In the image
Ribbon with the colors of the Hungarian flag [freepick]
Hungary will hold its first genuinely competitive elections in years on April 12, 2026. Yet the country’s electoral system raises questions about fairness. The electoral reforms introduced in 2011 and 2024 raise suspicion of manipulation and gerrymandering among scholars and opposition voices. The mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system compels strategic voting, as citizens must split tickets between local constituency candidates and national party lists to secure the best possible result under winner-take-all district rules and compensatory proportional allocation.
This article analyses how Hungary’s post‑2011 electoral system functions, how subsequent reforms—including the 2024 constituency revision—interact with its mixed‑member, largely majoritarian design, and how these features shape both party competition and voter incentives. It first outlines the institutional architecture (seat allocation rules, the relative weight of single‑member districts and party lists, and the role of compensation mechanisms), then synthesizes existing critiques regarding bias, disproportionality, treatment of ‘wasted’ votes, and gerrymandering. Building on this, it examines the logic of strategic voting within the current rules, illustrating how citizens who understand the distinct functions of district and list votes can, in principle, adjust their behavior to increase the effectiveness of their choices at the ballot box. To provide the necessary context, it starts by describing Hungary’s electoral system and the reforms it has experienced with time.
After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungary, a highly complex mixed-member electoral system was established by the 1989 transition law, allocating 386 seats in the Parliament across three distinct tiers: 176 single-member districts (SMDs), 152 regional list seats, and 58 national compensatory seats.
Voters cast ballots in three contests, often spanning two rounds for SMDs.
First, in the individual constituencies, the single-member districts (SMDs—only one candidate wins per district), voters elected individual candidates in geographically defined constituencies, using the two round runoff system; in the first round, relying on absolute majority (min. 50%), while in the second one, securing the seat through plurality vote (the candidate with the most votes wins).
Second, voters elected from territorial-level party lists in the 20 regional constituencies, where parties presented lists in multi-member districts (meaning that more than one candidate ran for office in the same district), and seats to the Parliament were apportioned proportionally through the d’Hondt method, which will be explained later. Parties were subject to a 5% threshold, meaning that, if a party did not get more than 5% of the citizen vote, it couldn't get a seat.
Third, a national compensatory tier was used in which the ‘leftover’ 58 seats were distributed according to ‘wasted’ votes. Wasted votes added up from the votes for losers, who were not able to get any seats (losing SMD candidates). This tier further balanced representation.
Voters cast three ballots, one for a candidate in their single‑seat district, one for a party list in their territorial district, and one counting toward the national list (via transferred/compensation votes).
Although this complex system was rather confusing, its structure gave importance to proportionality, aiming to balance geographic representation (SMD) with party-proportional representation and reconciling local accountability with national vote shares.
The triumph of Fidesz (Hungary’s ruling party since 2010) came in 2010. Viktor Orbán’s party gained 67.88% of the parliamentary seats with 52.73% of votes, winning a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. After a year of presidency, the existing electoral system came under threat, as Fidesz had a constitutional majority(Art. S (2)) and the Parliament only had one chamber. Orbán’s government exploited its legislative dominance by unilaterally changing the electoral law.
The electoral reform was not debated with other political actors nor was the proposal presented by Orban’s government to the general public. The National Assembly passed the government bill of electoral reform on December 23, 2011. Many scholars argue that this was one of the first illiberal turns of the regime, aspoliticians try to improve their position by changing electoral systems and amend the constitution when given the opportunity. The reform reduced the size of the Assembly from 286 to 199 seats and simplified the structure by exchanging the three-tier system with a two-tier one.
Under the new system, the first ballot accounts for 106 Parliamentary seats abiding by the plurality rule in the 106 SMDs on the local level, while the second is for 93 seats, elected by the proportional representation (PR) system in a single nation-wide electoral district.
The second vote brings a little bit of complexity with itself. Citizens vote for one party list, not for individual candidates, and the votes are allocated by the d’Hondt method. This technique affords a simple way to divide a fixed number of seats (93) among parties based on their total votes, by iteratively dividing each party's vote totals by consecutive integers (1, 2, 3, ...) and awarding seats to the highest resulting quotients until all seats are distributed, thereby maintaining a close approximation of proportionality while slightly favoring larger parties. The following graph explains this ‘auction method’.
Furthermore, a 5% threshold has been established that does not allow parties with less than 5% of votes get any seats (10% for alliances of two parties and 15% for those of more than two parties). In this system, wasted votes consist not only of loser votes, but the extra votes for winning parties that they did not need to win (excess votes). These are redirected to the national list tier, which strengthens the winner-take-all nature of the electoral system, which will be used in the upcoming elections.
In summary, Hungary qualifies as a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system because its 106 single-member districts (53% of seats) employ plurality voting—awarding winner-take-all outcomes—while the 93 compensatory list seats (47%) offer only partial proportional correction.
Examining the fundamental changes of the reform, it is visible that the new system is more majoritarian, as the SMDs dominate now, granting oversized seat bonuses to locally dominant parties rather than ensuring full proportionality. In the pre-2011 system, 46% of total MPs came from SMDs, while in the post-2011 system, the rate has risen to 53%.
The 2011 electoral reform provided Fidesz with a structural advantage, demonstrated by its 2014 victory in 91of the 106 single-member districts (86%) despite garnering just 44% of national list votes. This outcome illustrates asymmetrical competition: Fidesz entered as a cohesive alliance backed by strong local networks, whereas a divided opposition of several parties fragmented anti-Fidesz support in districts (for instance, 60% combined opposition votes dispersed as 20% each across three candidates). As a result, Fidesz secured plurality wins with only 35–40% in many races. This highlights to voters the necessity of opposition unity behind one candidate per district to overcome such imbalances.
The pre-2011 system required a candidate to get more than 50% to win the first round of one election if turnout in the constituency exceeded 50% and they obtained more than 50% of the valid votes; otherwise a second round was required. In the post-2011 the candidate with the most votes wins; there is no minimum turnout needed, making it easier to win districts without high turnout, while favoring parties with loyal base voters over broad appeal.
On the other hand, the new system is simpler for voters as it consists of only one round and two ballots, causing less confusion, although it still requires strategic voting behaviour.
Possibly the biggest consequence of the electoral reform is the suspicion of gerrymandering. Throughout this article, the question of how these electoral districts are constructed and how the borders are drawn has been ignored. According to Grofman et al., there are three potential sources of electoral bias: malapportionment, reactive malapportionment, and partisan gerrymandering. Malapportionment refers to the variations in the population size of constituencies, which can result in unequal representation across districts. Reactive malapportionment indicates the turnout rate differences across electoral districts, which can Lastly, partisan gerrymandering corresponds to territorial manipulation of electoral districts to favor certain parties.
Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament, Section 4(2)(a) explicitly states: “Single-member constituencies shall be established in a manner that a) they will not cross county boundaries or the boundaries of Budapest; b) they form contiguous areas; c) the number of voters will be approximately identical.” Although this rule was meant to be a standard anti-gerrymandering safeguard, critics argue that the country is subject to gerrymandering; moreover, this law can create a population balancing problem and forces intra-county gerrymandering.
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s research team of governance experts (BTI 2024 Country Report) argues that “The most notable distortion is gerrymandering, allowing Fidesz candidates to dominate electoral districts except in Budapest.’ Nevertheless, this report did not take into account the 2024 boundary changes.
Act LXXIX of 2024 adjusted Hungary’s 106 single-member constituencies for the 2026 parliamentary elections to address population shifts. Budapest’s districts were reduced from 18 to 16, while Pest county’s increased from 12 to 14. Furthermore, this amendment resulted in the need to redraw all constituencies in Pest county, including Budapest.
Moreover, border corrections were made in Fejér and Csongrád-Csanád counties. The official purpose of the amendment was to ensure fair representation of constituencies and equal voting power for all citizens. The bill’s justification notes demographic shifts, as the urban population grew and the rural declined, which caused voter imbalances exceeding 20% in constituencies, especially Pest county and Budapest, where inner-city population fell.
Máté Tóth, a Hungarian lawyer, argues that the reform was not only justified but necessary and not at all motivated by political aims. He stresses that in the county of Pest between 2010 and 2022 the population has grown, while the citizens of the capital are decreasing due to suburbanization. He refers to a 9% decrease in population in the whole country and a 20% decrease in Budapest. He argues that a vote from Budapest would count more than a vote from anywhere else in the country, referring to national laws establishing that votes should have the same weight coming from all citizens, as Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure, Preamble / Section 1 affirms. Additionally, failing to make the necessary changes to adjust electoral districts to population size is a constitutional violation caused by omission. Furthermore, he stresses that, based on the national laws, the timing was lawful, and that nothing was incorrect nor rash. He expresses his joy for the reform, while criticizing the questioning of the left-wing.
While the amendment might have been necessary, the way how it was executed brings up some concerns and questions among scholars. The Venice Commission (Council of Europe, 2025 Opinion CDL-AD(2025)018), for example, expresses its concern about possible political motivations behind the reform and a lack of political neutrality.
The opposition, meanwhile, claims that the process of redistributing was done in a questionable way, destroying constituencies, dividing them into two or more parts. According to demographic experts, the imbalance between constituencies 1 and 2 in Csongrád-Csanád county did not decrease significantly even after the modification. In Tolna and Somogy counties, where the constituencies were not changed, a high level of disproportionality remained, which benefits the governing parties. The modification in Fejér county was described as a clear example of politically motivated gerrymandering. In a few districts, several gerrymandering techniques were identified, including cracking, packing, and mixing. Cracking refers to the splitting of voters of a particular party across many districts, to make them become minority everywhere. Packing concentrates many opposition voters into one or a few districts, so they lose influence in other districts, while mixing blends voters of many different parties within the district to ensure a small but reliable majority of the preferred party.
The 2024 constituency boundary changes raise questions about consistency with point 4.2 of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Decision 22/2005 (VI. 17.), which clearly states that the legislature may depart from the maximum fulfilment of the constitutional requirements regarding the equal weight of votes, which derive from the principle of equality of suffrage, only if there is an appropriate constitutional justification. Therefore, such deviations cannot serve political advantages.
Two Hungarian experts inform the citizens about possible political manipulations and tricks of the current government. Róbert László, an election expert at Political Capital and Dániel Döbrentei, a lawyer specializing in electoral and voting rights at the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ), a Hungarian NGO focused on civil rights, rule of law, and democratic institutions. Their arguments include pervasive daily electoral abuses through state resources used for pro-government messaging (László), which blurs public communication and partisan campaigning to create an uneven playing field even if voting procedures are technically correct; and legal loopholes enabling vote-buying schemes, fake parties to split opposition votes, and lax campaign finance oversight allowing hidden influence operations (Döbrentei).
Overall, the 2024 amendment did not comprehensively solve the problem of disproportionality, and in some cases even exacerbated it. According to the experts consulted, it appeared that the districts were not primarily designed according to settlement structures but rather based on considerations of electoral geography. The European Commission for Democracy through Law and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have stressed previously that the delimitation of electoral constituencies should be based on broad and inclusive political consensus, conducted in a transparent and professional manner through an impartial and non-partisan procedure, avoiding short-term political considerations such as gerrymandering. The 2024 process—reportedly driven more by electoral geography than neutral criteria—thus raises questions regarding the impartiality of the boundary delimitation, as underscored by these authoritative standards.
It is clear that citizens are forced to vote strategically to achieve a wanted outcome. Maškarinec’s article on the 2014 election finds that voters follow the Duverger-type logic which shows a shift from choosing weaker parties to the locally strongest challenger under plurality rules. In practice, this means that voters not only have to think about who they want to give the power to, but also, who they do not want to. The system forces citizens who support the opposition to vote for the candidate with the best chance in the district, to earn as many votes as possible against Fidesz. This tactical voting promotes the biggest parties and weakens the smallest ones, as they do not have any chance of winning at the local, district level, because only one candidate can represent the SMD. In real terms, votes which are not for the candidate of Fidesz, nor for the strongest anti-Fidesz candidate (in the current political competition: Tisza) are wasted votes. Citizens who are aiming to change the current government in the upcoming elections are best off if they vote for the most viable anti-government candidate, even if from a different party. This understanding of the election highlights the faultiness of the system.
Vote-splitting is a phenomenon where voters cast a tactical district vote –mentioned above– and a sincere list vote. In the second, party-list ballot voters can express their sincere preference by voting for their true favorite party, as the system allows a proportional representation via the d’Hondt method. However, it is important to take into account the 5% threshold.
The mixed-member system compels opposition voters, in the upcoming 2026 election, to engage in split-ticket strategies—tactical district choices together with sincere list preferences—to counter disproportionality, irrespective of normative preferences regarding voter behavior.
As Hungary approaches its 2026 election, a truly competitive one between Fidesz and the newly famous Tisza, the structure of the mixed‑member majoritarian system will influence outcomes. Whether citizens understand and use their two votes strategically will further impact the results. Coordinating around the strongest challenger in each district, avoiding wasted list votes below the thresholds, and combining tactical SMD choices with sincere list preferences to limit disproportionality and make their voices count despite enduring concerns about bias and gerrymandering in the electoral framework are crucial. In this landscape, informed, coordinated participation becomes not just a right but a strategic necessity for those seeking political change in 2026. Ultimately, the election will test not only party strength, but also voter’s capacity to navigate an imperfect system to express their preferences effectively.