The inclusion of private investment and the requirement of efficient credits differ from the overwhelming amount of loans from Chinese state banks

The active role of China as lender to an increasing number of countries has forced the United States to try to compete in this area of “soft power”. Until last decade the US was clearly ahead of China in official development assistance, but Beijing has used its state-controlled banks to pour loans into ambitious projects worldwide. In order to better compete with China, Washington has created the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), combining the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and with USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA).

▲ The US agency helped to provide clean, safe, and reliable sanitation for more than 100,000 people in Nairobi, at the end of 2020 [USIDFC]

January 22, 2021

ARTICLE /  Alexandria Casarano

It is not easy to know the complete amount of the international loans given by China in recent years, which skyrocketed from the middle of last decade. Some estimations say that the Chinese state and its subsidiaries have lent about US$ 1.5 trillion in direct loans and trade credits to more than 150 countries around the globe, turning China into the world's largest official creditor.

The two main Chinese foreign investment banks, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, were both established in 1994. The banks have been criticized for their lack of transparency and for blurring the lines between official development assistance (ODA) and commercial financial arrangements. To address this issue, Beijing founded the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in April of 2018. The CIDCA will oversee all Chinese ODA activity, and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce will oversee all commercial financial arrangements going forward.

An additional complaint about Chinese foreign investment concerns “debt-trap diplomacy.” Since the PRC first announced its “One Belt One Road” initiative in 2013, the Chinese government has steadily increased its investment in the developing world even more dramatically than it had in the early 2000’s (when Chinese foreign aid was increasing annually by approximately 14%). At the 2018 China-Africa Convention Forum, the PCR pledged to invest US$ 60 billion in Africa that year alone. The Wall Street Journal said of the PRC in 2018 that it was “expanding its investments at a pace some consider reckless.” Ray Washburn, president of the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), called the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative a “loan-to-own” program. In 2018, this was certainly the case with the Chinese funded Sri Lankan port project, which led the Sri Lankan government to lease the port to Beijing for a 99-year period as a result of falling behind on payments.

OPIC, founded in 1971 under the Nixon administration, was recommended for elimination in the Trump administration’s 2017 budget. However, following the beginning of the US-China trade war in 2018, Washington reversed course completely. President Trump’s February 2018 budget recommended increasing OPIC’s funding and combining it with other government programs. These recommendations manifested themselves in the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, which was passed by Congress on October 5, 2018. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) called the BUILD Act “the most important piece of U.S. soft power legislation in more than a decade.”

The US International Development Finance Corporation

The principal achievement of the BUILD Act was the creation of the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), which began operation as an independent agency on December 20, 2019. The BUILD Act combined OPIC with USAID’s Development Credit Authority to form the USIDFC and established an annual budget of US$ 60 billion for the new organization, which is more than double OPIC’s 2018 budget of US$ 29 billion.

▲ USIDFC‘s investment commitments by region for the FY 2020. The US$ 29.9 billion is only a fraction of the agency's budget [USIDFC]

According to the Wall Street Journal, OPIC “has been profitable every year for the last 40 years and has contributed US$ 8.5 billion to deficit reduction,” a financial success which can primarily be attributed to project management fees. As of 2018, OPIC managed a portfolio valued at US$ 23 billion. OPIC’s strong fiscal track record, combined with both the concept of government program streamlining and the larger context of geopolitical competition with China, generated bipartisan support for the BUILD Act and the USIDFC.

The USIDFC has several key new capacities which OPIC lacked. OPIC’s business was limited to “loan guarantees, direct lending and political-risk insurance,” and suffered under a “congressional cap on its portfolio size and a prohibition on owning equity stakes in projects.” The USIDFC, however, is permitted under the BUILD Act to “acquire equity or financial interests in entities as a minority investor.”

Both the USIDFC currently and OPIC before its incorporation are classified as Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). DFIs seek to “crowd-in” private investment, that is, attracting private investment that would not occur otherwise. This differs from the Chinese model of state-to-state lending and falls in line with traditional American political and economic philosophy. According to the CSIS, “The USIDFC offers [...] a private sector, market-based solution. Moreover, it fills a clear void that Chinese financing is not filling. China does not support lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and it rarely helps local companies in places like Africa or Afghanistan grow.”

In the fiscal year of 2020, the most USIDFC’s investments were made in Latin America (US$ 8.5 billion) and Sub-Saharan Africa (US$ 8 billion). Lesser but still significant investments were made in the Indo-Pacific region (US$ 5.4 billion), Eurasia (US$ 3.2 billion), and Middle East (US$ 3 billion). This falls in line with the USIDFC’s goal to invest more in lower and lower-middle income countries, as opposed to upper middle countries. OPIC previously had fallen into the pattern of investing predominantly in upper-middle countries, and while the USIDFC is still authorized legally to invest in upper-middle income countries for national security or developmental motives.

These investments serve to further US national interests abroad. According to the USIDFC webpage, “by generating economic opportunities for citizens in developing countries, challenges such as refugees, drug-financed gangs, terrorist organizations, and human trafficking can all be addressed more effectively.” Between 2002 and 2014, financial commitments in the DFI sector have increased sevenfold, from US$ 10 billion to US$ 70 billion. In our increasingly globalized world, international interests increasingly overlap with national interests, and public interests increasingly overlap with private interests.

Ongoing USIDFC initiatives

The USIDFC has five ongoing initiatives to further its national interests abroad: 2X Women’s Initiative, Connect Africa, Portfolio for Impact and Innovation, Health and Prosperity, and Blue Dot Network. In 2020, the USIDFC "commited to catalyzing an additional US$ 6 billion of private sector investment in global women's economic empowerment" uner the 2X Women's Initiative which seeks global female empowerment. About US$1 billion for this US$ 6 billion commitment has been specially pledged to Africa. Projects that fall under the 2X Women's Initiative include equity financing for a woman-owned feminine hygiene products online store in Rqanda, and "expanding women's access to affordable mortages in India."

Continuing the USIDFC’s special focus on Africa follows the Connect Africa initiative, under which the USIDFC has pledged US$ 1 billion to promote economic growth and connectivity in Africa. The Connect Africa initiative involves investment in telecommunications, internet access, and infrastructure.

Under the Portfolio for Impact and Innovation initiative, the USIDFC has dedicated US$ 10 million to supporting early-stage businesses. This includes sponsoring the Indian company Varthana, which offers affordable online learning for children whose schools have been shut down due to the Covid-19 crisis.

The Health and Prosperity initiative focuses on “bolstering health systems” and “expanding access to clean water, sanitation, and nutrition.” Under the Health and Prosperity initiative, the USIDFC has dedicated US$ 2 billion to projects such as financing a 200+ mile drinking water pipeline in Jordan.

The Blue Dot Network initiative, like the Connect Africa initiative, also invests in infrastructure, but on a global scale. The Blue Dot Network initiative differs from the aforementioned initiatives in being a network. Launched in November 2019, the Blue Dot Network seeks to align the interests of government, private enterprise, and civil society to facilitate the successful development of infrastructure around the globe.

It is important to note that these five initiatives are not entirely separate. Many projects fall under several initiatives at once. The Rwandan feminine products e-store project, for example, falls under both the 2X Women’s initiative and the Health and Prosperity initiative.

[Rory Medcalf, Indo-Pacific Empire. China and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020) 310 págs.]

RESEÑA / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

En 2016, el primer ministro Abe de Japón y su homólogo indio, Narendra Modi, realizaron un viaje en el tren bala que une Tokio con Kobe para visualizar el nacimiento de una nueva era de cooperación bilateral. Sobre la base de esta anécdota, Rory Medcalf propone al lector una reconceptualización de la región más dinámica del globo que deje atrás la que, por mor del influjo norteamericano, ha predominado por algún tiempo bajo la denominación “Asia-Pacífico”, y que no refleja una realidad geopolítica más amplia.

El título de la obra es un tanto engañoso, pues parece aludir a un eventual dominio mundial ejercido desde la región indo-pacífica, y a la lucha de China y Estados Unidos por el mismo. No es esto lo que el libro ofrece.

Para Medcalf, un australiano que ha dedicado muchos años a trabajar en el servicio exterior de su país, “Indo-Pacífico” es un concepto geopolítico alternativo que engloba a una amplia región eminentemente marítima que comprende los océanos Pacífico e Índico, por los cuales circula la mayor parte del comercio marítimo global, así como los territorios costeros conectados por ambos mares. En el centro de este inmenso y diverso espacio se encuentran, actuando como una suerte de bisagra vertebradora, Australia, y la zona del sureste asiático que comprende el Estrecho de Malaca, vital paso marítimo.

El enfoque geopolítico propuesto sirve de argumento para articular una respuesta regional al creciente y cada vez más amenazador poder de China, que no pase por la confrontación o la capitulación sumisa. En palabras del autor, es un intento, hecho desde un punto de vista liberal, para contrarrestar los deseos de China de capitalizar la región en su favor.

En este sentido, la propuesta de Medcalf pasa por que las potencias medias de la región –India, Australia, Japón, Corea, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc.– logren una mayor coordinación para dibujar un futuro que tenga en cuenta los legítimos intereses de China, pero en el que estas potencias equilibren de forma eficaz el poder de Beijing. Se trata de que el futuro de la región esté diseñado con China, pero no sea impuesto por China. Tampoco por Estados Unidos al que, no obstante, se reconoce como actor clave en la región, y con cuyo apoyo el autor cuenta para dar cuerpo a la idea.

El argumento del libro sigue un guion cronológico en el que aparecen tres partes claramente diferenciadas: pasado, presente y futuro. La primera de ellas expone las razones históricas que justifican la consideración de la indo-pacífica como una región con entidad propia, y muestra las deficiencias de la visión “Asia-Pacífico”.

El bloque referido al presente es de índole descriptiva y hace una breve presentación de los principales actores del escenario indo-pacífico, del creciente poder militar chino, y de cómo China lo está empleando para retornar, en una reminiscencia de la época del navegante chino Zheng He, al Océano Índico, convertido ahora en arena de confrontación geoeconómica y geopolítica, así como en pieza clave del crecimiento económico chino como ruta por la que navegan los recursos que el país necesita, y como en parte marítima del proyecto global de la nueva Ruta de la Seda.

En lo tocante al futuro, Medcalf ofrece su propuesta para la región, basada en un esquema geopolítico en el que Australia, naturalmente, ocupa un lugar central. En una escala que va desde la cooperación hasta el conflicto, pasando por la coexistencia, la competición y la confrontación, el autor hace una apuesta por la coexistencia de los actores del tablero indo-pacífico con China, y plantea acciones en las tres áreas de la promoción del desarrollo en los países más vulnerables a la influencia –extorsión, en algunos casos– china; de la disuasión, en la que Estados Unidos continuará jugando un papel central, pero que no puede estar basada exclusivamente en su poder nuclear, sino en el crecimiento de las capacidades militares de los países de la región; y de la diplomacia, ejercida a varios niveles –bilateral, multilateral, y “minilateral”– para generar confianza mutua y establecer normas que eviten una escalada hacia la confrontación e, incluso, el conflicto.

Estos tres instrumentos deben venir acompañados de la práctica de dos principios: solidaridad y resiliencia. Por el primero se busca una mayor capacidad para gestionar el ascenso de China de una forma que promueva un balance entre el equilibrio de poder y el acercamiento, evitando los extremos de la contención y el acomodo a los designios del gigante. Por el segundo, los estados de la región se hacen más resistentes al poder de China y más capaces de recuperarse de sus efectos negativos.

No cabe duda de que este enfoque geopolítico, que sigue la estela abierta por Japón con su política “Indo-Pacífico Libre y Abierto”, está hecho desde una perspectiva netamente australiana y de que, de forma consciente o no, realza el papel de esta nación-continente, y sirve a sus intereses particulares de definir su lugar en el mundo y de mantener un entorno seguro y estable frente a una China que contempla de una forma cada vez más amenazadora.

Aún reconociendo esta motivación, que no deja de ser consecuencia lógica de la aplicación de los viejos conceptos del realismo, la visión propuesta no carece de méritos. Para empezar, permite conceptualizar a China de una forma que captura el interés por el Índico como algo integral a la visión que de sí misma tiene respecto a su relación con el mundo. Por otra parte, sirve como llamada de atención, tanto a las numerosas potencias medias asiáticas como a los pequeños estados insulares del Pacífico, sobre la amenaza china, ofreciendo el maná de una alternativa diferente al conflicto o a la sumisión acrítica al gigante chino. Finalmente, incorpora –al menos conceptualmente– a Estados Unidos, junto con India y Japón, a un esfuerzo multinacional capaz, por el peso económico y demográfico de los participantes, de equilibrar el poder de China.

Si la intención del concepto es la de fomentar en la región la conciencia de la necesidad de componer un equilibrio al poder de China, entonces puede argumentarse que la propuesta, excesivamente centrada en Australia, omite por completo la dimensión terrestre china, y la conveniencia de incorporar a ese balance a otras potencias medias regionales que, aunque no se cuenten entre las marítimas, comparten con ellas el temor al creciente poder de China. De forma similar, y aunque pueda pensarse que las naciones ribereñas de África y América forman parte integral de la entidad definida por las cuencas indo-pacíficas, éstas están conspicuamente ausentes del diseño geopolítico, a excepción de Estados Unidos y Rusia. Las referencias a África son muy escasas; América Central y del Sur están, simplemente, innombradas.

Se trata, en definitiva, de una interesante obra que aborda una importante cuestión de alcance global desde una óptica novedosa, realista y ponderada, sin caer en escenarios catastrofistas, sino abriendo una puerta a un futuro algo esperanzador en el que una China dominante pero cuyo poder, así se argumenta, podría haber ya alcanzado su pico máximo, pueda dar lugar al florecimiento de un espacio compartido en el corazón de un mundo reconectado de una forma que los antiguos navegantes no habían podido ni siquiera imaginar.

The two countries are greatly exposed to solar radiation and they already share electricity interconnectors

Spain was an early developer of solar energy, but it didn’t keep the pace with the required investments. The effort in renewables should mean a clear increase in installed capacity for solar energy. A partnership with Morocco, gifted with even stronger solar resources, could benefit both countries in producing and marketing this particular renewable energy. Spain and Morocco are about to have a third electricity interconnector.

January 7, 2021

ARTICLE / Ane Gil

Spain has a lot of potential in solar energy. Currently, its Germany who produces more photovoltaic electricity than Spain, Portugal or Italy in Europe. In fact, in 2019, Germany produced five times more solar energy than Spain (50 GW of installed capacity versus just 11 GW). This fact has little to do with the raw solar energy that the countries receive, considering that Spain is located in Southern Europe.

For how much solar irradiation Spain receives, the solar energy it produces is scarce. Up until 2013, the installed capacity for solar energy grew rapidly. However, since then, the country has fallen behind many other European countries in the development of capacity. The country initially had a leading role in the development of solar power, with low prices that encouraged a boom in solar power installed capacity. However, because of the 2008 financial crisis, the Spanish government drastically cut its subsidies for solar power and limited any future increases in capacity to 500 MW per year. Between 2012 and 2016, Spain was left waiting while other countries developed. The cost of this was high, seeing as Spain lost much of its world leading status to countries such as Germany, China and Japan.

However, as a legacy from Spain’s earlier development of solar power, in 2018 Spain became the first country in the world using concentrated solar power system (CSP), which accounts for almost a third of solar power installed capacity in the country. Nevertheless, in 2019, Spain installed 4,752 MW of photovoltaic solar energy, which situated Spain as the sixth leading country in the world. As of 2019, Spain has a total installed solar generation capacity of 11,015 MW: 8,711 of photovoltaic energy and 2,304 of solar thermal.

Photovoltaic solar (PV) energy is usually used for smaller-scale electricity projects. The devices generate electricity directly from sunlight via an electronic process that occurs naturally on semiconductors, converting it into usable electricity that can be stored in a solar battery of sent to the electric grid. Solar thermal energy (STE) capture is usually used for electricity production on a massive scale, for its use in the industry.

Low solar energy generated in Spain

By 2020, Spain national system has reached the maximum generation capacity ever recorded: 110,000 MW of wind energy, photovoltaic (PV), hydraulic, conventional thermal power (natural gas, coal, fuel oil), nuclear, etc. This amount of energy contrasts with the increasingly thin demand of power, which in 2019 was 40,000 MW (40 GW). According to the data published by Red Electrica de España, the renewable quota of energy amount to a total of 55,247 MW (55 GW out of 110 GW). This 55 GW is composed of 46% corresponding to wind energy, 16% are photovoltaic and the rest (38%) corresponds to other renewable technologies. During 2019, the national renewable production has been 97,826 GW-hour, which represents 37.5% of the kilowatt-hour that the country demanded last year (the remaining 62.5% has been produced in nuclear power plants or facilities that burn fossil fuels).

So, we can clearly see that the percentage of solar energy is extremely low (3,5% solar photovoltaic and 2% solar thermic of the total kilowatts-hour generated). Nevertheless, Spain has the capability to increase these numbers. According to a report on power potential by country published by the World Bank, Spain has a long-term energy availability of solar resource at any location (average theoretical potential) of 4.575 kilowatts-hour per square metre (kWh/m2). This potential is indicated by the variable of global horizontal irradiation (GHI) on the country, which will vary according to the local factors of the land. Furthermore, the power output achievable by a typical PV system, taking into consideration the theoretical potential and the local factors of the land (average practical potential) is 4.413 kWh, excluding areas due to physical/technical constraints (rugged terrain, urbanized/industrial areas, forests…) PV power output (PVOUT), power generated per unit of the installed PV capacity over the long-term, is an average of 1.93 kilowatt-hours per installed kilowatt-peak of the system capacity (kWh/kWp). It varies according to the season from 1.43 to 2.67 kWh/kWp. Finally, it’s worth mentioning that Spain’s electric consumption (balance of production and external trade) in 2019 was of 238 TWh (= 2,38 x1011 kWh).

Morocco’s solar energy plan

Africa is the continent that receives most solar irradiance, thus being the optimal continent to exploit solar energy. In this regard, Morocco is already aiming to take advantage of this natural resource. At first, this country launched a solar energy plan with investment of USD 9 billion, aiming to generate 2,000 MW (or 2 GW) of solar power by 2020. It has developed mega-scale solar power projects at five locations; at the Sahara (Laayoune), Western Sahara (Boujdour), South of Agadir (Tarfaya), Ain Beni Mathar and Ouarzazate. But Morocco is planning to go further. Morocco announced during COP21 that it planned to increase the renewables capacity to reach 52% of the total by 2030 (20% solar, 20% wind, 12% hydro). To meet the 2030 target, the country aims to add around 10 GW of renewable capacities between 2018 and 2030, consisting of 4,560 MW of solar, 4,200 MW of wind, and 1,330 MW of hydropower capacity. The Moroccan Agency for Renewable Energy revealed that by the end of 2019, Morocco’s renewable energy reached 3,685 megawatts (MW), including 700 MW of solar energy, 1,215 MW of wind power, and 1,770 MW of hydroelectricity.

Now, what would happen if Spain partnered up with Morocco? Morocco is the only African country to have a power cable link to Europe. In fact, it’s through Spain that these two electricity interconnectors arrive to Europe. The first subsea interconnection, with a technical capacity of 700 MW, was commissioned in 1997 and started commercial operation in 1998. The second was commissioned in the summer of 2016. Furthermore, a new interconnection had been commissioned. This should not only reduce the price of electricity in the Spanish market but it should also allow the integration of renewable energy, mainly photovoltaic, into European electricity system.

Moreover, Red Electrica de España (REE) stated that a collaborations agreement between the Spain and Morocco had been formed “to establish a strategic partnership on energy, whose objectives will be focused on the integration of networks and energy markets, the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency.” But the possibilities don’t stop there. If both countries further develop their solar energy capacities, they could jointly provide enough electricity to sustain Europe, through sustainable and renewable resources.

[Barack Obama, Una tierra prometida (Debate: Madrid, 2020), 928 págs.]

RESEÑA / Emili J. Blasco

Las memorias de un presidente son siempre un intento de justificación de su actuación política. Habiendo empleado George W. Bush menos de quinientas páginas en «Decision Points» para intentar explicar las razones de una gestión en principio más controvertida, que Barack Obama utilice casi mil para una primera parte de sus memorias (Una tierra prometida solo cubre basta el tercero de sus ocho años de presidencia) parece un exceso: de hecho, ningún presidente estadounidense ha requerido tanto espacio en ese ejercicio de querer dejar atado su legado.

Es verdad que Obama tiene gusto por la pluma, con algún libro precedente en el que ya demostró buena narrativa, y es posible que esa inclinación literaria le haya vencido. Pero probablemente ha sido más determinante la visión que Obama ha tenido de sí mismo y de su presidencia: la convicción de tener una misión, como primer presidente afroamericano, y su ambición de querer doblar el arco de la historia. Cuando, con el paso del tiempo, Obama comienza a ser ya uno más en la lista de presidentes, su libro revindica el carácter histórico de su persona y sus realizaciones.

El primer tercio de Una tierra prometida resulta especialmente interesante. Hay un repaso somero de su vida anterior a la entrada en política y luego el detalle de su carrera hasta alcanzar la Casa Blanca. Esta parte tiene la misma carga inspiradora que hizo tan atractivo Los sueños de mi padre, el libro que Obama publicó en 1995 cuando lanzó su campaña al Senado del estado de Illinois (en España apareció en 2008, a raíz de su campaña a la presidencia). Todos podemos sacar lecciones muy útiles para nuestra propia superación personal: la idea de ser dueños de nuestro destino, de cobrar conciencia de nuestra identidad más profunda, y la seguridad que eso nos da para llevar a cabo muchas empresas de gran valor y transcendencia; el poner todo el empeño en una meta y aprovechar oportunidades que quizá no vuelvan a presentarse; en definitiva, el pensar siempre por elevación (cuando Obama vio que su trabajo como senador de Illinois tenía poco impacto, su decisión no fue dejar la política, sino saltar al ámbito nacional: se presentó a senador en Washington y de ahí, solo cuatro años después, llegó a la Casa Blanca). Se trata, además, de unas páginas ricas en enseñanzas sobre comunicación política y campañas electorales.

Pero cuando la narración comienza a abordar el periodo presidencial, que arrancó en enero de 2009, ese tono inspirador decae. Lo que antes era una sucesión de adjetivos generalmente positivos hacia todos, empieza a incluir diatribas contra sus oponentes republicanos. Y aquí está el punto que Obama no logra superar: otorgarse todo el mérito moral y negárselo a quien con sus votos en el Congreso discrepaba de la legislación promovida por el nuevo presidente. Cierto que Obama contó con una oposición muy frontal de los líderes republicanos en el Senado y en la Cámara de Representantes, pero estos también apoyaron algunas de sus iniciativas, como el propio Obama reconoce. Por lo demás, ¿qué fue antes, el huevo o la gallina? Amplios sectores republicanos se echaron enseguida al monte, como pronto evidenció la marea del Tea Party en las elecciones de medio mandato de 2010 (en un movimiento que acabaría desembocando en el respaldo a Trump), pero también es que Obama había llegado con las posiciones más a la izquierda que se recordaban en la política estadounidense. Con su empuje idealista, Obama había dado poco ejemplo de esfuerzo bipartidista en su paso por el Senado de Illinois y de Washington; cuando algunas de sus reformas desde la Casa Blanca se vieron bloqueadas en el Congreso, en lugar de buscar un acomodo –aceptando una política de lo posible– fue a la calle a enfrentar a los ciudadanos con los políticos que se oponían a sus transformaciones, enquistando aún más las trincheras de unos y otros.

El historiador británico Niall Ferguson ha apuntado que el fenómeno Trump no se entendería sin la presidencia previa de Obama, aunque probablemente la agria división política en Estados Unidos sea una cuestión de corriente profunda en la que los líderes juegan un papel menos protagonista de lo que supondríamos. Justamente Obama se vio a si mismo como alguien idóneo, por su mezcla cultural (de raza negra, pero criado por su madre y abuelos blancos), para superar esa grieta que en la sociedad estadounidense iba agrandándose; sin embargo, no pudo tender los puentes ideológicos necesarios. Bill Clinton se enfrentó a un similar bloqueo republicano, en el Congreso liderado por Newt Gingrich, y procedió a transacciones que fueron útiles: restó carga ideológica y trajo una prosperidad económica que relajó la vida pública.

Una tierra prometida incluye muchas reflexiones de Obama. Generalmente aporta los contextos necesarios para entender bien las cuestiones, por ejemplo en la gestación de la crisis financiera de 2008. En política exterior detalla el estado de las relaciones con las principales potencias: la animadversión hacia Putin y la suspicacia hacia China, entre otros asuntos. Hay aspectos con distintas posibles vías de avance en los que Obama no deja margen para una posición alternativa lícita: así, en un tema especialmente emblemático, carga contra Netanyahu sin admitir ningún error propio en su aproximación al problema palestino-israelí. Esto es algo que otras reseñas del libro han señalado: la ausencia de autocrítica (más allá de admitir pecados de omisión al no haber sido todo lo audaz que hubiera deseado), y la falta en admitir que en algún aspecto quizás el oponente podía tener razón.

La narración transcurre con buen ritmo interno, a pesar de las muchas páginas. El tomo termina en 2011, en un momento aleatorio determinado por la extensión que se prevea para una segunda entrega; no obstante, tiene un colofón con suficiente fuerza: la operación contra Osama bin Laden, por primera vez contada en primera persona por quien tenía el máximo nivel de mando. Aunque se desconoce el grado de implicación de otras manos en la redacción de la obra, esta tiene un punto de lirismo que conecta directamente con Los sueños de mi padre y que ayuda a atribuirla, al menos en gran medida, al propio expresidente.

La obra contiene muchos episodios de la vida doméstica de los Obama. Los constantes piropos de Obama a su mujer, la admiración por su suegra y las continuas referencias a la devoción por sus dos hijas podrían considerarse algo innecesario, sobre todo por lo recurrente, en un libro político. No obstante, otorgan al relato el tono personal que Obama ha querido adoptar, dando además calidez humana a quien con frecuencia se le acusó de tener una imagen pública de persona fría, distante y demasiado reflexiva.

▲ A Challenger 2 tank on Castlemartin Ranges in Pembrokeshire, Wales, fires a ‘Squash-Head’ practice round [UK MoD]

January 7, 2021

COMMENTARY / Jairo Císcar Ruiz

At the end of last summer, two news pieces appeared in the forums and specialized magazines of the military field in the Anglo-Saxon world. The first of them was the forecast of the continuity (and worsening due to the current pandemic) of the spending cuts suffered in the UK Defense budget since 2010. The second, linked to the first, was the growing rumors of a possible withdrawal of the Challenger 2 tanks, which were already reduced to a quarter of their original strength. At a time of great economic instability, it seemed that the UK's strategic vision had decided to focus on its main assets to maintain its deterrent power and its projection of force: the very expensive nuclear arsenal and the maintenance and expansion of new naval groups in order to host the F-35B.

However, both pieces of news have been quickly overtaken by the announcement of the Boris Johnson executive to inject about 22 billion dollars over 4 years to take British power back to the levels of 30 years ago. Also, the decommissioning of battle tanks was dismissed by ministerial sources, who argued that it was simply a possibility raised in the "Integrated Review" that is being carried out by the British Ministry of Defense.

Although the waters have calmed down, the debate that has arisen as a result of these controversies seems extremely interesting, as well as the role that armored units will have on the battlefield of the future. This article aims to make a brief reflection, identifying possible scenarios and their implications.

The first of them It is a reality: the United Kingdom must improve its armored forces, which run the risk of becoming obsolete, not only in the face of threats (Russia has had since 2015 the T-14 Armata, a 5th generation tank; and recently the modernized version of the mythical T-90, Proryv-3), but also in front of their allies, such as France or Germany, which are already starting the project to replace their respective armor with the future European Main Battle Tank. It is not only a matter of improving their operational capabilities, but also of evolving their survival on the battlefield.

At a time when military technology is advancing by leaps and bounds (hypersonic projectiles; battlefield dominated by technology; extensive use of drones ...), it is necessary to rethink the traditional way of waging war. In the last Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, images and evidence of the effectiveness of the use of Israeli “suicide” drones could be seen against groups of infantry, but also against armored vehicles and tanks. Despite Foreign Policy accusing poor training and the complex terrain as the main factors for these casualties, the question is still up in the air: does the "classic" tank as we know it still have a place on the battlefield?

Experience tells us yes[1].  The tank is vital in large military operations, although, as noted above, new threats must be countered with new defenses. To this day, the tank remains the best vehicle to provide direct fire quickly and efficiently, against other armor, infantry, and reinforced enemy positions. By itself it is an exceptional striking force, although it must always act in accordance with the rest of the deployed troops, especially with Intelligence, Logistics units and the Infantry. It should not be forgotten that in a battlefield characterized by hybrid warfare, it is necessary to consider the increasingly changing environment of threats.

Sensors and detection systems on the battlefield are persistently more innovative and revolutionary, capable of detecting armored vehicles, even if they are camouflaged; when integrated with lethal precision firing systems, they make concealing and wearing heavy armor a challenge. There are technical responses to these threats, from countering electronic direction finding through spoofing and interference, to mounting active protection systems on vehicle hulls.

Despite the above, obviously, the battle tank continues to be a great investment in terms of money that must be made, questionable in front of the taxpayer in an environment of economic crisis, although at the strategic level it may not be.

There are also those who broke a spear in favor of withdrawing the tanks from their inventories, and it seems that today they regret having made this decision. The United Kingdom has the example of the army of the Netherlands, which in 2011 withdrew and sold to Finland 100 of its 120 Leopard 2A6s as a means of saving money and changing military doctrine. However, with Russia's entry into Ukraine and its increasing threats to NATO's eastern flank, they soon began to miss the armored forces' unique capabilities: penetrating power, high mobility that enables turning movements to engulf the enemy, maneuverability, speed, protection, and firepower. In the end, in 2015, they handed over their last 20 tanks (crews and mechanics included) to the German army, which since then has a contingent of a hundred Dutch, forming the Panzerbataillon 414. Knowing how important the concept of “lessons learned” is in military planning, perhaps the UK should pay attention to this case and consider its needs and the capabilities required to meet them.

A roadmap to the middle position would be to move towards an “army of specialization”, abandoning its armored units and specializing in other areas such as cyber or aviation; but this would only be possible within the framework of a defense organization more integrated than NATO. Although it is only a distant possibility, the hypothetical and much mentioned European Army -of which the United Kingdom would most likely be excluded after the Brexit- could lead to the creation of national armed forces that would be specialized in a specific weapon, relying on other countries to fulfill other tasks. However, this possibility belongs right now to the pure terrain of reverie and futurology, since it would require greater integration at all levels in Europe to be able to consider this possibility.

In the end we find the main problem when organizing and maintaining an army, which is none other than money. On many occasions this aspect, which is undoubtedly vital, completely overshadows any other consideration. And in the case of a nation’s armed forces, this is very dangerous. It would be counterproductive to ignore the tactical and strategic aspects to favor just the purely pecuniary ones. The reality is that Western armed forces, whether from the United Kingdom or any other NATO country, face not only IEDs and insurgent infantry in the mountainous regions of the Middle East, but also may have to confront peer rivals equipped with huge armored forces. Russia itself has about 2,000 battle tanks (that is, not counting other armored vehicles, whether they are capable of shooting rounds or not). China increases that figure up to 6,900 (more than half are completely out of date, although they are embarking on a total remodeling of the Chinese People's Army in all its forces). NATO does not forget the challenges, hence the mission "Enhanced Forward Presence" in Poland and the Baltic Republics, in which Spain contributes a Tactical Group that includes 6 Leopardo 2A6 Main Battle Tanks, 14 Pizarro Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and other armored infantry transports.

Certainly, war is changing. We can't even imagine how technology will change the battlefield in the next decade. Sometimes, though, it is better not to get ahead of time. Taking all aspects into account, perhaps the best decision the UK Ministry of Defense could make would be to modernize its tank battalions to adapt them to the current environment, and thus maintain a balanced military with full operational capabilities. It is plausible to predict that the tank still has a journey in its great and long history on the battlefield, from the Somme, to the war of the future. Time (and money) will tell what ends up happening.

[1] Doubts have existed since the very "birth" of the battle tank during the First World War. In each great war scene of the twentieth century that has contributed significant technological innovations (World War I; Spanish Civil War; World War II; Cold War; Gulf ...) it seemed that the tank was going to disappear under new weapons and technologies (first reliability problems, then anti-tank weapons and mines, aviation, RPG's and IED's…) However, armies have learned how to evolve battle tanks in line with the times. Even more valuable, today's tanks are the product of more than 100 years of battles, with many lessons learned and incorporated into its development, not only on a purely material level, but also in tactics and training.

December 22, 2020

ESSAY / Álvaro de Lecea Larrañaga

From the moment colonial empires left the African continent and the new republics celebrated their first democratic elections, the issue of election violence has been present in the majority of the countries. It is a problem that has not changed and that keeps disturbing national and international supporters of a peaceful democratization of the African continent. It is not the first time in history we know about election violence in democratic states, such as France during the nineteenth century; nevertheless, the African dynamics are quite peculiar.

Violence, in general terms, has become a political instrument in the African democratic dynamics (Laakso, 2007). Depending on the actor making use of it, the motivation behind it is different. It is also important to take into account the historical, political, socio-cultural and economic context of each country to understand the purposes of the usage of this controversial mechanism. The spur is not the same for the ruling party or the opposition party, or other groups like the youth. Hence the use of violence has a lot of influence in the outcomes of an election process as it is an effective means that shapes the democratic dynamics when it comes to the election of the representatives at all stages of the electoral processes. For example, the ruling parties use it to avoid being removed from their powerful positions and all the benefits that come from them (Mehler, 2007).

This issue of power, with a high level of influence of money, is probably the most common motivation for every actor involved in these dynamics (Muna & Otieno, 2020, pp. 92-111). Not only the ruling powers but the ones trying to substitute them or the ones trying to impose a new order are, in some way, motivated by the powerful positions they could attain. The violence therefore permeates all party structures and is also noticeable within the parties.

The issue of intra-party violence has not received a lot of attention due to more frequency of state inspired violence against the opposition. Yet it is becoming more prevalent especially in political parties that hold power. This is because the belief is usually entrenched that if one represents the ruling party the chances of getting elected get higher. It should also be noted that the risk of intra-party violence increases as inter-party competition decreases, making intra-party violence more common in districts where a single party dominates (Bech Seeberg, Skaaning, & Wahman, 2017).

The timing of the violence is very relevant to understand the problem of election violence. The different three kinds of election violence (pre-election violence, post-election violence and violence during the Election Day) carry different connotations with them (Daxecker, 2013). They are the result of the general context of the country and represent the behaviour of their citizens towards the democratic principles of the nation. This can also be a response to the electoral campaigns of both the ruling and opposition parties, which sometimes involve violent means too.

Pre-election violence is normally recorded within parties as they carry out their primaries to select representatives and during the campaign process in a bid to hinder opponents from getting access to the people. Violence on Election Day is usually designed to disrupt areas where some candidates suspect they will lose or feel the election process has not been fair. While post-election violence is mainly an expression of dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election.

The role of media and international observers are also key for drafting the big picture of the problems involving election violence. These to some extent can escalate the conflict or reduce it. The power of information is huge and these agents are the most reliable sources to the local and international communities. If an international observer, such as a Committee from the United Nations, declares an election fraud, post-election violence is a very possible outcome (Daxecker, 2012). However, the media, and more concretely a trustworthy local media agent, has the power to calm the masses and bring peace.

Finally, the electoral system chosen by each country will also have a direct effect on the violence because of the interests behind the election. The plurality voting is the most used system among African states. These kinds of systems are also known as winner-takes-all, because the winner gets all the power. Even if it is not necessarily a negative system, as successful countries such as France or Brazil also use them, the difference of power between a common citizen and a politician is so big in Africa that the interest of getting those posts is higher (Reynolds, 2009). This will cause that any means justified to get there, including the use of violence.

To further analyze the motivations behind election violence in Africa and the effects it has on the region, and to try to offer a functional solution for this issue the article explores two case studies: Kenya 2007 and Burundi 2010.

African election violence case studies

Kenya 2007

The presidential and parliamentary elections held in Kenya in 2007 are a great example of election violence where external factors had influences on the outcomes. However, these external factors were not the only ones causing the violence. Internal issues such as the historical culture of the country, the electoral system or the will of power were also influential in this case. To understand the big picture, it is always important to analyze every relevant aspect.

Since the first multi-party democratic elections in Kenya, held in 1992, post-election violence has been very present. During the almost thirty years of dictatorship in Kenya after their independence from the British Crown, repression was promoted throughout the whole territory. Abuses of human rights, nepotism, widespread corruption and patronage were very common (Onyebadi & Oyedeji, 2011), therefore Kenyans are used to protest, violently if needed, against political fraud and suppression of their democratic rights.

Mwai Kibaki’s victory in the 2007 elections brought a whole wave of violent protests because of the fraudulent accusations the elections received (Odhiambo Owuor, 2013). Not only the opposition leader Raila Odinga denounced the election as massively rigged, but also the international community did so. As they condemned the election as fraudulent, the United Nations intervened and helped reach a deal between both party leaders. In this case, the violence produced arrived after the elections (post-election violence) and was motivated by the fraudulent accusations made by international and national observers.

The solution reached was to recognize Kibaki as president and to create a new position of Executive Prime Minister for Odinga. Furthermore, they stipulated that cabinet positions were to be shared by the disputants and their political parties. This characteristic outcome was accepted with more enthusiasm by the Kenyan people because it divided the power in more than one person and, therefore, the abuse of it as it had happened before was not so probable. The electoral system, which is explained later on, has helped these abuses to be produced, so this different outcome meant a significant change in the Kenyan policy-making.

In the case of Kenya, media is very relevant, as the two most successful newspapers, the “Daily Nation” and “The Standard”, with a combined strength of 75% market share, do not receive funding from the government. Without falling into sensationalism, these newspapers were able to become agents of peace and reconciliation. As violence raged in the post-election period, the newspapers adopted a thematic approach to reaching a peaceful outcome (Onyebadi & Oyedeji, 2011).

This conflict, apart from the effects it had on the electoral outcome, influenced the economic situation of the country. The annual percentage growth of GDP fell from 6.8% in 2007 to 0.2% in 2008, the annual percentage of GDP per capita growth was negative (-2.5%) and the growth on the percentage of employment regarding total labour force began increasing again in 2008, going from 2.5% that year to 2.7% in 2009 (World Bank, 2020). However, this data is biased because of the economic recession several countries, including Kenya, suffered due to the 2008 financial crisis.

Finally, Kenya’s first-past-the-post single member constituency electoral system gives the electoral winner plenty of power. Moreover, the economic inequality, the domination of the powerful elites of the country who are very influential in the political system and the fact that Kenyan political parties are not usually founded on ideology but serve the ideas of the funders, produce a form of democracy that represents the few rather than the majority. Therefore, it is very complicated to terminate the desire for political power from the Kenyan mindset.

Burundi 2010

Burundi’s history has been marked by the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry. Since it got independence in 1962, the ethnic cleavages between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi have been remarkable. The 2010 elections are not quite different from the rest, as the outcomes resulted in boycotts and violence. Burundi is a country that has used violence as a tool of solving conflicts several times and has a violent historic precedent regarding “democratic” elections (Mehler, 2007). Several prime ministers and presidents from the different ethnic groups have been assassinated throughout Burundi’s democratic history, which has led to a series of coups and ethnic clashes.

During the 2010 elections, the United Nations also sent a mission to observe the democratic process followed. They affirmed that the winning party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD–FDD), were able to campaign throughout the country, whereas the opposition parties had much less visibility (Palmans, n.d.).

The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), which is supposed to organize, conduct and supervise the elections independently from any party were not as transparent as they were meant to and didn’t respect the rights of the political parties, which caused the boycott led by the opposition (Niang, n.d.). In Burundi too, elections have mainly been a struggle for power as a means of gaining access to economic resources through control of the state. So, the tensions have always been great during elections. Thus, violence tends to be used by nearly every actor involved.

The peculiarity within this case is that the violence didn’t only take place after knowing the results of the elections, but also before the Election Day. Pre-election violence came as a consequence of systematic disagreement between CNDD-FDD and opposition parties. Although several institutions were created to ensure the legality and transparency of the election, such as the CENI, the CNDD-FDD tried to arrange the legal and institutional context to force the process into its advantage and ensure its victory against the opposition.

The pre-election violence transformed into post-election violence leading to the main opposition leader, Agathon Rwasa, having to flee the country. Even though the violence was not as widespread as in Kenya, the situation remained tense in the country. The results didn’t change, and the political rivalries were further entrenched. In this case, the use of violence and coupled with display of power won the elections which created more fear and despair within the population.

Conclusion

Election violence is very common in several countries over the world, with an emphasis on Africa. There, it has become some kind of political instrument which, despite being anti-democratic by nature, is part of the policymaking, campaigning and electoral process. It is different depending on the timing it appears and plenty of factors influence its appearance and control. Within the most remarkable we can find the role of international and national observers, the role of the media, both national and international, and the will of power, usually linked to the economic benefits the winner receives. Furthermore, depending on who the actor is making use of it, the factors behind it can change drastically.

After having analyzed the two case studies, Kenya 2008 and Burundi 2010, and having interpreted the impact these issues have had in their internal socio-economic parameters, it is also obvious that these anti-democratic practices do have some impact in every aspect of the society involved in it. Its most remarkable influence can be seen on the election outcome. In both cases, violence was key for establishing the results. In the case of Kenya, it was the motor that boosted a change in the policymaking, and in the case of Burundi, it helped the winning party keep the power.

The three main factors that influence this kind of policymaking and that should be reviewed and, if necessary, modified to end the violence are the electoral system most African countries follow, the ethnic nature of violence and the common African mindset regarding power. The majority of the electoral systems followed in Africa are winner-takes-all systems that makes it hard for the loser to give up power and lose the benefits it brings. Also, as the case of Burundi has shown, ethnic rivalries are a very common reason motivating the violent outcomes of elections, even if the state follows a democratic regime. This, together with the great will of power present on the African societies, demonstrated by the intra- and inter-party violence, provokes the unsustainable situation present nowadays.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bank, W. (2020). World Bank Database. Retrieved from https://datos.bancomundial.org/

Bech Seeberg, M., Skaaning, S.-E., & Wahman, M. (2017). Candidate nomination, Intra-party Democracy, and Election Violence in Africa. ResearchGate.

Daxecker, U. E. (2012). The cost of exposing cheating: International election monitoring, fraud, and post-election violence in Africa. Journal of Peace Research.

Daxecker, U. E. (2013). All quiet on Election Day? International election observation and incentives for pre-election violence in African elections. Electoral Studies, 1-12.

Laakso, L. (2007). Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa. En M. Basedau, G. Erdmann, & A. Mehler, Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (págs. 224-252). South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Mehler, A. (2007). Political Parties and Violence in Africa: Systematic Reflections against Empirical Background. In M. Basedau, G. Erdmann, & A. Mehler, Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 194-223). South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Muna, W., & Otieno, M. (2020). The ‘Money Talks Factor’ in Kenya’s Public Policy and Electoral Democracy.

Niang, M. A. (n.d.). Case study: Burundi. EISA.

Odhiambo Owuor, F. (2013). The 2007 General Elections in Kenya: Electoral Laws and Process. EISA, 113-123.

Onyebadi, U., & Oyedeji, T. (2011). Newspaper coverage of post-political election violence in Africa: an assessment of the Kenyan example. Media, War & Conflict, 215-230.

Palmans, E. (n.d.). Burundi's 2010 Elections: Democracy and Peace at Risk? European Centre for Electoral Support.

Reynolds, A. (2009). Elections, Electoral Systems, and Conflict in Africa. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 75-83.

The wave of diplomatic recognition of Israel by some Arab countries constitutes a shift in regional alliances

▲ Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates [Pixabay]

ANALYSIS / Ann M. Callahan

With the signing of the Abraham Accords, seven decades of enmity between the states were concluded. With a pronounced shift in regional alliances and a convergence of interests crossing traditional alignments, the agreements can be seen as a product of these regional changes, commencing a new era of Arab-Israeli relations and cooperation. While the historic peace accords seem to present a net positive for the region, it would be a mistake to not take into consideration the losing party in the deal; the Palestinians. It would also be a error to dismiss the passion with which many people still view the Palestinian issue and the apparent disconnect between the Arab ruling class and populace.

On the 15th of September, 2020, a joint peace deal was signed between the State of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and the United States, known also as the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement. The Accords concern a treaty of peace, and a full normalization of the diplomatic relations between the United Emirates and the State of Israel. The United Arab Emirates stands as the first Persian Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel, and the third Arab state, after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. The deal was signed in Washington on September 15 by the UAE’s Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu. It was accepted by the Israeli cabinet on the 12th of October and was ratified by the Knesset (Israel’s unicameral parliament) on the 15th of October. The parliament and cabinet of the United Arab Emirates ratified the agreement on the 19th of October. On the same day, Bahrain confirmed its pact with Israel through the Accords, officially called the Abraham Accords: Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations. Signed by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the President of the United States Donald Trump as a witness, the ratification indicates an agreement between the signatories to commence an era of alliance and cooperation towards a more stable, prosperous and secure region. The proclamation acknowledges each state's sovereignty and agrees towards a reciprocal opening of embassies and as well as stating intent to seek out consensus regarding further relations including investment, security, tourism and direct flights, technology, healthcare and environmental concerns.

The United States played a significant role in the accords, brokering the newly signed agreements. President of the United States, Donald Trump, pushed for the agreements, encouraging the relations and negotiations and promoting the accords, and hosting the signing at the White House.

As none of the countries involved in the Abraham Accords had ever fought against each other, these new peace deals are not of the same weight or nature as Egypt’s peace deal with Israel in 1979. Nevertheless, the accords are much more than a formalizing of what already existed. Now, whether or not the governments collaborated in secret concerning security and intelligence previously, they will now cooperate publicly through the aforementioned areas.  For Israel, Bahrain and the UAE, the agreements pave a path for the increase of trade, investment, tourism and technological collaboration. In addition to these gains, a strategic alliance against Iran is a key motivator as the two states and the U.S. regard Iran as the chief threat to the region’s stability.

Rationale

What was the rationale for this diplomatic breakthrough and what prompted it to take place this year? It could be considered to be a product of the confluence of several pivotal impetuses.

The accords are seen as a product of a long-term trajectory and a regional reality where over the course of the last decade Arab states, particularly around the Gulf, have begun to shift their priorities. The UAE, Bahrain and Israel had found themselves on the same side of more than one major fissure in the Middle East. These states have also sided with Israel regarding Iran. Saudi Arabia, too, sees Shiite Iran as a major threat, and while, as of now, it has not formalized relations with Israel, it does have ties with the Hebrew state. This opposition to Tehran is shifting alliances in the region and bringing about a strategic realignment of Middle Eastern powers.

Furthermore, opposition to the Sunni Islamic extremist groups presents a major threat to all parties involved. The newly aligned states all object to Turkey’s destabilizing support of the Muslim Brotherhood and its proxies in the regional conflicts in Gaza, Libya and Syria. Indeed, the signatories’ combined fear of transnational jihadi movements, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS derivatives, has aligned their interests closer to each other.

In addition, there has been a growing frustration and fatigue with the Palestinian Cause, one which could seem interminable. A certain amount of patience has been lost and Arab nations that had previously held to the Palestinian cause have begun to follow their own national interests.  Looking back to late 2017, when the Trump administration officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, had it been a decade earlier there would have been widespread protests and resulting backlash from the regional leaders in response, however it was not the case. Indeed, there was minimal criticism. This may indicate that, at least for the regional leaders, that adherence to the Palestinian cause is lessening in general.

The prospects of closer relations with the economically vibrant state of Israel, and by extension with that of the United States is increasingly attractive to many Arab states. Indeed, expectations of an arms sale of U.S. weapon systems to the UAE, while not written specifically into the accords, is expected to come to pass through a side agreement currently under review by Congress.

From the perspective of Israel, the country has gone through a long political crisis with, in just one year alone, three national elections. In the context of these domestic efforts, prime minister Netanyahu raised propositions of annexing more sections of the contended West Bank. Consequently, the UAE campaigned against it and Washington called for Israel to choose between prospects of annexation or normalization. The normalization was concluded in return for suspending the annexation plans. There is debate regarding whether or not the suspending of the plans are something temporary or a permanent cessation of the annexation. There is a discrepancy between the English and Arabic versions of the joint treaty. The English version declared that the accord “led to the suspension of Israel’s plans to extend its sovereignty.” This differs slightly, however significantly, from the Arabic copy in which “[the agreement] has led to Israel’s plans to annex Palestinian lands being stopped.” This inconsistency did not go unnoticed to the party most affected; the Palestinians. There is a significant disparity between a temporary suspension as opposed to a complete stopping of annexation plans.

For Netanyahu, being a leading figure in a historic peace deal bringing Israel even more out of its isolation without significant concessions would certainly boost his political standing in Israel. After all, since Israel's creation, what it has been longing for is recognition, particularly from its Arab neighbors.

Somewhat similarly to Netanyahu, the Trump Administration had only to gain through the concluding of the Accords. The significant accomplishment of a historic peace deal in the Middle East was certainly a benefit especially leading up to the presidential elections, the which took place earlier this November. On analyzing the Administration’s approach towards the Middle East, its strategy clearly encouraged the regional realignment and the cultivation of the Gulf states’ and Israel’s common interests, culminating in the joint accords.

Implications

As a whole, the Abraham Accords seem to have broken the traditional alignment of Arab States in the Middle East. The fact that normalization with Israel has been achieved without a solution to the Palestinian issue is indicative of the shift in trends among Arab nations which were previously staunchly adherent to the Palestinian cause. Already, even Sudan, a state with a violent past with Israel, has officially expressed its consent to work towards such an agreement. Potentially, other Arab states are thought to possibly follow suit in future normalization with Israel.

Unlike Bahrain and the UAE, Sudan has sent troops to fight against Israel in the Arab-Israeli wars. However, following the UAE and Bahrain accords, a Sudan-Israel normalization agreement transpired on October 23rd, 2020. While it is not clear if the agreement solidifies full diplomatic relations, it promotes the normalization of relations between the two countries. Following the announcement of their agreement, the designated foreign minister, Omar Qamar al-Din, clarified that the agreement with Israel was not actually a normalization, rather an agreement to work towards normalization in the future. It is only a preliminary agreement as it requires the approval of an elected parliament before going into force. Regardless, the agreement is a significant step for Sudan as it had previously considered Israel an enemy of the state.

While clandestine relations between Israel and the Gulf states were existent for years, the founding of open relations is a monumental shift. For Israel, putting aside its annexation plans was insignificant in comparison with the many advantages of the Abraham Accords. Contrary to what many expected, no vast concessions were to be made in return for the recognition of sovereignty and establishment of diplomatic ties for which Israel yearns for. In addition, Israel is projected to benefit economically from its new forged relations with the Gulf states between the increased tourism, direct flights, technology and information exchange, commercial relations and investment. Already, following the Accord’s commitment, the US, Israel and the UAE have already established the Abraham Fund. Through the program more than $3 billion dollars will be mobilized in the private sector-led development strategies and investment ventures to promote economic cooperation and profitability in the Middle East region through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Israel and the UAE.

The benefits of the accords extend to a variety of areas in the Arab world including, most significantly, possible access to U.S. defense systems. The prospect of the UAE receiving America’s prestigious F-35 systems is in fact underway. President Trump, at least, is willing to make the sale. However, it has to pass through Congress which has been consistently dedicated to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region. According to the Senate leader Mitch McConnell (Rep, KY), “We in congress have an obligation to review any U.S. arm sale package linked to the deal [...] As we help our Arab partners defend against growing threats, we must continue ensuring that Israel’s qualitative military edge remains unchallenged.” Should the sale be concluded, it will stand as the second largest sale of U.S. arms to one particular nation, and the first transfer of lethal unmanned aerial systems to any Arab ally. The UAE would be the first Arab country to possess the Lockheed Martin 5th generation stealth jet, the most advanced on the market currently.

There is debate within Israel regarding possible UAE acquisition of the F-35 systems. Prime Minister Netanyahu did the whole deal without including the defense minister and the foreign minister, both political rivals of Netanyahu in the Israeli system. As can be expected, the Israeli defense minister does have a problem regarding the F-35 systems. However, in general, the Accords are extremely popular in Israel.

Due to Bahrain’s relative dependence on Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s close ties, it is very likely that it sought out Saudi Arabia’s approval before confirming its participation in the Accords. The fact that Saudi Arabia gave permission to Bahrain could be seen as indicative, to a certain extent, of their stance on Arab-Israeli relations. However, the Saudi state has many internal pressures preventing it, at least for the time being, from establishing relations.

For over 250 years, the ruling Saudi family has had a particular relationship with the clerical establishment of the Kingdom. Many, if not the majority of the clerics would be critical of what they would consider an abandonment of Palestine. Although Mohammed bin Salman seems more open to ties with Israel, his influential father, Salman bin Abdulaziz sides with the clerics surrounding the matter.

Differing from the United Arab Emirates, for example, Saudi Arabia gathers a notable amount of its legitimacy through its protection of Muslims and promotion of Islam across the world. Since before the establishment of the state of Israel, the Palestinian cause has played a crucial role in Saudi Arabia’s regional activities. While it has not prevented Saudi Arabia from engaging in undisclosed relations with Israel, its stance towards Palestine inhibits a broader engagement without a peace deal for Palestine. This issue connected to a critical strain across the region: that between the rulers and the ruled. One manifestation of this discrepancy between classes is that there seems to be a perception among the people of the region that Israel, as opposed to Iran, is the greater threat to regional security. Saudi Arabia has a much larger population than the UAE or Bahrain and with the extensive popular support of the Palestinian cause, the establishment of relations with Israel could elicit considerable unrest.

While Saudi Arabia has engaged in clandestine ties with Israel and been increasingly obliging towards the state (for instance, opening its air space for Israeli direct flights to the UAE and beyond), it seems unlikely that Saudi Arabia will establish open ties with Israel, at least for the near future.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has only heightened prevailing social, political and economic tensions all throughout the Middle East. Taking this into account, in fear of provoking unrest, it can be expected that many rulers will be hesitant, or at least cautious, about initiating ties with the state of Israel. 

That being said, in today’s hard-pressed Middle East, Arab states, while still backing the Palestinian cause, are more and more disposed to work towards various relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia is arguably the most economically and politically influential Arab state in the region. Therefore, if Saudi Arabia were to open relations with Israel, it could invoke the establishment of ties with Israel for other Arab states, possibly invalidating the longstanding idea that such relations could come about solely though the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Regarding Iran, it cannot but understand the significance and gravity of the Accords and recent regional developments. Just several nautical miles across the Gulf to Iran, Israel has new allies. The economic and strategic advantage that the Accords promote between the countries is undeniable. If Iran felt isolated before, this new development will only emphasize it even more.

In the words of Mike Pompeo, the current U.S. Secretary of State, alongside Bahrain’s foreign minister, Abdullatif Al-Zayani, and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the accords “tell malign actors like the Islamic Republic of Iran that their influence in the region is waning and that they are ever more isolated and shall forever be until they change their direction.”

Apart from Iran, in the Middle East Turkey and Qatar have been openly vocal in their opposition to Israel and the recent Accords. Qatar maintains relations with two of Israel’s most critical threats, both Iran and Hamas, the Palestinian militant group. Qatar is a staunch advocate of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. One of Qatar’s most steady allies in the region is Turkey. Israel, as well as the UAE, have significant issues with Ankara. Turkey’s expansion and building of military bases in Libya, Sudan and Somalia demonstrate the regional threat that it poses for Israel and the UAE. For Israel in particular, besides Turkey’s open support of Hamas, there have been clashes concerning Ankara’s interference with Mediterranean maritime economic sovereignty.

With increasing intensity, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has made clear Turkey’s revisionist actions. They harshly criticized UAE’s normalization with Israel and even said that they would consider revising Ankara’s relations with Abu Dhabi. This, however, is somewhat incongruous as Turkey has maintained formal diplomatic relations with Israel since right after its birth in 1949. Turkey’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region, including in Qatar, is also a source of contention between Erdogan and the UAE and Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia. Turkey is Qatar’s largest beneficiary politically, as well as militarily.

In the context of the Abraham Accords, the Palestinians would be the losers undoubtedly. While they had a weak negotiating hand to begin with, with the decreasing Arab solidarity they depend on, they now stand even feebler. The increasing number of Arab countries normalizing relations with Israel has been vehemently condemned by the Palestinians, seeing it as a betrayal of their cause. They feel thoroughly abandoned. It leaves the Palestinians with very limited options making them severely more debilitated. It is uncertain, however, whether this weaker position will steer Palestinians towards peacemaking with Israel or the contrary. 

While the regional governments seem more willing to negotiate with Israel, it would be a severe mistake to disregard the fervor with which countless people still view the Palestinian conflict. For many in the Middle East, it is not so much a political stance as a moral obligation. We shall see how this plays out concerning the disparity between the ruling class and the populace of Arab or Muslim majority nations. Iran will likely continue to advance its reputation throughout the region as the only state to openly challenge and oppose Israel. It should amass some amount of popular support, increasing yet even more the rift between the populace and the ruling class in the Middle East.

Future prospects

The agreement recently reached between President Trump’s Administration and the kingdom of Morocco by which the U.S. governments recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara in exchange for the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the kingdom and the state of Israel is but another step in the process Trump would have no doubt continued had he been elected for a second term. Despite this unexpected move, and although the Trump Administration has indicated that other countries are considering establishing relations with Israel soon, further developments seem unlikely before the new U.S. Administration is projected to take office this January of 2021. President-elect Joe Biden will take office on the 20th of January and is expected to instigate his policy and approach towards Iran. This could set the tone for future normalization agreements throughout the region, depending on how Iran is approached by the incoming administration.

In the United States, the signatories of the Abraham Accords have, in a time of intensely polarized politics, enhanced their relations with both Republicans as well as Democrats though the deal. In the future we can expect some countries to join the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan in normalization efforts. However, many will stay back. Saudi Arabia remains central in the region regarding future normalization with Israel. As is the case across the region, while the Arab leaders are increasingly open to ties with Israel, there are internal concerns, between the clerical establishment and the Palestinian cause among the populace – not to mention rising tensions due to the ongoing pandemic. 

However, in all, the Accords break the strongly rooted idea that it would take extensive efforts in order for Arab states to associate with Israel, let alone establish full public normalization. It also refutes the traditional Arab-state consensus that there can be no peace with Israel until the Palestinian issue is en route to resolution, if not fully resolved.

Behind the tension between Qatar and its neighbors is the Qatari ambitious foreign policy and its refusal to obey

Recent diplomatic contacts between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have suggested the possibility of a breakthrough in the bitter dispute held by Qatar and its Arab neighbors in the Gulf since 2017. An agreement could be within reach in order to suspend the blockade imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain (and Egypt), and clarify the relations the Qataris have with Iran. The resolution would help Qatar hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup free of tensions. This article gives a brief context to understand why things are the way they are.

▲ Ahmad Bin Ali Stadium, one of the premises for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar

ARTICLE / Isabelle León

The diplomatic crisis in Qatar is mainly a political conflict that has shown how far a country can go to retain leadership in the regional balance of power, as well as how a country can find alternatives to grow regardless of the blockade of neighbors and former trading partners. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain broke diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a blockade on land, sea, and air.

When we refer to the Gulf, we are talking about six Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. As neighbors, these countries founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to strengthen their relation economically and politically since all have many similarities in terms of geographical features and resources like oil and gas, culture, and religion. In this alliance, Saudi Arabia always saw itself as the leader since it is the largest and most oil-rich Gulf country, and possesses Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holy sites. In this sense, dominance became almost unchallenged until 1995, when Qatar started pursuing a more independent foreign policy.

Tensions grew among neighbors as Iran and Qatar gradually started deepening their trading relations. Moreover, Qatar started supporting Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered by the UAE and Saudi Arabia as terrorist organizations. Indeed, Qatar acknowledges the support and assistance provided to these groups but denies helping terrorist cells linked to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State or Hamas. Additionally, with the launch of the tv network Al Jazeera, Qatar gave these groups a means to broadcast their voices. Gradually the environment became tense as Saudi Arabia, leader of Sunni Islam, saw the Shia political groups as a threat to its leadership in the region.

Consequently, the Gulf countries, except for Oman and Kuwait, decided to implement a blockade on Qatar. As political conditioning, the countries imposed specific demands that Qatar had to meet to re-establish diplomatic relations. Among them there were the detachment of the diplomatic ties with Iran, the end of support for Islamist political groups, and the cessation of Al Jazeera's operations. Qatar refused to give in and affirmed that the demands were, in some way or another, a violation of the country's sovereignty.

A country that proves resilient

The resounding blockade merited the suspension of economic activities between Qatar and these countries. Most shocking was, however, the expulsion of the Qatari citizens who resided in the other GCC states. A year later, Qatar filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice on grounds of discrimination. The court ordered that the families that had been separated due to the expulsion of their relatives should be reunited; similarly, Qatari students who were studying in these countries should be permitted to continue their studies without any inconvenience. The UAE issued an injunction accusing Qatar of halting the website where citizens could apply for UAE visas as Qatar responded that it was a matter of national security. Between accusations and statements, tensions continued to rise and no real improvement was achieved.

At the beginning of the restrictions, Qatar was economically affected because 40% of the food supply came to the country through Saudi Arabia. The reduction in the oil prices was another factor that participated on the economic disadvantage that situation posed. Indeed, the market value of Qatar decreased by 10% in the first four weeks of the crisis. However, the country began to implement measures and shored up its banks, intensified trade with Turkey and Iran, and increased its domestic production. Furthermore, the costs of the materials necessary to build the new stadiums and infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup increased; however, Qatar started shipping materials through Oman to avoid restrictions of UAE and successfully coped with the status quo.

This notwithstanding, in 2019, the situation caused almost the rupture of the GCC, an alliance that ultimately has helped the Gulf countries strengthen economic ties with European Countries and China. The gradual collapse of this organization has caused even more division between the blocking countries and Qatar, a country that hosts the largest military US base in the Middle East, as well as one of Turkey, which gives it an upper hand in the region and many potential strategic alliances.

The new normal or the beginning of the end?

Currently, the situation is slowly opening-up. Although not much progress has been made through traditional or legal diplomatic means to resolve this conflict, sports diplomacy has played a role. The countries have not yet begun to commercialize or have allowed the mobility of citizens, however, the event of November 2019 is an indicator that perhaps it is time to relax the measures. In that month, Qatar was the host of the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup tournament in which the Gulf countries participated with their national soccer teams. Due to the blockade, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain had boycotted the championship; however, after having received another invitation from the Arabian Gulf Cup Federation, the countries decided to participate and after three years of tensions, sent their teams to compete. The sporting event was emblematic and demonstrated how sport may overcome differences.

Moreover, recently Saudi Arabia has given declarations that the country is willing to engage in the process to lift-up the restrictions. This attitude toward the conflict means, in a way, improvement despite Riyadh still claims the need to address the security concerns that Qatar generates and calls for a commitment to the solution. As negotiations continue, there is a lot of skepticism between the parties that keep hindering the path toward the resolution.  

Donald Trump’s administration recently reiterated its cooperation and involvement in the process to end Qatar's diplomatic crisis. Indeed, US National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien stated that the US hopes in the next two months there would be an air bridge that will allow the commercial mobilization of citizens. The current scenario might be optimistic, but still, everything has remained in statements as no real actions have been taken. This participation is within the US strategic interest because the end of this rift can signify a victorious situation to the US aggressive foreign policy toward Iran and its desire to isolate the country. This situation remains a priority in Trump’s last days in office. Notwithstanding, as the transition for the administration of Joe Biden begins, it is believed that he would take a more critical approach on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, pressuring them to put an end to the restrictions.

This conflict has turned into a political crisis of retention of power or influence over the region. It is all about Saudi Arabia’s dominance being threatened by a tiny yet very powerful state, Qatar. Although more approaches to lift-up the rift will likely begin to take place and restrictions will gradually relax, this dynamic has been perceived by the international community and the Gulf countries themselves as the new normal. However, if the crisis is ultimately resolved, mistrust and rivalry will remain and will generate complications in a region that is already prone to insurgencies and instability. All the countries involved indeed have more to lose than to gain, but three years have been enough to show that there are ways to turn situations like these around.

La venta de GNL de EEUU a sus vecinos y la exportación desde países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe a Europa y Asia abre nuevas perspectivas

No depender de gaseoductos, sino poder comprar o vender gas natural también a países distantes o sin conexiones terrestres, mejora las perspectivas energéticas de muchas naciones. El éxito del frácking ha generado un excedente de gas que EEUU ha comenzado a vender en muchas partes del mundo, también a sus vecinos hemisféricos, que por su parte cuentan con más posibilidad de elegir proveedor. A su vez, el poder entregar gas en tanqueros ha ampliado la cartera de clientes de Perú y sobre todo de Trinidad y Tobago, que hasta el año pasado eran los dos únicos países americanos, aparte de EEUU, con plantas de licuación. A ellos se añadió Argentina en 2019 y México ha impulsado en 2020 inversiones para sumarse a esta revolución.

▲ Un carguero de gas natural licuado (GNL; en inglés: LNG) [Pline]

ARTÍCULO / Ann Callahan

Estados Unidos está conectado por gaseoducto únicamente con Canadá y México, pero está vendiendo gas por barco a una treintena más de países (España, por ejemplo, se ha convertido en un importante comprador). En 2019, EEUU exportó 47.500 millones de metros cúbicos de gas natural licuado (GNL), de los cuales la quinta parte fueron para vecinos americanos, de acuerdo con el informe BP 2020 sobre el sector.

Ocho países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe cuentan ya con plantas de regasificación del gas llegado en carguero en estado líquido: existen tres plantas en México y en Brasil; dos en Argentina, Chile, Jamaica y Puerto Rico, y una en Colombia, República Dominicana y Panamá, según el resumen anual la asociación de países importadores de GNL. A esos países el GNL llega, además desde EEUU, también desde Noruega, Rusia, Angola, Nigeria o Indonesia. Por su parte, dos países exportan GNL a diversas partes del mundo: Trinidad y Tobago, que cuenta con tres plantas de licuación, y Perú, que tiene una (otra entró operativa en Argentina en el último año).

En un intento por mitigar el riesgo de escasez de electricidad debido a un descenso de producción hidroeléctrica por sequía o a otras dificultades de acceso a fuentes energéticas, muchos países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe están recurriendo al GNL. Siendo además una energía más limpia, supone también un atractivo para países que ya están luchando contra el cambio climático. Asimismo, el gas ayuda a superar la discontinuidad de fuentes alternativas, como la eólica o la solar.

En el caso de pequeños países insulares, como los caribeños, que en su mayor parte carecen de fuentes de energía, los programas de cooperación para el desarrollo de terminales de GNL pueden aportarles una cierta independencia respecto a determinados suministros petroleros, como la influencia que sobre ellos ejerció la Venezuela chavista a través de Petrocaribe.

El GNL es un gas natural que ha sido licuado (enfriado a unos -162° C) para su almacenamiento y transporte. El volumen del gas natural en estado líquido se reduce aproximadamente 600 veces en comparación con su estado gaseoso. El proceso hace posible y eficiente su transporte a lugares a los que no llegan los gaseoductos. También es mucho más respetuoso con el medio ambiente, ya que la intensidad de carbono del gas natural es alrededor de un 30% menos que la del diésel u otros combustibles pesados.

El mercado mundial del gas natural ha evolucionado rápidamente en los últimos años. Se espera que las capacidades mundiales de GNL continúen creciendo hasta 2035, encabezadas por Catar, Australia y EEUU. Según el informe de BP sobre el sector, en 2019 la proporción de gas en la energía primaria alcanzó un máximo histórico del 24,2%. Gran parte del crecimiento de la producción de gas en 2019, año en que aumentó en un 3,4%, se debió a las exportaciones adicionales de GNL. Así, el año pasado las exportaciones de GNL crecieron en un 12,7%, hasta alcanzar los 485.100 millones de metros cúbicos.

Plantas de licuación y regasificación en América [Informe GIIGNL]

Auge

Mientras que al comienzo de la primera década de este siglo Estados Unidos se quedó atrás en la producción gasística, el auge del esquisto desde 2009 ha llevado a EEUU a aumentar de forma exponencial la extracción de gas y a desempeñar un papel fundamental en el comercio mundial del producto licuado. Con el transporte relativamente fácil del GNL, EEUU ha podido exportarlo y enviarlo muchos lugares del mundo, siendo América Latina, por su proximidad, una de las regiones que más están notando ese cambio. De los 47.500 millones de metros cúbicos de GNL exportados por EEUU en 2019, 9.700 millones fueron para Latinoamérica; los principales destinos fueron México (3.900 millones), Chile (2.300), Brasil (1.500) y Argentina (1.000).

Si bien la región tiene un potencial de exportación prometedor, dadas sus reservas probadas de gas natural, su demanda supera la producción y debe importar. Venezuela es el país con mayores reservas en Latinoamérica (aunque su potencia gasística es menor que la petrolera), pero su sector de hidrocarburos está en declive y la mayor producción en 2019 correspondió a Argentina, un país emergente en esquisto, seguido de Trinidad y Tobago. Brasil igualó la producción de Venezuela, y luego siguieron Bolivia, Perú y Colombia. En total, la región produjo 207.600 millones de metros cúbicos, mientras que su consumo fue de 256.100 millones.

Algunos países reciben gas por gaseoducto, como es el caso de México y de Argentina y Brasil: el primero recibe gas de EEUU y los segundos de Bolivia. Pero la opción en auge es instalar plantas de regasificación para recibir gas licuado; esos proyectos requieren cierta inversión, normalmente extranjera. El mayor exportador de GNL a la región en 2019 fue EEUU, seguido de Trinidad y Togado, que por su bajo consumo doméstico prácticamente exporta toda su producción: de sus 17.000 millones de metros cúbicos de GNL, 6.100 fueron para países latinoamericanos. El tercer país exportador es Perú, que destinó sus 5.200 millones de metros cúbicos a Asia y Europa (no vendió en el propio continente). A las exportaciones en 2019 se sumó por primera vez Argentina, aunque con una baja cantidad, 120 millones de metros cúbicos, casi todos destinados a Brasil.

La región importó en 2019 un total de 19.700 millones de metros cúbicos de GNL. Los principales compradores fueron México (6.600 millones de metros cúbicos), Chile (3.300 millones), Brasil (3.200) y Argentina (1.700).

Algunos de los que importaron cantidades más reducidas luego reexportaron parte de los suministros, como hicieron República Dominicana, Jamaica y Puerto Rico, en general con Panamá como principal destino.

Tablas extraídas del informe Statistical Review of World Energy 2020 [BP]

Por países

México es el mayor importador de GNL de América Latina; sus suministros proceden sobre todo de EEUU. Durante mucho tiempo, México ha dependido de los envíos de gas de su vecino del norte llegados a través de gaseoductos. Sin embargo, el desarrollo del GNL ha abierto nuevas perspectivas, pues la ubicación del país le puede ayudar a impulsar ambas capacidades: la mejora de sus conexiones por gaseoducto con EEUU le puede permitir a México disponer de un surplus de gas en terminales del Pacífico para la reexportación de GNL a Asia, complementando la ausencia por ahora de plantas de licuación en la costa oeste estadounidense.

La posibilidad de reexportar desde la costa pacífica mexicana al gran y creciente mercado del GNL de Asia –sin necesidad, por tanto, de que los tanqueros tengan que atravesar el Canal de Panamá– supone un gran atractivo. El Departamento de Energía de EEUU concedió a comienzos de 2019 dos autorizaciones al proyecto Energía Costa Azul de México para reexportar gas natural derivado de EEUU en forma de GNL a aquellos países que no tienen un acuerdo de libre comercio (TLC) con Washington, según se recoge en el informe de 2020 del Grupo Internacional de Importadores de Gas Natural Licuado (GIIGNL).

Durante la última década, Argentina ha estado importando GNL de EEUU; sin embargo, en años recientes ha reducido sus compras en más de un 20% al haber aumentado la producción nacional de gas gracias a la explotación de Vaca Muerta. Esos yacimientos han permitido también reducir las compras de gas a la vecina Bolivia y vender más gas, igualmente por gaseoducto, a sus también vecinos Chile y Brasil. Además, en 2019 comenzó exportaciones de GNL desde la planta de Bahía Blanca.

Con el bombeo de gas de Argentina a su vecino Chile, en 2019 las importaciones chilenas de GNL disminuyeron a su grado más bajo en tres años, aunque sigue siendo uno de los compradores importantes de América Latina, que ha cambiado Trinidad y Tobago por EEUU como proveedor preferente. Cabe señalar, sin embargo, que la capacidad de las exportaciones de Argentina depende de los niveles de los flujos internos, especialmente durante las temporadas de invierno, en las que la calefacción generalizada es una necesidad para los argentinos.

En el último decenio, la importación de GNL por parte del Brasil ha variado significativamente de un año a otro. No obstante, se proyecta que será más consistente en la dependencia del GNL por lo menos hasta la próxima década, mientras se desarrollan energía renovables. En Brasil, el gas natural se utiliza en gran medida como refuerzo de la energía hidroeléctrica brasileña.

Además de Brasil, Colombia también considera el GNL como un recurso ventajoso para respaldar su sistema hidroeléctrico en períodos bajos. En su costa pacífica, Colombia está planeando actualmente un segundo terminal de regasificación. Ecopetrol, la empresa estatal de hidrocarburos, destinará 500 millones de dólares a proyectos no convencionales de gas, además de petróleo. Junto con la autorización del gobierno para permitir el frácking, se proyecta que las reservas actualmente estancadas se incrementen.​

Bolivia también posee un importante potencial de producción de gas natural y es el país de la región cuya economía es más dependiente de este sector. Tiene la ventaja de la infraestructura ya existente y el tamaño de los mercados de gas vecinos; no obstante, se enfrenta a la competencia de producción de Argentina y Brasil. Asimismo, al ser un país sin acceso al mar queda limitado en la comercialización de GNL.

Aunque Perú es el séptimo país en producción de gas natural de la región, se ha convertido en el segundo exportador de GNL. El menor consumo interno, comparado con otros mercados vecinos, le ha llevado a desarrollar la exportación de GNL, reforzando su perfil de nación enfocada hacia Asia.

Por su parte, Trinidad y Tobago, ha acomodado su producción gasística a su condición de país insular, por lo que basa su exportación de hidrocarburos mediante tanqueros, lo que le da acceso a mercados distantes. Es el primer exportador de la región y el único que tiene clientes en todos los continent

▲ A B-1B Lancer unleashes cluster munitions [USAF]

December 17, 2020

ESSAY / Ana Salas

The aim of this paper is to study the international contracts on cluster bombs. Before going deeper into this issue, it is important to understand the concept of international contract and cluster bomb. “A contract is a voluntary, deliberate, legally binding, and enforceable agreement creating mutual obligations between two or more parties and a contract is international when it has certain links with more than one State.”[1]

A cluster bomb is a free-fall or directed bomb that can be dropped from land, sea, or air. Cluster bombs contain a device that releases many small bombs when opened. These submunitions can cause different damages, they are used against various targets, including people, armored vehicles, and different types of material. It is an explosive charge designed to burst after that separation, in most cases when impacting the ground. But often large numbers of the submunitions fail to function as designed, and instead land on the ground without exploding, where they remain as very dangerous duds.

The main problem with these types of weapons is that they may cause serious collateral damage such as the death of thousands of civilians. Because of that, the legality of this type of weapon is controversial. Out of concern for the civilians affected by artifacts of this type, the Cluster Bomb Convention was held in Dublin, Ireland in 2008. There, a treaty was signed that prohibited the use of these weapons. Not all countries, though, signed the treaty; major arms producers, such as the United States, Russia and China, are not parties in the convention.

Among other things, the Convention proposed a total ban on cluster munitions, the promotion of the destruction of stocks in a period of 8 years, the cleaning of contaminated areas in 10 years, and assistance to the victims of these weapons.   

Convention on Cluster Munitions: geopolitical background  

The antecedents of this convention are in the recognition of the damage produced by the multiple attacks that have been carried out with cluster munitions. The International Handicap Organization has produced a report that offers concrete and documented data on the victims of cluster bombs around the world. In Laos[2], the attacks were designed to prevent enemy convoys make use of dense vegetation to camouflage among the trees. Furthermore, in this way it was not necessary to use ground troops. In Kosovo (1999), the targets were military posts, road vehicles, troop concentrations, armored units, and telecommunications centers. In Iraq cluster bombs have been used several times. During Operation “Desert Storm” in 1991, US forces dropped almost 50,000 bombs with more than 13 million submunitions on Iraq in air operations alone (not taking into account those dropped from the sea or by artillery). Estimates suggest that a third did not explode, and were found on roads, bridges and other civil infrastructure.

Pressure for an international ban on cluster bombs has recently intensified, following Israel's bombardments with these weapons in southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Also, in Afghanistan, in 2001 and 2002, during the US offensive, more than 1,200 cluster bombs with almost 250,000 submunitions were dropped against Taliban military bases and positions. These targets were near towns and villages, whose civilian population was affected. UN demining teams estimate that around 40,000 munitions did not explode. These have been the main concern of NGOs. On the one hand, because of the large percentage of civilians who have been affected by the cluster bombs and on the other hand, due to the amount of submunitions that did not explode at the time and that are in the affected areas, being an even greater risk for the security of the civilian population or even for their agriculture in those lands.

Due to the great commotion over the death of thousands of civilians and after several attempts, a convention on such munitions was adopted in Dublin, where more than 100 countries had come together for an international agreement. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on May 30, 2008, in Dublin and signed on December 3-4, 2008 in Oslo, Norway. The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on August 1, 2010.

One of the major problems addressed in the Convention was the threat posed by submunitions that do not explode as expected, and which remain in the area as a mortal danger, turning the affected area into a large minefield where the civilian population is the most vulnerable. A study indicates that 20-30% of these bombs do not explode either due to manufacturing defects, or to falls in soft areas or in trees, for example.

Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention are of great importance. Article 3 refers to the stockpile, storage, and destruction of cluster bombs. Here all Parties haves the obligation of making sure to destroy their stored cluster bombs no later than 8 years. Article 4, on the cleaning and destroying of cluster munition remnants and education on risk reduction, is intended to protect possible victims from the danger of bombs that have not exploded. Article 5 reinforces the obligation of the signatory parties to assist the victims of cluster bombs.

After the convention there is a double deal on cluster bombs. Since the destruction of the entire arsenal of these ammunitions and submunitions was approved, the affected companies and the countries involved will have a new challenge in hiring companies that carry out the extinction of these reserves.

Producers

The main manufacturers of cluster bombs are the United States, Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan, and India. Approximately 16 states are the largest producers of this ammunition and submunition worldwide, and none of these countries adhered to the convention on cluster munitions. Some of the countries involved are Greece, South Korea, North Korea, Egypt, Iran, Poland, Turkey, Brazil, Singapore, Romania, and Poland. The date on which the cluster munitions were produced is not clear because of the lack of transparency and the data available.

A total of 85 companies have produced, along history, cluster bombs or their essential parts. Many of these companies are headquartered in the United States or Europe, but others are state-owned industries located in developing countries. Cluster munition production involves the manufacturing and integration of a large number of parts, including metal parts, explosives, fuses, and packaging materials. All components are seldom produced by a single company in the same state. This makes difficult to determine the true extent of the international trade in cluster munitions.

International trade on cluster bomb has slackened. As the cluster munition monitor of 2017 states, the US company Textron Systems Corporation, for example, has slowed production of the CBU-105[3] weapon due to “reduced orders, and claimed that the current political environment has made it difficult to obtain sales approvals from the executive branch.”

Manufactures are also adapting their production to international regulations. Following a study by Pax[4] on “Worlwide Investments in cluster munitions,” Avibras (Brazil), Bharat Dynamics Limited (India), China Aerospace Science and Industry (China) or Hanwha (South Korea) are some of the companies that develop or produce cluster bombs according to the definition given by the Dublin Convention in 2008.

It is important to warn about the existing sensitivity regarding the production of cluster bombs. Undoubtedly, they pose a serious problem from the point of view of civil protection, but many companies engaged in the production and the funders of this kind of weapons have a high interest in keeping them legal.

There are very controversial weapons. Many countries insist on that cluster munitions are legal weapons, that, although not essential, have great military use. Some states believe that submunitions can be accurately targeted to reduce damage to civilians, meaning that military purposes can be isolated in densely populated areas. On the other hand, others believe that the ability of cluster munitions to destroy targets just as effectively throughout the attack area can cause those using them to neglect the target, thus increasing the risk of civilian casualties.

The future of International contracting on cluster bombs

As Jorge Heine defines the "New Diplomacy", it requires the negotiation of a wide range of relationships with the state, NGOs and commercial actors. “As middle powers have demonstrated, through joining forces with NGOs, they have actually succeeded in augmenting their power to project their interests into the international arena.”[5] Cluster munition is an example of this case.

Because of this, parties forming international contracts for the purchase and financing of cluster bombs are forced to change the object of the cluster bomb business. As mentioned earlier, the new business will be the destruction of these weapons, rather than their production. Especially munitions with high submunition failure rates. For this reason, countries such as Argentina, Canada, France, UK, Denmark, Norway, Spain and more have promoted a new business on the destruction of the storage of cluster bombs. As a result, cluster munitions move away from their useful life and have more chances of being destroyed than of being sold for profit.

By financing companies that produce cluster munitions, financial institutions (in many cases states themselves) help these companies to produce the weapon. But to achieve an effective elimination of cluster bombs, more than a convention is needed. The effort requires national legislation that reflects that purpose. Domestic governments must provide clear guidelines by introducing and enforcing legislation that prohibits investment in cluster munitions producers.  

Conclusion

As a military tactic, the use of cluster bombs provides a high percentage of success. A good number of states and armies defend that they are effective weapons, sometimes even decisive ones, depending on the circumstances and the context. It is often argued that using another type of weapon to achieve the same objective would require more firepower and use more explosives, and that this would cause even greater collateral damage. At the same time, and to avoid the low reliability of these weapons, some armies have begun to modernize their arsenals and to replace older weapons with more modern and precise versions that incorporate, for example, guidance or self-destruct systems. Their main objective in developing cluster bombs is to compensate for precision failures with more munitions and, on the other hand, to allow a greater number of targets to be hit in less time.

Advances in technology can certainly reduce some of the humanitarian problems generated by the less advanced types of cluster bombs but a good number of military operations are currently peace operations, where the risk generated by these products also becomes a military concern, not just humanitarian. For example, to address the issue of unexploded ordnance, weapons are being developed that have self-destruction or, at least, self-neutralization mechanisms[6].

There is great uncertainty about how the norms of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are interpreted and whether they are applied rigorously in the case of cluster munitions, given the lack of precision and reliability of these weapons. The Convention on Cluster Munitions gives hope, but we must consider the different current situations and how they can change. We also have to take into account that this agreement leaves open many possibilities of circumventing what has been signed. For example, guided or self-destructive cluster bombs do not fall under the umbrella of this pact.

Despite the provisions of International Humanitarian Law, existing cluster munitions have caused large numbers of civilian casualties in various conflicts. A better implementation of the IHL, including the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, will not be able to fully address the problems caused by these weapons. There is a need for specific rules on these munitions as outlined above.

[1] Renzo Cavalieri and Vincenzo Salvatore, An introduction to international contract law, Torino: Giappichelli, 2018.

[2] During the years 1964 to 1973, Laos was bombed by the United States. The attacks were intended to cut off North Vietnamese supply lines and support Laotian government forces in their fight against communist rebels.

[3] CBU-105 is a free fall cluster bomb unit of the United States Air Force.

[4] Pax is a peace organization with the aim of “bringing peace, reconciliation and justice in the world”.

[5] Matthew Bolton and Thomas Nash, “The Role of Middle Powe-NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban”, Global Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 2010), pp 172-184.

[6] Some essential component for the operation of the bomb is deactivated.