State of the Join Task Force Bravo and US assistance to Honduras

For decades, Honduras and Latin America in general have been at the back of US security policy. Compared to its counterparts in Europe, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) held only a miniscule force with which to engage the handful but formidable threats in theater. However, since the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the United States has increased its military presence in Latin America, primarily aimed at fighting the drug cartels and containing Chinese influence in the region. One key area in the War on Drugs, however, has seen no increase in American forces: Honduras and the vital Soto Cano Air Base.

The present article seeks to analyze the US military assets and missions currently in Honduras and the US approach to the security challenges the small but geographically vital Central American nation is facing, to conclude that the current level of US forces in Soto Cano base is insufficient. The article also offers recommendations for US and Honduran policymakers in this matter. Additionally, the article identifies challenges faced by the US in the region and possible contingencies.

Background

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States reduced its attention regarding security issues in Latin America. The end of proxy conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua saw considerable reductions of US forces in the region after the 1989 invasion of Panama, (operation ‘Just Cause’) and the subsequent withdrawal of all US bases from the Canal Zone by 2000.

In the case of Honduras, Soto Cano Air Base in Comayagua Valley also saw troop reductions. The 1980s had seen the deployment of considerable numbers of US Army, Marine, and Air Force units to that facility to contain the ‘spread of Communism’ and provide assistance to Contra rebels engaged in attempting to overthrow Nicaragua’s revolutionary regime. The end of the Cold War saw the withdrawal of most of these forces, as focus shifted to the Balkans and disarmament.

This situation has persisted ever since. In 2025, however, the Western Hemisphere saw a considerable shift in US posturing, as Washington deployed a considerable amount of assets to the Caribbean as part of a campaign against drug trafficking launched by the Trump Administration. The campaign soon escalated into pressuring Venezuela’s regime to fall. These efforts were later consolidated into Operation ‘Southern Spear.’

American military efforts saw increased US military presence in the Caribbean and the reopening of decommissioned military bases in Puerto Rico. However, Soto Cano, America’s largest base in Central America was not involved in the buildup that culminated in the US’s first military operation in a Latin American country since Panama when US Special Forces, supported by aircraft and naval assets, captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro on January 3rd, 2026 during operation ‘Absolute Resolve.’

Furthermore, American efforts to fight drug cartels, organized crime and human trafficking led to the establishment of the ‘Shield of the Americas’ initiative in Florida in a meeting between Trump and eleven Latin American leaders, with the declared objective of increasing coordination to fight the drug cartels and organized crime. The pact has faced severe criticism over the absence of key countries involved in drug trafficking such as Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

As of 2026, despite US President Trump’s more aggressive push to fight drug cartels and reclaim American influence in the region, US military assets in Honduras have not varied in any significant way, even if the situation in Honduras has started to deteriorate in relation to the War on Drugs, with production of illegal drugs gradually increasing, and with the country shifting from the status of transit country to one of producer.

Furthermore, operations in Latin America have seen the transfer of resources to Europe and the Middle East with the start of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran (operation ‘Epic Fury’). Particularly significant was the departure of the aircraft carrier USS ‘Gerald Ford’, which was transferred to the Mediterranean to participate in the operation against Iran in February of 2026.

Major challenges in security

One of the major security challenges facing Honduras has been transnational crime in the form of traffickers tied to the drug trade in Mexico and Colombia. Honduras’ geographical location makes it a necessary steppingstone for cartels heading to the US. The influence of drug traffickers has been well documented, as seen in the major scandals that have affected presidents in the left and right or their families. While the true scope of the involvement of these figures varies based on available evidence, the damage government and political institutions have suffered has been palpable, as well as Honduras’ image in the international stage. This problem has been exacerbated by a weak judicial system.

Another challenge is that posed by natural disasters. Honduras, as the rest of the Central American region, is particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Eta and Ioata in 2020, or like the infamous 1998 Hurricane Mitch. Another major risk is forest fires, particularly during the dry summer seasons. Water shortages have caused problems for firefight attempts trying to put down the flames in forest areas, which in turn leads to massive ecological damage. Furthermore, Honduras lacks helicopters with the capability to carry large water baskets to combat the fires, hampering efforts.

Organized crime and gangs are a common threat faced by the countries of the Northen Triangle, and one that has left its mark. While El Salvador under President Bukele’s controversial but effective war on gangs saw major success, Guatemala and Honduras have continued to suffer from high criminality rates. Alarmingly, members of gangs such as MS-13, which have been a thorn for law enforcement in the Northen Triangle for decades, have been arrested and deported in several Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations in the US, showing the range of the gangs. Furthermore, in Central America, gangs have managed to control areas via extorsion as well as the freeing of fellow gang members from prison or deadly riots in prisons.

Poverty is the main concern of Central American countries, and one that has been linked to the other security problems affecting the region. Honduras has typically ranked amongst the worst-off countries in the region, surpassed only by Haiti. The lack of opportunities and inequality has led to considerable numbers of people leaving the country in the caravans. Complicating matters, a considerable amount of labor is informal in Honduras. This, alongside the dependency of many low-income families who wither live exclusively or partly on remittances sent by relatives in the US, some of which entered illegally into the country, causes considerable problems for Honduras’ stagnant economy, dependent on willingness of US officials on whether or not to enforce immigration laws.

Without any doubt, however, drug trafficking is the most important security challenge for Honduras, one whose effects spill over the country’s borders to involve the whole Central American region, and the US beyond it.

The Area of Operations (AO) where the War on Drugs takes place in Honduras is La Mosquitia, a massive jungle area covering the eastern part of Honduras and the border with Nicaragua, with considerable biodiversity and isolated population centers made up of native Misquito populations. The area is also known as the Biosphere of the Platano River. Dense jungle and rivers dominate the area, making ground access difficult, meaning operations will have to be conducted via helicopter or using small patrol boats to patrol rivers, like the US approached in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. Drug traffickers have built small ‘narcopistas’: small, clandestine airstrips where Cessna and smaller aircraft land to unload drugs. Operations to neutralize them involve using explosives to crater the airstrips.

However, recent operations by the Honduran Army in the 2020s have discovered cocaine farms, where coca leaf plantation has started. This has expanded the AO from La Mosquitia to several major departments of Honduras, consisting of the Caribbean Coast areas and the Nicaraguan border areas. These areas are mountainous, and covered with either forest or jungle, making ground operations difficult in the perilous dirt roads that crisscross the mountains and valleys.

Trafficking also takes place in the Caribbean and Pacific, with small boats, known as ‘narcolanchas,’ moving considerable amounts of drugs towards the US. With all these things considered, Honduras faces at least three fronts of the War on Drugs: the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Eastern Honduras. Located geographically at the center of the continent and Central America, Honduras is the door for the drug cartels to reach the United States, and for Washington, the choke point where to slow the cartels.

Countering these problems is of immediate importance, not only for Honduras, but also for the United States, especially as Trump’s focus on security has emphasized countering illegal migration and drug trafficking.

Joint Task Force Bravo

The main US military force in the region is Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B). JTF-B is headquartered in the only US base in Central America, Soto Cano Air Base, which is on the outskirts of Comayagua, in the central part of the country. The force and base were established during the 1980s to assist US Southern Command counter Communist influence from Cuba and Nicaragua. After the end of the Cold War, JTF-B switched focus to humanitarian assistance missions, providing aid to poverty-stricken areas in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the rest of the Caribbean. JTF-B has also provided training for Honduran and partner nations in CENTAM exercises such as CENTAM Smoke and CENTAM Guardian.

The current composition of JTF-Bravo is a small military force, made up of three units: An Army Forces Battalion (ARFOR), responsible for command of the forces in the theater, the 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, equipped with UH-60 Blackhawks and CH-47 Chinook Helicopters, and the 612th Air Base Squadron, responsible for logistical duties on the base and the maintenance of the helicopters. As seen by these forces, they are mostly for humanitarian missions such as those associated with humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief, such as during Hurricane Eta.

JTF-B’s assets, particularly its helicopters have been of valuable assistance to assist Honduras in countering forest fires or helping in evacuating civilians during hurricanes such as those of 2020. The training provided by JTF-B, including first responder, firefighting, and military has been valuable for Honduran emergency response services.

Proposals to improve security in Honduras

Based on the threats faced by Honduras identified above, which eventually translate to threats to US National Security, the forces in JTF-B’s possession are insufficient to counter drug trafficking and to conduct and/or support humanitarian operations in Central America, the two areas the JTF-B is designed to handle. The US would need more forces to assist Honduran forces in counter narcotic operations. With the more militarized approach taken by the Trump Administration, it would be of outmost importance to increase the number of assets in Honduras.

However, before sending more US forces, those of the Honduran Armed Forced have to be reinforced. Considerable modernization efforts would have to be conducted on the equipment of the Fuerza Aérea Hondureña (FAH) to allow them to take a more aggressive role in the campaign and to prevent the US from taking the brunt of the challenge. To increase these abilities, the Honduran Armed Forces would have to be reinforced. Not only with an expansion of the Embraer fleet ‘Super Tucanos,’ but also the proposal of an American or European alternative should be explored to modernize the aircraft fleet.

Another challenge to deal with traffickers is small boats, like those attacked by SOUTHCOM assets in the Caribbean. Honduras’ small navy can conduct some patrols and interdictions, but will require expansion of its ships and surveillance assets to counter drug trafficking effectively. With a small navy made up of only two Damen Stan 4207 Patrol Vessels and a single Sa'ar 62-class offshore patrol vessel for coastal defense duties, the acquisition of more of this ships might be required to increase the ability to launch patrols.

As mentioned before, modernizations would be required for the Honduran military to ensure the ability to operate without putting a strain on US resources. These modernizations could be an acquisition of more Airbus H145 helicopters, as seen in the purchase from Germany in 2024. The acquisition of more Bell helicopters could also be a solution to increase the ability of Honduran forces to insert.

However, ground forces would be required for the destruction of the clandestine airstrips and laboratories, which would need to increase the number of ground forces in the area. Operations would see Honduran Forces, with US advisors or small units of US soldiers attached to them for Search and Destroy mission (S&D) against coca farms and clandestine airstrips in the region. These could see the establishment of a small infantry force in the region, composed of either US Army, Marine Corps or Special Operations (SOF) units, as well as the transport helicopters to mount operations against drug traffickers.

The most adequate forces for the theater would be Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), such as the MQ9 ‘Reaper.’ Surveillance aircraft would be needed to help track the planes and boats bringing drugs from South America. For the interception of smuggler aircraft, the US would need to deploy a small force of fighter aircraft to Soto Cano. These could be either F-16 ‘Fighting Falcon’ or units of older F-15 ‘Eagles’ deployed in the US mainland from Air National Guard units (ANG). These forces would assist the Embraer ‘Super Tucanos’ operated by Honduras, emulating actions seen in Brazil, where aircraft have been used to intercept smugglers.

For naval interdiction, US Coast Guard cutters, and handful of US Navy ships can provide assistance to cover the area under the command of the 4th Fleet. The permanent deployment of an aircraft carrier would not be required, but destroyers such as the Arleigh Burke Class or Litoral Combat Ships (LCS). Ground forces deployed in the region would be SOF units specialized in jungle warfare to assist Honduran forces, though at least two battalions of US Army or Marines should be considered to be deployed permanently at any time to reinforce Honduran forces.

To address the economic problems in Honduras, mayor investments in education and key industries would be required. The main industries identified are agricultural exports such as coffee and bananas. There is a considerable textile industry in the Northern part of the country, called ‘maquilas,’ responsible for clothing manufacturing. Shrimp aquaculture is also a considerable part of Honduras’ exports, most of which goes to the United States. There is also a snack company, Yummies, which is popular in Honduras. The other main source of revenue is tourism, particularly beaches such as Tela and Roatan in the North, as well as the Mayan Ruins in Copan in the western part of the country.

Citing the issues mentioned, the first approach would be to take measures to regularize informal labor, alongside massive investments in existing industries and attempting to create new ones. Education would be a requirement to solve the problems; an area Honduras and impoverished nations are suffering. The public education system in Honduras is in poor shape, understaffed and rampant with corruption, the more expensive private education tends to be better prepared and as such, sees better prepared students graduating.

Regarding tourism, the main approach would have to be an intense PR campaign to get people to visit those areas. It is not impossible, as Mexico, despite being one of the most dangerous countries in the region has a well-established tourist industry in Cancun despite the intensifying violence in the country. This soft power campaign would have to be conducted by both, private and public actors, to increase its effect well beyond Honduras’ borders.

However, to allow for these measures to succeed, legal and security conditions must be achieved, Honduran law would have to be changed, and legal guarantees created to ensure investments are protected from expropriation. For its part, Honduras will have to balance the economic need with environmental concerns. To ensure security for those seeking to invest and for tourism to flourish, security would have to be restored in the streets, with more aggressive police action by the Policia Nacional and Policia Militar de Orden Publico (PMOP) against gangs and areas controlled by them. In addition, Honduran security forces would likely have to be deployed to said area during moments tourism is expected to peak, such as Holly Week. With all their weaponry coming from the US and Israel, ramping up assistance and training for these initiatives should be conducted.

Challenges to US aid

However, US assistance to Honduras or any other Latin American country would be plagued by considerable political challenges coming from both US and local populations. On one side, is the understandable concernsof the American public of being dragged into a Vietnam situation or an Iran-Contra fiasco. On the other hand, there is the fear of many in the region of an increased American role in its ‘backyard.’ As such Honduras would have to increase its role, including modernization programs and increase the size of the armed forces, though a draft may not be necessary.

The main problem to any US action against cartels and traffickers may come from sectors in the Honduran population opposed to US presence, particularly from socialist sectors, like the Libre Party. Libre, short for Libertad y Refundación, was formed as a splinter group from the traditional Liberal Party around President Manuel ‘Mel’ Zelaya after the 2009 constitutional crisis that saw him arrested and removed from power by the Armed Forces of Honduras after Congress approved his removal. Within the party’s supporters, it is widely believed that the US orchestrated Zelaya’s downfall, a claim which hampered US-Honduran cooperation during the presidency of Zelaya’s wife, Xiomara Castro, from 2022-2026.

The killing of Honduran nationals or US direct operations may cause tensions to rise if the US military conducts operations in the same way as those in the Caribbean and Pacific. Honduras saw major riots in 1988after the US abducted in Honduran drug trafficker linked to Pablo Escobar and the killing of a DEA agent in Mexico in 1985. In 2025, after President Trump pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who was in prison in the United States after being convicted for drug trafficking, protests broke out outside the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa. Protests erupted again in 2026 after the US capture of Maduro. On both occasions, Libre organized the protests.

If the US and Honduras are forced to pursue more aggressive strikes against drug traffickers, a massive PR campaign will have to be launched, aimed at convincing people in the US and Honduras on the necessity of the strikes and operations and benefits, not only for the US but also for Honduras to take a hardline approach to fight cartels. Furthermore, a framework must be created to allow the operations to continue despite the change in governments that will occur in Washington and Tegucigalpa, especially if a left-wing party arrives to power.

Libre has used, especially in moments of tension, such as the mentioning of the links politicians with drug traffickers or unpopularity during the government of Xiomara, the idea of closing Soto Cano but have never gone through with the threat, likely due to fears of US reprisals in the shape of drug trafficking links becoming public, reduced US economic aid, or more likely, direct indictments in US courts, which could lead to extradition requests.

Furthermore, killing of drug traffickers could bring issues with Human Rights groups, and even of supporters of operations against cartels, who might question the legality of taking out a threat. In 2012, mayor backlash came when a Honduran Army operation with DEA assistance attacked a suspected drug boat, killing civiliansin La Mosquitia.

Another fear of the US Government has been the possibility that some of the weapons sent to Honduras may end up in the hands of organized crime groups. The Mexican experience of the Zetas Cartel, where Mexican Special Forces soldiers deserted to form one of Mexico’s most violent and infamous cartels. A fear that was amplified during the Obama Administration’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tabaco, Firearms, Explosives (ATF) Gunwalking Scandal, commonly referred to some as the Fast and Furious Scandal, in which the ATF sold weapons to cartels in Mexico in a failed attempt to track those weapons, which led to the killing of a US Border Patrol agent in 2010.

In economic terms, the main challenges of any change to legal and economic areas would come from Libreand sectors that might see the new actors in the economic system as a threat. These actors would likely oppose any piece of legislation that is seen as part of the neo-liberal model or US investment which they might view as an infringement of Honduran sovereignty. Much of this resentment is rooted in the complex history of the role of the United States in the region, particularly regarding the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit Company, who wielded considerable influence in the country in the early 20th Century, making Honduras synonymous with the term Banana Republic. Another source of tension is the military interventions of the Banana Wars in the 1920s and the coups and military dictatorships assisted by the US during the Cold War. The US would require considerable resources in soft power to attempt to limit the negative backlash from any U.S. investment or financial assistance in the region.

Conclusions

We can conclude, based on this analysis, that the precarious and complex economic and security situation of Honduras is a threat to the National Security of the United States and the broader stability of the Western Hemisphere. The US would be wise to ramp up assistance to Honduras and increase the amount of assets and resources in theater to counter drug trafficking. Honduras will also require making considerable efforts to change the situation, mainly, economic reforms, and military modernization. The main challenge to solve the problems will be the willingness of politicians and public opinion in the two stakeholders to take the necessary measures to authorize the deployments into a region which has a complex history with the United States.