In the image
A section of the atomic enrichment facilities in Natanz nuclear power plant, in Iran [Atomic Energy Organization of Iran]
The Islamic Republic of Iran's silent objective over the past two decades has likely been to obtain the atomic bomb. At almost any price, because it believed its survival depended on nuclear deterrence. That is why the regime has been willing to endure a robust package of international sanctions. But now that Tehran’s Axis of Resistance has been weakened and Iran finds itself more vulnerable—both internally and externally—a window of opportunity for an agreement has opened. This article reviews the vicissitudes of Iran's nuclear program and examines the options for a deal.
The Iranian nuclear program harks back to the times of the Shah, within the context of the United States-led ‘Atoms for Peace’ program. In the 1950s, the US assisted other countries in implementation of civilian nuclear programs, as they allowed for the creation of cheap energy. Shah Reza Pahlavi envisaged nuclear power as a key element to modernise the country economically. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shah’s monarchy was replaced by the Islamic Republic, which was ideologically opposed to Western influence in the country, which it viewed as corrupting society.
Even though the Supreme Leader of Iran, ayatollah Khomeini, had opposed the development of nuclear material, which he viewed as un-Islamic, he shifted his stance in 1984. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) led to a reevaluation of nuclearisation for the Iranian regime. The deployment by Iraq of chemical weapons, added to its isolation in the international sphere, meant that nuclear weapons were viewed as guarantees of national security. Although the exact date is unknown, by the late 1990s to early 2000s Iran had created a nuclear weapons program, codenamed ‘Project Amad’.
The Iranian program and covert actions to derail it
While Iran has not formally developed nuclear weapons, it would have a relatively short breakout time, which refers to how long it would take to assemble a nuclear weapon. Though there is no consensus, with estimates ranging from anywhere between several months and a year, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has argued that it could be achieved in mere weeks. By staying just one step away from nuclearisation, Teheran has been able to enjoy the safety granted by nuclear deterrence, but without exposing itself to foreign intervention to dismantle the nuclear program.
There have been some attempts to dismantle the Iranian nuclear program. The most famous covert operation occurred in 2010, when the nuclear centrifuges in the Natanz facility were targeted by a cyberattack known as ‘Stuxnet’. Though no actor took formal responsibility, it was widely attributed to a joint United States-Israeli operation. Should the program be targeted militarily, Iran is already a nuclear threshold state. As such, it would be able to deploy a nuclear weapon shortly. Consequently, the military option is not feasible as a means to limit Iranian nuclearisation.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
Diplomatic efforts to reduce the Iranian nuclear program have also been carried out. The most prominent agreement was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA, hailed as one of the Obama Administration’s main foreign policy achievements, was the successor to the Joint Plan of Action. At the time, the JCPOA was opposed by Israel and some Middle Eastern countries, which did not trust that Iran’s denuclearisation efforts were credible.
The basis of the deal was severely capping the country’s ability to enrich uranium by limiting the total amount of centrifuges. Iran committed to reduce its number of operational centrifuges by ⅔, and agreed to enrich uranium exclusively in the Natanz facility. Additionally, the level of uranium enrichment would be capped at 3.67%. Finally, Iran would reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%. In exchange, the US and the EU, which had placed sanctions on Iran, would lift them. This was especially advantageous for the oil and gas sectors, which had seen their export opportunities curtailed. As the country with the fourth largest oil reserves and the most abundant gas reserves after Russia, it was in Iran’s interest to access the global market.
Why did the US withdraw from the JCPOA?
President Trump had been very critical of the JCPOA, arguing that the deal negotiated by his predecessor would not result in an Iranian inability to obtain a nuclear weapon, but merely a delay in its nuclearisation process. Additionally, the Trump Administration was frustrated with the sanctions relief which had been agreed in exchange for compliance with the JCPOA. This reluctance was due to fears that such relief would allow the regime to increase its funding for proxies around the Middle East. Another contentious issue was that the deal did not tackle the question of Iran’s ballistic missile program or the destabilisation of the region through the actions of its proxies. Additionally, there was skepticism about the inclusion of the so-called ‘sunset clause’, which meant that the restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program would be lifted by 2025. This, coupled with increasing domestic opposition from Republicans in Congress meant that the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018.
The current status
Though Iran initially complied with the restrictions imposed by the deal, the United States’ withdrawal severely affected the viability of the JCPOA. As a result of the reimposition of sanctions, there was no longer an incentive to continue meeting the terms of the deal. By 2020, Iran was no longer abiding by some of the key provisions of the deal. One of the key violations was enriching uranium to 4.5%, well in excess of the 3.67% required for a civilian nuclear program.
Iran currently has numerous functional uranium production and enrichment sites dispersed around the country. Their exact locations are unknown, but in any case, the plurality of sites means that it would be almost impossible to completely dismantle the Iranian nuclear program employing military means. According to United Nations inspectors, Iran has almost weapons-grade level enriched uranium, at 83.7% purity.
Why are negotiations happening now?
Negotiations between France, the United Kingdom, Germany (the E-3), and Iran have been ongoing since January. Though no breakthrough has been made, it is in Iran’s interest to come to an agreement. As the E-3 did not withdraw from the JCPOA, until October 2025 they may still make use of the “snap-back clause”. This would entail reimposing sanctions at the Security Council, of which both France and the United Kingdom are permanent members. Should no progress be made before mid-2025, it is highly likely that the E-3 would move to reimpose sanctions on Iran.
President Trump, since his return to the White House, has also made reaching a nuclear deal a priority. The US and Iran are on their fifth round of negotiations, with the parties suggesting that enrichment remains the main point of contention. However, the White House’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, stated that the US may be willing to accept some enrichment, so long as it remains under the 3.67% threshold. This may suggest at least some willingness by the Trump Administration to reach a deal. Furthermore, the US is incentivised to do so rapidly, in order to have a concrete proposal to pass through the Senate, which the Republicans currently control, before the 2026 Midterm elections.
Opportunity
In conclusion, the presently ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and the E-3, but especially the US, offer a credible opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E-3 has leverage that it is not willing to give up, while the US seems committed to settle the question of Iranian nuclearisation. Additionally, Iran would benefit from the lifting of sanctions, and needs to reintegrate itself in the international sphere now that its Axis of Resistance has been weakened.