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Primer encuentro de alto nivel EEUU-China de la era Biden, celebrado en Alaska el 18 de marzo de 2021 [Dpto. de Estado]

 

ENSAYO /  Ramón Barba

El presidente Joe Biden está construyendo con cautela su política para el Indo-Pacífico, buscando construir una alianza con India sobre la que construir un orden que contrarreste el auge chino. Tras su entrada en la Casa Blanca, Biden ha mantenido el foco de atención en esta región, aunque con un enfoque diferente al de la Administración Trump. Si bien es cierto que el objetivo principal sigue siendo contener a China y defender el libre comercio, Washington está optando por un acercamiento multilateral que otorga mayor protagonismo al QUAD[1] y cuida especialmente la relación con India. Como abanderada del mundo libre y de la democracia, la Administración Biden pretende renovar el liderazgo estadounidense en el mundo y particularmente en esta decisiva región. No obstante, aunque la relación con India se encuentra en un buen momento, especialmente teniendo en cuenta la firma del acuerdo BECA[2] alcanzado al final de la Administración Trump, la interacción entre ambos países está lejos de consolidar una alianza.

La nueva presidencia de Estados Unidos se encuentra con un puzle muy complicado de resolver en Indo-Pacífico, cuyos principales actores son China y la India. Por lo general, nos encontramos con que, de las tres potencias, solo Pekín ha sabido gestionar con éxito la situación post-pandemia[3], mientras que Delhi y Washington siguen enfrentando una crisis tanto sanitaria como económica. Todo ello puede afectar a la relación entre India y Estados Unidos, en especial en lo comercial[4], no obstante, y a pesar de que Biden aún no ha demostrado cuál va a ser su estrategia en la región, todo parece que la relación entre ambas potencias va a ir a más[5]. Sin embargo, a pesar de que Estados Unidos quiere llevar a cabo una política de alianzas multilateral y profundizar en su relación con la India, la Administración Biden deberá tener en cuenta diversas dificultades antes de poder hablar de una alianza como tal.

Biden comenzó a actuar en esta dirección desde el primer momento. En primer lugar estuvo en febrero la reunión del QUAD[6], que algunos consideran una mini OTAN[7] para Asia, en la que se discutieron cuestiones relativas a la distribución de la vacuna en Asia (pretendiendo distribuir un billón de dosis en 2022), la libertad de navegación en los mares de la región, la desnuclearización de Corea del Norte y la democracia en Myanmar. Además, el Reino Unido parece estar mostrando un interés mayor en la región y en este grupo de diálogo. Por otro lado, a mediados de marzo hubo una reunión en Alaska[8] entre las diplomacias de China y de Estados Unidos (encabezadas, respectivamente, por Yang Jiechi, director de la Comisión Central de Asuntos Exteriores, y Antony Blinken, secretario de Estado), en la cual ambos países se reprocharon duramente sus políticas. Washington se mantiene firme en sus intereses, aunque abierto a cierta colaboración con Pekín, mientras que China insiste en rechazar cualquier injerencia en lo que considera sus asuntos internos. Por último, cabe mencionar que Biden parece estar dispuesto a organizar una cumbre de democracias[9] en su primer año de mandato.

Tras los contactos que también hubo en Alaska entre los titulares de Defensa de China y de Estados Unidos, Austin Lloyd[10], jefe del Pentágono, visitó la India para remarcar la importancia de la cooperación indo-estadounidense. Además, a comienzos de abril se produjo la participación de Francia en las maniobras navales La Pérouse[11] en la Bahía de Bengala, dando lugar a la posibilidad de un QUAD-plus en el que, además de las cuatro potencias originales, se integren también otros países.

El Indo-Pacífico recordemos, se asienta como el presente y el futuro de las relaciones internacionales debido a su importancia económica (sus principales actores, India, China y EEUU representan el 45% del PIB mundial), demográfica (albergando un 65% de la población de todo el Globo) y, como veremos a lo largo del presente artículo, geopolítica[12].

Las relaciones entre EEUU, China e India

La Administración Biden parece ser continuista con la línea seguida por Trump, puesto que los objetivos no han variado. Lo que sí que cambia es el acercamiento hacia el objeto de la cuestión, que en este caso no es otro que la contención de China y la libertad de navegación en la región, ahora bien, en base a una gran apuesta por el multilateralismo. Como bien dijo el nuevo sucesor de George Washington en su toma de posesión[13], Estados Unidos quiere retomar su liderazgo, pero de una manera diferente a la de la Administración anterior; esto es, mediante una fuerte política de alianzas, un liderazgo moral y una fuerte defensa de valores como la dignidad, los derechos humanos y el Estado de Derecho.

La nueva presidencia concibe a China como un rival para tener en cuenta[14], al igual que la Administración Trump, pero no ve esto como un juego de suma cero, puesto que, aunque declara abiertamente estar en contra de la actuación de Xi, abre la puerta al diálogo[15] en materias como el cambio climático o la sanidad. Por lo general, en línea con lo visto en Nuevas tensiones en Asia Pacífico[16], Estados Unidos apuesta por un multilateralismo que busca rebajar la tensión. Recordemos que Estados Unidos propugna la defensa de la libre navegación y el Estado de Derecho, así como de la democracia en una región en la que está viendo mermada su influencia por el creciente peso de China.

Para entender bien el estado de las relaciones entre Estados Unidos, China e India cabe que remontarse a 2005[17], cuando todo parecía ir bien. En lo relativo a la relación sino-india, ambas naciones habían resuelto sus disputas motivo de los ensayos nucleares de 1998; además, su presencia en foros regionales era creciente y parecía que la cuestión relativa a las disputas transfronterizas comenzaba a arreglarse. Por su parte, Estados Unidos gozaba de buenas relaciones comerciales con ambos países. Sin embargo, el cambio de patrones en la economía mundial, motivado por el auge de China; la crisis financiera de 2008, surgida en Estados Unidos, y la inhabilidad de India para mantener la tasa de crecimiento rompieron este equilibrio. A ello contribuyó la actitud tirante de Donald Trump. No obstante, hay quien argumenta que la rotura del orden posterior a la Guerra Fría en Asia Pacífico comenzó con el “pivote hacia Asia”[18] de la Administración Obama. A ello hay que añadir los pequeños roces que China ha tenido con ambas naciones.

Brevemente, cabe mencionar que entre India y China existen problemas fronterizos[19] que a partir de 2013 se han ido reavivando. A su vez, India es contraria a la hegemonía china; no quiere verse subyugada por Pekín y apuesta claramente por el multilateralismo. Finalmente, existen problemas en lo relativo al dominio marítimo debido a que el Estrecho de Malaca está al límite de su capacidad. Además, Delhi reclama como suyas las islas Adaman y Nicobar, en la ruta de acceso a Malaca. Es más, como India ahora se encuentra muy por debajo del poder militar y económico de China[20] –roto el equilibrio que había entre las dos potencias en 1980–, intenta poner trabas a Pekín para así contenerle.

Estados Unidos mantiene roces de tipo ideológico con China, debido al carácter autoritario del régimen de Xi Jinping[21], y comercial, en una pugna[22] que Pekín pretende aprovechar para aminorar la influencia estadounidense en la zona. En medio de este conflicto está India, que apoya a Estados Unidos puesto que, aunque no parece querer estar del todo en contra de China[23], rechaza una hegemonía regional china[24].

Según el último informe del CEBR[25], China superará a Estados Unidos como potencia mundial en 2028, antes de lo previsto en proyecciones anteriores, en parte gracias a cómo ha gestionado la emergencia del coronavirus: ha sido el único gran país que tras la primera oleada ha evitado una crisis. Por otro lado, Estados Unidos ha perdido la batalla contra la pandemia; se espera que se crecimiento económico entre 2022-2024 sea del 1.9% del PIB y se reduzca al 1.6% en los siguientes ejercicios[26], mientras que China, según el informe estará entre 2021-2025 creciendo al 5.7%[27].

Para China la pandemia ha sido una forma de indicar su lugar en el mundo[28], una manera de avisar a Estados Unidos de que está lista para tomar el testigo como líder de la comunidad internacional. A ello cabe aunarle la actitud beligerante de China en la región de Asia Pacífico, así como su crecimiento hegemónico en la zona y proyectos comerciales con África y Europa. Todo ello ha llevado a desequilibrios en la región que implican los movimientos de Washington en lo relativo al QUAD. Recordemos que, a pesar de su rol menguante como potencia, a Estados Unidos le interesa la libertad de navegación por razones tanto comerciales como militares[29].

Así pues, el auge económico chino ha dado lugar a un empeoramiento de la relación entre Washington y Pekín[30]. Además, aunque Biden apuesta por la cooperación en lo relativo a la pandemia y al cambio climático, desde algunos sectores de la política americana se habla de una competición inevitable entre ambos países[31].

El grado de alianza entre EEUU e India

En línea con lo expuesto anteriormente podemos observar que nos movemos en tesituras delicadas, tras el cambio en la Casa Blanca. Enero y febrero han sido meses de pequeños movimientos por parte de Estados Unidos e India, que no han dejado indiferente a China. Aunque la relación chino-estadounidense ha beneficiado a ambas partes desde su inicio (1979)[32], creciendo el comercio entre ambos países en un 252% desde entonces, la realidad es que ahora los niveles de confianza están por los suelos, habiendo suspendido más de 100 mecanismos de diálogo entre ellos. Por lo tanto, aunque no se prevé un conflicto, sí que se pronostica un aumento de la tensión ya que, lejos de poder cooperar en amplios campos, por el momento solo parecen viables cooperaciones leves y limitadas. A su vez, recordemos que China se ve muy afectada por el Dilema de Malaca[33], por lo que busca otros accesos al Océano Índico, dando lugar a disputas territoriales con la India, con quien ya tiene el problema territorial de Ladakh[34]. En medio de esta Trampa de Tucídides[35], en la que China parece amenazar con superar a Estados Unidos, Washington se ha ido acercando a Nueva Delhi.

Por consiguiente, ambos países han ido desarrollando una colaboración estratégica[36], basada esencialmente en seguridad y defensa, pero que Estados Unidos busca ampliar a otras áreas. Bien es cierto que los problemas de Delhi están en el Índico y los de Washington en el Pacífico; sin embargo, ambos tienen a China[37] como denominador común. Su relación, además, se ve muy marcada por la ya expuesta “crisis tripartita”[38] (sanitaria, económica y geopolítica).

A pesar de la intensa cooperación entre Washington y Nueva Delhi, encontramos dos puntos de vista diferentes en lo relativo a este “partnership”. Mientras que desde Estados Unidos se afirma que India es un aliado muy importante, con el que comparte mismo sistema político y una intensa relación comercial[39], India prefiere una alianza menos estricta. Tradicionalmente, desde Delhi se ha transmitido una política de no alineamiento[40] en materias internacionales. De hecho, aunque India no quiere una supremacía China en el Indo-Pacífico, tampoco desea alinearse directamente contra Pekín, con quien comparte más de 3.000 km de frontera. No obstante, desde Delhi se ve muy necesaria la cooperación con Washington en materia de seguridad y defensa. De hecho, hay quien afirma que hoy la India necesita a EEUU más que nunca.

Si bien el pasado febrero, desde Washington se comenzó a revisar la Estrategia de Posición Global de Estados Unidos, todo apunta a que la Administración Biden continuará la línea de Trump en lo relativo a la colaboración con India como forma de contener a China. Sin embargo, aunque Washington habla de India como su aliado, por parte de Delhi hay ciertas reticencias, hablando pues de un alineamiento[41] más que de una alianza. Aunque la realidad que vivimos dista de la de la Guerra Fría[42], este nuevo containment[43] en el que se busca a Delhi como base, apoyo y estandarte, se ve materializado en lo siguiente:

i) Una intensa cooperación en materia de Seguridad y Defensa

Aquí existen distintos foros y acuerdos. En primer lugar, el ya mencionado QUAD[44]. Esta nueva alianza de cooperación multilateral que comenzó a gestarse en 2006[45] acordó en su reunión de marzo el desarrollo de su diplomacia de vacunas, con India como eje para así contrarrestar la exitosa campaña internacional llevada por Pekín en este campo. De hecho, hubo el compromiso de emplear 600 millones para repartir 1.000 millones de vacunas[46] en 2022. La idea es que Japón y EEUU financien la operación[47], mientras que Australia se encarga de la logística. No obstante, India apuesta por un mayor multilateralismo en el Indo-Pacífico, dando entrada a países como Inglaterra o Francia[48], que ya participaron en los últimos Diálogos de Raisina junto con el QUAD. A lo largo de la reunión también se trataron otros temas como la desnuclearización de Corea, la restauración democrática de Myanmar y el cambio climático[49].

India busca contener a China, pero sin provocar un enfrentamiento directo con China[50]. De hecho, Pekín ha dado a entender que de ir las cosas más allá, no solo India sabe jugar a la Realpolitk. Recordemos que Nueva Delhi va a presidir este año la reunión con los BRICS. Además, la Shanghai Cooperation Organization va a acoger ejercicios militares conjuntos de China y Pakistán, país de compleja relación con India.

Por otro lado, en su viaje de marzo a India, el jefe del Pentágono[51] trató con su homólogo Rajnath Singh sobre el incremento de la cooperación militar, así como de asuntos relacionados con la logística, el intercambio de información, posibles oportunidades de asistencia mutua y la defensa de la libre navegación. Lloyd afirmó no ver con malos ojos que Australia y Corea participen como miembros permanentes en los ejercicios Malabar. Desde 2008 el comercio en materia militar entre Delhi y Washington suma 21 billones de dólares[52]. Además, recientemente, se han gastado 3000 de dólares en drones y otro material aéreo para misiones de reconocimiento y vigilancia.

Una semana después esta reunión, dos barcos indios y uno estadounidense realizaron un ejercicio marítimo de tipo PASSEX[53] como forma de consolidar las sinergias e interoperabilidad alcanzadas en el ejercicio de Malabar del pasado noviembre.

En este contexto, cabe hacer una mención especial a la plataforma de diálogo 2+2 y al ya mencionado BECA (Acuerdo Básico de Intercambio y Cooperación para la cooperación en materia geoespacial). El primero, es un tipo de reunión en la que los titulares de Exteriores y Defensa de ambos países se reúnen cada dos años para tratar de temas que les sean de interés. La reunión más reciente tuvo lugar en octubre de 2020[54]. En ella no solo se acordó el BECA, sino que Estados Unidos se reafirmó en su apoyo a India en lo relativo a sus problemas territoriales con China. A su vez, también se firmaron otros memorándums de entendimiento sobre cuestiones de energía nuclear y climáticas.

El BECA, firmado en octubre de 2020 durante los últimos meses de la Administración Trump, facilita a India localizar mejor a enemigos, terroristas y otro tipo de amenazas que vengan desde tierra o desde mar. Con este acuerdo se pretende consolidar la amistad que hay entre ambos países, así como ayudar a India a superar tecnológicamente a China. En virtud de este acuerdo se concluye la “troika de pactos fundacionales” para una profunda cooperación en seguridad y defensa entre ambos países[55].

Antes de este acuerdo, en 2016 se firmó el LEMOA (Memorando de Acuerdo para el Intercambio de Logística), y en 2018 el COMCASA (Acuerdo de Compatibilidad y Seguridad de las Comunicaciones). El primero permite a ambos países acceso a las bases de cada uno para abastecimiento y reposición; el segundo permite a India recibir sistemas, información y comunicación encriptada para comunicarse con Estados Unidos. Ambos acuerdos afectan a los ejércitos de tierra, mar y aire[56].

ii) Unidos por la democracia

Desde Washington se pone especial énfasis en que ambas potencias son muy semejantes, puesto que comparten el mismo sistema político, y se destaca con cierta grandilocuencia que conforman la democracia más antigua y la más grande (por número de habitantes)[57]. Debido a que eso presupone compartir una serie de valores, Washington gusta hablar de “likeminded partners”[58].

Desde el think tank Brookings Institution, Tanvi Mandan defiende esta idea de ligazón ideológica. El mismo sistema de gobierno hace que ambos países se vean como aliados naturales, que piensan igual y que además creen en el valor del imperio de la ley. De hecho, en todo lo relativo a la extensión de la democracia por el globo, hay una fuerte cooperación entre ambas naciones: por ejemplo, apoyando la democracia en Afganistán o en Maldivas, lanzando la US-India Global Democracy Iniciative y dotando de asistencia legal y técnica en cuestiones democráticas a otros países. Finalmente cabe resaltar que la democracia y los valores que acarrea han facilitado el intercambio y flujo de personas de un país a otro. En cuanto a la relación económica entre ambos países se vuelve más viable, puesto que los dos son economías abiertas, comparten una lengua y su sistema jurídico tiene raigambre anglosajona.

iii) Creciente cooperación económica

Estados Unidos es el principal socio comercial de India, con quien tiene un importante superávit[59]. Los intercambios entre ambos han crecido un 10% anual a lo largo de la última década, y en 2019 fueron de 115.000 millones de dólares[60]. Alrededor de 2.000 empresas estadounidenses están instaladas en India, y unas 200 empresas indias se hallan en EEUU[61]. Entre ambos existe un Mini-Trade Deal, que se cree que será firmado en breve, y que tiene por objeto ahondar en esta relación económica. Con motivo de la pandemia, todo lo relativo al ámbito sanitario tiene un papel importante[62]. De hecho, a pesar de que ambos países han adoptado recientemente una actitud proteccionista, la idea es alcanzar 500.000 millones de dólares en comercio[63].

Divergencias, retos y oportunidades para India y EEUU en la región

Brevemente, entre los líderes de ambos países hay pequeños roces, oportunidades y retos a matizar para hacer de esta relación una fuerte alianza. Dentro de los puntos de conflicto, destacamos la compra desde India de misiles S-400 a Rusia, lo cual va en contra del CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries trhough Sanctions Act[64], por lo que puede que India reciba una sanción, aunque en la reunión entre Sigh y Lloyd, este pareció pasar el tema por alto[65]. Sin embargo, cabe ver qué pasa una vez lleguen los misiles a Delhi. También existen pequeñas divergencias en lo relativo a libertad de expresión, seguridad y derechos civiles, y cómo relacionarse con países no democráticos[66]. Dentro de los retos que ambos países deben tener en cuenta, está la posible pérdida de apoyo en algunos sectores de la política estadounidense a la relación con India. Ello se debe a las actuaciones de India en Cachemira en agosto de 2019, la protección de la libertad religiosa y el trato a la disidencia. Por otro lado, en el caso contrario no ha faltado el debilitamiento de las normas democráticas, restricciones a la inmigración y violencia contra naturales de India[67].

En último lugar, recordemos que ambos se enfrentan a una profunda crisis sanitaria y por consiguiente económica, cuya resolución será determinante en relación con la competición con Pekín[68]. La crisis ha afectado a la relación bilateral puesto que, aunque el comercio en servicios se ha mantenido estable (alrededor de los 50.000 millones), el comercio de bienes decayó de 92.000 a 78.000 millones entre 2019 y 2020, aumentando el déficit comercial indio[69].

Para finalizar, cabe mencionar las oportunidades. En primer lugar, ambos países pueden desarrollar resiliencia democrática en el Indo-Pacífico así como en un orden internacional basado en normas[70]. En seguridad y defensa, también hay oportunidades como la entrada de Reino Unido y Francia como aliados en la zona, por ejemplo intentando que ambos países entren en el ejercicio de Malabar o que Francia presida el Indian Ocean Naval Simposium de 2022[71].  Aunque la tendencia a medio plazo es de cooperación entre Estados Unidos e India, la competencia con Rusia será una amenaza creciente[72], por lo que la cooperación entre Estados Unidos, India y Europa es muy importante.

También se abre la posibilidad de cooperación en mecanismos de MDA (Alerta del Entorno Marítimo) y ASW (Guerra Anti Submarina), en tanto que el Océano Índico reviste una importancia general para varios países debido al valor de sus rutas de transporte energético. Se abre la posibilidad de la cooperación mediante el uso de la Aeronave US P-8 “Poseidón”. A pesar de las disputas sobre el archipiélago de Chagos, India y Estados Unidos deberían aprovechar los acuerdos que tienen sobre islas como Andamán o Diego García para la realización de estas actividades[73]. Por lo tanto, India debería usar los organismos y grupos de trabajo regionales para cooperar con los países europeos y Estados Unidos[74].

Europa parece adquirir una creciente importancia debido a la posibilidad de entrar en el juego del Indo-Pacífico mediante el QUAD Plus. Los países europeos están muy a favor del multilateralismo, de la defensa de la libertad de navegación y del papel de las normas para regularla. Si bien es cierto que la UE ha firmado recientemente un tratado de comercio con China recientemente -el CAI-, incrementar la presencia europea en la región adquiere mayor importancia, puesto que el autoritarismo de Xi y sus actuaciones en Tíbet, Xinjiang, o el centro de China no son plato de buen gusto para los países europeos[75].

En último lugar, cabe recordar que hay algunas voces que hablan de un decaimiento o debilitamiento de la globalización[76], en especial tras la epidemia del coronavirus[77], por lo cual reavivar los intercambios multilaterales mediante la acción conjunta se convierte en un reto y en una oportunidad para ambos países. De hecho, se cree que a corto plazo las tendencias proteccionistas, al menos en el ámbito de la relación sino-india van a continuar, a pesar de la intensa cooperación económica[78].

Conclusión

El panorama geopolítico del Indo-Pacifico es cuanto menos complejo. El expansionismo chino choca con los intereses de la otra gran potencia regional, India, que si bien evita enfrentarse a Pekín ve con malos ojos la actuación de su vecino. En una apuesta por el multilateralismo, y con la mirada puesta en sus aguas regionales, amenazadas por el Dilema de Malaca, la India parece cooperar con Estados Unidos, pero aferrándose a los foros y grupos regionales para dejar clara su postura, mientras parece abrir la puerta a los países europeos, cuyo interés en la región va en aumento, a pesar del reciente tratado comercial firmado con China.

Por otro lado, también Estados Unidos se ve amenazado por el expansionismo chino y ve acercarse el momento del sorpasso económico de su rival, que la crisis del coronavirus pude haber adelantado incluso a 2028. En aras de evitar tal situación, la Administración Biden apuesta por el multilateralismo a nivel regional y ahonda en su relación con India, más allá de lo militar. Desde Washington parece haberse entendido que la hegemonía estadounidense en el Indo-Pacífico dista de ser real, al menos a medio plazo, por lo que solo cabe una actitud cooperativa e integradora. Por otro lado, en medio de este supuesto repliegue de la globalización, vemos cómo Washington junto con la India, y seguramente a medio plazo con Europa, hacen defensa de los valores occidentales que rigen en la esfera internacional, esto es, defensa de los derechos humanos, del estado de derecho y del valor de la democracia.

Estamos ante dos factores. Por un lado, India no quiere ver cómo se impone un orden de ningún tipo, ni americano ni chino, de ahí sus reticencias a enfrentarse directamente contra Pekín y su preferencia a expandir el QUAD. Por otro lado, Estados Unidos parece percibir encontrarse en un momento delicado, puesto que su competición con China va más allá de la mera sustitución de una potencia por otra. Washington no deja de ser una potencia tradicional que, para su presencia en el Indo-Pacífico, se ha servido sobre todo de poder militar, mientras que China ha basado la extensión de su influencia en el establecimiento de fuertes relaciones comerciales que van más allá de la lógica beligerante de la Guerra Fría. De ahí que Estados Unidos intente formar un frente con India y sus aliados europeos, que además vaya más allá de la cooperación militar.

 

REFERENCIAS 

[1] El QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), es un grupo de diálogo formado por los Estados Unidos, India, Japón y Australia. Sus miembros comparten una visión común sobre la seguridad de la región Indo-Pacífico contraria a la de China; abogan por el multilateralismo y la libertad de navegación en la región.

[2] BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). Tratado firmado por la India y Estados Unidos en octubre de 2019 para mejorar la seguridad en la región del Indo-Pacífico. Su objetivo es el intercambio de sistemas de seguimiento, localización e inteligencia.

[3]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective". Chinawatch. Conecting Thinkers.http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS60349146a310acc46eb43e2d.html, (accedido el 5 de febrero de 2021),

[4] Tanvi Madan,”India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties,” en Tanvi Madan, “India And The Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties”,. German Marshal Found of the United Stateshttps://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/11/india-and-biden-administration-consolidating-and-rebalancing-ties, (accedido el 11 de febrero de 2021).

[5]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, y Nilanthi Samaranayake, "Agenda 2021: A Blueprint For U.S.-Europe-India Cooperation”, US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security. GMF India Trilateral Forum. Pag:1. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/16/us-india-cooperation-indo-pacific-security , (accedido el 16 de febrero de 2021).

[6] “’QUAD’ Leaders Pledge New Cooperation on China, COVID-19, Climate”. Aljazeera.com. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/12/quad-leaders-pledge-new-cooperation-on-china-covid-19-climate (accedido en marzo 2021)

[7] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden Renueva La Alianza De ‘QUAD’ A Pesar De Las Presiones De Pekín". Atalayarhttps://atalayar.com/content/biden-renueva-la-alianza-de-%E2%80%98QUAD%E2%80%99-pesar-de-las-presiones-de-pek%C3%ADn. (accedido en febrero de 2021)

[8] “`Grandstanding`: US, China trade rebukes in testy talks". Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/19/us-china-top-diplomats-trade-rebukes-in-testy-first-talks (accedido, marzo 2021)

[9] Joseph R. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again”. Foreign Affairshttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accedido febrero, 2021).

[10] Maria Siow. "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind". South China Morning Posthttps://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126091/india-receives-us-defence-secretary-lloyd-austin-china-its-mind. (accedido, 19 de marzo de 2021)

[11] Seeram Chaulia, “France and sailing toward the ‘QUAD-plus’”. The New Indian Expresshttps://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/apr/06/france-and-sailing-toward-the-QUAD-plus-2286408.html  (accedido, 4 de abril, 2021)

[12] Juan Luis López Aranguren. “Indo-Pacífico: El nuevo orden sin China en el centro”. El Indo-Pacífico como nuevo eje geopolítico mundial. Global Affairs Journal. Pág.:2. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/indo-pacifico-el-nuevo-orden-sin-china-en-el-centro?_33_redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fglobal-affairs%2Fpublicaciones%2Finformes. (accedido, Abril 2021).

[13] Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World | The White House"..

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/

[14] Íbid.

[15] Derek Grossman, "Biden's China Reset Is Already On The Ropes". Nikkei Asiahttps://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Biden-s-China-reset-is-already-on-the-ropes. (accedido, 14 de marzo de 2021)

[16] Ramón Barba Castro, “Nuevas tensiones en Asia Pacífico en un escenario de cambio electoral”. Global Affairs and Strategic Studieshttps://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/nuevas-tensiones-en-asia-pacifico-en-un-escenario-de-cambio-electoral-en-eeuu. (accedido, abril 2021)

[17] Sankaran Kalyanaraman, "Changing Pattern Of The China-India-US Triangle”. Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyseshttps://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/changing-pattern-china-india-us-triangle-skalyanaram (accedido, marzo 2021)

[18] Pang Zhongying, "Indo-Pacific Era Needs US-China Cooperation, Not Great Power Conflict". South China Morning Posthttps://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3125926/indo-pacific-needs-us-china-cooperation-not-conflict-QUAD (accedido el 19 de marzo de 2021)

[19] Sankaran Kalayanamaran, “Changing Pattern of the China-India-US Triangle”.

[20] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, “Trilateral Perspective”.

[21] Joseph R. Biden, “Remarks By President Biden On America’s Place In The World

[22]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, “Trilateral Perspective”.

[23] Maria Siow, “India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind”.

[24]Tanvi Madan, “India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties”.

[25] CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research), es una entidad dedicada al análisis y predicción económica de empresas y organizaciones. Enlace: https://cebr.com/about-cebr/ . Esta entidad elabora cada año un informe titulado World Economic League Table¸ en el que se analiza el posicionamiento en que tendrá cada país del Globo en lo relativo al estado de su economía. La última edición (World Economic League Table 2021), fue publicada el 26 de diciembre de 2020, este presenta una predicción del estado de la economía mundial en 2035, para así saber quienes serán las principales potencias económicas mundiales. (CEBR, “World Economic League Table 2021”. Centre for Economics and Business Research (12th edition), https://cebr.com/reports/world-economic-league-table-2021/ (accedido marzo 2021).

[26] Íbid., 231.

[27] Íbid., 71.

[28] Vijay Gokhale, “China Doesn’t Want a New World Order. It Wants This One”. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/china-america-united-nations.html. (accedido en abril de 2021)

[29] Mereyem Hafidi, “Biden renueva la Alianza de `QUAD` a pesar de las presiones de Pekín.

[30] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, “Trilateral Perspective”.

[31] Íbid.

[32] Wang Huiyao, “More cooperation, less competition”. Chinawatch. Conecting Thinkershttp://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS6034913ba310acc46eb43e28.html. (accedido, marzo 2021).

[33] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, “Trilateral Perspective”.

[34]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, y Nilanthi Samaranayake, “US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security”. Page 5.

[35] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, “Trilateral Perspective”.

[36] Ibid.

[37]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, y Nilanthi Samaranayake, “US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security”. Page 5.

[38] Tanvi Madan, “India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties”

[39] Tanvi Madan, “Democracy and the US-India relationship”. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-and-the-us-india-relationship/ . (accedido, marzo 2021)

[40] Maria Siow, “India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind”.

[41] Bilal Kuchay, “India, US sign key military deal, symbolizing closer ties”. Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/2/india-us-military-deal. (accedido, marzo 2021)

[42] Wang Huiyao, “More cooperation, less competition”

[43] Alex Lo, “India-the democratic economic giant that disappoints”. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3126342/india-democratic-economic-giant-disappoints. (accedido, 21 de marzo de 2021)

[44] Simone McCarthy, “QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific”. South China Morning Posthttps://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125344/QUAD-summit-us-india-australia-and-japan-counter-chinas. (accedido, 13 de marzo de 2021)

[45]Mereyem Hafidi, “Biden renueva la Alianza de `QUAD` a pesar de las presiones de Pekín.

[46] Simone McCarthy, “QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific”.

[47] Aljazeera, “’QUAD’ leaders pledge new cooperation on China, COVID-19, climate”.

[48]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, y Nilanthi Samaranayake, “US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security”. Page 2.

[49]Simone McCarthy, “QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific”.

[50] Maria Siow, “India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind”.

[51] “US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner”. Hindustan Timeshttps://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-says-us-considers-india-to-be-a-great-partner-101616317189411.html. (accedido, 21 de marzo de 2021)

[52] Maria Siow, “India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind”.

[53] El término PASSEX es una abreviatura propia de la jerga militar inglesa, viene de Passing Exercise. Este, consiste en aprovechar  que una unidad de marines pasa por una zona determinada para ahondar en la cooperación militar del ejército de esa zona por la que se está pasando. Como ejemplo encontramos la noticia citada en el presente artículo: “India, US begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean región”. The Economic Timeshttps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-begin-two-day-naval-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-region/articleshow/81735782.cms (accedido, 28 de marzo de 2021)

[54] Annath Krishnan, Dinakar Peri, Kallol Bhattacherjee; India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue: U.S. to support India’s defence of territory. The Hinduhttps://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-us-22-dialogue-rajnath-singh-raises-chinas-action-in-ladakh/article32955117.ece. (consultado, marzo 2021)

[55] Maria Siow, “India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind”.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Tanvi Madan, “Democracy and the US-India relationship”

[58] Hindustan Times, “US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner”.

[59] “Committed to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu”.The Economic Timeshttps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/committed-to-achieving-goal-of-500-bn-in-bilateral-trade-with-us-ambassador-sandhu/articleshow/80878316.cms. (accedido, marzo 2021).

[60] Joe C. Mathew, “India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages”. Business Todayhttps://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-us-mini-trade-deal-low-duty-on-medical-devices-pact-in-final-stages/story/413669.html. (Accedido, marzo de 2021)

[61] Economic Times, “Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu”.

[62] Joe C. Mathew, “India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages”.

[63] Economic Times, “Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu”.

[64] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, y Nilanthi Samaranayake, “US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security”. Page 2.

[65] “Hindustan Times “US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner”.

[66]  Tanvi Madan, “Democracy and the US-India relationship”.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Tanvi Madan, “India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties”.

[69] Economic Times, “Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu”.

[70] Tanvi Madan, “Democracy and the US-India relationship”.

[71] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, y Nilanthi Samaranayake, “US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security”. Page3.

[72] IBIDEM pag.3

[73] IBIDEM. Pag. 6

[74] IBIDEM. Pag. 7

[75] Seeram Chaulia, “France and sailing toward the ‘QUAD-plus’”. The New Indian Express

[76] Elisabeth Mearns, Gary Parkinson; “With a pandemic, populism and protectionism, have we passed peak globalization?”. China Global Television Network. https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/With-a-pandemic-populism-and-protectionism-has-globalization-peaked--QOQMPg3ABO/index.html. (accedido, abril 2021).

[77] Abraham Newman, Henry Farrel; “The New Age of Protectionism”. Foreign Affairshttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2021-04-05/new-age-protectionism. (accedido el 5 de abril de 2021)

[78] Economic Times, “Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu”.

Categorías Global Affairs: Asia Orden mundial, diplomacia y gobernanza Ensayos

IDF soldiers during a study tour as part of Sunday culture, at the Ramon Crater Visitor Center [IDF]

ESSAY /  Jairo Císcar

The geopolitical reality that exists in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean is incredibly complex, and within it the Arab-Israeli conflict stands out. If we pay attention to History, we can see that it is by no means a new conflict (outside its form): it can be traced back to more than 3,100 years ago. It is a land that has been permanently disputed; despite being the vast majority of it desert and very hostile to humans, it has been coveted and settled by multiple peoples and civilizations. The disputed territory, which stretches across what today is Israel, Palestine, and parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria practically coincides with historic Canaan, the Promised Land of the Jewish people. Since those days, the control and prevalence of human groups over the territory was linked to military superiority, as the conflict was always latent. The presence of military, violence and conflict has been a constant aspect of societies established in the area; and, with geography and history, is fundamental to understand the current conflict and the functioning of the Israeli society.

As we have said, a priori it does not have great reasons for a fierce fight for the territory, but the reality is different: the disputed area is one of the key places in the geostrategy of the western and eastern world. This thin strip, between the Tigris and Euphrates (the Fertile Crescent, considered the cradle of the first civilizations) and the mouth of the Nile, although it does not enjoy great water or natural resources, is an area of ​​high strategic value: it acts as a bridge between Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean (with Europe by sea). It is also a sacred place for the three great monotheistic religions of the world, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the “Peoples of the Book”, who group under their creeds more than half of the world's inhabitants. Thus, for millennia, the land of Israel has been abuzz with cultural and religious exchanges ... and of course, struggles for its control.

According to the Bible, the main para-historical account of these events, the first Israelites began to arrive in the Canaanite lands around 2000 BC, after God promised Abraham that land “... To your descendants ...”[1] The massive arrival of Israelites would occur around 1400 BC, where they started a series of campaigns and expelled or assimilated the various Canaanite peoples such as the Philistines (of which the Palestinians claim to be descendants), until the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah finally united around the year 1000 BC under a monarchy that would come to dominate the region until their separation in 924 BC.

It is at this time that we can begin to speak of a people of Israel, who will inhabit this land uninterruptedly, under the rule of other great empires such as the Assyrian, the Babylonian, and the Macedonian, to finally end their existence under the Roman Empire. It is in 63 BC when Pompey conquered Jerusalem and occupied Judea, ending the freedom of the people of Israel. It will be in 70 AD, though, with the emperor Titus, when after a new Hebrew uprising the Second Temple of Jerusalem was razed, and the Diaspora of the Hebrew people began; that is, their emigration to other places across the East and West, living in small communities in which, suffering constant persecutions, they continued with their minds set on a future return to their “Promised Land”. The population vacuum left by the Diaspora was then filled again by peoples present in the area, as well as by Arabs.

The current state of Israel

This review of the historical antiquity of the conflict is necessary because this is one with some very special characteristics: practically no other conflict is justified before such extremes by both parties with “sentimental” or dubious “legal” reasons.

The current state of Israel, founded in 1948 with the partition of the British Protectorate of Palestine, argues its existence in the need for a Jewish state that not only represents and welcomes such a community but also meets its own religious requirements, since in Judaism the Hebrew is spoken as the “chosen people of God”, and Israel as its “Promised Land”. So, being the state of Israel the direct heir of the ancient Hebrew people, it would become the legitimate occupier of the lands quoted in Genesis 15: 18-21. This is known as the concept of Greater Israel (see map)[2].

On the Palestinian side, they exhibit as their main argument thirteen centuries of Muslim rule (638-1920) over the region of Palestine, from the Orthodox caliphate to the Ottoman Empire. They claim that the Jewish presence in the region is primarily based on the massive immigration of Jews during the late 19th and 20th centuries, following the popularization of Zionism, as well as on the expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians before, during and after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, a fact known as the Nakba[3], and of many other Palestinians and Muslims in general since the beginning of the conflict. Some also base their historical claim on their origin as descendants of the Philistines.

However, although these arguments are weak, beyond historical conjecture, the reality is, nonetheless, that these aspirations have been the ones that have provoked the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This properly begins in the early 20th century, with the rise of Zionism in response to the growing anti-Semitism in Europe, and the Arab refusal to see Jews settled in the area of ​​Palestine. During the years of the British Mandate for Palestine (1920-1948) there were the first episodes of great violence between Jews and Palestinians. Small terrorist actions by the Arabs against Kibbutzim, which were contested by Zionist organizations, became the daily norm. This turned into a spiral of violence and assassinations, with brutal episodes such as the Buraq and Hebron revolts, which ended with some 200 Jews killed by Arabs, and some 120 Arabs killed by the British army.[4]

Another dark episode of this time was the complicit relations between the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Almin Al-Husseini, and the Nazi regime, united by a common agenda regarding Jews. He had meetings with Adolf Hitler and gave them mutual support, as the extracts of their conversations collect[5]. But it will not be until the adoption of the “United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine” through Resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly when the war broke out on a large scale.[6] The Jews accepted the plan, but the Arab League announced that, if it became effective, they would not hesitate to invade the territory.

And so, it was. On May 14, 1948, hours after the proclamation of the state of Israel by Ben-Gurion, Israel was invaded by a joint force of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian troops. In this way, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War began, beginning a period of war that has not stopped until today, almost 72 years later. Despite the multiple peace agreements reached (with Egypt and Jordan), the dozens of United Nations resolutions, and the Oslo Accords, which established the roadmap for achieving a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine, conflicts continue, and they have seriously affected the development of the societies and peoples of the region.

The Israel Defense Forces

Despite the difficulties suffered since the day of its independence, Israel has managed to establish itself as the only effective democracy in the region, with a strong rule of law and a welfare state. It has a Human Development Index of 0.906, considered very high; is an example in education and development, being the third country in the world with more university graduates over the total population (20%) and is a world leader in R&D in technology. Meanwhile, the countries around it face serious difficulties, and in the case of Palestine, great misery. One of the keys to Israel's success and survival is, without a doubt, its Army. Without it, it would not have been able to lay the foundations of the country that it is today, as it would have been devastated by neighboring countries from the first day of its independence.

It is not daring to say that Israeli society is one of the most militarized in the world. It is even difficult to distinguish between Israel as a country or Israel as an army. There is no doubt that the structure of the country is based on the Army and on the concept of “one people”. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) act as the backbone of society and we find an overwhelming part of the country's top officials who have served as active soldiers. The paradigmatic example are the current leaders of the two main Knesset parties: Benny Ganz (former Chief of Staff of the IDF) and Benjamin Netanyahu (a veteran of the special forces in the 1970s, and combat wounded).

This influence exerted by the Tzahal[7] in the country is fundamentally due to three reasons. The first is the reality of war. Although, as we have previously commented, Israel is a prosperous country and practically equal to the rest of the western world, it lives in a reality of permanent conflict, both inside and outside its borders. When it is not carrying out large anti-terrorist operations such as Operation “Protective Edge,” carried out in Gaza in 2014, it is in an internal fight against attacks by lone wolves (especially bloody recent episodes of knife attacks on Israeli civilians and military) and against rocket and missile launches from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli population has become accustomed to the sound of missile alarms, and to seeing the “Iron Dome” anti-missile system in operation. It is common for all houses to have small air raid shelters, as well as in public buildings and schools. In them, students learn how to behave in the face of an attack and basic security measures. The vision of the Army on the street is something completely common, whether it be armored vehicles rolling through the streets, fighters flying over the sky, or platoons of soldiers getting on the public bus with their full equipment. At this point, we must not forget the suffering in which the Palestinian population constantly lives, as well as its harsh living conditions, motivated not only by the Israeli blockade, but also by living under the government of political parties such as Al-Fatah or Hamas. The reality of war is especially present in the territories under dispute with other countries: the Golan Heights in Syria and the so-called Palestinian Territories (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip). Military operations and clashes with insurgents are practically daily in these areas.

This permanent tension and the reality of war not only affect the population indirectly, but also directly with compulsory military service. Israel is the developed country that spends the most defense budget according to its GDP and its population.[8] Today, Israel invests 4.3% of its GDP in defense (not counting investment in industry and military R&D).[9] In the early 1980s, it came to invest around 22%. Its army has 670,000 soldiers, of whom 170,000 are professionals, and 35.9% of its population (just over 3 million) are ready for combat. It is estimated that the country can carry out a general mobilization around 48-72 hours. Its military strength is based not only on its technological vanguard in terms of weapons systems such as the F-35 (and atomic arsenal), material, armored vehicles (like the Merkava MBT), but also on its compulsory military service system that keeps the majority of the population trained to defend its country. Israel has a unique military service in the western world, being compulsory for all those over 18 years of age, be they men or women. In the case of men, it lasts 32 months, while women remain under military discipline for 21 months, although those that are framed in combat units usually serve the same time as men. Military service has exceptions, such as Arabs who do not want to serve and ultra-Orthodox Jews. However, more and more Israeli Arabs serve in the armed forces, including in mixed units with Druze, Jews and Christians; the same goes for the ultra-orthodox, who are beginning to serve in units adapted to their religious needs. Citizens who complete military service remain in the reserve until they are 40 years old, although it is estimated that only a quarter of them do so actively.[10]

Social cohesion

Israeli military service and, by extension, the Israeli Defense Forces are, therefore, the greatest factor of social cohesion in the country, above even religion. This is the second reason why the army influences Israel. The experience of a country protection service carried out by all generations creates great social cohesion. In the Israeli mindset, serving in the military, protecting your family and ensuring the survival of the state is one of the greatest aspirations in life. From the school, within the academic curriculum itself, the idea of ​​patriotism and service to the nation is integrated. And right now, despite huge contrasts between the Jewish majority and minorities, it is also a tool for social integration for Arabs, Druze and Christians. Despite racism and general mistrust towards Arabs, if you serve in the Armed Forces, the reality changes completely: you are respected, you integrate more easily into social life, and your opportunities for work and study after the enlistment period have increased considerably. Mixed units, such as Unit 585 where Bedouins and Christian Arabs serve,[11] allow these minorities to continue to throw down barriers in Israeli society, although on many occasions they find rejection from their own communities.

Israelis residing abroad are also called to service, after which many permanently settle in the country. This enhances the sense of community even for Jews still in the Diaspora.

In short, the IDF creates a sense of duty and belonging to the homeland, whatever the origin, as well as a strong link with the armed forces (which is hardly seen in other western countries) and acceptance of the sacrifices that must be made in order to ensure the survival of the country.

The third and last reason, the most important one, and the one that summarizes the role that the Army has in society and in the country, is the reality that, as said above, the survival of the country depends on the Army. This is how the military occupation of territories beyond the borders established in 1948, the bombings in civilian areas, the elimination of individual objectives are justified by the population and the Government. After 3,000 years, and since 1948 perhaps more than ever, the Israeli people depend on weapons to create a protection zone around them, and after the persecution throughout the centuries culminating in the Holocaust and its return to the “Promised Land,” neither the state nor the majority of the population are willing to yield in their security against countries or organizations that directly threaten the existence of Israel as a country. This is why despite the multiple truces and the will (political and real) to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, the country cannot afford to step back in terms of preparing its armed forces and lobbying.

Obviously, during the current Covid-19 pandemic, the Army is having a key role in the success of the country in fighting the virus. The current rate of vaccination (near 70 doses per 100 people) is boosted by the use of reserve medics from the Army, as well as the logistic experience and planning (among obviously many other factors). Also, they have provided thousands of contact tracers, and the construction of hundreds of vaccination posts, and dozens of quarantine facilities. Even could be arguable that the military training could play a role in coping with the harsh restrictions that were imposed in the country.

The State-Army-People trinity exemplifies the reality that Israel lives, where the Army has a fundamental (and difficult) role in society. It is difficult to foresee a change in reality in the near future, but without a doubt, the army will continue to have the leadership role that it has assumed, in different forms, for 3,000 years.

 

[1] Genesis 15:18 New International Version (NIV)18: “On that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram and said, ‘To your descendants I give this land, from the Wadi [a] of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates’.”

[2] Great Israel matches to previously mentioned Bible passage Gn. 15: 18-21.

[3] Independent, JS (2019, May 16). This is why Palestinians wave keys during the 'Day of Catastrophe'. Retrieved March 23, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/nakba-day-catastrophe-palestinians-israel-benjamin-netanyahu-gaza-west-bank-hamas-a8346156.html

[4] Ross Stewart (2004). Causes and Consequences of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Evan Brothers, Ltd., 2004.

[5] Record of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in in Berlin, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XIII, London , 1964, p. 881ff, in Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, (NY: Facts on File, 1984), pp. 79-84. Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-mufti-and-the-f-uuml-hrer#2. “Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine .... Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle .... Germany's objective [is] ... solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere .... In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. The Mufti thanked Hitler profusely. ”

[6] United Nations General Assembly A / RES / 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

[7] Tzahal is a Hebrew acronym used to refer to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

[8] Newsroom. (8th. June 2009). Arming Up: The world's biggest military spenders by population. 03-20-2020, by The Economist Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/news/2009/06/08/arming-up

[9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (nd). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved March 21, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

[10] Gross, JA (2016, May 30). Just a quarter of all eligible reservists serve in the IDF. Retrieved March 22, 2020, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/just-a-quarter-of-all-eligible-reservists-serve-in-the-idf/

[11] AHRONHEIM, A. (2020, January 12). Arab Christians and Bedouins in the IDF: Meet the members of Unit 585. Retrieved March 19, 2020, from https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/The-sky-is-the-limit-in-the- IDFs-unique-Unit-585-613948

Categorías Global Affairs: Oriente Medio Seguridad y defensa Ensayos

Los ministros de Exteriores de Bahréin y EAU firman con el ‘premier’ israelí los Acuerdos Abraham, en septiembre de 2020 [Casa Blanca]

▲ Los ministros de Exteriores de Bahréin y EAU firman con el ‘premier’ israelí los Acuerdos Abraham, en septiembre de 2020 [Casa Blanca]

ENSAYO / Lucas Martín Serrano *

Es interesante incorporar a cualquier tipo de análisis geopolítico unas pinceladas de historia. La historia es una ayuda fundamental para comprender el presente. Y la mayor parte de los conflictos, problemas, fricciones u obstáculos ya sea entre naciones o entidades públicas o privadas siempre tienen subyacente un trasfondo histórico. Además, llevado al terreno de la negociación, sin importar el nivel de esta, demostrar un cierto conocimiento histórico del adversario es útil porque, por un lado, no deja de ser una muestra de interés y respeto hacia él, lo cual siempre nos situará en una posición ventajosa, sino que, en otro orden de cosas, cualquier escollo o dificultad que aparezca tiene amplias posibilidades de tener su homólogo histórico, y precisamente ahí se puede hallar el camino hacia la solución. La parte que disponga una mayor profundidad de ese conocimiento aumentará notablemente las opciones de una solución más favorable a sus intereses.

En la antigüedad, el territorio que hoy ocupan los Emiratos Árabes Unidos estaba habitado por tribus árabes, nómadas agricultores, artesanos y comerciantes. El saqueo de los barcos mercantes de potencias europeas que navegaban por sus costas, aproximándose a estas más de lo recomendable, era algo habitual. Y, en cierto modo, una forma de vida para parte de sus habitantes. Es en el siglo VII cuando el Islam se asienta en la cultura local. De las dos corrientes surgidas tras las disputas acaecidas después de la muerte del Profeta, es la sunní la que se hace con la hegemonía a partir del siglo XI.

Con la finalidad de poner fin a la piratería y asegurar las rutas comerciales marítimas, el Reino Unido, a partir de 1820, firma con los jeques de la zona un tratado de paz. En 1853 se va un paso más allá y se logra firmar otro acuerdo por el cual todo el territorio quedaba bajo el protectorado militar del Reino Unido.

La zona atrajo la atención de potencias como Rusia, Francia y Alemania, y en 1892, para proteger sus intereses, se firma el acuerdo que garantiza para los británicos el monopolio sobre el comercio y la exportación.

La zona que abarca a los actuales siete Emiratos Árabes Unidos más Catar y Bahréin se conoció a partir de ese momento como los “Estados de la Tregua” o “Trucial States”.

Durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, los aeródromos y puertos del Golfo tomaron un importante papel en el desarrollo del conflicto en favor de Reino Unido. Al término de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en 1945, se creó la Liga de Estados Árabes (Liga Árabe), formada por aquellos que gozaban de cierta independencia colonial. La organización llamó la atención de los Estados de la Tregua.

En 1960, se crea la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP), siendo Arabia Saudita, Irán, Irak, Kuwait y Venezuela sus fundadores y con sede en Viena, Austria. Los siete emiratos, que posteriormente formarían los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, se unieron a la organización en 1967.

Desde 1968, nueve emiratos de la costa oriental de la península Arábiga habían comenzado negociaciones para constituir un estado federal. Tras la retirada definitiva de las tropas británicas y después de que Bahréin y Catar se desmarcasen del proceso y obtuviesen la independencia por separado, en 1971, seis emiratos se independizaron del imperio británico: Abu Dhabi, Dubái, Sharjah, Ajmán, Umm al Qaywayn y Fujairah, formando la federación de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, con un sistema legal basado en la constitución de 1971. Una vez consolidada, el 12 de junio se unieron a la Liga Árabe. El séptimo emirato, Ras Al-Khaimah se adhirió al año siguiente, destacando como componentes más fuertes los emiratos de Dubái y Abu Dabi, la capital.

Fue el inicio de la explotación de los enormes pozos petrolíferos descubiertos años atrás lo que dio un giro total a la situación. A partir de la crisis del petróleo de 1973, los Emiratos comenzaron a acumular una enorme riqueza, debido a que los miembros de la OPEP decidieron no exportar más petróleo a los países que apoyaron a Israel durante la guerra del Yom Kippur.

El petróleo y el turismo basado en el crecimiento urbanístico y el desarrollo tecnológico son las principales fuentes de prosperidad del país en la actualidad, y un dato muy importante desde todos los puntos de vista es que, actualmente, el 80-85% de la población de EAU es inmigrante.

Situación actual

Ha sido especialmente durante la última década, y como consecuencia en parte de los acontecimientos acaecidos en la región a partir de lo que se conoció como la Primavera Árabe, cuando los EUA han emergido como una potencia regional con capacidad de influir en la zona.

La principal característica que puede atribuirse a esta aparición en la escena internacional es la transformación de una política exterior conservadora y muy dirigida hacia la “autoconservación”, hacia otras más aperturista con clara vocación de, no sólo jugar un papel relevante en la región, sino de influir en la misma para proteger sus intereses.

La que se puede considerar como la principal ambición de Abu Dhabi es convertirse en un actor principal capaz de influir en la definición y establecimiento de las estructuras de gobernanza a lo largo de la región según su propio modelo, asegurando y ampliando las rutas comerciales, introduciendo en ella a sus vecinos para crear un nodo económico lo suficientemente potente con capacidad para estrechar lazos con toda la región Este de África y con el sudeste asiático, en lo que parece otro claro ejemplo de cómo el centro geopolítico mundial se está desplazando ya definitivamente hacia el eje Asia-Pacífico.

El modelo emiratí ha sido capaz de evolucionar para integrar una creciente apertura económica junto con un modelo político conservador y de gobierno fuerte cuyo principal discurso está construido en base a un estado perfectamente afianzado y seguro. Y todo ello aunándolo con una gran capacidad como proveedor de servicios. Y lo que es muy interesante, el modelo social es de base relativamente secular y liberal, si lo comparamos con los estándares de la región.

Pero un dato fundamental que no puede olvidarse es el rechazo frontal hacia cualquier ideología política o religiosa que suponga la más leve amenaza a la hegemonía y supremacía del Estado y de sus líderes.

Es Abu Dhabi, por ser el mayor y más próspero de los siete emiratos, el que ejerce más influencia a la hora de marcar las líneas generales de la política, tanto interior como exterior. De hecho, la evolución del modelo establecido por los EAU está firmemente asociado al príncipe de la corona de Abu Dhabi y líder de facto del emirato, Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ).

Lo que no se puede perder de vista es que, a pesar de que MbZ y su círculo más íntimo de confianza comparten la misma visión del mundo y la política, sus acciones y decisiones no siguen necesariamente un plan preestablecido. No hay una doctrina base con objetivos tácticos y estratégicos marcados y las líneas de trabajo a seguir para alcanzarlos.

Su forma de llevar a cabo la estrategia país, si así puede llamarse, se basa en un pequeño grupo perteneciente a ese círculo íntimo, el cual pone sobre la mesa varias opciones normalmente tácticas y reactivas ante cualquier problema o asunto que surja para llevar a cabo. En base a estas, la cúpula dirigente sigue un proceso de toma de decisiones ad hoc que puede conducir a una excesiva necesidad de correcciones y ajustes posteriores que a su vez derive en una pérdida de oportunidades.

Amenazas – Situación de seguridad

Las autoridades de los Emiratos tienen una clara percepción de cuáles son las principales amenazas geoestratégicas para su desarrollo: por un lado, la difusión transnacional promovida por Irán de la ideología política islamista y, por otro, la influencia que tratan de ejercer los Hermanos Musulmanes y sus promotores y apoyos, incluido Catar y Turquía, es percibida como una amenaza existencial a su visión de una forma de gobierno más secular, así como para la estabilidad del actual statu quo regional, dado que pueden actuar como un catalizador para el radicalismo en la zona.

No obstante, Abu Dhabi ha sido mucho más beligerante en su discurso contra los Hermanos Musulmanes y aquellos que les apoyan, al tiempo que ha mantenido cierta cautela en su posicionamiento contra Irán.

El reciente acuerdo con el Estado de Israel ha servido para restar credibilidad a muchos de los tradicionales tópicos tan arraigados al tiempo que ha puesto de manifiesto el nacimiento de un bloque judeo-sunní como oposición a la beligerante y creciente corriente chiita liderada por Irán y por sus proxies, activos en prácticamente todos los países de la zona y en todos los conflictos regionales.

Esta nueva situación debe servir a las potencias occidentales para confirmar que en la región del Próximo Oriente la visión de su propia problemática ha cambiado e Irán y su particular forma de ejercer su política exterior y defender sus intereses son considerados en la actualidad un factor mucho más desestabilizador que el duradero conflicto palestino-israelí. La amenaza que supone Irán ha actuado como catalizador a la hora de aunar criterios al tiempo que, a pesar de todo, Israel es visto como un elemento que proporciona estabilidad tanto en el plano militar como en el económico.

El Tratado EAU-Israel

El 15 de septiembre, Israel, Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Bahréin, formalizaron la normalización de sus relaciones. Este acuerdo significa que ya son cuatro los Estados árabes que han aceptado el derecho de Israel a existir, y esto es indudablemente un auténtico éxito diplomático.

El hecho de que hayan sido, precisamente, los EAU y Bahréin no es casual. Ninguno de los dos Estados ha participado en una guerra directa contra Israel.  Y, si esa característica es común a ambos estados, la relación de Bahréin con Israel ha sido mucho más fluida que la de Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Esta realidad se sustenta en la comunidad judía asentada en Al-Qatif y en su integración, que se ha traducido en una participación plena y activa en la vida política de Bahréin. Ello ha ayudado a que las relaciones entre Manama y Jerusalén no hayan sido en absoluto conflictivas.

A pesar de ser visto a los ojos del gran público como una novedad, la verdad es que el reciente acuerdo alcanzado es el tercer “Tratado de Paz” que firma el país hebreo con una nación árabe. Sin embargo, es el primero que tiene visos de nacer con unos cimientos lo suficientemente sólidos que permiten augurar una nueva situación mucho más estable y duradera, en claro contraste con las relaciones fruto de los anteriores acuerdos con Egipto y Jordania, muy ceñidos a limitadas relaciones personales y en el campo de la seguridad y la diplomacia convencional.

El nuevo acuerdo con Israel establece una nueva senda de colaboración que afecta a todo Oriente Próximo, e incluye de un modo sustancial contrapesar la influencia de Irán, fomentar las relaciones comerciales, el turismo, la colaboración en materia militar a la hora de compartir inteligencia, cooperación en el área sanitaria y de ese modo contribuir a posicionar a EAU para liderar la diplomacia árabe en la región ofreciendo una oposición sólida a grupos islamistas como los Hermanos Musulmanes y su brazo palestino en Gaza, Hamas para de ese modo abrir la puerta a que otros países de la zona den pasos en su misma dirección.

La decisión de Israel de suspender la anunciada anexión bajo su soberanía de determinadas zonas de Cisjordania es la prueba de que estos movimientos en la región son mucho más profundos y están mucho más preparados y acordados de antemano de lo que pueda imaginarse.

Y esta es precisamente una de las grandes diferencias que se encuentran con los acuerdos anteriores. La gran expectación que se ha creado y los claros indicios de que otros países, incluido Arabia Saudí, sigan la estela de EAU.

De hecho, un paso lleno de significado se ha dado en esta dirección, y ha sido algo tan simple como que un avión de la compañía israelí “EI-Al” sobrevoló espacio aéreo saudí llevando como pasajeros a un gran número de hombres de negocios, personal oficial e inversores camino de Emiratos como un gesto de buena voluntad. Y al contrario de lo que cabría haber esperado en otros momentos, este hecho, ni tuvo repercusión en el mundo árabe, ni provocó ningún tipo de protesta o manifestación en contra.

Lugares como Amman, Beirut, Túnez y Rabat, donde tradicionalmente las manifestaciones en contra de la “ocupación” israelí y acusaciones similares son por lo general numerosas en cuanto a participación, en esta ocasión se mantuvieron en total calma.

Pero si este dato ha pasado desapercibido para la población en general, no ha sucedido así para los líderes de las potencias de Oriente Próximo y las organizaciones violentas que utilizan como proxies.

Para aquellos que aspiran a seguir los pasos de EAU y establecer relaciones con Israel, ello ha servido de acicate para reafirmar su decisión, pues ha disminuido la sensación de inquietud o incluso de peligro emanante de las calles en el mundo árabe en relación con el conflicto palestino israelí que dicho paso podría provocar.

Por el contrario, para Irán y sus proxies ha sido una dura lección. No solo por comprobar que la baza de la causa palestina, enarbolada y puesta sobre el tablero durante tanto tiempo, ha disminuido notablemente su importancia, sino porque ha coincidido en el tiempo con potestas tanto en Iraq como en el Líbano de sentido totalmente contrario, es decir, en contra de la injerencia de Irán en los asuntos internos de ambos países.

Como conclusión, se debe extraer que, a pesar de que esa ausencia de protestas por el acuerdo entre Israel y EAU pueda parecer sorprendente, no es más que un signo evidente de un largo proceso de maduración y evolución política dentro del mundo árabe en general.

La población de Oriente Próximo en general no aspira ya a una unidad panarabista, panislámica, al establecimiento del Gran Califato o, en el caso de Irán o Turquía, a sueños imperialistas que son cosa del pasado. La masa del pueblo y de la sociedad lo que realmente desea es mejorar su bienestar, disponer de mayores y más atractivas oportunidades económicas, tener un buen sistema educativo, mejorar los niveles de desarrollo en todos los órdenes, que rija el imperio de la ley, y que esta sea igual para todos en sus respectivos países.

El tratado objeto de este punto encaja a la perfección dentro de esas aspiraciones y ese esquema mental. Las masas que antaño tomaban las calles ya no creen que la causa palestina sea merecedora de más esfuerzos y atención que su propia lucha por alcanzar un futuro mejor en sus naciones.

Y, este dato es muy importante, a pesar de la opacidad del régimen de los ayatolás, en Irán, la población es cada vez menos sumisa a unas políticas que llevan al país a una serie de conflictos permanentes y sin visos de finalización que provocan un derroche de los recursos del país para mantenerlos.

Justo dos días después del anuncio del acuerdo de paz, Emiratos Árabes Unidos levantó la prohibición de la comunicación telefónica con Israel, siendo el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores hebreo, Gabi Ashkenazi, y su homólogo de Emiratos, Abdullah binZayed, los encargados de simbolizar la apertura de esta nueva línea de comunicación.

Casi inmediatamente después, un equipo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores israelí se desplazó a Abu Dhabi para comenzar a buscar posibles emplazamientos para la futura sede de la embajada de Israel.

Un importante flujo de inversiones procedentes de EAU se está canalizando hacia empresas israelíes que tratan de buscar nuevas formas de tratar la COVID19 y de desarrollar nuevas pruebas para detectar la enfermedad. El incremento de acuerdos de negocios entre empresas israelíes y de Emiratos ha sido prácticamente inmediato, y la compañía “El-Al” está trabajando ya para abrir un corredor directo entre Tel Aviv y Abu Dhabi.

Todo ello está favoreciendo que, ante la nueva situación y los nuevos planteamientos, en Marruecos, Omán y otros países árabes, se estén produciendo movimientos buscando seguir la estela de EAU. El atractivo de Israel no hace sino acrecentarse, en una significativa evolución desde la condición de país más odiado de la región a la de socio más deseado.

No obstante, un factor a tener en cuenta es el impacto en EEUU y Europa. En Occidente, en general, la causa palestina está ganando adeptos principalmente debido al movimiento “Boicot, Desinversión y Sanciones” (BDS). Por ello, es probable que los cambios en las relaciones con Israel no sólo no logren minar ese apoyo, sino que inciten a incrementar sus esfuerzos para evitar la normalización mediante campañas de desinformación de difusión del odio hacia Israel.

Por último, la oposición de Turquía, Catar e Irán era algo que puede calificarse de previsible, pero también es un elemento clarificador. El presidente iraní ha calificado el acuerdo de “grave error”, mientras que su homólogo turco ha amenazado con cerrar la embajada de EAU en Turquía. En ambos casos, la razón última de esta reacción es la misma: la utilización de la causa palestina en beneficio de sus propios intereses y, casualmente ambas son en esta ocasión coincidentes, distraer a la opinión pública de la difícil situación económica que por diferentes motivos los dos países están atravesando.

Política regional

El elemento más importante y perdurable en el tiempo en la política exterior y de seguridad de EAU lo constituye sus alianzas estratégicas con EEUU y Arabia Saudí. A pesar de que durante la última década Emiratos ha seguido una línea más independiente, los hechos acontecidos y esta nueva dirección no habrían sido posibles sin el apoyo de EEUU, en cuya protección confía el pequeño pero rico y al mismo tiempo poco poblado estado, y con quien pueden contar a la hora de exportar sus recursos energéticos en el supuesto de un conflicto.

Incluso durante la época de la administración de Obama, cuando las relaciones se enrarecieron debido a la política que tomó EEUU en relación con los sucesos de la “Primavera Árabe” y con respecto a Irán, la alianza estratégica entre ambas naciones se mantuvo.

La claramente definida política anti iraní del gobierno liderado por Donald Trump, equivalente a la de EAU, facilitó una mejora rápida de las relaciones de nuevo, y la nueva administración norteamericana vio en Emiratos un pilar fundamental en el que cimentar su política en Oriente Próximo. De ese modo, en la actualidad, junto con Israel y Arabia Saudí, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos son el principal aliado de EEUU en la zona.

Al contrario que lo sucedido con EEUU, Arabia Saudí se convirtió en un socio estratégico de la nueva política regional de EAU durante los mandatos de Obama. En realidad, ambas naciones han mantenido estrechos lazos desde el nacimiento de los Emiratos en 1971, pero como era lógico, el nuevo y joven estado se mantuvo a la sombra de la otra nación, más asentada y siguiendo las políticas de su “hermano mayor”.

Esta situación cambió con la subida al poder de Mohamed Bin Zayed quien, desde 2011, se empeñó en abanderar una línea política de acciones conjuntas en la región que a la postre han sido decisivas. MbZ encontró a su contraparte perfecta en el príncipe saudí Mohamed Bin Salman, quien gradualmente, desde 2015 fue tomando las riendas como la cabeza visible de la política de Arabia Saudí. Llegando a tal extremo que en ciertos casos como los de Yemen y Catar el liderazgo y empuje de EAU parece haber sido la fuerza aglutinadora de las políticas regionales conjuntas.

Alianzas

Estados Unidos

El papel de EEUU como aliado de EAU se remonta a comienzos de los años 80, justo después de la revolución iraní de 1979, que supuso la pérdida de su más importante aliado en la región y del comienzo de la guerra Irán-Irak.

No obstante, fue la Guerra del Golfo de 1990-1991 la que, con la invasión de Kuwait por parte de Irak el día 2 de agosto de 1990, mostró a EAU lo vulnerables que eran los pequeños Estados del Golfo ante una agresión militar por parte de cualquiera de sus poderosos vecinos.

Con la finalidad de asegurarse la protección, y de la misma manera que otros países de la región, EAU favoreció durante los años posteriores a la guerra el aumento de la presencia de EEUU en su territorio. Todo ello concluyó con un acuerdo bilateral de seguridad firmado en julio de 1994. Mediante este, Estados Unidos recibían acceso a las bases aéreas y puertos de los Emiratos y, en contraprestación, se comprometía a proteger al país de posibles agresiones externas. Lo interesante, y que da una medida de cómo ha evolucionado la situación, es que el acuerdo permaneció en secreto a petición de Abu Dhabi por el temor de EAU a las posibles críticas y protestas tanto internas como por parte de Irán.

Inicialmente, EAU no fue más que un aliado más de los EEUU en el Golfo Pérsico. Sin embargo, su importancia como socio fue incrementándose entre 1990 y 2000, en parte debido al puerto de Jebel Ali, el cual fue se convirtió en la base más usada por la US Navy fuera de su país, y a la base aérea de Al Dhafra, instalación clave para las actividades de EEUU en la región.

Además, desde finales de la década de los 90, EAU inició un proceso para mostrarse ante su nuevo aliado como un socio fiable y más relevante, aumentando en cantidad y nivel su cooperación. Siguiendo esa línea, fuerzas militares de Emiratos han participado en todas las grandes operaciones de EEUU en Oriente Próximo, desde la Guerra del Golfo en 1991 a Somalia en 1992, Kosovo en 1999, Afganistán desde 2002, Libia desde 2011, y Siria (en el marco de la lucha contra el Daesh) entre 2014 y 2015. Sólo se evitó por parte de Emiratos, y de una forma muy vehemente, la participación en la invasión de Iraq en 2003. De esta implicación las Fuerzas Armadas de EAU han obtenido una gran experiencia sobre el terreno que ha redundado en su eficacia y profesionalidad.

Esta implicación en las no pocas veces controvertidas acciones militares de EEUU en países árabes ha supuesto, indudablemente, un elemento fundamental para Estados Unidos. No sólo por lo que supone desde el punto de vista de la imagen y la narrativa que al menos un país musulmán les apoyara, sino porque la contribución de Abu Dhabi no se ha limitado al aspecto militar. Organizaciones humanitarias han actuado en paralelo con la finalidad de ganar el apoyo de la población allá donde se intervenía invirtiendo enormes cantidades de dinero. El ejemplo más claro es Afganistán, país en el que Emiratos ha gastado millones de dólares en proyectos humanitarios y de desarrollo para ayudar a la estabilización del país, al mismo tiempo que proporcionó un pequeño contingente de fuerzas de operaciones especiales en la especialmente peligrosa zona sur del país desde 2003. Además, entre 2012 y 2014 ampliaron su despliegue con seis aviones F16 para apoyar las operaciones aéreas contra los talibanes. Incluso cuando EEUU comenzó su retirada gradual después de 2014, las tropas de Emiratos continuaron en Afganistán.

Lograr que EAU se adhiriera a la causa de la lucha contra los yihadistas no fue tarea difícil en absoluto, pues sus líderes sienten una especial aversión a cualquier forma de extremismo religioso que afecte al sistema político dentro del Islam. Esta es la principal razón para que su Fuerza Aérea se implicara en la coalición liderada por EEUU contra el Daesh en Siria entre 2014 y 2015. Hasta tal punto que, después de los aparatos norteamericanos, fueron los procedentes de EAU los que llevaron a cabo más salidas contra objetivos yihadistas.

Pero no se limitó la colaboración a EEUU. Tanto Australia como Francia tuvieron a su disposición las bases aéreas de los emiratos para llevar a cabo sus operaciones.

Sólo la ruptura abierta de hostilidades y la implicación de EAU en la Guerra de Yemen de 2015 redujo su participación en la lucha contra el Daesh.

Pero no todo ha sido fácil. La invasión de Iraq en 2003 produjo profundas reticencias en EAU, que lo consideró un grave error. Su temor era que dicha intervención terminara por aumentar la influencia de Irán sobre Irak, o derivara en una guerra civil, lo cual desestabilizaría toda la región.

Los temores se vieron cumplidos cuando en 2005 una coalición chiita próxima a Irán ganó las elecciones en Irak y estalló la guerra, dejando a EAU de manos atadas para tartar de influir de algún modo en la situación. Su mayor preocupación entonces era que una prematura retirada de todas las fuerzas de EEUU complicara aún más la situación.

La renovada relación con la administración Trump ha llevado a la firma de un nuevo acuerdo de seguridad y cooperación firmado en 2017. En contraste con lo sucedido en 1994, los contenidos del mismo han sido hechos públicos, y hacen referencia principalmente a la presencia de tropas de EEUU en suelo emiratí de manera permanente. El acuerdo así mismo abarca el adiestramiento de las Fuerzas Armadas de Emiratos y la realización de ejercicios conjuntos de manera periódica.

Gracias a este acuerdo, la presencia de EEUU en Emiratos es más numerosa que nunca. Actualmente hay unos 5.000 hombres desplegados entre la base aérea de Al Dhafra, el puerto de Jebel Ali y en algunas otras pequeñas bases o estaciones navales. Sólo en la mencionada base aérea hay 3.500 hombres que, desde allí, operan desde aviones de combate F-15, F-22 y F-35, además de aparatos de reconocimiento y vehículos aéreos no tripulados (UAVs).

Por su parte, EAU ha continuado desarrollando sus propias capacidades militares adquiriendo material de fabricación norteamericana, principalmente sistemas antiaéreos (“Patriot” y THAAD) y aviones de combate (110 F-16). A ello se añade que, desde hace un par de años, EAU ha mostrado gran interés por hacerse con el Nuevo F-35, aunque las negociaciones, no exentas de ciertas reticencias, aún continúan.

En 2018 surgieron problemas para el suministro de municiones de precisión guiadas tanto a EAU como a Arabia Saudí, dado que ambos países las estaban usando en la Guerra de Yemen. El asesinato del periodista Saudí Jamal Kashoggi agravó la resistencia del congreso de EEUU, forzando al presidente Trump a usar su derecho de veto para poder mantener el suministro. Esto da una medida de cuan determinante es la actitud de la actual administración en relación con ambos países.

A pesar de todas las dificultades mencionadas, la actual administración norteamericana ha redoblado sus esfuerzos para apoyar a EAU en sus políticas regionales, pues son coincidentes con los objetivos de EEUU.

El primer objetivo ha sido construir una alianza anti-Irán entre estados de Próximo Oriente que incluye a EAU como socio clave junto con Arabia Saudí y Egipto. Este plan es totalmente coincidente con la aspiración de Abu Dhabi de cobrar cierto liderazgo en la región, y tiene visos de prosperar, ya que EAU probablemente apoyará a EEUU en una solución para el conflicto palestino que está bastante en línea con la propuesta israelí.

Arabia Saudita

Arabia Saudí es, a día de hoy, el aliado más importante de EAU en la región. Ambos estados se financian gracias a las exportaciones de crudo y ambos tienen las mismas reticencias a las ambiciones expansionistas de sus poderosos vecinos, especialmente Irán.

No obstante, durante mucho tiempo, a pesar de esta alianza, EAU ha temido que Arabia Saudí, valiéndose de su desigual tamaño tanto en población como en fuerza militar como en capacidad de producción de petróleo tratara de mantener una posición hegemónica en el Golfo Pérsico.

En 1981, los países del Golfo Pérsico aprovecharon la oportunidad para crear una alianza que excluyera a las por entonces principales potencias regionales. Así, Bahréin, Kuwait, Omán, Catar, Arabia Saudí y EAU crearon el Consejo de Cooperación para los Estados Árabes del Golfo (GCC en sus siglas en inglés). Dicho Consejo disponía de una fuerza militar conjunta que nunca alcanzó una entidad significativa. La mayor prueba de la debilidad del GCC y su ineficacia fue la invasión de Kuwait por parte de Irak sin oposición alguna por el ente supranacional.

Como resultado de lo anterior, EAU depositó en EEUU la confianza para su protección, el único país que aunaba la voluntad y la capacidad de llevar a cabo la tarea de defender al pequeño Estado frente a potenciales agresiones extranjeras.

La consecuencia a nivel regional viene marcada por la convergencia de intereses de Arabia Saudí y EAU los cuales, entre 2011 y 2019, han perseguido objetivos políticos regionales comunes apoyándose si es necesario en sus capacidades militares.

Como ejemplo, tenemos la petición de ayuda de Bahréin al GCC en 2011 cuando sus gobernantes se sintieron amenazados por los movimientos de protesta chiitas. No obstante, su intervención más relevante fue el apoyo al golpe de estado en Egipto contra el presidente Mohamed Morsi y los Hermanos Musulmanes en 2013.

India

Las relaciones sociopolíticas y económicas entre los miembros del GCC y la India siempre han sido muy estrechas, y han estado basadas en el entendimiento de que un entorno seguro y estable tanto política como socialmente en el entorno del Golfo Pérsico y en el subcontinente indio son factores críticos para el desarrollo de los respectivos países y sus lazos transregionales.

Desde la perspectiva de la India, la mejora de su desarrollo tecnológico y económico va en consonancia a la capacidad de Nueva Delhi para afianzar sus alianzas en todo el mundo. A este respecto, los países del Golfo Pérsico, y especialmente EAU, son considerados un puente de acceso al conocimiento, capacidades, recursos y mercados para mejorar ese desarrollo.

En 2016, las hasta entonces relaciones bilaterales entre ambos países se formalizaron en un acuerdo de cooperación estratégica denominado CSP (Comprehensive Strategic Partnership)

Para EAU, India es un país moderno, un fenómeno político independiente de Occidente que mantiene fuertes raíces religiosas y tradicionales sin renunciar a su diversidad. En cierto modo y con algunas reservas, para EAU es un espejo donde mirarse.

El acuerdo de cooperación es transversal y se refiere a asuntos tan diversos como lucha contra el terrorismo, intercambio de información e inteligencia, medidas para luchar contra el lavado de dinero, ciberseguridad, así como cooperación en materia de defensa, ayuda humanitaria, etc.

En el aspecto más económico la iniciativa incluye acciones concretas que faciliten el comercio y las inversiones, con el compromiso de EAU de alcanzar el objetivo de 75 mil millones de dólares para apoyar el desarrollo de infraestructuras de nueva generación en la India, especialmente ferroviarias, puertos, carreteras, aeropuertos y parques industriales.

En lo que se refiere al sector energético, el acuerdo contempla la participación de EAU en la modernización del sector petrolífero en todas sus ramas, teniendo en cuenta el desarrollo de una reserva estratégica.

Es muy significativa la parte que trata sobre el desarrollo de tecnología para el uso pacífico de la energía nuclear, así como la cooperación en el sector aeroespacial incluyendo el desarrollo y lanzamiento conjunto de satélites, así como de la infraestructura necesaria de control en tierra y todas las aplicaciones necesarias.

En la actualidad, la India tiene unos lazos socioeconómicos crecientes y multifacéticos tanto con Israel como con los países del Golfo Pérsico, y en especial con EAU. La diáspora de trabajadores indios en el Golfo Pérsico supone unas remesas anuales de casi 50.000 millones de dólares. Las relaciones comerciales dejan a las arcas del país asiático más de 150.000 millones de dólares, y casi dos tercios de los hidrocarburos que necesita el país proceden de esa región. Por ello, es evidente que la nueva situación es vista con especial interés desde esta parte del mundo, valorando oportunidades y posibles amenazas.

Evidentemente, cualquier acuerdo como este que suponga al menos a priori más estabilidad y una normalización de relaciones siempre será beneficioso, pero también hay que tener en cuenta sus puntos débiles y la posible evolución de la situación.

Así pues, desde el punto de vista geopolítico, India ha acogido con buenos ojos el restablecimiento de relaciones entre EAU e Israel, toda vez que ambos son socios estratégicos.

El nuevo panorama que se abre entre Israel y el GCC parece acercar una solución moderada y consistente para el problema palestino, haciendo mucho más fácil el trabajo de la diplomacia india.

Pero hay que ser cautos, y especialmente en esta zona del planeta nada es de un solo color. Este esperanzador acuerdo puede tener un efecto perverso que polarice aún más a los sectores yihadistas del mundo árabe enfrentándolos más aun si cabe al resto.

La posibilidad de que la región del Golfo Pérsico se convierta en el nuevo campo de batalla donde se enfrenten los proxies de Irán e Israel no puede descartarse por completo, especialmente en aquellas zonas controladas por los chiitas. No obstante, no es por el momento una opción probable.

Pero para India tiene mucha más importancia, si cabe, gestionar las implicaciones económicas del nuevo tratado. Con la cooperación en defensa y seguridad como pilares fundamentales, ambas partes comienzan ahora a contemplar el verdadero potencial económico que se abre al complementar sus economías.

Reacciones al tratado: escenarios   

Ante un hecho tan relevante como el relatado es de esperar que se produzcan reacciones en varias direcciones, y en función de estas la evolución de la situación puede ser diferente.

Los actores que pueden tener un papel relevante en los diferentes escenarios son EAU y la nueva alianza, Arabia Saudí, Irán, Turquía, Palestina y los Hermanos musulmanes.

No se puede olvidar que el trasfondo de este tratado es económico. Si su desarrollo tiene éxito el aporte de estabilidad a una región largamente castigada por todo tipo de conflictos y enfrentamientos se transformará en un aumento exponencial de las operaciones comerciales, trasvase de tecnología y la apertura de nuevas rutas y colaboraciones principalmente con el sudeste asiático.

El papel de EEUU será determinante en cualquiera de los escenarios que puedan plantearse, pero en cualquiera de ellos su posición será minimizar la presencia física y apoyar a los firmantes del tratado con acciones políticas, económicas y de defensa mediante el suministro de material militar.

El tratado tiene una fuerte componente económica fijada en el subcontinente indio y en el sudeste asiático. Esto no es sino un signo más de cómo el centro de gravedad geopolítico mundial se está situando en la región Asia-Pacífico y este es uno de los principales motivos del apoyo incondicional de EEUU.

Los miembros del gobierno de EAU han considerado tradicionalmente que las ideologías y políticas islamistas más radicales suponen una amenaza existencial para los valores fundamentales del país. Tanto el régimen sectario chiita en Irán como los Hermanos Musulmanes, grupo de corte sunnita, son vistos como una amenaza constante para la estabilidad de los poderes de la región.

Para EAU estos movimientos transnacionales son un catalizador para el radicalismo en toda la región.

Por todo lo anterior se pueden plantear como plausibles los siguientes escenarios:

Escenario 1

Por el momento, los más perjudicados en sus intereses por la nueva situación son los palestinos. Personalidades relevantes de la sociedad palestina, así como altos cargos de la Autoridad Palestina, han considerado el nuevo tratado como una traición. Como se ha mencionado, el problema palestino está pasando a un segundo plano en el mundo árabe.

Si, como se vaticina, en los próximos meses más países se unen al nuevo tratado, es posible que la Autoridad Palestina trate por todos los medios de volver a llevar a la actualidad sus reivindicaciones y su lucha. Para ello contaría con el apoyo de Irán y sus proxies y de Turquía. En esta situación, se empezaría por deslegitimar a los gobiernos de los países que se han alineado con EAU e Israel mediante una fuerte campaña de información a todos los niveles, con un uso masivo de redes sociales con la finalidad de movilizar a la población más sensible y afín a los palestinos. El objetivo sería promover manifestaciones y/o revueltas que crearan dudas en aquellos que aún no se han adherido al pacto. Estas dudas podrían llevar a un cambio de decisión o retraso en las nuevas adhesiones, o que estos nuevos candidatos a formar parte del tratado aumentaran las condiciones relacionadas con los palestinos para sumarse al mismo. Esta opción pasa por ser la más peligrosa por la posibilidad de generar disensiones o discusiones internas que llevaran a una implosión del mismo.

Puede considerarse un escenario probable de intensidad media/baja.

Escenario 2

La posición que tome Arabia Saudí es clave. Y será determinante para calibrar la reacción de Irán. En el ecosistema de Próximo Oriente, Irán es la potencia que más tiene que perder con esta nueva alianza. No puede olvidarse la lucha que existe por la hegemonía dentro del mundo musulmán. Y esta lucha, que no deja de ser religiosa, pues enfrenta a chiitas y sunnitas, tiene como principales protagonistas a Irán y Arabia Saudí.

Arabia Saudí es posible que se una al tratado, pero dada la situación, y en un intento de no tensar más la cuerda con su principal enemigo, puede tomar la decisión de no unirse al mismo, pero apoyarlo desde fuera con acuerdos puntuales o bilaterales. Siempre con el resto de países árabes miembros del mismo, que harían de puente para sus relaciones con Israel. Sería un modo de lavar la cara y evitar el reconocimiento expreso del Estado de Israel o sus relaciones directas con este. Hay que tener en cuenta las bolsas de mayoría chiita que hay en el país y que podrían ser espoleadas por Irán.

No obstante, y planteando el peor de los casos, Irán reaccionará a través de sus proxies, recrudeciendo su actividad en Yemen, tratando de promover protestas y revueltas dentro de Arabia Saudí, reforzando su apoyo a Hamas en Palestina y a Hezbollah en el Líbano e incluso a sus milicias en Irak.

El apoyo a las protestas que ya se han producido en Sudán formará también parte de esta campaña. Sudán es un país muy inestable, con unas estructuras de poder muy débiles que difícilmente podrán sofocar revueltas de alta intensidad.

El objetivo sería incendiar la región bajo la pantalla del apoyo al pueblo palestino con la finalidad de disuadir más adhesiones al tratado, así como minar la eficacia del mismo, dando la imagen de inestabilidad e inseguridad en la región. Ello hará desistir a posibles inversores de acercarse a EAU atraídos por las enormes posibilidades económicas que ofrece al tiempo que mantiene a Arabia Saudí ocupada con su flanco sur y sus problemas internos. No es descartable alguna acción sin autor claro o reconocido contra los buques que transitan por el Golfo, como ya ha sucedido, o el abordaje de alguno por parte de fuerzas iraníes bajo cualquier tipo de acusación o argucia legal. Acciones directas que involucren a fuerzas iraníes no son probables.

Turquía puede involucrarse proporcionando armas, tecnología e incluso combatientes mercenarios a cualquiera de las facciones que actúan como proxy de Irán.

Este escenario puede considerarse como posible y de intensidad media

Escenario 3

Irán necesita que, o bien los gobiernos, o bien la población de los diferentes países de Próximo Oriente continúen viendo en Israel a su principal enemigo y amenaza. Entre otros motivos porque es una narrativa de consumo interno que utiliza recurrentemente para desviar la atención de su propia población de otro tipo de problemas. Hasta el momento, el elemento aglutinador de esa forma de ver a Israel ha sido el conflicto palestino. Por lo tanto, es probable que se lleven a cabo acciones que provoquen una reacción de Israel. Estas acciones pueden ser dentro del propio Estado de Israel procedentes desde territorio palestino o libanés, siempre a cargo de los proxies de Irán. No se puede descartar alguna provocación que tenga como resultado un ataque de Israel sobre territorio árabe, seguramente contra Irán o Siria. El objetivo final no sería el Estado hebreo sino minar las bases del tratado, crear malestar social en los firmantes, evitar la adhesión de Arabia Saudí y volver a poder utilizar el conflicto palestino en su propio interés.

Este es un escenario posible y de alta intensidad. 

Conclusiones

La irrupción de EAU como una potencia geopolítica emergente en Oriente Próximo ha sido algo tan sorprendente como precipitado, pues no hace tanto los observadores internacionales no daban demasiada esperanza de vida a la nueva federación de pequeños estados que acababa de nacer.

Por el contrario, EAU y Abu Dhabi, su mayor y más próspero emirato, en particular, ha ido incrementando su posición durante la última década, jugando un papel determinante en la región. Hasta tal punto que, a día de hoy, se considera que las acciones de EAU son las que han facilitado en cierto modo los cambios a los que estamos asistiendo.

Por lo general, los políticos occidentales se sienten deslumbrados por el liberalismo que se percibe de EAU y por la capacidad de sus elites de hablar tanto literal como figuradamente su propio idioma. Es importante que se familiaricen con el modelo de EAU en todos sus aspectos y, lo que es la clave, que entiendan que Abu Dhabi espera ser tratado por todos de igual a igual. Tratar con EAU de esta manera y considerándolo un socio robusto y fiable significa también lanzarles el mensaje de la clara intención de apoyarles.

Una de las grandes consecuencias de este acuerdo puede ser la bajada de intensidad en el conflicto palestino, si no acabando con él, si limitándolo permanentemente. Durante generaciones, este conflicto ha sido utilizado por líderes políticos y religiosos a lo largo y ancho del mundo árabe y musulmán para distraer su atención de otros asuntos. Era un recurso fácil y siempre a mano. Pero ahora ya se reconoce que se trata de una disputa territorial entre dos pueblos, y las futuras negociaciones no tienen más remedio que ir por ese camino, poniendo el foco en el desfasado liderazgo de los palestinos.

Existe la nada desdeñable posibilidad de que el acuerdo alcanzado tenga un efecto dominó y arrastre a otros Estados de la zona a seguir los pasos de EAU, algo que en algunos casos sólo significaría hacer públicas las relaciones que de facto ya mantienen con el Estado de Israel. En este sentido, se conocen conversaciones entre el ministro de exteriores de Omán con su homólogo israelí justo después de la firma del tratado con EAU.

Así mismo, el Primer Ministro israelí mantuvo un encuentro con el líder sudanés Abdel Fattah Burhan, lo cual podría ser una señal de próximos movimientos en ese flanco también.

Aunque la filtración tuvo consecuencias para un alto funcionario sudanés, lo cierto es que el gobierno no negó los contactos. Y todo se ha confirmado cuando EEUU, al anuncio de la próxima salida de Sudán de la lista de países patrocinadores del terrorismo, ha seguido el acuerdo entre Israel y Sudán para normalizar sus relaciones diplomáticas.

Desde hace años, la política de EEUU pasa por desmilitarizar su posición en Próximo Oriente; el coste de su presencia ha sido muy elevado frente a los beneficios que le reporta, además de generar cierta animadversión. Tanto EEUU como otros miembros del G8 apoyan a EAU como el líder económico de la región. Ese apoyo les proporciona la posición ideal para desplegar sus intereses económicos de la región (commodities, I+D & investment). 

Esta posición de apoyo EEUU/EAU (más algunos países del G8), fortalece el papel del país árabe en la región en materia política y por defecto militar, y de cierta forma le permite a sus nuevos aliados y valedores tener cierta influencia en organizaciones como la OPEP, CCG, Liga Árabe) y en países vecinos, pero desde una posición más árabe y menos occidental.

Referente al asunto de la compra de los F-35 por parte de EAU, es innegable que este asunto incomoda a Israel a pesar del cambio en las relaciones. El motivo principal es el temor a que se produzca una equiparación en capacidades militares que podrían ser peligrosos. No obstante, esto no será un obstáculo para el avance en los futuros acuerdos de paz y en el desarrollo de este. Una operación de tal envergadura llevaría años para materializarse y para entonces, las relaciones entre Jerusalén y Abu Dhabi se habrán consolidado. Es más, puede que incluso llegue a verse con buenos ojos por parte de Israel, dado que fortalecería las capacidades militares frente a sus principales oponentes en la región

Cada vez es más patente en el mundo árabe que Israel es demasiado pequeño como para albergar aspiraciones imperialistas, en contraste con países como Turquía e Irán, países ambos que formaron antiguos imperios, y que parecen tener la intención de tratar de restaurar aquello que una vez lograron o fueron.

En cambio, Israel, cada vez más, es visto como un país fuerte, próspero y lo suficientemente dinámico, que convierten la cooperación con Jerusalén en un movimiento inteligente que puede proporcionar beneficios a ambas partes.

Es posible que el acuerdo entre Israel y EAU haya sido impulsado en parte por el temor de ambos a los avances de Irán y al peligro que supone. Pero los beneficios que puede proporcionarles van mucho más allá de ese asunto.

Estos se extienden a posibilidades de inversiones económicas, financieras, turismo y especialmente a compartir know-how. EAU puede beneficiarse de la ventaja tecnológica y científica de Israel del mismo modo que Israel puede obtener rédito de la posición de EAU como centro de servicios internacionales y puerta fundamental de entrada hacia el subcontinente indio y el sudeste asiático.

En relación con la puerta de entrada al subcontinente indio, hay que tener en cuenta que para India la parte más importante del acuerdo es gestionar la faceta económica de las sinergias causadas por este.

EAU y Bahréin pueden convertirse en intermediarios de las exportaciones israelíes tanto de materias como de servicios a diversas partes del mundo.

Israel tiene una fuerte industria de defensa, seguridad y equipos de vigilancia. Es puntera en cultivos sobre terrenos áridos, energía solar, horticultura, alta tecnología joyería y productos farmacéuticos.

Es más, Israel tiene la capacidad de proveer de mano de obra muy cualificada y semicualificada a los países del GCC, especialmente si proceden de las etnias sefardí y mizrahim, muchos de los cuales hablan árabe. Incluso los árabes israelíes pueden encontrar oportunidades que ayuden a seguir tendiendo lazos y puentes que estrechen la división cultural.

La incursión de Israel en el Golfo tiene el potencial de influir en la arquitectura político-económica que India lleva años construyendo, siendo, por ejemplo, uno de los mayores proveedores de trabajadores, productos alimenticios, farmacéuticos etc.

Los mayores clientes del mercado inmobiliario de Dubái, así como el mayor número de turistas que visitan el país proceden de la India. Pero en este cambiante escenario hay margen para establecer sinergias a tres bandas, lo cual convierte a la India en un actor principal en este.

La conclusión final que se puede extraer a modo de valoración a futuro es que, sin duda, esta nueva relación será un modelo a seguir por otros Estados sunnitas que transformará una región estancada en conflictos del siglo XIX en uno de los centros de poder del siglo XXI.

* Teniente Coronel de Infantería. Analista de Geopolítica

 

BIBLIOGRAFÍA

Acharya, Arabinda, “COVID-19: A Testing Time for UAE–India Relations? A Perspective from Abu Dhabi”, Strategic Analysis, Septiembre 2020.

Arab Center for Research and Policy studies, “The Abraham Agreement: normalization of relations or announcement of an existing Emirati - Israeli alliance?”. Catar, Agosto 2020.

Karsh, Ephraim, ed., “The Israel-UAE Peace: A Preliminary Assessment”, Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Septiembre 2020

Salisbury, Peter, “Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy”, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, Londres: Julio 2020

Steinber, Guido, “Regional Powers, United Arab Emirates”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Julio 2020.

Categorías Global Affairs: Oriente Medio Seguridad y defensa Ensayos

Nicolás Maduro during a broadcasted speech [Gov. of Venezuela]

▲ Nicolás Maduro during a broadcasted speech [Gov. of Venezuela]

ESSAY /  Isabelle León Graticola

It is no secret to anyone that Venezuela is going through the most convoluted economic and social crisis in its history, a crisis in which the creators have manipulated the existence of the people, degrading its integrity, and extinguishing everything that once characterized Venezuela.

The country holds a key geopolitical location that serves as a route for North America and the Caribbean to the rest of South America. Likewise, the country is endowed with abundant natural resources like natural gas, iron ore, diamonds, gold, and oil.1 Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, with 302 billion barrels in January 2018, emanating an extremely rich country with astonishing potential.2  However, this crisis has not only hindered people's lives but has ironically dissipated the country's resources to consolidate the pillars of the regime to such an extent that today the government of Nicolás Maduro is importing oil from Iran. Inadequate policies that have weakened the society’s sense of responsibility and nationalism, decreased foreign investment out of lack of trust, and annihilated the state-led oil production, therefore reinforcing the country’s economic downfall and hyperinflation.

The Venezuelan government, headed by Nicolás Maduro, has managed its way to continue holding power despite accusations of corruption, crimes against humanity, and even drugs trafficking involvement. The perplexing socio-economic and political crisis has created an unsustainable and violent context in which poorly informed people are manipulated by the government through speeches that take big significance on how society perceives the actual situation, as well as other countries’ statements on the crisis. Up to this point, it has become difficult to understand what keeps bolstering this regime, but if the situation is analyzed from the nucleus, the well-orchestrated rhetoric of Chávez and his successor, Maduro, has contributed to support the ends and sustainment of the regime. 

Since Maduro reached power, poverty motivated violence has been rampant in Venezuela and insecurity has become a significant part of society’s dynamics. Consequently, many protests against the government demanding for freedom and better living standards have taken place. Maduro’s regime has been forced to employ tools such as fake news and hateful rhetoric to soften the anger of the people by manipulating them and brainwashing the armed forces to avoid uprisings. 

This article aims to analyze how Maduro’s rhetoric has maintained a minority in the wrong side of history and a majority in constant battle by making erroneous accusations to third parties to justify the perturbed situation, while the government keeps enriching its wallet at the cost of the people and its smudged operations. Such feverish society gave rise to pure uncertainty, to a place where disinformation takes the form of a lethal weapon for the dangerous context in which it exists.

The background: Chávez’s indoctrinated society

First, it is necessary to clarify that the focus of this article is merely on the rhetorical aspect as a pillar of the regime. However, when it comes to the background that has sustained Maduro’s administration up to this day, there is a more complex reality, full of crime, death, manipulation, and corruption. Venezuela is an almost abnormal reality because, after more than twenty years, it is still tied to a group of people who have taken absolutely everything from it. From a man that portrayed nothing but hope for the poor, to one who has managed his way sticking to policies damaging to the very people they mean to help, and which, sooner or later, will make the regime collapse.

Hugo Chávez’s presidency was characterized by a tremendous and persuasive oratory; he knew how to get to the people. Chávez’s measures and campaigns were based on a psychological strategy that won him the admiration of the most impoverished classes of the country. Chávez arrived and gave importance and attention to the big mass of the population that previous governments had systematically neglected. People felt the time had come for them to have what they never had before. Filled with charisma and political mastery, his speeches always contained jokes, dances, and colloquial phrases that were considered indecent by the country’s highest class and often misunderstood abroad.

Chávez always built a drastic separation between the ideals of the United States and Venezuela and looked for ways to antagonize the former with his rhetoric. He began to refer to George W. Bush as “Mr. Danger”, an imperial literary character of one of the most famous Venezuelan novels, Doña Bárbara.3

Hugo Chávez is one of the most revolutionary characters in Venezuelan history, one who brought the convoluted situation that today perpetuates in the country. Chávez persecuted journalists and political opponents, expropriated lands, nationalized Venezuela’s key industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and the refining processes of heavy crudes, and slowly degraded the society as the exercise of power was directed to hold complete control of Venezuela’s internal dynamics.4

Chávez extended education and medical assistance to the least favored classes and improved the living conditions of the needy. This policy did nothing but create among these classes a culture of dependence on the government. Chávez’s supporters or Chavistas were the pillars that buttressed the government, while the wealthy were cataloged as “squealing pigs” and “vampires.”5 The Chavistas admired Chavez’s charismatic character and his constant gifts; he gave them fridges and TVs, gadgets that they could never afford on their own. He also constructed buildings, under the “Misión Vivienda” initiative, to give people living in slums a ‘proper’ home. All of this was possible because the oil prices at the time were skyrocketing; he used the oil income to buy his support. The general standard of life, however, continued to be poor. The government knew what to give and how to manipulate to stay in power, and that is precisely what made Hugo Chávez so powerful and almost impossible to defeat despite strong opposition. 

Historically, the United States has opposed left-wing governments in Latin America, so Chávez condemned the US, by referring to them as an imperialist power, or the “Empire.” He disgraced US leaders and actions and transferred that anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist approach to the population, part of which supported him and was blindly loyal to the cause. Chávez’s alliance with Cuba under Fidel Castro led to the supply of oil at cut-rate prices, all related to the desire of reducing US economic influence in South America. Chávez's populist initiatives were the tenets of his administration and controversial foreign policy. These, along with his rhetoric and opposition from the Venezuelan wealthy class, deeply polarized the society and gave rise to what Venezuela has today: a divided society that has suffered from the lack of basic necessities, disinformation, and integrity.

Currently, the spokesmen of the Government of Nicolás Maduro address citizens at all hours from public channels and social networks to stir up the disgruntlement of the population toward the external enemy.6 Despite the poorly prepared speeches, the lack of vocabulary, and the improper formulation of sentences, Maduro has kept the colloquial and unformal rhetoric that characterized Chávez, but has failed to draw the connection that the late president enjoyed. The anti-imperialist strategy has been maintained, and, as the justification of the crisis, it has become the epicenter of the regime’s speech. Nicolás Maduro’s rhetoric revolves around two words: the US and the “Patria”, a word frequently used by Chávez.

The base of Maduro’s rhetoric: the love for Chávez

Shortly before dying in March 2013, Hugo Chávez appointed Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor. Chávez’s charisma and legacy are what somehow ensured him that Maduro would provide a smooth transition. After Chávez’s passing, Maduro took advantage of the momentum and sentiment that the Chavistas revealed and ensured that if picked, he would follow the steps of his predecessor and would continue to strengthen the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’. Along with the continuity with Chávez's legacy, the defense of Venezuelan sovereignty in front of the US, and the social equality became the key messages of his administration.7 Nevertheless, Maduro had little support from the elites and inherited a country that was already economically weak due to the downfall of the oil prices and corruption.

In Chávez’s wake, Maduro appealed to the emotion of the audience. He strongly claimed that the people were there for the ‘Comandante’ and said that “his soul and his spirit was so strong that his body could not stand it anymore, and he was released and now through this universe expanding filling us with blessings and love”. He knew what this meant for the people and a crying audience exclaimed “Chávez vive, la lucha sigue”.

Maduro filled his rhetoric with the love for Chávez. He acknowledged that the Chavistas worshipped him as if he was God and that for ideological reasons, support for Maduro was guaranteed. Nevertheless, others recognized that the situation in the country was not favorable and questioned Maduro’s ability to fill the void left by Chávez. When Maduro took power, the country entered a period of reinforced economic decline accompanied by hyperinflation that nowadays exceeds 10 million percent.8 As it was previously stated, the conditions of poverty surpass anything seen before in the country, which is now on the brink of collapse.

Furthermore, Venezuela went through two rounds of mass protests, in 2014 and 2018, that demanded freedom and change. Unfortunately, and as was expected from the government, thousands of violations of human rights were part of the demonstration’s dynamics as brutal repression and the unjust imprisonment of demonstrators took place all along. Simultaneously, Maduro managed to call for concentrations on the days of the major opposition’s marches and retained the populist speech based on ideological arguments and emotional appeals among the minority of supporters to consolidate his power in Venezuela. Last year, in a regime concentration on February 23rd, he condemned the elites as he explained that he was certain that from the bottom of his Chavista sentiment of loyalty to this battle, he was never going to be part of one. He stated that Venezuela will continue to be Patria for more many years to come. 

The ongoing crisis has forced many to survive rather than to live, but despite all, Maduro remains in control. Maduro has kept Chávez’s anti-imperialist policy and has rejected any minimum support from the United States. The government takes advantage of the hunger and the vulnerable situation of its people and makes sure that it remains as the only source of food. It does not take responsibility and instead, blames the crisis on the ‘economic war’ that the US has imposed on Venezuela.9  When Juan Guaidó sworn himself the legitimate president, Maduro’s supporters started raising firms in a campaign called “Hands off Venezuela”, while the US was trying to get humanitarian assistance into Venezuela through the Colombian border in the name of Guaidó. 

In this sense, he explained in the same concentration speech that they were defending the national territory and the right to live freely and independently. Although it may seem ironic, because the government has killed hundreds of people with its police brutality and torture, this rhetoric is what has kept him the support of the hardcore revolutionary followers. The “Hands off Venezuela”, was shouted and accompanied by the worst English pronunciation –that characterizes Maduro–, and followed with insults to Guaidó.

As Maduro yelled “puppet, clown, and beggar of imperialism and Donald Trump. If he is the President, where are the economic and social measures that he has applied for the people? It is a game to deceive and manipulate, it is a game that has failed, the coup d'état has failed” as the red audience shouted, “jail him, jail him!”. He drew his speech to a hardcore anti-imperialist audience and firmly stated that the US intended to invade Venezuela and enslave it. Maduro finalized his speech by shouting “wave up the flag, up the Patria, for the people in defense of the Revolution”.

Recently, the US State Department released a price for the capture of Maduro and his cabinet, not only for the crimes committed against the Venezuelan population, but also because of their involvement in a huge drug-trafficking network. With this, the regime's position has become more vulnerable and simultaneously pragmatic, but as tough actions were taken against possible threats and opposing figures, Maduro’s rhetoric remains to deny its status and manipulating those that still support him. In another public speech, he stated that “Donald Trump's government, in an extravagant and extreme, vulgar, miserable action, launched a set of false accusations and like a racist cowboy of the 21st century, put a price on the heads of revolutionaries that still are willing to fight them”. He one more time accused the US of being the main cause of the economic crisis of Venezuela.

Nicolás Maduro’s speech has always been directed to the hardcore revolutionaries, those that worship Chávez since the beginning and who firmly believe in the socialist cause. Maduro has maintained his rhetoric despite the changes in the internal situation of the country; he has held an enduring method for antagonizing the opposition, the Venezuelan upper class, and the United States. On the other hand, regarding the strategic foreign allies, the regime openly gives declarations to support them, but again to somehow antagonize the United States. Indeed, this was the case of the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian top commander, in which government representatives attended the Iranian embassy to give the condolences in the name of the regime and swore to avenge Soleimani’s death. The administration of Nicolás Maduro has no gray areas, everything is either black or white; the opposition, the upper class, the US, and the US-influenced countries are the enemies, and the rhetoric rarely leans toward a conciliatory message, rather has always revolved around these conflicting parties.

What is left

Twenty years have passed since the Chavismo arrived in the country. Nowadays, a passionate minority of the population keeps supporting Maduro. His regime continues to train armed groups to combat discontent headed by opposition leader Juan Guaidó. The Chavismo keeps being strong, but it has been fragmented by those who believe that the revolution ended at the moment Chávez died, and the ones that are convinced that supporting Maduro means being loyal to Chávez. In the case of Juan Guaidó, he keeps doing his efforts. He still has relative support and keeps being a source of hope. Nevertheless, many criticize the fact that he let again the people cool down. A close change is expected, but no one knows what the movements behind are. Meanwhile, the people will continue suffering and trying to survive.

Upon reflection, it can be noticed that Maduro's entire argumentation revolves around a confrontational rhetoric: the US and capitalism against Venezuela; Guaidó against the Patria; the elites against the Revolution.10 Far from recognizing the reality that the country faces and take actions to improve it, this confrontational approach simply places the blame on those who have tried to bring a change in the internal dynamics of Venezuela. The regime has managed to construct a national united front against a common foreign enemy and to demonize the opposition.

Chávez and Maduro’s rhetoric has followed a tangible objective: the Revolution. Maduro's regime up to this point is searching for a way to consolidate its power and sustain itself as the best way to elude a rather somber future in jail. This never-ending nightmare should have long ago collapsed due to the economic catastrophe, hyperinflation, political repression, human rights violations, and the lack of direction for Venezuela. Behind what maintains this structure there is nothing but the exercise of power and the almost absolute control of society. The Patria that they constantly speak of is running out of fuel to keep going. Nonetheless, the rhetorical deceptions of the Bolivarian revolution, which for two decades have appealed to the popular classes, settled in the collective mindset of the Chavismo and brought space for support in the Venezuelan society.

Chávez and Maduro’s presidencies have been based on educating and changing the mindset of the population as they wanted; a population that is content with one box of food a month and which, unfortunately, hunts for the easy means to achieve its goals instead of fighting to improve its lot.

Today, the regime is fed on the memory of Hugo Chávez, on his promises, on his battle. As long as it keeps generating an illusion on the supporters, Maduro will appeal to it as a pillar of his administration and of the Revolution.

 

1. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Venezuela facts and figures. 2019, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

2. US Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Venezuela. Jan. 2019, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=VEN. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

3. Livingstone, G. (2013, March 10). The secret of Hugo Chavez's hold on his people. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-secret-of-hugo-chavezs-hold-on-his-people-8527832.html

4. El País. (2007, January 08). Chávez anuncia la nacionalización del servicio eléctrico y las telecomunicaciones. Retrieved July 01, 2020, from https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/01/08/actualidad/1168210811_850215.html

5. The Guardian. (2012, October 08). Hugo Chávez: A victory of enduring charisma and political mastery. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/08/hugo-chavez-victory-political-venezuela

6. Twitter, F., & Miraflores, P. (2017, July 23). Maduro, sus ministros y la corrupción del lenguaje. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/07/22/opinion/1500746848_239358.html

7. Grainger, S. Hugo Chávez and Venezuela Confront his Succession. Dec. 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20678634. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

8.  Sánchez, V. Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. ‘Shock therapy’ may be only chance to undo economic damage. Aug. 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

9. TVVenezuela. Las cajas CLAP ya no tienen con qué alimentar a los venezolanoshttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MelhZDbiFQQ. Sept. 2019. Accessed 30 Nov. 2019.

10. Delgado, A., & Herrero, J. (2019, February 12). Retóricas de Venezuela en Twitter: Guaidó vs. Maduro. Retrieved March 18, 2020, from https://beersandpolitics.com/retoricas-de-venezuela-en-twitter-guaido-vs-maduro

Categorías Global Affairs: Orden mundial, diplomacia y gobernanza Latinoamérica Ensayos

Members of Colombia's National Liberation Army  [Voces de Colombia]

▲ Members of Colombia's National Liberation Army [Voces de Colombia]

ESSAY / Ángel Martos

Terrorism and transnational organized crime are some of the most relevant topics nowadays in international security. The former represents a traditional threat that has been present during most our recent history, especially since the second half of the twentieth century. International organized crime, on the other hand, has taken place throughout history in multiple ways. Examples can be found even in the pre-industrial era: In rural and coastal areas, where law enforcement was weaker, bandits and pirates all over the world made considerable profit from hijacking vehicles along trade routes and roads, demanding a payment or simply looting the goods that the merchants carried. The phenomenon has evolved into complex sets of interconnected criminal networks that operate globally and in organized way, sometimes even with the help of the authorities.

In this paper, the author will analyze the close interaction between terrorism and organized crime often dubbed the “crime-terror continuum”. After explaining the main tenets of this theory, a case study will be presented. It is the network of relations that exists in Latin America which links terrorist groups with drug cartels. The evolution of some of these organizations into a hybrid comprising terrorist and criminal activity will also be studied.

Defining concepts

The crime-terror nexus is agreed to have been consolidated in the post-Cold War era. After the 9/11 attacks, the academic community began to analyze more deeply and thoroughly the threat that terrorism represented for international security. However, there is one specific topic that was not paid much attention until some years later: the financing of terrorist activity. Due to the decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, these groups have managed to look for funding by partnering with organized criminal groups or engaging in illicit activities themselves. Starting in the 1980s with what later came to be known as narco-terrorism, the use of organized crime by terrorist groups became mainstream in the 1990s. Taxing drug trade and credit-card fraud are the two most common sources of revenues for these groups (Makarenko, 2010).

The basic level of relationship that exists between two groups of such different nature is an alliance. Terrorists may look for different objectives when allying with organized crime groups. For example, they may seek expert knowledge (money-laundering, counterfeiting, bomb-making, etc.) or access to smuggling routes. Even if the alliances may seem to be only beneficial for terrorist groups, criminal networks benefit from the destabilizing effect terrorism has over political institutions, and from the additional effort law enforcement agencies need to do to combat terrorism, investing resources that will not be available to fight other crimes. Theirs is a symbiotic relation in which both actors win. A popular example in the international realm is the protection that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) offered to drug traders that smuggle cocaine from South America through West and North Africa towards Europe. During the last decade, the terrorist organization charged a fee on the shipments in exchange for its protection along the route (Vardy, 2009).

The convergence of organizations

Both types of organizations can converge into one up to the point that the resulting group can change its motives and objectives from one side to the other of the continuum, constituting a hybrid organization whose defining points and objectives blur. An organization of this nature could be both a criminal group with political motivations, and a terrorist group interested in criminal profits. The first one may for example be interested in getting involved in political processes and institutions or may use violence to gain a monopolized control over a lucrative economic sector.

Criminal and terrorist groups mutate to be able to carry out by themselves a wider range of activities (political and financial) while avoiding competitiveness, misunderstandings and threats to their internal security. This phenomenon was popularized after the 1990s, when criminal groups sought to manipulate the operational conditions of weak states, while terrorist groups sought to find new financial sources other than the declining state sponsors. A clear example of this can be found in the Italian Mafia during the 1990s. A series of deliberate bombing attacks were reported in key locations such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the church of St. John Lateran in Rome. The target was not a specific enemy, but rather the public opinion and political authorities (the Anti-Mafia Commission) who received a warning for having passed legislation unfavorable to the interests of the criminal group. Another example far away from Europe and its traditional criminal groups can be found in Brazil. In the early 2000s, a newly elected government carried out a crackdown on several criminal organizations like the Comando Vermelho, the Amigos dos Amigos, and the group Terceiro Comando, which reacted violently by unleashing brutal terrorist attacks on governmental buildings and police officers. These attacks gave the Administration no other choice but to give those groups back the immunity with which they had always operated in Rio de Janeiro.

On the other side of the relationship, terrorist organizations have also engaged in criminal activities, most notably illicit drug trade, in what has been a common pattern since the 1970s. Groups like the FARC, ETA, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), or Sendero Luminoso are among them. The PKK, for example, made most of its finances using its advantageous geographic location as well as the Balkan routes of entry into Europe to smuggle heroin from Asia into Europe. In yet another example, Hezbollah is said to protect heroin and cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley, in Lebanon.

Drug trafficking is not the only activity used by terrorist groups. Other criminal activities serve the same purpose. For example, wholesale credit-card fraud all around Europe is used by Al Qaeda to gain profits (US$ 1 million a month). Furthermore, counterfeit products smuggling has been extensively used by paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland and Albanian extremist groups to finance their activities.

Sometimes, the fusion of both activities reaches a point where the political cause that once motivated the terrorist activity of a group ends or weakens, and instead of disbanding, it drifts toward the criminal side and morphs into an organized criminal association with no political motivations) that the convergence thesis identifies is the one of terrorist organizations that have ultimately maintained their political façade for legitimation purposes but that their real motivations and objectives have mutated into those of a criminal group. They are thus able to attract recruits via 2 sources, their political and their financial one. Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and FARC are illustrative of this. Abu Sayyaf, originally founded to establish an Islamic republic in the territory comprising Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (Philippines), is now dedicated exclusively to kidnapping and marijuana plantations. The former granted them US$ 20 million only in 2000. Colombian FARC, since the 1990s, has followed the same path: according to Paul Wilkinson, they have evolved from a revolutionary group that had state-wide support into a criminal guerrilla involved in protection of crops and laboratories, also acting as “middlemen” between farmers and cartels; kidnapping, and extortion.  By the beginning of our century, they controlled 40 per cent of Colombia’s territory and received an annual revenue of US$ 500 million (McDermott, 2003).

“Black hole” states

The ultimate danger the convergence between criminal and terrorist groups may present is a situation where a weak or failed state becomes a safe haven for the operations of hybrid organizations like those described before. This is known as the “black hole” syndrome. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Angola, Sierra Leone and North Korea are examples of states falling into this category. Other regions, such as the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, and others in Indonesia and Thailand in which the government presence is weak can also be considered as such.

Afghanistan has been considered a “black hole state” since at least the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. Since the beginning of the civil war, the groups involved in it have sought to survive, oftentimes renouncing to their ideological foundations, by engaging in criminal activity such as the production and trafficking of opiates, arms or commodities across the border with Pakistan, together with warlords. The chaos that reigns in the country is a threat not only to the nation itself and its immediate neighbors, but also to the entire world.

The People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is, on the other hand, considered a criminal state. This is because it has engaged in transnational criminal activities since the 1970s, with its “Bureau 39”, a government department that manages the whole criminal activity for creating hard currency (drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, privacy, etc.). This was proved when the Norwegian government expelled officials of the North Korean embassy in 1976 alleging that they were engaged in the smuggling of narcotics and unlicensed goods (Galeotti, 2001).

Another situation may arise where criminal and terrorist groups deliberately foster regional instability for their own economic benefits. In civil wars, these groups may run the tasks that a state’s government would be supposed to run. It is the natural evolution of a territory in which a political criminal organization or a commercial terrorist group delegitimizes the state and replaces its activity. Examples of this situation are found in the Balkans, Caucasus, southern Thailand and Sierra Leone (Bangura, 1997).

In Sierra Leone, for example, it is now evident that the violence suffered in the 1990s during the rebellion of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) had nothing to do with politics or ideals - it was rather a struggle between the guerrilla and the government to crack down on the other party and reap the profits of illicit trade in diamonds. There was no appeal to the population or political discourse whatsoever. The “black hole” thesis illustrates how civil wars in our times are for the most part a legitimization for the private enrichment of the criminal parties involved and at the same time product of the desire of these parties for the war to never end.

The end of the Cold War saw a shift in the study of the nexus between crime and terrorism. During the previous period, it was a phenomenon only present in Latin America between insurgent groups and drug cartels. It was not until the emergence of Al Qaeda’s highly networked and globally interconnected cells that governments realized the level of threat to international security that non-state actors could pose. As long as weak or failed states exist, the crime-terror nexus will be further enhanced. Moreover, the activity of these groups will be buttressed by effects of globalization such as the increase of open borders policies, immigration flows, international transportation infrastructure, and technological development. Policymakers do not pay enough attention to the criminal activities of both types of organizations. Rather than dealing with the political motivations of a group, what really makes the difference is to focus on its funding resources – credit-card frauds, smuggling, money laundering, etc.

The following section focuses on the crime-terror continuum that exists between illegal drug trade and terrorist networks. This phenomenon has emerged in many regions all around the world, but the case of Latin America, or the Andean region more specifically, represents the paradigm of the characteristics, dangers and opportunities of these situations.

NARCO-TERRORISM CASE STUDY:

When drug trafficking meets political violence

The concept of narco-terrorism was born in recent years as a result of the understanding of illicit drug trade and terrorism as two interconnected phenomena. Traditionally linked with Latin America, the concept can now be found in other parts of the world like, for example, the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), or the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos and Myanmar).

There is no consensus on the convenience and accuracy of the term “narco-terrorism,” if only because it may refer to different realities. One can think of narco-terrorism as the use of terrorist attacks by criminal organizations such as the Colombian Medellin Cartel to attain an immediate political goal. Or, from a different point of view, one can think of a terrorist organization engaging in illicit drug trade to raise funds for its activity. Briefly, according to Tamara Makarenko’s Crime-Terror Continuum construct all organizations, no matter the type, could at some point move along this continuum depending on their activities and motivations; from the one extreme of a purely criminal organization, to the other of a purely political one, or even constituting a hybrid in the middle (Makarenko, 2010).

There is a general perception of a usual interaction between drug-trafficking and terrorist organizations. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between the cooperation of two organizations of each nature, and an organization carrying out activities under both domains. There are common similarities between the different organizations that can be highlighted to help policymaking more effective.

Both type of organizations cohabit in the same underground domain of society and share the common interest of remaining undiscovered by law enforcement authorities. Also, their transnational operations follow similar patterns. Their structure is vertical in the highest levels of the organization and turns horizontal in the lowest. Finally, the most sophisticated among them use a cell structure to reduce information sharing to the bare minimum to reduce the risk of the organization being unveiled if some of its members are arrested.

The main incentive for organizations to cooperate are tangible resources. Revenues from narcotics trafficking might be very helpful for terrorist organizations, while access to explosive material may benefit drug trade organizations. As an example, according to the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2004, an estimated US$ 2.3 billion of the total revenue of global drug trade end up in the hands of organizations like Al Qaeda. Another example is the illegal market of weapons emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, field of interest of both types of networks. On the other hand, intangible resources are similar to tangible in usefulness but different in essence. Intangible resources that drug trafficking organizations possess and can be in the interests of terrorist ones are the expertise on methods and routes of transports, which could be used for terrorist to smuggle goods or people - drug corridors such as the Balkan route or the Northern route. On the other way around, terrorists can share the military tactics, know-how and skills to perpetrate attacks. Some common resources that can be used by both in their benefit are the extended networks and contacts (connections with corrupt officials, safe havens, money laundering facilities, etc.) A good example of the latter can be found in the hiring of ELN members by Pablo Escobar to construct car bombs.

The organizations are, as we have seen, often dependent on the same resources, communications, and even suppliers. This does not lead to cooperation, but rather to competition, even to conflict. Examples can be traced back to the 1980s in Peru when clashes erupted between drug traffickers and the terrorist Sendero Luminoso, and in Colombia when drug cartels and the FARC clashed for territorial matters. Even the protection of crops terrorists offer to drug traffickers is one of the main drivers of conflict, even if they do find common grounds of understanding most of the time; for example, in terms of government, revenue-motivated organizations are a threat to the state as they fight to weaken some parts of it such as law enforcement or jurisdiction, while politically-motivated ones wish not only to undermine the state but to radically change its structures to fit their ideological vision (state-run economy, religious-based society, etc.).

The terrorism and drug connection in the Andean Region

Nowhere has the use of illicit drug trade as a source of funds for terrorism been so developed as in the Andean Region (Steinitz, 2002). Leftist groups such as FARC and Peruvian Sendero Luminoso, as well as right-wing paramilitary organizations such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are involved in this activity. At the beginning, the engagement between terrorists and drug traffickers was limited only to fees imposed by the former on the latter in exchange for the protection of crops, labs and shipments. Later, FARC and AUC have further expanded this engagement and are now involved in the early stages of the traffic itself – being the main substance cocaine, and the main reward money and arms from the drug syndicates. The terrorist cells can be therefore considered a hybrid of political and criminal groups. The following paragraphs will further analyze each case.

Peru’s Sendero Luminoso

Sendero Luminoso (SL) started to operate in the Huallaga Valley, a strong Peruvian coca region, several years after its foundation, in 1980. Peru was at the time the world’s first producer of coca leaf. The plant was then processed into coca paste and transported to Colombian laboratories by traffickers. Arguably, the desire for profit from the coca business rather than for political influence was the ultimate motive for Sendero Luminoso’s expansion into the region. SL protected the crops and taxed the production and transportation of coca paste: the 1991 document “Economic Balance of the Shining Path” shows that the group charged US$ 3,000-7,000 per flight leaving Huallaga. Taxes were also levied in exchange for a service that the group provided the cocaleros: negotiating favorable prices with the traffickers. In the late 1980s, SL’s annual income from the business was estimated at US$ 15-100 million (McClintock, 1998).

The Peruvian government’s fight against SL represents a milestone in the fight against the terrorism-crime nexus. Lima set up a political-military command which focused on combatting terrorism while ignoring drugs, because a reasonable percentage of the Peruvian population eked out a living by working in the coca fields. The government also avoided using the police as they were seen as highly corruptible. They succeeded in gaining the support of peasant growers and traffickers of Huallaga Valley, a valuable source of intelligence to use against SL. The latter finally left the Valley.

But it was not a final victory. Due to the vacuum SL left, the now more powerful traffickers reduced the prices paid for the coca leaf. SL was no longer there to act as an intermediary in defense of peasants and minor traffickers, so thanks to the new lower prices, the cocaine market experienced a boom. The military deployed in the area started to accept bribes in exchange for their laissez-faire attitude, becoming increasingly corrupted. President Fujimori in 1996 carried out a strategy of interdiction of the flights that departed from the Valley carrying coca paste to Colombia, causing the traffickers and farmers to flee and the coca leaf price to fall notably. However, this environment did not last long, and the country is experiencing a rise in drug trade and terrorist subversive activities.

The Colombian nexus expands

The collapse of the Soviet Union and an economic crisis in Cuba diminished the amount of aid that the FARC could receive. After the government’s crackdown, with the help of Washington, of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the drug business in Colombia was seized by numerous smaller networks. There was not any significant reduction of the cocaine flow into the United States. The FARC benefitted greatly from the neighboring states’ actions, gaining privileged access to drug money. Peru under Fujimori had cracked down on the coca paste transports, and Bolivia’s government had also put under strict surveillance its domestic drug cultivation. This elimination of competitors caused a doubling of coca production in Colombia between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, opium poppy cultivation also grew significantly and gained relevance in the US’ East-coast market. The FARC also benefitted from this opportunity.

According to the Colombian government, in 1998 the terrorist groups earned US$ 551 million from drug, US$ 311 million from extortion, and US$ 236 million from kidnapping. So much so that the organization has been able to pay higher salaries to its recruits than the Colombian army pays its soldiers. By 2000, the FARC had an estimated 15,000-20,000 recruits in more than 70 fronts, de facto controlling 1/3 of the nation’s territory. Most of the criminal-derived money in the country comes nowadays from taxation and protection of the drug business. According to the Colombian Military, more than half both the FARC’s fronts were involved in the collection of funds by the beginning of the 2000s decade, compared to 40% approx. of AUC fronts (Rebasa and Chalk, 1999).

The situation that was created in both scenarios required created a chaos in which the drug cartels, the cultivation syndicates and the terrorist organizations were the strongest actors. This makes it a very unstable environment for the peoples that lived in the territories under criminal/terrorist control. The tactics of law enforcement agents and government, in these cases, need to be carefully planned, so that multilateral counter-drug/counter-terrorist strategies can satisfactorily address threats existing at multiple dimensions. In the following section, the author will review some key aspects of the policies carried out by the US government in this domain.

The “War on Drugs” and the “War on Terror”

Since 9/11, policies considering both threats as being intertwined have become more and more popular. The separation of counter terrorism and counter-narcotics has faded significantly. Although in the Tashkent Conferences of 1999-2000 the necessary link between both was already mentioned, the milestone of cooperative policies is the Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council (Björnehed, 2006). In it, emphasis is given to the close connection between terrorism and all kinds of organized crime, and therefore coordination at national, regional and global level is said to be necessary. War on drugs and war on terror should no longer be two separate plans of action.

The effectiveness of a policy that wishes to undermine the threat of illicit drug trade and terrorism is to a high degree dependent on successful intelligence gathering. Information about networks, suspects, shipments, projects, etc. benefits agencies fighting drug trafficking as well as those fighting terrorism, since the resources are most of the times shared.  Narco-terrorism nexus is also present in legal acts, with the aim of blocking loopholes in law enforcement efforts. Examples are the Victory Act and the Patriot Act, passed in the US. Recognizing the natural link and cooperation between drug trade and terrorism leads to security analysts developing more holistic theories for policymakers to implement more accurate and useful measures.

However, there are many aspects in which illicit drug trade and terrorist activity differ, and so do the measures that should be taken against them. An example of a failure to understand this point can be found in Afghanistan, where the Taliban in 2000 set a ban in poppy cultivation which resulted in a strong increase of its price, being this a victory for traffickers since the trade did not stop. Another idea to have in mind is that strategies of a war on drugs differ greatly depending on the nature of the country: whether it is solely a consumer like the UK or a producer and consumer like Tajikistan. In regard to terrorism, the measures adopted to undermine it (diplomacy, foreign aid, democratization, etc.) may have minimal effect on the fight against drug trade.

Sometimes, the risk of unifying counter-policies is leaving some areas in which cooperation is not present unattended. Certain areas are suitable for a comprehensive approach such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement and security devices, while others such as drug rehabilitation are not mutually beneficial. Not distinguishing the different motivations and goals among organizations can lead to a failed homogenous policy.

CONCLUSIONS:

Multilevel threats demand multilevel solutions

Terrorism has traditionally been considered a threat to national and international security, while illicit drug trade a threat to human security. This perception derives from the effects of drugs in a consumer country, although war on drugs policies are usually aimed at supplier ones. Although it was already constituting a threat to regional stability during the twentieth century, it was not considered a crucial political issue until 9/11 attacks, when the cooperative link between criminal and terrorist organizations became evident. An example of unequal attention paid to both threats can be found in US’s Plan Colombia in 2000: one of the main advocators of the legislation stated that the primary focus was on counter-drug, so the United States would not engage with Colombian counterinsurgency efforts (Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, 2003).The same type of failure was also seen in Afghanistan but in the opposite way, when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completely neglected any action against drug traffickers, the trade or the production itself.

The merging of drug trafficking and terrorism as two overlapping threats have encouraged authorities to develop common policies of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. The similarities between organizations engaged in each activity are the main reason for this. However, the differences between them are also relevant, and should be taken into consideration for the counter policies to be accurate enough.

Evidence of a substantial link between terrorists and criminals has been proved all along our recent history. Around the world, leaders of mafias and terrorist commanders have oftentimes worked together when they felt that their objectives were close, if not similar. When cohabitating in the outlaw world, groups tend to offer each other help, usually in exchange for something. This is part of human behavior. Added to the phenomenon of globalization, lines tend to be blurred for international security authorities, and thus for the survival of organizations acting transnationally.

The consequences can be noticed especially in Latin America, and more specifically in organizations such as the FARC. We can no longer tell what are the specific objectives and the motivations that pushed youngsters to flee towards the mountains to learn to shoot and fabricate bombs. Is it a political aspiration? Or is it rather an economic necessity? The reason why we cannot answer this question without leaving aside a substantial part of the explanation is the evolution of the once terrorist organization into a hybrid group that moves all along the crime-terror continuum.

The ideas of Makarenko, Björnehed and Steinitz have helped the international community in its duty to protect its societies. It cannot be expected for affected societies to live in peace if the competent authorities try to tackle its structural security issues only through the counter-terrorist approach or through the organized crime lens. The hybrid threats that the world is suffering in the twenty-first century demand hybrid solutions.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bangura, Y. (1997) ‘Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the sierra leone war’, Africa Development, vol. 22, no. 3/4 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Björnehed, E., 2006. Narco-Terrorism: The Merger Of The War On Drugs And The War On Terror. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Galeotti, M. (2001) ‘Criminalisation of the DPRK’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (March) [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Makarenko, T., 2010. The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing The Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at [Accessed 3 April 2020].

McClintock, C. Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 341 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

McDermott, J. (2003) ‘Financing insurgents in Colombia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 15, no. 2

(February) [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Mutschke, R., (2000) ‘The threat posed by organised crime, international drug trafficking and terrorism’, written testimony to the General Secretariat Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime (13 December) [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Rebasa and Chalk, pp. 32–33; “To Turn the Heroin Tide,” Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A9; “Colombian Paramilitary Chief Shows Face,” Associated Press, March 2, 2000.

Steinitz, M., 2002. The Terrorism And Drug Connection In Latin America’S Andean Region. [online] Brian Loveman, San Diego State University. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, Adam “‘The War on Drugs’ meets the ’War on Terror’ ”(CIP International Policy Report February 2003) p. 13.

Vardy, N., 2009. Al-Qaeda's New Business Model: Cocaine And Human Trafficking. [online] Forbes. Available at [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Categorías Global Affairs: Seguridad y defensa Latinoamérica Ensayos

The British Raj in 1909 showing Muslim majority areas in green

▲ The British Raj in 1909 showing Muslim majority areas in green

ESSAYVictoria Paternina and Claudia Plasencia

Pakistan’s partition from India in 1947 marked the beginning of a long road of various territorial disputes, causing different effects in the region. The geopolitics of Pakistan with India are often linked when considering their shared history; and in fact, it makes sense if we take the perspective of Kashmir as the prominent issue that Islamabad has to deal with. However, neither the history nor the present of Pakistan can be reduced to New Delhi and their common regional conflict over the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

The turbulent and mistrustful relations between India and Pakistan go beyond Kashmir, with the region of Punjab divided in two sides and no common ground between New Delhi and Islamabad. In the same way, the bitter ties between Islamabad and a third country are not exclusively with India. Once part of Pakistan, Bangladesh has a deeply rooted hatred relationship with Islamabad since their split in 1971. Looking beyond Kashmir, Punjab and Bangladesh show a distinct aspect of the territorial disputes of the past and present-day Pakistan. Islamabad has a say in these issues that seem to go unnoticed due to the fact that they stand in the shadow of Kashmir.

This essay tries to shed light on other events that have a solid weight on Pakistan’s geopolitics as well as to make clear that the country is worthy of attention not only from New Delhi’s perspective but also from their own Pakistani view. In that way, this paper is divided in two different topics that we believe are important in order to understand Pakistan and its role in the region. Punjab and Bangladesh: the two shoved under the rug by Kashmir.

Punjab

The tale of territorial disputes is rooted deeply in Pakistan and Indian relations; the common mistake is to believe that New Delhi and Islamabad only fight over Kashmir. If the longstanding dispute over Kashmir has raised the independence claims of its citizens, Punjab is not far from that. On the edge of the partition, Punjab was another region in which territorial lines were difficult to apply. They finally decided to divide the territory in two sides; the western for Pakistan and the eastern for India. However, this issue automatically brought problems since the majority of Punjabis were neither Hindus nor Muslims but rather Sikhs. Currently, the division of Punjab is still in force. Despite the situation in Pakistan Punjab remains calm due to the lack of Sikhs as most of them left the territory or died in the partition. The context in India Punjab is completely different as riots and violence are common in the eastern side due to the wide majority of Sikhs that find no common ground with Hindus and believe that India has occupied its territory. Independence claims have been strengthened throughout the years in many occasions, supported by the Pakistani ISI in order to destabilize India. Furthermore, the rise of the nationalist Indian movement is worsening the situation for Punjabis who are realizing how their rights are getting marginalized in the eyes of Modi’s government.

Nonetheless, the question of Punjabi independence is only a matter of the Indian side. The Pakistan-held Punjab is a crucial province of the country in which the wide majority are Muslims. The separation of Punjab from Islamabad would not be conceived since it would be devastating. For Pakistan, it would mean the loss of 72 million inhabitants; damaging the union and stability of the country. All of this taking into account that Punjab represents a strong pillar for the national economy since it is the place where the Indus river – one of the most important ones – flows. It can be said that there is no room for independence of the Pakistani side, nor for a rapprochement between both parts of the former Punjab region. They have lost their main community ties. Besides, the disagreements are between New Delhi and Eastern Punjab, so Islamabad has nothing to do here. According to that, the only likely long-term possibility would be the independence of the Indian side of the Punjab due to the growth of the hatred against New Delhi. Additionally, there are many Sikhs living abroad in UK or Canada who support the independence of Punjab into a new country “Khalistan” strengthening the movement into an international concern. Nevertheless, the achievement of this point would probably increase the violence in Punjab, and in case they would become independent it would be at the expense of many deaths.

There is a last point that must be taken into account when referring to India-Pakistan turbulent territorial relations. This is the case of the longstanding conflict over water resources in which both countries have been increasing tensions periodically. Considering that there is a scarcity of water resources and a high demand of that public good, it is easy to realize that two enemies that share those resources are going to fight for them. Furthermore, if they both are mainly agrarian countries, the interest of the water would be even harder as it is the case of Pakistan and India. However, for more than five decades both Islamabad and New Delhi have maintained the Indus Waters Treaty that regulates the consumption of the common waters. It divides the six rivers that flow over Pakistan and India in two sides. The three western ones for Pakistan, and the other three of the eastern part for India. Nevertheless, it does not mean that India could not make any use of the Pakistani ones or vice versa; they are allowed to use them in non-consumptive terms such as irrigation, but not for storage or building infrastructures[1]. This is where the problem is. India is seemed to have violated those terms by constructing a dam in the area of the Pakistani Indus river in order to use the water as a diplomatic weapon against Islamabad.

This term has been used as an Indian strategy to condemn the violence of Pakistan-based groups against India undermining in that way the economy of Pakistan which is highly dependent on water resources. Nevertheless, it is hard to think that New Delhi would violate one of the milestones treaties in its bilateral relations with Pakistan. Firstly, because it could escalate their already existent tensions with Pakistan that would transform into an increase of the violence against India. Islamabad’s reaction would not be friendly, and although terrorist activities follow political causes, any excuse is valid to lead to an attack. Secondly, because it would bring a bad international image for PM Modi as the UN and other countries would condemn New Delhi of having breached a treaty as well as leaving thousands of people without access to water. Thirdly, they should consider that rivers are originated in the Tibet, China, and a bad movement would mean a reaction from Beijing diverting the water towards Pakistan[2]. Finally, India does not have enough infrastructure to use the additional water available. It is better for both New Delhi and Islamabad to maintain the issue over water resources under a formal treaty considering their mutual mistrust and common clashes. Nevertheless, it would be better for them to renew the Indus Waters Treaty in order to include new aspects that were not foreseen when it was drafted as well as to preserve the economic security of both countries.

Bangladesh

Punjab is a territory obligated to be divided in two between India and Pakistan, yet Bangladesh separated itself completely from Pakistan and finds itself in the middle of India. Bangladesh, once part of Pakistan, after a tumultuous war, separated into its own country.  While India did not explicitly intervene with Bangladesh and Pakistan’s split, it did promote the hatred between the two for its own agenda and to increase in power. The scarring aspect of the split of Bangladesh from Pakistan is the bloody war and genocide that took place, something that the Bengali people still have not overcome to this day. The people of Bangladesh are seeking an apology from Pakistan, something that does not look like it is going to come anytime soon.

Pakistan and Bangladesh share a bitter past with one another as prior to 1971, they were one country which separated into two as a result of a bloody war and emerging political differences. Since 1971 up to today, India and the Awami league have worked to maintain this hatred between Bangladesh and Pakistan through propagandist programs and different techniques. For example, they set up a war museum, documentaries and films in order to boast more the self-proclamation of superiority on behalf of India against Bangladesh and Pakistan. India and the Awami League ignore the fact that they have committed atrocities against the Bengali people and that in large part they are responsible for the breakup between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) worked to improve relations with Pakistan under the governments of Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaldia Zia, and Hossain Mohammad Ershad in Bangladesh, who had maintained distance from India. Five Pakistani heads of government have visited Bangladesh since 1980, along with signing trade and cultural agreements to improve relations between the two nations.[3] While an alliance between Pakistan and Bangladesh against India is not a realistic scenario, what is important for Pakistan and Bangladesh for the next decade to come is attempt to put their past behind them in order to steer clear of India and develop mutually beneficial relations to help improve their economies. For example, a possible scenario for improving Pakistan and Bangladesh relations could be to join the CPEC to better take advantage of the trade opportunities offered within South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and China and Russia.[4]

Despite decades of improving trade and military links, especially as a defense against Indian supremacy in the region, the two countries continue to be divided by the question of genocide. Bangladesh wants Pakistan to recognize the genocide and its atrocities and teach them as a part of its history. However, Pakistan has refused to do so and has even referred to militant leader executed for war crimes as being killed for his loyalty to Pakistan.[5]

Even though India supported Bangladesh in its independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh thinks that India is self-serving and that they change ideas depending on their own convenience.[6] An alliance of Pakistan and Bangladesh, even though it is against a common enemy, India, is not realistic given the information recently provided. India is a country that yes, even though they helped Bangladesh against Pakistan, they are always going to look out for themselves, especially in search to be the central power in the region. India sees still a lot of potential for their power in the coming decades. Indian PM Narendra Modi is very keen on making strategic choices for the country to transform an increase its global leadership position.[7]

The hostile relations between Pakistan and India find their peak in its longstanding conflict over Kashmir, but Punjab and Bangladesh must not be put in the shadow. The further directions of both PM Imran Khan and PM Modi could have consequences that would alter the interests of Punjab and Bangladesh as different actors in the international order. In the case of Punjab their mutual feelings of mistrust could challenge the instability of a region far from being calm. It is true that independence claims is not an issue for Pakistan itself since both Islamabad and Pakistan-held Punjab would lose in that scenario, and they both know it. Nonetheless, Indian Punjabis’ reality is different. They have crucial problems within New Delhi, again as a historical matter of identity and ethnicity that is still present nowadays. Sikhs have not found common ground with Hindus yet and it does not seem that it will happen in a near future. In fact, tensions are increasing, posing a threat for two nations with their views on Kashmir rather than on Punjab. In the case of Bangladesh, its relations with Pakistan did not have a great start. Bangladesh gained freedom with help from India and remained under its influence. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh took a long time to adjust to the shock of separation and their new reality, with India in between them.

In conclusion, Punjab and Bangladesh tend to be the less important territorial issues, and not a priority neither for Islamabad nor for New Delhi that are more engaged in Kashmir. However, considering the magnitude of both disputes, we should appreciate how the Sikhs in the Indian-held territory of Punjab as well as the Bengali people deserve the same rights as the Kashmiris to be heard and to have these territorial disputes settled once and for all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayres, Alyssa. “India: a ‘Major Power’ Still below Its Potential.” Lowy Institute, July 24, 2018.

Iftikhar, Momin. “Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations.” The Nation. The Nation, December 15, 2018.

"Indus Water Treaty: Everything You Need to Know". ClearIAS.

Muhammad Hanif, Col. “Keeping India out of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations.” Daily Times, March 6, 2018.

Sami, Shafi. “Pakistan Bangladesh Relations In the Changing International Environment.” JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

Shakoor, Farzana. “Pakistan Bangladesh Relations Survey.” JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

 


[2] ibid

[3] Muhammad Hanif, Col. “Keeping India out of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations.” Daily Times, March 6, 2018.

[4] Iftikhar, Momin. “Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations.” The Nation. The Nation, December 15, 2018.

[5] Sami, Shafi. “Pakistan Bangladesh Relations In the Changing International Environment.” JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

[6] Shakoor, Farzana. “Pakistan Bangladesh Relations Survey.” JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

[7]Ayres, Alyssa. “India: a ‘Major Power’ Still below Its Potential.” Lowy Institute, July 24, 2018.

Categorías Global Affairs: Asia Seguridad y defensa Ensayos

Ejercicios navales de comandos de la Guardia Revolucionaria en el Estrecho de Ormuz en 2015 [Wikipedia]

▲ Ejercicios navales de comandos de la Guardia Revolucionaria en el Estrecho de Ormuz en 2015 [Wikipedia]

ENSAYOAna Salas Cuevas

La República Islámica de Irán, también conocida como Persia, es un país con gran importancia en la geopolítica. Es una potencia regional no solo por su localización estratégica, sino también por sus grandes recursos de hidrocarburos, que hacen de Irán el cuarto país en reservas probadas de petróleo y el primero en reservas de gas[1].

Así hablamos de uno de los países más importantes del mundo por tres motivos fundamentales. El primero, mencionado anteriormente: sus inmensas reservas petrolíferas y de gas. En segundo lugar, porque Irán controla el estrecho de Ormuz, que es llave de entrada y salida del Golfo Pérsico y por el que pasan la mayor parte de las exportaciones de hidrocarburos de Irán, Arabia Saudí, Irak, Emiratos Árabes, Kuwait, Catar y Bahréin[2]. Por último, por el programa nuclear en el que ha invertido tantos años[3].

La república iraní se basa en los principios del Islam chií, aunque hay una gran diversidad étnica en su sociedad. Por ello, es indispensable tener en cuenta la gran “fuerza del nacionalismo iraní” para comprender su política. Apelando a la posición dominante sobre otros países, el movimiento nacionalista iraní pretende influir en la opinión pública. El nacionalismo se ha ido asentando desde hace más de 120 años, desde que el Boicot de Tabaco de 1891[4] supuso una respuesta directa a la intervención y presión exterior, y hoy pretende lograr la hegemonía en la región. La política exterior e interior de Irán son una clara expresión de este movimiento[5].

Por agente interpuesto (Proxy armies)

La guerra subsidiaria (en inglés, war by proxy) es un modelo de guerra en el cual un país hace uso de terceros para combatir o influenciar en un determinado territorio, en lugar de enfrentarse directamente. Como señala David Daoud, en el Líbano, Irak, Yemen y Siria, “Teherán ha perfeccionado el arte de conquistar gradualmente un país sin reemplazar su bandera”[6]. En esa tarea participa directamente la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica de Irán (GRI), formando o favoreciendo militarmente a las fuerzas de otros países.

La GRI nació con la Revolución Islámica liderada por el ayatolá Ruhollah Jomeini, con el fin de mantener los logros del movimiento[7]. Se trata de uno de los principales actores políticos y sociales del país. Posee gran capacidad para influir en los debates y decisiones de la política nacional. Es, además, propietaria de numerosas empresas dentro del país, lo que le garantiza una fuente de financiación propia y refuerza su carácter de poder interno. Constituye un cuerpo independiente de las fuerzas armadas, y el nombramiento de sus altos cargos depende directamente del Líder de la Revolución. Entre sus objetivos está la lucha contra el imperialismo, y expresamente se compromete a intentar rescatar Jerusalén para devolverla a los palestinos[8]. Su importancia es crucial para el régimen, y cualquier ataque a estos cuerpos representa una amenaza directa al gobierno iraní[9].

La relación de Irán con los países musulmanes de su entorno se encuentra marcada por dos hechos principales: por un lado, su condición chiita; por otro, la preeminencia que logró tener en el pasado en la región[10]. Gracias a que su acción exterior se encuentra apoyada en la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica, Irán ha conseguido establecer grandes vínculos con grupos políticos y religiosos por todo Oriente Medio. A partir de ahí, Irán aprovecha distintos recursos para afianzar su influencia en los distintos países. En primer lugar, haciendo uso de herramientas de poder blando o soft power. Así, entre otras acciones, ha participado en la reconstrucción de mezquitas y escuelas en países como el Líbano o Irak[11]. En Yemen ha proporcionado ayudas logísticas y económicas al movimiento hutí. En 2006, se implicó en la reconstrucción del sur de Beirut.

No obstante, los métodos utilizados por estas fuerzas alcanzan otros extremos, pasando a mecanismos más intrusivos (hard power). Por ejemplo, tras la invasión israelí de 1982 en el Líbano, Irán ha ido estableciendo allí a lo largo de tres décadas un punto de apoyo, con Hezbolá como proxy, aprovechando las quejas sobre la privación de derechos de la comunidad chiita. Esta línea de acción ha permitido a Teherán promover su Revolución Islámica en el extranjero[12].

En Irak la GRI buscó la desestabilización interna de Irak, apoyando facciones chiitas como la organización Badr, durante la guerra irano-iraquí de la década de 1980. Por otro lado, Irán involucró a la GRI en el levantamiento de Saddam Hussein a principios de la década de 1990. A través de este tipo de influencias y encarnando el paradigma de proxy army, Irán ha ido estableciendo influencias muy directas sobre estos lugares. Incluso en Siria, este cuerpo de élite iraní tiene una gran influencia, apoyando al gobierno de Al Assad y las milicias chiitas que combaten junto a él.

Por su parte, Arabia Saudí acusa a Iran y su Guardia de proveer armas en Yemen a los hutíes (movimiento que defiende a la minoría chiita), generando una importante escalada de tensión entre ambos países[13].

La GRI se consolida, así, como uno de los factores más importantes en el panorama de Oriente Medio, impulsando la lucha entre dos bandos que quedan contrapuestos. No obstante, no es el único. De esta manera, encontramos un escenario de “guerra fría”, que acaba trascendiendo y convirtiéndose en foco internacional. Por un lado, Irán, apoyado por potencias como Rusia o China. Por el otro, Arabia Saudí, de la mano de EEUU. Esta contienda se desarrolla, en gran medida, de una manera no convencional, a través de proxy armies como Hezbolá y las milicias chiitas en Irak, en Siria o en Yemen[14].

Causas de una confrontación

Las tensiones entre Arabia Saudí e Irán se han extendido a todo Oriente Medio (y más allá), creando en este territorio dos bandos bien determinados, ambos con pretensión de adjudicarse la hegemonía en la zona.

Para interpretar este escenario y comprender mejor su oposición es importante, en primer lugar, distinguir dos corrientes ideológicas contrapuestas: el chiismo y el sunismo (wahabismo). El wahabismo es una tendencia religiosa musulmana de extrema derecha, de la rama del sunismo, que hoy en día es la religión mayoritaria en Arabia Saudí. El chiismo, como previamente se ha mencionado, es la corriente en la que se basa la República de Irán. No obstante, como veremos, la pugna que se desarrolla entre Irán y Arabia Saudí es política, no religiosa; está más basada en la ambición de poder, que en la religión.

En segundo lugar, encontramos en el control del tráfico del petróleo otra causa de esta rivalidad. Para entender este motivo, conviene tener en cuenta la posición estratégica que juegan los países de Oriente Medio en el mapa global al acoger las mayores reservas de hidrocarburos del mundo. Un gran número de luchas contemporáneas se deben, en efecto, a la intromisión de las grandes potencias en la región, intentando tener un papel sobre estos territorios. Así, por ejemplo, el acuerdo de Sykes-Picot[15] de 1916 para el reparto de influencias europeas sigue condicionando acontecimientos actuales. Tanto Arabia Saudí como Irán, como venimos diciendo, poseen un protagonismo especial en estos enfrentamientos, por las razones descritas.

Bajo estas consideraciones, es importante señalar, en tercer lugar, la implicación en dichas tensiones de potencias exteriores como Estados Unidos.

Los efectos de las primaveras árabes han debilitado a muchos países de la zona. No así a Arabia Saudí e Irán, que han buscado en las últimas décadas su consolidación como potencias regionales, en gran medida gracias al respaldo que les otorga su producción y sus grandes reservas de petróleo. Las diferencias entre ambos países se ven reflejadas en la manera en la que intentan configurar la región y en los distintos intereses que pretenden lograr. Además de las diferencias étnicas entre Irán (persas) y Arabia Saudí (árabes), su alineamiento en el panorama internacional también es opuesto. El wahabismo se presenta como antinorteamericano, pero el gobierno saudí es consciente de la necesidad que tiene del apoyo de EEUU, y ambos países mantienen una conveniencia recíproca, con el petróleo como base. No sucede lo mismo con Irán.

Irán y EEUU fueron estrechos aliados hasta 1979. La Revolución Islámica lo cambió todo y desde entonces, con la crisis de los rehenes de la embajada estadounidense en Teherán como momento inicial especialmente dramático, las tensiones entre los dos países han sido frecuentes. La confrontación diplomática ha vuelto a ser aguda con la decisión del presidente Donald Trump de retirada del Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto (PAIC), firmado en 2015 para la no proliferación nuclear de Irán, con la consiguiente reanudación de las sanciones económicas hacía este país. Además, en abril de 2019 Estados Unidos situó a la Guardia Revolucionaria en su lista de organizaciones terroristas[16], responsabilizando a Irán de financiar y promover el terrorismo como una herramienta de gobierno[17].

Por un lado, pues, está el bando de los saudís, apoyados por EEUU y, dentro de la región, por Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Kuwait, Baréin e Israel. Por el otro lado, Irán y sus aliados de Palestina, Líbano (parte pro-chiita) y recientemente Qatar, lista a la que podría añadirse Siria e Irak (milicias chiitas). Las tensiones aumentaron tras la muerte de Qasem Soleimani en enero de 2020. En este último bando podríamos destacar el apoyo internacional de China o Rusia, pero poco a poco podemos observar un alejamiento de las relaciones entre Irán y Rusia.

Al hablar de la lucha por la hegemonía del control del tráfico del petróleo, es imprescindible mencionar el Estrecho de Ormuz, el punto geográfico crucial de esta contienda, donde se ven enfrentadas ambas potencias directamente. Este estrecho es una zona estratégica situada entre el Golfo Pérsico y el de Omán. Por ahí pasa un 40% del petróleo mundial[18]. El control de estas aguas es, evidentemente, decisivo en el enfrentamiento entre Arabia Saudí e Irán; así como para cualquiera de los miembros de la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo de Oriente Medio (OPEP) en la región: Irán, Arabia Saudí, Irak, Emiratos Árabes y Kuwait.

Uno de los objetivos de las sanciones económicas impuestas por Washington a Irán es reducir sus exportaciones para favorecer a Arabia Saudí, su mayor aliado regional. A estos efectos, la Quinta Flota estadounidense, con sede en Baréin, tiene la tarea de proteger la navegación comercial en esta área.

El Estrecho de Ormuz “es la válvula de escape que utiliza Irán para aliviar la presión que se ejerce desde fuera del Golfo” [19]. Desde aquí, Irán intenta reaccionar ante las sanciones económicas impuestas por EEUU y otras potencias; es lo que le otorga una mayor voz en el panorama internacional, al tener capacidad de bloquear el estratégico paso. Recientemente se han dado ataques a petroleros de Arabia Saudí y otros países[20], algo que provoca una gran desestabilización tanto económica como militar en cada nuevo episodio[21].  

En definitiva, la competencia entre Irán y Arabia Saudí tiene un efecto no solo regional sino que afecta globalmente. Los conflictos que pudieran desatarse en esta área recuerdan, cada vez más, a una ya conocida Guerra Fría, tanto por los métodos en el frente de batalla (y la incidencia de las proxy armies en este frente), como por la atención que requiere para el resto del mundo, que depende de este resultado, quizá, bastante más de lo que es consciente.

Conclusiones

Desde hace varios años se ha ido consolidando un enfrentamiento regional que implica también a las grandes potencias. Esta lucha trasciende las fronteras de Oriente Medio, análogamente a la situación desencadenada durante la Guerra Fría. Sus principales agentes son las proxy armies, que impulsan luchas a través de agentes no estatales y con métodos de guerra no convencionales, desestabilizando constantemente las relaciones entre los Estados, así como dentro de los propios Estados.

Para evitar la lucha en Ormuz, países como Arabia Saudí y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos han intentado transportar el petróleo por otras vías, por ejemplo, mediante la construcción de oleoductos. Este grifo lo tiene Siria, país por el que las conducciones deben pasar para llegar a Europa). Al fin y al cabo, la guerra de Siria se puede ver desde muchas perspectivas, pero no hay duda de que uno de los motivos de la intromisión de potencias extrarregionales es el interés económico que conlleva la costa siria.

Desde 2015 hasta ahora se libra la silenciada guerra civil de Yemen. En ella están en juego asuntos estratégicos como el control del Estrecho de Mandeb. Detrás de esta terrible guerra contra los hutíes (proxies), hay un latente miedo a que estos se hagan con el control de acceso al Mar Rojo. En este mar y cerca del estrecho se encuentra Djibouti, donde las grandes potencias han instalado bases militares para un mejor control sobre la zona.

La potencia más perjudicada es Irán, que ve su economía debilitada por las constantes sanciones económicas. La situación afecta a una población oprimida tanto por el propio gobierno como por la presión internacional. El propio gobierno acaba desinformando a la sociedad, provocando una gran desconfianza hacia las autoridades. Esto genera una creciente inestabilidad política, que se manifiesta en frecuentes protestas.

El régimen ha publicitado esas manifestaciones como protestas por las actuaciones de EEUU, como por ejemplo a raíz del asesinato del general Soleimani, sin mencionar que muchas de estas revueltas se deben al gran descontento de la población civil por las graves medidas tomadas por el ayatolá Jamenei, más centrado en procurar la hegemonía en la zona que en resolver los problemas internos.

Así, muchas veces es difícil darse cuenta de implicación de estos enfrentamientos para la mayoría del mundo. En efecto, la utilización de proxy armies no debe distraernos del hecho de la verdadera involucración de las principales potencias de Occidente y de Oriente (al verdadero modo de una Guerra Fría). Tampoco los motivos que se alegan para mantener estos frentes abiertos deben distraernos de la verdadera incidencia de lo que está en juego realmente: ni más ni menos que la economía global.


[1] El nuevo mapa de los gigantes globales del petróleo y el gas, David Page, Expansión.com, el 26 de junio de 2013. Disponible en

[2] Los cuatro puntos clave por los que viaja el petróleo: El Estrecho de Ormuz, el “arma” de Irán, 30 de julio de 2018. Disponible en

[3] En noviembre de 2013 firmaban China, Rusia, Francia, Reino Unido y Estados Unidos (P5) e Irán el Plan de Acción Conjunto (PAC). Se trató de un acuerdo inicial sobre el programa nuclear de Irán sobre el cual se realizaron varias negociaciones que concluyeron con un pacto final, el Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto (PAIC), firmado en 2015, al que se adhirió la Unión Europea.

[4] El Boicot de Tabaco fue el primer movimiento en contra de una actuación concreta del Estado, no se dio una revolución en el sentido estricto de la palabra, pero en él se arraigó un fuerte nacionalismo. Se dio debido a la ley del monopolio del tabaco concedida a los británicos en 1890. Más información en: “El veto al tabaco”, Joaquín Rodríguez Vargas, Profesor de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

[5] Cuaderno de estrategia 137, Ministerio de Defensa: Irán, potencia emergente en Oriente Medio. Implicaciones en la estabilidad del Mediterráneo. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, julio de 2007. Disponible en

[6] Meet the Proxies: How Iran Spreads Its Empire through Terrorist Militias,The Tower Magazine, March 2015. Disponible en

[7] El artículo 150 de la Constitución de la República Islámica de Irán lo dice expresamente.

[8] Tensiones entre Irán y Estados Unidos: causas y estrategias, Kamran Vahed, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, noviembre 2019. Disponible en, pág. 5.

[9] Una de las seis secciones de la GRI es la Fuerza “Quds” (cuyo comandante era Qasem Soleimani), especializada en guerra convencional y operaciones de inteligencia militar. También responsable de llevar a cabo intervenciones extraterritoriales.

[10] Irán, Ficha país. Oficina de Información Diplomática, España. Disponible en

[11] Tensiones entre Irán y Estados Unidos: causas y estrategias, Kamran Vahed, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, noviembre 2019. Disponible en

[12] Hezbollah Watch, Iran’s Proxy War in Lebanon. November 2018. Disponible en

[13] Yemen: la batalla entre Arabia Sudí e Irán por la influencia en la región, Kim Amor, 2019, El Periódico. Disponible en

[14] Irán contra Arabia Saudí, ¿una guerra inminente?, Juan José Sánchez Arreseigor, IEEE, 2016. Disponible en

[15] El acuerdo de Sykes-Picot fue un pacto secreto entre Gran Bretaña y Francia durante la Primera Guerra Mundial (1916) en el que, con el consentimiento de Rusia (aún presoviética), ambas potencias se repartieron las zonas conquistadas del Imperio Otomano tras la Gran Guerra.

[16] Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Boureau of Counterterrorism. Disponible en

[17] Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Foreign Policy, april of 2019. Disponible en

[18] El estrecho de Ormuz, la principal arteria del petróleo mundial, Euronews (datos contrastados con Vortexa), 14 de junio de 2019. Disponible en

[19] “Máxima presión” en el Estrecho de Ormuz, Félix Arteaga, Real Instituto el Cano, 2019. Disponible en

[20] Estrecho de Ormuz: qué se sabe de las nuevas explosiones en buques petroleros que aumentan la tensión entre Estados Unidos e Irán, BBC News Mundo, 14 junio 2019. Disponible en

[21] Arabia Saudí denuncia el sabotaje de dos petroleros en aguas de Emiratos Árabes, Ángeles Espinosa, 14 de mayo de 2019, El País. Disponible en

Categorías Global Affairs: Oriente Medio Seguridad y defensa Ensayos

Logo of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence organization. It depicts Pakistan's national animal, Markhor, eating a snake [Wikipedia]

▲ Logo of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence organization. It depicts Pakistan's national animal, Markhor, eating a snake [Wikipedia]

ESSAYManuel Lamela

Jihadism continues to be one of the main threats Pakistan faces. Its impact on Pakistani society at the political, economic and social levels is evident, it continues to be the source of greatest uncertainty, which acts as a barrier to any company that is interested in investing in the Asian country. Although the situation concerning terrorist attacks on national soil has improved, jihadism is an endemic problem in the region and medium-term prospects are not positive. The atmosphere of extreme volatility and insistence that is breathed does not help in generating confidence. If we add to this the general idea that Pakistan's institutions are not very strong due to their close links with certain radical groups, the result is a not very optimistic scenario. In this essay, we will deal with the current situation of jihadism in Pakistan, offering a multidisciplinary approach that helps to situate itself in the complicated reality that the country is experiencing.

 

 

 

1. Jihadism in the region, a risk assessment

Through this graph, we will analyze the probability and impact of various risk factors concerning jihadist activity in the region. All factors refer to hypothetical situations that may develop in the short or medium term. The increase in jihadist activity in the region will depend on how many of these predictions are fulfilled.

Risk Factors:

R1: US-Taliban treaty fails, creating more instability in the region. If the United States is not able to make a proper exit from Afghanistan, we may find ourselves in a similar situation to that experienced during the 1990s. Such scenario will once again plunge the region into a fierce civil war between government forces and Taliban groups. The proposed scenario becomes increasingly plausible if we look at the recent American actions regarding foreign policy.

R2: Pakistan two-head strategy facing terrorism collapse. Pakistan’s strategy in dealing with jihadism is extremely risky, it’s collapse would lead to a schism in the way the Asian state deals with its most immediate challenges. The chances of this strategy failing in the medium term are considerably high due to its structure, which makes it unsustainable over the time.

R3: Violations of the LoC by the two sides in the conflict. Given the frequency with which these events occur, their impact is residual, but it must be taken into account that it in an environment of high tension and other factors, continuous violations of the LoC may be the spark that leads to an increase in terrorist attacks in the region.

R4: Agreement between the afghan Taliban and the government. Despite the recent agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Albduallah, it seems unlikely that he will be able to reach a lasting settlement with the Taliban, given the latter's pretensions. If it is true that if it happens, the agreement will have a great impact that will even transcend Afghan borders.

R5: Afghan Taliban make a coup d’état to the afghan government. In relation to the previous point, despite the pact between the government and the opposition, it seems likely that instability will continue to exist in the country, so a coup attempt by the Taliban seems more likely than a peaceful solution in the medium or long term

R6: U.S. Democrat party wins the 2020 elections. Broadly speaking, both Republican and Democratic parties are betting on focusing their efforts on containing the growth of their great rival, China.

R7: U.S. withdraw its troops from Afghanistan regarding the result of the peace process. This is closely related to the previous point as it responds to a basic geopolitical issue.

R8: New agreement between India and Pakistan regarding the LoC.  If produced, this would bring both states closer together and help reduce jihadist attacks in the Kashmir region. However, if we look at recent events, such a possibility seems distant at present.

 

 

2. The ties between the ISI and the Taliban and other radical groups

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused on many occasions of being closely linked to various radical groups; for example, they have recently been involved with the radicalization of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh[1]. Although Islamabad continues strongly denying such accusations, reality shows us that cooperation between the ISI and various terrorist organizations has been fundamental to their proliferation and settlement both on national territory and in the neighboring states of India and Afghanistan. The West has not been able to fully understand the nature of this relationship and its link to terrorism. The various complaints to the ISI have been loaded with different arguments of different kinds, lacking in unity and coherence. Unlike popular opinion, this analysis will point to the confused and undefined Pakistani nationalism as the main cause of this close relationship.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, together with the Intelligence Bureau and the Military Intelligence, constitute the intelligence services of the Pakistani State, the most important of which is the ISI. ISI can be described as the intellectual core and center of gravity of the army. Its broad functions are the protection of Pakistan's national security and the promotion and defense of Pakistan's interests abroad. Despite the image created around the ISI, in general terms its activities and functions are based on the same "values" as other intelligence agencies such as the MI6, the CIA, etc. They all operate under the common ideal of protecting national interests, the essential foundation of intelligence centers without which they are worthless. We must rationalize their actions on the ground, move away from inquisitive accusations and try to observe what are the ideals that move the group, their connection with the government of Islamabad and the Pakistani society in general.

2.1. The Afghan Taliban

To understand the idiosyncrasy of the ISI we must go back to the war in Afghanistan[2], it is from this moment that the center begins to build an image of itself, independent of the rest of the armed forces. From the ISI we can see the victory of the Mujahideen on Afghan territory as their own, a great achievement that shapes their thinking and vision. But this understanding does not emerge in isolation and independently, as most Pakistani society views the Afghan Taliban as legitimate warriors and defenders of an honorable cause[3]. The Mujahideen victory over the USSR was a real turning point in Pakistani history, the foundation of modern Pakistani nationalism begins from this point. The year 1989 gave rise to a social catharsis from which the ISI was not excluded.

Along with this ideological component, it is also important to highlight the strategic aspect; we are dealing with a question of nationalism, of defending patriotic interests. Since the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan has not hesitated to support them for major strategic reasons, as there has always been a fear that an unstable Afghanistan would end up being controlled directly or indirectly by India, an encircle strategy[4]. Faced with this dangerous scenario, the Taliban are Islamabad's only asset on the ground. It is for this reason, and not only for religious commitment, that this bond is produced, although over time it is strengthened and expanded. Therefore, at first, it is Pakistani nationalism and its foreign interests that are the cause of this situation, it seeks to influence neighboring Afghanistan to make the situation as beneficial as possible for Pakistan. Later on, when we discuss the situation of the Taliban on the national territory, we will address the issue of Pakistani nationalism and how its weak construction causes great problems for the state itself. But on Afghan territory, from what has been explained above, we can conclude that this relationship will continue shortly, it does not seem likely that this will change unless there are great changes of impossible prediction. The ISI will continue to have a significant influence on these groups and will continue its covert operations to promote and defend the Taliban, although it should be noted that the peace treaty between the Taliban and the US[5] is an important factor to take into account, this issue will be developed once the situation of the Taliban at the internal level is explained.

2.2. The Pakistani Taliban (Al-Qaeda[6] and the TTP)

The Taliban groups operating in Pakistan are an extension of those operating in neighboring Afghanistan. They belong to the same terrorist network and seek similar objectives, differentiated only by the place of action. Despite this obvious similarity, from Islamabad and increasingly from the whole of Pakistani society, the two groups are observed in a completely different way. On the one hand, as we said earlier, for most Pakistanis, the Afghan Taliban are fighting a legitimate and just war, that of liberating the region from foreign rule. However, groups operating in Pakistan are considered enemies of the state and the people. Although there was some support among the popular classes, especially in the Pashtun regions, this support has gradually been lost due to the multitude of atrocities against the civilian population that have recently been committed. The attack carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[7] in the Army Public School in Peshawar in the year 2014 generated a great stir in society, turning it against these radical groups. This duality marks Pakistan's strategy in dealing with terrorism both globally and internationally. While acting as an accomplice and protector of this groups in Afghanistan, he pursues his counterparts on their territory. We have to say that the operations carried out by the armed forces have been effective, especially the Zarb-e-Azb operation carried out in 2014 in North Waziristan, where the ISI played a fundamental role in identifying and classifying the different objectives. The position of the TTP in the region has been decimated, leaving it quite weakened. As can be seen in this scenario, there is no support at the institutional level from the ISI[8], as they are involved in the fight against these radical organizations. However, on an individual level if these informal links appear. This informal network is favored by the tribal character of Pakistani society, it can appear in different forms but often draw on ties of Kinship, friendship or social obligation[9]. Due to the nature of this type of relationship, it is impossible to know to what extent the ISI's activity is conditioned and how many of its members are linked to Taliban groups. However, we would like to point out that these unions are informal and individual and not institutional, which provides a certain degree of security and control, at least for the time being, the situation may vary greatly due to the lack of transparency.

2.3. ISI and the radical groups that operate in Kashmir

Another part of the board is made up of the radical groups that focus their terrorist attention on the conflict with India over control of Kashmir, the most important of which are: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Both groups have committed real atrocities over the past decades, the most notorious being the one committed by LeT in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. There are numerous testimonies, in particular, that of the American citizen David Haedy, which point to the cooperation of the ISI in carrying out the aforementioned attack.[10]

Recently, Hafiz Saeed, founder of Let and intellectual planner of the bloody attack, was arrested. The news generated some turmoil both locally and internationally and opened the debate as to whether Pakistan had finally decided to act against the radical groups operating in Kashmir. We are once again faced with a complex situation, although the arrest shows a certain amount of willpower, it is no more than a way of making up for the situation and relaxing international pressure. The above coincides with the FATF's[11] assessment of Pakistan's status within the institution, which is of great importance for the short-term future of the country's economy. Beyond rhetoric, there is no convincing evidence that suggests that Pakistan has made a move against those groups. The link and support provided by the ISI in this situation are again closely linked to strategic and ideological issues. Since its foundation, Pakistani foreign policy has revolved around India[12], as we saw on the Afghan stage. Pakistani nationalism is based on the maxim that India and the Hindus are the greatest threat to the future of the state. Given the significance of the conflict for Pakistani society, there has been no hesitation in using radical groups to gain advantages on the ground. From Pakistan perspective, it is considered that this group of terrorists are an essential asset when it comes to putting pressure on India and avoiding the complete loss of the territory, they are used as a negotiating tool and a brake on Indian interests in the region.

As we can see, the core between the ISI and certain terrorist groups is based on deep-seated nationalism, which has led both members of the ISI and society, in general, to identify with the ideas of certain radical groups. They have benefited from the situation by bringing together a huge amount of power, becoming a threat to the state itself. The latter has compromised the government of Pakistan, sometimes leaving it with little room for maneuver. The immense infrastructure and capacity of influence that Let has thanks to its charitable arm Jamaat-ud-Dawa, formed with re-localized terrorists, is a clear example of the latter. A revolt led by this group could put Islamabad in a serious predicament, so the actions taken both in Kashmir and internally to try to avoid the situation should be measured very well. The existing cooperation between the ISI and these radical groups is compromised by the development of the conflict in Kashmir, which may increase or decrease depending on the situation. What is certain, because of the above, is that it will not go unnoticed and will continue to play a key role in the future. These relationships, this two-way game could drag Pakistan soon into an internal conflict, which could compromise its very existence as a nation.

 


[3] Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a Hard Country. 1st ed. London: Penguin, 2012.

[4] United States Institute for PeaceThe India-Pakistan Rivalry In Afghanistan, 2020.

[5] Maizland, Lindsay. "U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What To Know". Council On Foreign Relations, 2020.

[6] Blanchard, Christopher M. Al Qaeda: Statements And Evolving Ideology. PDF, 2007.

[7] Mapping Militant Organizations. “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.” Stanford University. Last modified July 2018.

[9] Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a Hard Country. 1st ed. London: Penguin, 2012.

[10] Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a Hard Country. 1st ed. London: Penguin, 2012.

[12] "India And Pakistan: Forever Rivals?". Aljazeera.Com, 2017.

Categorías Global Affairs: Asia Seguridad y defensa Ensayos

Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur, also called Kartarpur Sahib, is a Sikh holy place in Kartarpur, in the Pakistani Punjab [Wikimedia Commons]

▲ Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur, also called Kartarpur Sahib, is a Sikh holy place in Kartarpur, in the Pakistani Punjab [Wikimedia Commons]

ESSAYPablo Viana

Punjab region has been part of India until the year 1947, when the Punjab province of British India was divided in two parts, East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) due to religious reasons. After the division a lot of internal violence occurred, and many people were displaced.

East and West Punjab

The partition of Punjab proved to be one of the most violent, brutal, savage debasements in the history of humankind. The undivided Punjab, of which West Punjab forms a major region today, was home to a large minority population of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus unto 1947 apart from the Muslim majority[1]. This minority population of Punjabi Sikhs called for the creation of a new state in the 1970s, with the name of Khalistan, but it was detained by India, sending troops to stop the militants. Terrorist attacks against the Sikh majority emerged, by those who did not accept the creation of the state of Khalistan and wished to stay in India.

The Sikh population is the dominant religious ethnicity in East Punjab (58%) followed by the Hindu (39%). Sikhism and Islamism are both monotheistic religions, they do believe on the same concept of God, although it is different on each religion. Sikhism was developed during the 16th and 17th century in the context of conflict in between Hinduism and Islamism. It is important to mention Sikhism if we talk about Punjab, as its origins were in Punjab, but most important in recent times, is that the Guru Nanak Dev[2] was buried in Pakistani territory. Four kilometres from the international border the Sikh shrine was conceded to Pakistan at the time of British India’s Partition in 1947. For followers of Sikhism this new border that cut through Punjab proved especially problematic. Sikhs overwhelmingly chose India over the newly formed Pakistan as the state that would best protect their interests (there are an estimated 50,000 Sikhs living in Pakistan today, compared to the 24 million in India). However, in making this choice, Sikhs became isolated from several holy sites, creating a religious disconnection that has proved a constant spiritual and emotional dilemma for the community[3].

In order to let the Sikhist population visit the Gurdwara Darbar Sahib[4], the Kartarpur Corridor was created in November 2019. However, there is an incessant suspicion in between India and Pakistan that question Pakistan motives. Although it seems like a generous move work of the Pakistani government, there is a clear perception that Pakistan is engaged in an act of deception[5]. Thus, although this scenario might seem at first beneficial for the rapprochement of East and West Punjab, it is not at all. Pakistan is involved in a rhetorical policy which could end up worsening its relations with India.

The division of Punjab in 1947 was like the division of Pakistan and India on that same year. Territorial disputes have been an issue that defines very well India-Pakistan relations since the independence. In the case of Punjab, there has not been a territorial debate. The division was clear and has been respected ever since. Why would Pakistan and/or India be willing to unify Punjab? There is no reason. East and West Punjab represent two different nations and three religions. If we think about reunifying Pakistan and India, the conclusion is the same (although more dramatic); too many discrepancies and recent unrest to think about bringing back together the nations. However, if the Kartarpur Corridor could be placed out of bonds for the territorial disputes between Pakistan and India (e.g. Kashmir), Islamabad and New Delhi could use this situation as a model to find out which are the pressure points and trying to find a path for identifying common solutions. In order to achieve this, there should be a clear behaviour by both parts of cooperation. Sadly, in recent times both Pakistan and India have discrepancies regarding many topics and suspicious behaviours that clearly show that they won’t be interested in complicating more the situation in Punjab searching for unification. The riots of 1947 left a terrific era on the region and now that both sides are established and no major disputes have emerged (except for Sikh nationalism), the situation should and will most likely remain as it is.

The Indus Water Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 after nine years of negotiations between India and Pakistan with the help of the World Bank, which is also a signatory. Seen as one of the most successful international treaties, it has survived frequent tensions, including conflict, and has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than half a century. The Treaty basically provides a mechanism for exchange of information and cooperation between Pakistan and India regarding the use of their rivers. This mechanism is well known as the Permanent Indus Commission. The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise: “questions” are handled by the Commission; “differences” are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and “disputes” are to be referred to a seven-member arbitral tribunal called the “Court of Arbitration.” As a signatory to the Treaty, the World Bank’s role is limited and procedural[6].    

Since 1948, India has been confident on the fact that East Punjab and the acceding states have a prior and superior claim to the rivers flowing through their territory. This leaves West Punjab in disadvantage regarding water resources, as East Punjab can access the highest sections of the rivers. Even under a unified control designed to ensure equitable distribution of water, in years of low river flow cultivators on tail distributaries always tended to accuse those on the upper reaches of taking an undue amount of the water, and after partition any temporary shortage, whatever the cause, could easily be attributed to political motives. It was therefore wise of Pakistan-indeed it became imperative-to cut the new feeder from the Ravi for this area and thus become independent of distributaries in East Punjab[7]. The Treaty acknowledges the control of the eastern rivers to India, and to the western rivers to Pakistan.

The main issue of water distribution in between East and West Punjab is then a matter of geography. Even though West Punjab covers more territory than East Punjab, and the water flow of West Punjab is almost three times the water flow of East Punjab rivers, the Indus Water Treaty gives the following advantage to India: since Pakistan rivers receive much more water flow from India, the treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unlimited use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture and this is where the disputes mainly came from, as Pakistan has objected all Indian hydro-electric projects on western rivers irrespective of size and layout.

It is worth mentioning that with the World Bank mediating the Treaty in between India and Pakistan, the water access will not be curtailed, and since the ratification of the Treaty, India and Pakistan have not engaged in any water wars. Although there have been many tensions the disputes have been via legal procedures, but they haven’t caused any major cause for conflict. Today, both countries are strengthening their relationship, and the scenario is not likely to get worse, it is actually the opposite, and the Indus Water Treaty is one of the few livelihoods of the relationship. If the tensions do not cease, the World Bank should consider the possibility of amending the treaty, obviously if both Pakistan and India are willing to cooperate, although with the current environment, a renegotiation of the treaty would probably bring more complications. There is no shred of evidence that India has violated the Indus Water Treaty or that it is stealing Pakistan’s water[8], although Pakistan does blame India for breaching the treaty, as showed before. This is pointed out by Hindu politicians as an attempt by Pakistan to divert the attention of its own public from the real issues of gross mismanagement of water resources[9].

Pakistan has a more hostile attitude regarding water distribution, trying to find a way to impeach India, meanwhile India focuses on the development of hydro-electric projects. India won’t stop providing water to the West Punjab, as the treaty is still in force and is fulfilled by both parts. Pakistan should reconsider its role and its benefits received thanks to the treaty and meditate about the constant pressure towards India, as pushing over the limit could mean a more hostile activity carried out by India, which in the worst case scenario (although not likely to happen) could mean a breakdown of the treaty.


[1] The Punjab in 1920s – A Case study of Muslims, Zarina Salamat, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1997. table 45, pp. 136.

[2] Guru Nanak Dev was the founder of Sikhism (1469-1540)

[3] Wyeth, G. (Dec 28, 2019). Opening the Gates: The Kartarpur Corridor. Australian Institute of International Affairs.

[4] Site where Guru Nanak Dev settled the Sikh community, and lived for 18 years after his death in 1539.

[5] Islamabad promoted the activity of Sikhs For Justice including the will to establish the state of Khalistan.

Categorías Global Affairs: Asia Seguridad y defensa Ensayos

Attack in Kashmir linked to groups of Pakistani origin [twitted by @ANI]

▲ Attack in Kashmir linked to groups of Pakistani origin [twitted by @ANI]

ESSAYIsabel Calderas [Ignacio Lucas as research assistant]

There is a myriad of security concerns regarding external factors when it comes to Pakistan: India, Afghanistan, the Saudi Arabia-Iran split and the United States, to name a few. However, there are also two main concerns that come from within: jihadism and organized crime. They are interconnected but differ in many ways. The latter is frequently overlooked to focus on the former, but both have the capacity of affecting the country, internally and externally, as the effectiveness of dealing with them impacts the perception the international community has of Pakistan. While internally disrupting, these problems also have international reach, as such groups often export their activities, adversely affecting at a global scale. Therefore, international actors put so much pressure on Pakistan to control them. Historically, there has been much scepticism over the government’s ability, or even willingness to solve these risks. We will examine both problems separately, identifying the impact they have on the national and international arena, as well as the government’s approach to dealing with either and the future risks they entail.

1. JIHADISM

Pakistan’s education system has become a central part of the country’s radicalization phenomenon[1], in the materialization of madrassas. These schools, which teach a more puritanical version of Islam than had traditionally been practiced in Pakistan, have been directly linked to the rise of jihadist groups[2]. Saudi Arabia, who has always had very close relations with Pakistan, played a key role in their development, by funding the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi madrassas since the 1970s. The Iranian revolution bolstered the Saudi’s imperative to control Sunnism in Pakistan, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave them the vehicle to do so[3]. In these schools, which teach a biased view of the world, students display low tolerance for minorities and are more likely to turn to jihadism.

Saudi and American funding of madrassas during the Soviet occupation helped the Pakistani army’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), become more powerful, as they channelled millions of dollars to them, a lot of which went into the madrassas which sent mujahedeen fighters to fight for their cause[4]. The Taliban’s origins can also be traced to these, as the militia was raised mainly from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Saudi-funded madrassas[5].

Madrassas are especially popular in the poorer provinces of the country, where parents send their children to them for several non-religious reasons. First, because the Qur’an is written in Arabic and madrassas teach this language[6]. The dire situation of many families forces millions of Pakistanis to migrate to neighbouring, oil-rich Arabic-speaking countries, from where they send remittances home to help support their families. Secondly, the public-school system in Pakistan is weak, often failing to teach basic reading skills[7], something the madrassas do teach.

Partly in response to the international pressure[8] it has been under to fight terrorism within its territory; Pakistan has tried to reform the madrassas. The government has stated its intention to bring madrassas under the umbrella of the education ministry, financing these schools by allocating cash otherwise destined to fund anti-terrorism security operations[9]. It plans to add subjects like science to the curriculum, to lessen the focus on Islamic teachings. However, this faces several challenges, among which the resistance from the teachers and clerical authorities who run the madrassas outstands[10].

Before moving on to the prominent radical groups in Pakistan, we would like to make a brief summary on a different cause of radicalization: the unintended effect of the drone strategy adopted by the United States.

The United States has increasingly chosen to target its radical enemies in Pakistan through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can be highly effective in neutralizing objectives, but also pose a series of risks, like the killing of innocent civilians that are in the neighbouring area. This American strategy, which Pakistan has publicly criticized, has fomented anti-American sentiment among the Pakistanis, at a ratio on average of every person killed resulting in the radicalization of several more people[11]. The growing unpopularity of drone strikes has further weakened relations between both governments, but shows no signs of changing in the future, if recent attacks carried by the U.S. are any indication. Pakistan’s efforts to de-radicalize its population will continue to be undermined by the U.S. drone strikes[12].

Pakistan’s anti-terrorism strategy is linked to its geostrategic and regional interests, especially dealing with its eastern and western neighbours[13]. There are many radical groups operating within their territory, and the government’s strategy towards them shifts depending on their goal[14]. Groups like the Afghan Taliban, who target foreign invasions in their own country, and Al Qaeda, whose jihad against the West is on a global scale, have been allowed to use Pakistani territory to coordinate operations and take refuge. Their strategy is quite different for Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) who, despite being allied with the Afghan Taliban, has a different goal: to oust the Pakistani government and impose Sharia law[15]. Most of the military’s campaigns aimed at cracking down on radicals have been targeted at weakening groups affiliated with TTP. Lastly, there are those groups with whom some branches of the Pakistani government directly collaborate with.

Pakistan has been known to use jihadi organizations to advance its security objectives through proxy conflicts.  Pakistan’s policy of waging war through terrorist groups is planned, coordinated, and conducted by the Pakistani Army, specifically the ISI[16] who, as previously mentioned, plays a vital role in running the State.

Although this has been a longstanding cause of tension between the Pakistani and the American governments, the U.S. has made no progress in persuading or compelling the Pakistani military to sever ties with the radical groups[17], even though the Pakistani government has stated that it has, over the past year, ‘fought and eradicated the menace of terrorism from its soil’ by carrying out arrests, seizing property and freezing bank accounts of groups proscribed by the United States and the United Nations[18]. Their actions have been enough to keep them off the FATF’s blacklist for financing terrorism and money laundering[19], which would prevent them from getting financing, but concerns remain about ISI’s involvement with radical groups, the future of the relations between them, the overall activity of these groups from within Pakistani territory, and the risk of a future attack to its neighbours.

We will use two of Pakistan’s main proxy groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, to analyse the feasibility of an attack in the near future.

1.1. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Created to support the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, LeT now focuses on the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the highest priorities for the Pakistani military’s foreign policy. The Ahl-e-Hadith group is led by its founder, Hafiz Saeed. Its headquarters are in Punjab. Unlike its counterparts, it is a well-organized, unified, and hierarchical organization, which has become highly institutionalized in the last thirty years. As a result, it has not suffered any major losses or any fractures since its inception[20].

Since the Mumbai attacks in 2008 (which also involved ISI), for which LeT were responsible, its close relationship with the military has defined the group’s operations, most noticeably by restraining their actions in India, which reflects both the Pakistani military’s desire to avoid international pressure and conflict with their neighbour and the group’s capability to contain its members. The group has calibrated its activities, although it possesses the capability to expand its violence. Its outlets for violence have been Afghanistan and Kashmir, which align with the Pakistani military’s agenda: to bring Afghanistan under Pakistan’s sphere of influence while keeping India off-balance in Kashmir[21]. The recent U.S.-Taliban deal in Afghanistan and militarization of Kashmir by India may change this. LeT has benefitted handsomely for its loyalty, receiving unparalleled protection, patronage, and privilege from the military. However, after twelve years of restraint, Lashkar undoubtedly faces pressures from within its ranks to strike against India again, especially now that Narendra Modi is prime minister.

1.2. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)

The Deobandi organization, led by its founder Masood Azhar, has had close bonds with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban since they came into light in 2000. With the commencement of the war on terror in Afghanistan, JeM reciprocated by launching an attack on the Indian Parliament on December 2001, in cooperation with LeT. However, it ignored the Pakistani military’s will in 2019 when it launched the Pulwama attack, after which the government of Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on them, taking leaders and members into preventive custody[22].

1.3. Risk assessment

Although it has gone rogue before, Jaish-e-Muhammad has been weakened by the recent government’s crackdown. What remains of the group, consolidated under Masood Azhar, has repaired ties with the military. Although JeM has demonstrated it still possesses formidable capability in Indian Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba represents the main concern for an attack on India in the near future.

Lashkar has been both the most reliable and loyal of all the proxy groups and has also proven it does not take major action without prior approval from the ISI, which could become a problem. Pakistan has adopted a policy of maintaining plausible deniability for any attacks in order to avoid international pressure after 9/11, thus LeT’s close ties with the military make it more likely that its actions will provoke a war between the two countries.

The United States has tried for several years to get Pakistan to stop using proxies. There are several scenarios in which Lashkar would break from the Pakistani state (or vice versa), but they are farfetched and beyond foreign influence: a) a change in Pakistan’s security calculus, b) a resolution on Kashmir, c) a shift in Lashkar’s responsiveness and d) a major Lashkar attack in the West[23].

a) A change in Pakistan’s security calculus is the least likely, as the India-centric understanding of Pakistan’s interests and circumstances is deeply embedded in the psyche of the security establishment[24].

b) A resolution on Kashmir would trouble Lashkar, who seeks full unification of all Kashmir with Pakistan, which would not be the outcome of a negotiated resolution. More so, Modi’s recent decision regarding article 370 puts this possibility even further into the future.

c) A shift in Lashkar responsiveness would be caused by the internal pressures to perform another attack, after more than a decade of abiding by the security establishment’s will. If perceived as too powerful of insufficiently responsive, ISI would most likely seek to dismantle the group, as they did with Jaish-e-Muhammad, by focusing on the rogue elements and leaving Lashkar smaller but more responsive. This presents a threat, as the group would not allow itself to be simply dismantled but would probably resist to the point of becoming hostile[25].

d) The last option, a major Lashkar attack in the West, is also unlikely, as the group has not undertaken any major attack without perceived greenlight from ISI.

This does not mean that an attack from LeT can be ruled out. ISI could allow the group to carry out an attack if, in the absence of a better reason, it feels that the pressure from within the group will start causing dissent and fractures, just like it happened in 2008. It is in ISI’s best interest that Lashkar remains a strong, united ally. Knowing this, it is important to note that a large-scale attack in India by Lashkar is arguably the most likely trigger to a full-blown conflict between the two nations. Even a smaller-scale attack has the potential of provoking India, especially under Modi.

If such an attack where to happen, India would not be expected to display a weak-kneed gesture, as PM Modi’s policy is that of a tough and powerful approach in defence vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. This has already been made evident by its retaliation for the Fidayeen attack at Uri brigade headquarters by Jaish-e-Muhammad in 2016[26]. It has now become evident that if Pakistan continues to harbour terrorist groups against India as its strategic assets, there will be no military restraint by India as long as Modi is in power, who will respond with massive retaliation. In its fragile economic condition, Pakistan will not be able to sustain a long-drawn war effort[27].

On the other hand, Afghanistan, which has been the other focus of Pakistan’s proxy groups, is now undergoing a process which could result in a major organizational shift. The Taliban insurgent movement has been able survive this long due to the sanctuary and support provided by Pakistan[28]. Furthermore, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s participation in the Afghan insurgency furthered the Pakistani military’s goal of having a friendly, anti-India partner on its western border[29]. The development and outcome of the intra-Afghan talks will determine the continued use of proxies in the country. However, we can realistically assume that, at least in the near future, radical groups will maintain some degree of activity in Afghanistan.

It is highly unlikely that the Pakistani intelligence establishment will stop engaging with radical groups, as it sees in them a very useful strategic tool for achieving its security goals. However, Pakistan’s plausible deniability approach will come into question, as its close ties with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba make it increasingly hard for it to deny involvement in its acts with any credibility. Regarding India, any kind of offensive from this group could result in a large-scale conflict. This is precisely the most likely scenario to occur, as Modi’s history with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and their twelve-year-long “hiatus” from impactful attacks could propel the organization to take action that will impact the whole region.

2. DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drug trafficking constitutes an important problem for Pakistan. It originates in Afghanistan, from where thousands of tonnes are smuggled out every year, using Pakistan as a passageway to provide the world with heroin and opioids[30]. The following concept map has been elaborated with information from diverse sources[31] to present the different aspects of the problem aimed to better comprehend the complex situation.

 

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

 

Afghanistan, one of the world’s largest heroin producers, has supplied up to 60% and 80% of the U.S. and European markets, respectively. The landlocked country takes advantage of its blurred border line, and the remoteness and inaccessibility of the sparsely populated bordering regions with Pakistan, using it as a conduct to send its drugs globally. The Pakistani government is under a lot of pressure from the international community to fight and minimize drug trafficking from its territory.

Pakistan feels a special kind of pressure from the European Union, as its GSP+ status could be affected if it does not control this problem. The GSP+ is dependent on the implementation of 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance, including the UN Convention on Fighting Illegal Drugs[32]. Pakistan was granted GSP+ status in 2014 and has shown commitment to maintaining ratifications and meeting reporting obligations to the UN Treaty bodies[33]. However, one of the aspects of the scheme is its “temporary withdrawal and safeguard” measure, which means the preferences can be immediately withdrawn if the country is unable to control drug trafficking effectively[34]. This has not been the case, and the EU has recognized Pakistan’s efforts in the fight on drugs; the UN has also removed it from the list of cannabis resin production countries[35]. Anti-corruption frameworks have been strengthened, along with legislation review and awareness building, but they have been advised that better coordination between law enforcement agencies is needed[36].

The GSP+ status is very important to Pakistan, as the European Union is their first trade partner, absorbing over a third of their total exports in 2018, followed by the U.S., China and Afghanistan[37]. The Union can use this as leverage to obtain concessions from Pakistan. However, the approach they have taken so far has been of collaboration in many areas, including transnational organized crime, money laundering and counter-narcotics[38]. In this sense, the EU ambassador to Pakistan recently stated that the new Strategic Engagement Plan of 2019 would “further boost their relations in diverse fields”[39].

Even with combined efforts, erradicating the drug trafficking problem in Pakistan has proven to be very difficult. This is because production of the drug is not done in its territory, and even if border patrols are strengthened, it will be very hard to stop drugs from coming in from its neighbour if the Afghan government doesn’t take appropriate measures themselves.

 

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

 

A “5 whys” exercise has led us to understand that the root cause of the problem is the fact that most farmers in Afghanistan are too poor to turn to different crops. A nearly two decade war has ravaged the country’s land, leaving opium crops, which are cheaper and easier to maintain, as the only option for most farmers in this agrarian nation. A substantial investment in the country’s agriculture to produce more economic options would be needed if any serious advance is expected to be made in stopping illegal drug trafficking. These investments will have to be a joint effort of the international community, and funding for the government will also be necessary, if stability is to be reached. Unless this is done, opium will likely remain entangled in the rural economy, the Taliban insurgency, and the government corruption whose sum is the Afghan conundrum[40]. And as long as this does not happen, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan will be able to make any substantial progress in its effort to fight illicit drugs.
 

[1] Khurshid Khan and Afifa Kiran, “Emerging Tendencies of Radicalization in Pakistan,” Strategic Studies, vol. 32, 2012.

[2] Hassan N. Gardezi, “Pakistan: The Power of Intelligence Agencies,” South Asia Citizenz Web, 2011, http://www.sacw.net/article2191.html.

[3] Madiha Afzal, “Saudi Arabia’s Hold on Pakistan,” 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/saudi-arabias-hold-on-pakistan/.

[4] Gardezi, “Pakistan: The Power of Intelligence Agencies.”

[5] Ibid.

[6] Myriam Renaud, “Pakistan’s Plan to Reform Madrasas Ignores Why Parents Enrol Children in First Place,” The Globe Post, May 20, 2019, https://theglobepost.com/2019/05/20/pakistan-madrasas-reform/.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Drazen Jorgic and Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan Begins Crackdown on Mlitant Groups amid Global Pressure,” Reuters, March 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-un/pakistan-begins-crackdown-on-militant-groups-amid-global-pressure-idUSKCN1QM0XD.

[9] Saad Sayeed, “Pakistan Plans to Bring 20,000 Madrasas under Government Control,” Reuters, April 29, 2019.

[10] Renaud, “Pakistan’s Plan to Reform Madrasas Ignores Why Parents Enrol Children in First Place.”

[11] International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clininc (Stanford Law Review) and Global Justice Clinic (NYE School of Law), “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” 2012, https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/313671/doc/slspublic/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf.

[12] Saba Noor, “Radicalization to De-Radicalization: The Case of Pakistan,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 5, no. 8 (2013): 16–19.

[13] Muhammad Iqbal Roy and Abdul Rehman, “Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy (2001-2019): Evolution, Paradigms, Prospects and Challenges,” Journal of Politics and International Studies 5, no. July-December (2019): 1–13.

[14] Madiha Afzal, “A Country of Radicals? Not Quite,” in Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State (Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 208, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/chapter-one_-pakistan-under-siege.pdf.

[15] Ibid.

[16] John Crisafulli et al., “Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan,” 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20107.7.

[17] Tricia Bacon, “The Evolution of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” Orbis, no. Winter (2019): 27–43.

[18] Susannah George and Shaiq Hussain, “Pakistan Hopes Its Steps to Fight Terrorism Will Keep It off a Global Blacklist,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2020.

[19] Husain Haqqani, “FAFT’s Grey List Suits Pakistan’s Jihadi Ambitions. It Only Worries Entering the Black List,” Hudson Institute, February 28, 2020.

[20] Bacon, “The Evolution of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.”

[21] Ibid.

[22] Farhan Zahid, “Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11, no. 4 (2019): 1–5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26631531.

[23] Tricia Bacon, “Preventing the Next Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Attack,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2019): 53–70.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Abhinav Pandya, “The Future of Indo-Pak Relations after the Pulwama Attack,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 2 (2019): 65–68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26626866.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Crisafulli et al., “Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan.”

[29] Bacon, “The Evolution of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.”

[30] Alfred W McCoy, “How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan,” The Guardian, January 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explains-the-us-uk-failure-in-afghanistan.

[31] Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza, “The Afghanistan-India Drug Trail - Analysis,” Eurasia Review, August , https://www.eurasiareview.com/02082019-the-afghanistan-india-drug-trail-analysis/; Mehmood Hassan Khan, “Kashmir and Power Politics,” Defence Journal 23, no. 2 (2019); McCoy, “How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan”; Pakistan United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Country Office, “Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan,” 2008, https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit Drug Trends Report_Pakistan_rev1.pdf; “Country Profile - Pakistan,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2020, https://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile.html.

[32] European Commission, “Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP),” 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/.

[33] High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+’) Assessment of Pakistan Covering the Period 2018-2019” (Brussels, 2020).

[34] Dr. Zobi Fatima, “A Brief Overview of GSP+ for Pakistan,” Pakistan Journal of European Studies 34, no. 2 (2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333641020_A_BRIEF_OVERVIEW_OF_GSP_FOR_PAKISTAN.

[35] High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+’) Assessment of Pakistan Covering the Period 2018-2019.”

[36] Fatima, “A Brief Overview of GSP+ for Pakistan.”

[37] UN Comtrade Analytics, “Trade Dashboard,” accessed March 27, 2020, https://comtrade.un.org/labs/data-explorer/.

[38] European External Action Services, “EU-Pakistan Five Year Engagement Plan” (European Union, 2017), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-pakistan_five-year_engagement_plan.pdf; European Union External Services, “EU-Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan 2019” (European Union, 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-pakistan_strategic_engagement_plan.pdf.

[39] “EU Ready to Help Pakistan in Expanding Its Reports: Androulla,” Business Recorder, October 23, 2019.

[40] McCoy, “How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan.”

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