In the image
First Lady Michelle Obama holding a sign with the hashtag ‘#bringbackourgirls’ in support of the 2014 Chibok kidnapping in Nigeria by Boko Haram fighters [White House]
Fundamentalism and violent extremism are two concepts that are usually intertwined but with often confused distinct meanings. Fundamentalism can be defined as the literal interpretation and the complete adherence to a religious or ideological writing over human life. Fundamentalists hold four relevant patterns: in the first place, fundamentalists have a literal interpretation of the scripture giving more value to the written words than the human life. Secondly, a fundamentalist is someone who would sacrifice a person for its beliefs. In the third place, fundamentalist groups have a similar political attitude, as fundamentalist groups are usually reactionaries; hence, they harbour anti-secular values and usually despise liberalism, perceived as an impending threat going against their traditional beliefs. Finally, fundamentalist groups have a very strong distinction between in-group and out-group.
Delving further into the first concept and restricting the analysis to only scripture-based religions, fundamentalist doctrines are strictly based on what is the literal understanding of the sacred texts. This approach rests on the view that right is directly instituted by God as a positive divine legislator, whose authority is not bounded by logic, reason, or any requirement of internal coherence. Therefore, the religious interpretation is shaped around the literal understanding of the deity/deities embedded in the scriptures rather than looking at the essence of the deity itself. This causes fundamentalists to interpret the text under voluntarist theological lenses which lead to moral arbitrariness; hence what is morally right and wrong is based on the divine command. Any derogation, therefore, from the divine command—the scripture itself—is considered a sacrilege. Somehow, the written law is seen as more divine than God himself—a kind of idol adored to whom man can be sacrificed. Therefore, because of this sacred understanding of the scripture, scriptural inerrancy overrides human dignity; as the text is God-given, hence, it is unquestionable, thus resulting in a ‘dogmatic’ faith that evolves into doctrinal absolutism.
Moral codes in fundamentalist groups are meticulous because these are considered sacred themselves: these strict interpretations create a strong homogeneity within the group. Furthermore, the fear of breaking the divine command is very high; the derogation of even the smallest rule is considered a sacrilege (a sin), and the punishment of such acts can lead to expulsion or even resort to physical violence, as in some religious texts is written so. These radical interpretations of divine command lead to the radicalization of a community and the creation of a strong in-group. It is interesting that what brings together the community in the first place is not only the fear of the out-group, but the dehumanisation within the ingroup, by which the single person loses his individuality as all the members of the group become one entity.[1]
Moving forward to the sociological aspect, fundamentalist groups naturally radicalise by accentuating exceptionalism and emphasizing parochialism. The reactionary nature of most of these groups rises spontaneously as a mechanism to preserve their doctrine from being changed by external influences; rather than returning to the past they choose specific doctrines from the past and reuse them to counter out-group values.[2] Thus, fundamentalists create very strong in-groups with a very unique radical lifestyle which detaches them from the out-groups which they consider “inferior,” or “inimical.” In fact, these distinctions are needed to reaffirm themselves again.[3]
Contrary to common stereotypes, fundamentalists do not necessarily resort to violence; for example, the Amish[4] or the ultra-orthodox Haredi Jews live in peace and abide by doctrines that forbid any form of armed struggle.[5] Instead, violent extremists resort to violence as a tool to achieve political or ideological goals which can be religious, political, economic, social, ethnic, or nationalist, and that can range from various political views, social and cultural backgrounds.
Therefore, how come we hear so much about violent fundamentalist extremism like Jihadist groups? How come it is so present, especially in the poorest, war-torn countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)? Most importantly, how and why violent extremism and fundamentalism overlap?
According to Galtung’s triangle of violence, cultural values play an important role in legitimising violence to which cultural violence, combined with structural violence, sustains direct violence. Using this model, it is possible to argue that fundamentalism is the cultural force that generates an enabling framework for violence to unfold, as the doctrines themselves subjugate individuals to the scripture, dehumanising people, and further creating a strong sense of exceptionalism. Furthermore, fundamentalism stress the social cleavage between the in-group and out-group, which combined with the structural systemic injustice and poverty results in a dangerous intermixture that can exacerbate into direct violence.[6]
Case study: Boko Haram
The case of Boko Haram may help to prove this thesis. Boko Haram, or by its official name Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Da’awah wa al-Jihad, is a Jihadist Sunni terrorist group (based on a radical interpretation of the concept of jihad, and of the Sharia Law) founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in the northern region of Borno in Nigeria, bordering Niger and Cameroon. Boko Haram is the designation given to the terrorist organisation by the people living in Maiduguri and adopted by the organisation which literally means in Hausa ‘Westernization is Sacrilege’[7] (‘Sacrilege’ is the translation provided by Britannica, but Haram is an Islamic term better translated as ‘forbidden’[8]). The name can be analysed as a label that sums up both the religious fundamentalist aspect and the reactionary political attitude of Boko Haram. The unofficial name of the organization immediately defines the out-group: ‘westerners.’ The name of the group further gives the reason why ‘westerners’ are the evil enemies: they commit sacrilege by going against God’s will. Hence Boko Haram portraits itself as the paladin defending Islam while clearly defining an in-group and an out-group.
Boko Haram wants to achieve its ideological goals through violence; hence, we can say that it is a violent fundamentalist extremist group. This group started large-scale operations in 2009 but, due to various military operations in the region, its overall capacity has been damaged, although it continues to perform terrorist attacks, especially targeting Christians. How is it possible that after so many attempts, such as the Operation Barkhane (2014-2022) and the efforts of the G5 Sahel to eradicate violent fundamentalist extremism in the Sahel, these terrorist organisations continue to grow and appeal to people in the region? The analysis provided by Cambridge scholars Mustapha and Meagher in their book ‘Overcoming Boko Haram: Faith, society and Islamic radicalization in Northern Nigeria’[9] confronted with Galtung’s triangle, can shed a light on how fundamentalism can fuel violent extremism.
Using this case study, we can analyse how fundamentalism fuels cultural violence. This aspect of the crisis comes directly from the radical interpretation of Islam by some Ulamas (Muslim scholars) in Borno. As Mustapha and Meagher point out, the “dual role of Ulamas” is pivotal in radicalising and counter-radicalising people.[10] Religion is a hot-button issue and can become a highly polarising topic; terrorist groups instrumentalise it by transforming it into an ideology to justify violence and retain support of their members. Fundamentalism is more mouldable than other religious interpretations; its doctrinal absolutism makes it more conducive to instrumentalization, as through a dogmatic interpretation of religion is easier to justify certain actions and retain control over individuals. However, in this case, the fundamentalist religious interpretation is not only the instrument to control people, but most importantly is the rationale behind the creation of Boko Haram, which is the clear example of how a fundamentalist groups can evolve to become the motivation of a violent extremism as explained by Barkindo: “Consequently, like Ibn Taymiyya, Boko Haram believed that the reformation of Islam and the implementation of Islamic law remains the only valuable option for social justice and prosperity.”[11]
In the 1980s, the influence of Salafism gave rise to fundamentalist postures.[12] Radical fundamentalist narratives penetrated Islamic schools in the region before the socio-economic crises which amplified those narratives, by giving rise to radical ideas that translated into Jihadism. In this case, Boko Haram is motivated and moved by beliefs that set the agenda for their actions. They also further instrumentalise Islam for their political goals, as the jihadist fundamentalist interpretation of the Sharia justifies the violent struggle and atrocious human rights violations in the region.
Boko Haram, for one, pushes the narrative of Muslim-victimhood, as they accuse the Nigerian state of secular influences with the purpose of creating tensions among Muslims against the state and other communities. The group exploits local poverty and post-colonial grievance to justify its political aims and instil hatred into people; as the founder of the group Muhammed Yusuf preached: “our land was an Islamic state before it was turned into a land of ‘kafir’ (infidels); the current system is contrary to true Muslim beliefs.”[13] This sentence reflects what the organization stands for and is also a clear example of instrumentalization of religion to reinforce historical grievances.
Boko Haram doesn’t have people’s support in Nigeria (79% view it very unfavourably[14]). The operations carried out by the authorities, however, were mainly targeting direct violence rather than the structural and cultural root causes of the issue, thus only provoking a stronger response from the terrorist organisations in the region ending in the current ongoing spiral of violence. The organisation takes advantage of catastrophic humanitarian crises to recruit new followers as many join them due to despair or lack of options seeing no future in the region; while some are forced into the organization, some others voluntarily choose to join.[15]
Fundamentalist communities are more prone
In conclusion, violent extremism is more likely to arise in fundamentalist groups, even though their doctrines do not necessarily entail it; because they are ‘per se’ radical and are based on exceptionalism and parochialism, fundamentalist groups are more likely to trigger and justify violence. Furthermore, fundamentalist communities are more likely to be manipulated and instrumentalized for political reasons due to their dogmatic doctrine and in-group and out-group narrative.
Applying Galtung’s theory, trying to solve fundamentalist extremism by targeting only direct violence provokes a never-ending spiral of violence. Instead, cultural violence should be addressed first: in the context of Boko Haram, by engaging with Ulamas to avoid the radicalization of isolated Islamic communities and invest more in the region to fill power-vacuums. Perhaps, pushing for dialogue and openness is the first step for understanding the way of life of these fundamentalist groups and building a constructive dialogue to prevent the spread of violence.
[1] Marty, M. E. (1988). ‘Fundamentalism as a social phenomenon.’ Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 42(2), 15–29. doi.org
[2] Marty, M. E., & Appleby, R. S. (1992). ‘The glory and the power: The fundamentalist challenge to the modern world’. Beacon Press.
[3] Ibidem
[4] Vile, J. R. (December 12, 2023,). ‘Amish and Mennonites.’ The Free Speech Center. https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/amish-and-mennonites/
[5] Martínez Zubillaga, M. (November 8, 2025). ‘The Haredi community and Israel’s national project.’ Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies, University of Navarra. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/the-haredi-community-and-israels-national-project
[6] Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. Galtung Institute, https://www.galtung-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cultural-Violence-Galtung.pdf
[7] Augustyn, A. ‘Boko Haram.’ Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram
[8] Cambridge University Press. (s.f.). ‘Haram.’ Cambridge Dictionary. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/es/diccionario/ingles/haram
[9] Mustapha, A. R., & Meagher, K. (Eds.). (2020). ‘Overcoming Boko Haram: Faith, society and Islamic radicalization in Northern Nigeria’. Boydell & Brewer.
[10] Umar, M. S. (2020). ‘The roles of the Ulama in radicalization & counter-radicalization.’ in A. R. Mustapha & K. Meagher (Eds.), ‘Overcoming Boko Haram: Faith, society and Islamic radicalization in Northern Nigeria’ (pp. 33–63). Boydell & Brewer.
[11] Barkindo, A. (2016). ‘Join the Caravan: The ideology of political authority in Islam from Ibn Taymiyya to Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria.’ JTSOR, p. 37. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26296938?seq=8
[12] Council on Foreign Relations (January 27, 2017). ‘Salafism in Northern Nigeria beyond Boko Haram.’ https://www.cfr.org/articles/salafism-northern-nigeria-beyond-boko-haram
[13] Barkindo, A. Op. cit.
[14] Pew Research Center (July 1, 2014). ‘Concerns about Islamic extremism on the rise in Middle East: Publics around the world express concern about Islamic extremism, but most are not overly worried about the Islamic State.’ https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/
[15] Council on Foreign Relations (April 16, 2013). ‘Boko Haram recruitment strategies.’ https://www.cfr.org/articles/boko-haram-recruitment-strategies