This paper discusses the conception of Justice, both acquired and infused, in Leonardo Polo's thought, in comparison with Aquinas' view. It is widely assumed in Christian Thought that through the will effort, one acquires the virtue of justice, while infused justice comes from God's grace. Acquired justice is a virtue of the will, and God's infused justice is also received in the will. Inspired in Thomist systematization, Polo distinguishes justice's integral elements, its subjective types, and its potential elements. The integral elements are two: to give each one her due when he lacks it, and not to take away one's belongings, its subjective types are the commutative, legal, and distributive justice. Justice potential elements have to do when one cannot pay what one owes, or when one is not obliged to satisfy the other's right. We shall also see how infused justice improves each of these parts of acquired justice. In contrast with Aquinas, from Leonardo Polo's anthropology the virtue of justice is superior to the virtue of prudence.

En este trabajo se defiende, según la filosofía de Leonardo Polo, que, aunque la fidelidad se suele referir al trato con cosas, propiamente se refiere a las personas, y en especial a Dios. Se estudian sus requisitos ¿fortaleza, constancia, libertad y esperanza¿, así como las diversas formas de la fidelidad a la naturaleza humana, a la esencia del hombre y al acto de ser personal, atendiendo por último al don de la perseverancia.

Reseña de JUAN A. GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ (ed.), Sobre la filosofía de Leonardo Polo: familia, educación y economía, Madrid, Ideas y Libros ediciones, 2019, publicada en Studia et Documenta 15 (2021), pp. 489-490. http://www.isje.org/setd/2021/SetD-15-2021-12-Schede.pdf Tít. en inglés (WOS): On the philosophy of Leonardo Polo: family, education and economy

El conocimiento de la libertad comienza por la experiencia del acto libre. Este trabajo explica la experiencia del acto libre como la entiende Polo, y las características del mismo. Explica también la relación entre la teoría kantiana de la libertad trascendental y la teoría de Polo.

This paper analyzes Game Theory (GT) from the point of view of moral psychology and makes explicit some of its assumptions regarding the human person as a moral agent, as well as the ends of human action, and reciprocity. Using a largely philosophical methodology, we will argue that GT assumes an instrumental form of rationality underpinned by a logic of self-interest, hence placing individuals, communities, and their social practices in service of external goods and their maximization. Because of this, GT is not adequate to describe the entirety of human social existence and interaction. Nevertheless, by revealing these assumptions, GT can be amplified with another form of rationality based on realist ethics and a personalist anthropology reinforced by the logic of gift. This rationality values the singularity of each person as a holistic unity, as the center of the social realm and as an end in herself called to growth and flourishing with others, nurturing the human community through giving and receiving. We will thus provide a wider philosophical framework for GT with a series of non-mathematical axioms of what can be called a Game Metatheory (GMt). These axioms refer to society as a complex system, not to particular interactions. GMt axioms are not a model of social games, but rather an axiomatic description of social life as a game, revealing its systematic character, complexity, and possible deterioration.

Reseña de Graciela Soriano, Mª Idoya Zorroza, Genara Castillo y Juan Fernando Sellés, (Eds.), "Filósofo, maestro, amigo. 234 Testimonios sobre Leonardo Polo", Pamplona : EUNSA, 2018, 644 p., ISBN: 9788431332624

There is no dispute in neuroscience that structure and function are related, but it is difficult to identify how exactly this relationship occurs. The phrenological view advocates for the idea that each area of the brain corresponds to a particular function. This view then evolved into a modular view, meaning that each brain network corresponds to a singular function. But these views have serious limitations and a more systemic one is in order. It is thought that brain function is related to dynamic and temporary neural assemblies. What seems obvious is that the relationship between structure and function is not straightforward. In this article, we will see how the non-function of brain areas and the non-univocal relationship between structure and function can serve as an opportunity to offer a new concept, i.e., "functionalization", which the philosopher Leonardo Polo proposed. Polo understood functionalization as a part of function. We believe that the presence of this "intermediate element" can help to provide new insights into the relationship between structure and function.