Nuestros investigadores

Miguel García-Valdecasas Merino

Publicaciones científicas más recientes (desde 2010)

Autores: Echarte-Alonso, Luis E; García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
ISSN 0328-8390  Vol. 25  Nº 3  2014  págs. 415 - 425
The development of neuroprosthetics has given rise to significant theoretical and practical challenges concerning personal identity. The Extended Mind Theory (EMT) attempts to provide an answer to these challenges by arguing that the mind and the external world are co-extensive to the point that both can make a seamless unified entity. The EMT also proposes that physical states determine the nature of mental states. Here, we propose a non-deterministic and less locationist view of mental states that we will call iEMT. The iEMT articulates, firstly, that the co-extensivity of the mind and the world does not justify the dissolution of the mind in the objects of the external world with which the mind interacts. Consequently, the agent¿s mind is still part of his unique personal identity. Secondly, neural implants cannot be regarded as mere replacement parts in the context of a weak concept of personal identity. Thirdly, there are no compelling reasons to believe or to fear that neuroprosthetics can alter personal identity at the profound level.
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
ISSN 1214-8407  Vol. 11  Nº 2  2014  págs. 205 - 231
Aristotle¿s epistemology has sometimes been associated with foundationalism, the theory according to which a small set of premise-beliefs that are deductively valid or inductively strong provide justification for many other truths. In contemporary terms, Aristotle¿s foundationalism could be compared with what is sometimes called ¿classical foundationalism¿. However, as I will show, the equivalent to basic beliefs in Aristotle¿s epistemology are the so-called first principles or ¿axiómata¿. These principles are self-evident, but not self-justificatory. They are not justified by their act of understanding, but by the arguments that satisfactorily prove them. In addition, these principles are intellectual, rather than perceptual, so that no basic belief that is about our immediate experience or sensory data is apt to provide the required foundation of knowledge. In spite of this, I argue that Aristotle¿s foundationalism has no givens, and that his epistemology resists the objections usually leveled against givens.
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
ISSN 2300-7648  Vol. 2  Nº 2  2014  págs. 93 - 128
To mark the 25th anniversary of A. Kenny¿s The Metaphysics of Mind, this article discusses some of the central arguments of this book, in particular, it discusses Descartes¿ dualism, the notion of soul or Aristotle¿s psychê, human and animal language, voluntary action, the self, the mind-brain relation, thinking and intentionality, and determinism and free will. The author holds that, although Kenny¿s book offers valid and substantial arguments inspired in Wittgenstein¿s thought and the Aristotelian tradition, he occasionally fails to appreciate the depth of basic concepts in the Aristotelian tradition such as that of psychê and the immateriality of the human intellect. Despite this, the book constitutes one of the best efforts to break off with Descartes¿ and the empiricists¿ ideas, and to incorporate the Aristotelian tradition to the contemporary philosophy of mind.
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
ISSN 1122-1151  Vol. 23  Nº 4  2013  págs. 665 - 681
If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein¿s claim that the psychological phenomena called `dispositions¿ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at which the expectation is satisfied. However, it seems that we cannot always identify the beginning of an expectation, and in a few cases, its end. If so, the reduction of expectations to neural events or accompanying feelings which spread over time in the usual way seems a hard enterprise, because these processes, much as other physical processes, have a definite and largely measurable time span. Only at a higher level, that is, as part of human life, expectation can be said to be temporal.
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
ISSN 1526-5161  Vol. 3  Nº 3  2012  págs. 38
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
ISSN 1379-2547  Vol. 12  2012  págs. 343 - 368
ICS Wittgenstein¿s concept of intentionality is strongly connected with his views on language and thinking. Although his views progressively developed over time, Wittgenstein came to realise that intentionality is a property of thought that can only be accounted for in the context of ordinary language. On this basis, the view of intentionality that regards it as a natural property, or as a scientifically examinable property that can be found in the natural world is hostage to a number of paradoxes, some of which are discussed here. His atomistic view of language and reality heavily weighed on his earlier conviction that the analysis of the processes of thinking would inevitably provide a central key to intentionality. This analysis regarded thinking as a mental process with undefined and elusive features. Wittgenstein soon realised that this view was the result of unchecked prejudices, and that unless language is regarded as a capacity of thinking, and thinking as an inherently representative capacity of humans that use language in the context of language-games, intentionality will remain unknown. This article provides evidence to understand why Wittgenstein thinks this way
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Handbook of virtue ethics in business and management
2017  págs. 1 - 11
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Diccionario interdisciplinar austral
2017  págs. 1- 18
El término ¿conocimiento¿ y la disciplina filosófica que lo estudia ¿la teoría del conocimiento¿ han experimentado notables cambios hasta el presente. La teoría clásica concibe el conocimiento en íntima unión con la verdad, como una captación intelectual de realidades necesarias e inmutables. Con la llegada de la modernidad, la difusión de un clima escéptico puso en duda esta pretensión, cuestionando la aptitud misma del conocimiento para la verdad. Esta duda ha presidido toda la modernidad hasta el presente. Para responder al desafío escéptico, las principales corrientes de la llamada epistemología analítica contemporánea han intentado, sin éxito, explorar el carácter justificante del conocimiento. En este intento, han destacado teorías encaminadas a mostrar que el conocimiento recibe su justificación desde un fundamento, como el fundacionismo y el coherentismo; teorías encaminadas a mostrar que el conocimiento recibe su justificación desde sus fuentes, como el externismo y el internismo; y teorías encaminadas a mostrar que la recibe por las facultades cognitivas mismas como instrumentos de conocimiento fiables, como la epistemología de la virtud. Todas ellas generan, a su vez, nuevas paradojas e imponen la necesidad de volver a los fundamentos de esta disciplina, presentes en la teoría clásica, para descubrir la conexión entre conocimiento y verdad, e intentar detener el desafío escéptico.
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Biology and subjectivity. Philosophical contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience
2016  págs. 77 - 94
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel; Pablo Rodolfo Brumovsky;
Libro:  ¿Determinismo o indeterminismo? Grandes preguntas de las ciencias a la filosofía
2016  págs. 309 - 341
Autores: Murillo, José Ignacio; García-Valdecasas, Miguel; Barrett, Nathaniel F.;
Libro:  Biology and Subjectivity. Philosophical Contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience
2016  págs. 1 - 12
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Logik, Naturphilosophie, Dialektik: Neue internationale Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik
Vol. 11  2014  págs. 21 - 42
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Escribir en las almas: estudios en honor de Rafael Alvira
2014  págs. 305 - 323
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Título: Ideas
Libro:  Diccionario de filosofía
2010  págs. 546 - 550
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Diccionario de filosofía
2010  págs. 471 - 476
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Título: Sujeto
Libro:  Diccionario de filosofía
2010  págs. 1039 - 1043
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel;
Libro:  Diccionario de filosofía
2010  págs. 358 - 363
Autores: García-Valdecasas, Miguel, (Editor); Murillo, José Ignacio, (Editor); Barrett, Nathaniel F., (Editor)