number:null/12