En la imagen
Rohingya people in Rakhine State, in 2012 [UK Gov.]
Introduction
The Indo-Pacific should be approached as a region rather than any other form of international association. It is made up of culturally distinct nations, which tends to interfere with the acceptance or reluctance to accept human rights of every country.
There are blocks or nations more aligned with each other and tend to have a similar view regarding the treatment of human rights. Nonetheless, the result is that this approach does not look the same around the region.
This cultural distinctiveness does not allow the creation of a shared regional identity. The lack of this shared identity makes it difficult to construct a common approach towards human rights.
Regional integration is an arduous challenge in the Indo-Pacific. Without regional integration taking place, the creation of established shared norms and values is closer to being a dream than a reality.
Different governance structures or models are somewhat in competition in the region. The United States presents itself as a protector of freedoms, democracy, and human rights, ensuring a place in the scene for itself. Several nations, especially those that make up the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), are aligned, at least partially, with this position.
The other main power in the region is the People’s Republic of China, which can be considered an antithesis. Several nations in the Indo-Pacific have not reached a democracy and tend to lean toward China when it comes to getting foreign assistance, as Chinese aid comes with no strings attached.
Other regional or middle powers, such as Japan or India, are also relevant actors in the Indo-Pacific. Both nations have their spheres of influence, specifically with the countries that surround them.
The treatment of human rights in each nation is profoundly interconnected with colonization and the post-Cold War era. Colonization, even though it had the same purpose, could be done in many different ways. English former colonies, such as India, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka, might have a different colonial past than French former colonies, such as Vietnam or Cambodia. The effect of colonialism is visible in their government structures,
Still, the United States, and nowadays China, play a key role in shaping human rights norms in the Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific region serves as a vital space where human rights norms face active competition and development. Human rights norms in the Indo-Pacific face substantial limitations in effectiveness because of intense geopolitical competition and deep national sovereignty concerns, which influence their development.
The Indo-Pacific region has evolved into a strategic arena where different governance systems compete between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. The United States promotes human rights alongside democratic values and legal frameworks as fundamental elements of its regional diplomatic approach because these principles protect its national security interests. China works to modify international human rights standards because it wants to expand its policy of flexibility while prioritizing development and state security above universal human rights principles through its UN Human Rights Council and Security Council influence. The ideological conflict becomes clear through regional order approaches, which support flexible political frameworks instead of demanding democratic norms and human rights standards.
Historical context: The evolution of human rights norms in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific region has witnessed human rights norms evolve through postcolonial sovereignty assertions and external framework resistance, together with regional organization leadership and global and regional political-economic forces.
After colonial rule ended, numerous Indo-Pacific nations proudly declared their independence, which shaped their stance toward international norms. Human rights principles from the United Nations Charter face criticism for upholding Western cultural values while disregarding diverse world civilizations. The nations known as the ‘third world’ after colonial rule sometimes view global norms as potential tools to restore Western imperial control. The objective of these nations is to protect their sovereignty and maintain their status as global entities on par with Western countries. This opposition serves to confront what has been called the “great hypocrisy of the powers” because Western powers actively break the rules they establish.
The ‘Asian Values’ controversy emerged as a major expression of resistance during the 1990s. This perspective supported the idea that historical development, combined with cultural factors, enabled Asia to implement human rights differently. The approach generally prioritized duties toward both the community and the state rather than individual rights.
The ‘ASEAN Way’ functions as a vital regional standard within the area. The ASEAN Way operates through formal procedures, and it emphasizes both state sovereignty in internal matters and decision-making processes. The principles that guide ASEAN member states interactions continue to be applicable today. The ASEAN Way functions as a model for ‘soft regionalism’ because it focuses on non-binding people-to-people initiatives and immaterial cooperation mechanisms.
The clash between universal Western-based norms and regional norms like Asian Values and ASEAN Way requires human rights standards to undergo ‘norm interpretation’ or norm regionalization processes to become more acceptable in the region. Standard Interpreters function as mediators who connect global standards to local standards to achieve this bridging process. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) represents the outcome of standards interpretation processes.
The regional organizations ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum play key roles in creating standards.
ASEAN has established human rights standards in the region but faces multiple challenges in this process. Sources show that ASEAN’s dedication to human rights has expanded the distance between what the organization does and what it claims to stand for. Human rights institutions now exist at the regional level through the ASEAN Charter’s establishment and the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. National member states of ASEAN frequently break these rights despite their official commitments.
The organization deliberately refrained from creating robust systems for enforcement. The AICHR’s Terms of Reference demonstrate this reluctance by maintaining that member states’ internal affairs remain non-interference zones. AICHR was established with the purpose of promoting human rights rather than protecting them. Sources identify the AICHR as a political entity that operates within the region. The establishment of the AICHR serves as proof that ASEAN continues to advance its regional development.
The process of economic liberalization, together with rising global interconnectivity, produces mixed effects on human rights standards. Economic growth and investment have become fundamental components that drive diplomatic efforts throughout the region. The Belt and Road Initiative of China serves as a primary driver for numerous Asian infrastructure development projects. China stands as the largest organization that provides infrastructure investments outside its borders throughout Asia. Through programs like the Asian Reaffirmation Act (ARIA) and the BUILD Act, and USAID initiatives such as Asia EDGE, the United States works to advance high standards and transparent investment practices and free and fair trade.
Economic relationships might even work against the advancement of human rights enforcement. China's growing dominance as a main trading partner enables it to use its economic influence through interdependence to force states into following its interests. This creates an environment where countries develop dependencies, which makes them avoid taking action against China.
Modifications in economic priorities, together with domestic and international pressures, have caused developments to occur. ASEAN underwent regional reforms following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which added human rights as a component. The organization's legitimacy received a boost through this initial strategic and political move, which subsequently enhanced regional involvement.
Human rights norms in the Indo-Pacific region evolved because of post-colonial developments combined with sovereign claims and regional norms shaped by local traditions and ASEAN principles, alongside great power political complexities and economic liberalization that both create possibilities and difficulties for human rights implementation.
Geopolitical competition and the divergence of human rights approaches
The Indo-Pacific region functions as a vital geopolitical battleground, while its competitive nature strongly relates to different approaches regarding human rights protection alongside democratic principles and legal systems. Key actors like the United States and its allies, China, and ASEAN navigate this complex landscape with distinct strategies and priorities.
The United States, together with its partners, including Australia, Japan, India, and the EU, functions as a collective force that champions human rights promotion.
From its perspective, the United States[1] considers human rights promotion in the Indo-Pacific region essential to both national security and diplomatic goals across the region. From the US viewpoint, denying fundamental rights normally creates regional crises that disrupt both US interests and those of its allies and partners. The United States, together with Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, has jointly organized panels to denounce human rights violations across Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and the Philippines.
Through sanctions and visa restrictions, the United States implements various tools to respond to severe human rights violations and foreign corruption. The organization supports the rule of law along with transparent governance through civil society development to enhance international standard compliance and governance capabilities. Official Development Assistance[2] serves as Japan’s foreign policy instrument that specifically targets security objectives and promotes universal values consisting of freedom alongside democracy and fundamental human rights. The EU faces difficulties in pushing significant human rights transformations within ASEAN because its role in the region is mainly seen as an economic force.
The US, along with its allies, champions universal human rights principles, although its actions sometimes face criticism due to perceptions of selectivity or double standards. The US maintains arms export relationships with countries that demonstrate major human rights problems. The US frequently shifts between two approaches toward China, through containment or engagement, while value-based foreign policy approaches lead to social divisions.
China maintains an opposing view regarding human rights compared to Western universalist perspectives. China defends the right of states to make their own decisions since human rights matters belong exclusively within national boundaries. The Chinese government has received criticism for its strict treatment of ethnic and religious minorities and its treatment of independent journalists and human rights defenders.
China achieves political influence through its economic statecraft program, which includes the use of ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Economic pressure from China allows the country to manipulate the political decisions of nations it economically controls and to affect their actions during UN meetings. BRI projects face several issues because they are connected to human rights violations and lack transparency, while also disregarding environmental and social consequences and potentially blocking access to legal recourse through Chinese commercial courts.
China works to create new definitions of human rights in international forums, which would give it greater freedom to implement its domestic policies. The Chinese government supports a different governance model that stresses ‘social stability,’[3] economic growth, and capacity development because these elements form vital human rights. China uses its United Nations positions at the Human Rights Council and Security Council to promote its own human rights position while defending its domestic human rights practices. Some academic researchers believe that China implements these actions to create a new legal framework that would allow its operational methods to become more acceptable.
The fundamental principles of ASEAN regionalism include the ASEAN Way framework, which combines consensus decision-making with informal approaches and, most importantly, the principle of non-interference in member state domestic affairs. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs remains crucial for preserving both state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
ASEAN’s commitment to human rights at the regional level remains separate from the human rights practices within its member states because of the action-identity gap. This discrepancy between words and actions can be interpreted as states adopting human rights norms for political gain to improve their image instead of actual moral belief.
ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis demonstrates both the barriers created by non-interference and the internal disagreements within the organization. International pressure to respond after the 2021 military takeover and subsequent violent oppression has not stopped ASEAN from developing the Five-Point Consensus as its response. Member states of ASEAN hold different opinions regarding Myanmar junta engagement because Cambodia supports dialogue, but Singapore, together with Indonesia and Malaysia, maintains opposition. Thailand maintains cautious relations with the Myanmar military government because of its domestic political considerations and past history of military coups, and its need to sustain friendly diplomatic ties. National interests and domestic politics lead nations to prioritize their own agendas above shared regional human rights initiatives.
Key human rights challenges in the Indo-Pacific
Digital authoritarianism
The Indo-Pacific region is now experiencing a rise in authoritarian states that enhance their ability to suppress their domestic populations. We have been seeing different types of suppression tactics being used to silence dissent. The Duterte Government of the Philippines received international criticism because it imprisoned independent journalists through false charges in 2019. The Hun Sen government in Cambodia used jail sentences to silence journalists while it dismantled democratic institutions.
The ‘virtual prison state’ in China uses security checkpoints combined with police forces and intelligence operatives, along with facial recognition technology for massive surveillance operations. The Chinese government threatens anyone who tries to reveal abuses, including activists who reside in the United States. The Chinese government implements this repressive model throughout other regions of China.
The Hong Kong protests against coercion and authoritarianism faced online trolling attacks from the Chinese government while millions demonstrated for freedom. The United States did support the fundamental principles of freedom, which theoretically existed in Hong Kong. Six years later, we have seen how this repression has become more frequent.
The Vietnamese government implemented restrictive cybercrime and media laws through China-sponsored cybersecurity training, while Uganda and Tanzania adopted similar measures from 2018 onwards. The Chinese government continues to enhance its human rights abuse capabilities through technology by selling surveillance systems alongside providing educational programs about its practices to other nations. The Digital Silk Road functions as a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) subproject dedicated to constructing internet infrastructure across different regions. Governments can use this technology to monitor dissidents while suppressing opposing viewpoints, which may lead countries toward authoritarian political systems. When democracies fail to progress their fundamental values, digital authoritarianism may become unavoidable in the future.
Minority rights and state repression
The persecution of minority groups, together with state repression, constitutes a major human rights concern. The Rohingya crisis[4] in Myanmar demonstrates genocide and crimes against humanity, according to some observers who characterize these incidents. The Rohingya people had to endure persecution while authorities prevented them from exercising their fundamental rights to move freely and receive an education.
Uyghurs in China experience forced detention in camps that hold more than one million people under terrorism prevention pretenses. Social engineering efforts against the Uyghur population have existed for decades through assimilatory and repressive measures, which target their ethnic identity as well as their language and culture and history, and religion. Normal religious practices have been declared ‘religious extremism’ by China.
The main crime of numerous Uyghurs consists of their ethnic identity as Uyghurs. The PRC uses its economic influence to pressure connected nations into backing its actions while employing international forum positions to evade criticism. The US, along with its partners, worked lightly to build worldwide pressure on the People’s Republic of China to stop its persecution of Uyghurs and Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The US government implements export control measures and visa restrictions as measures to stop these human rights violations.
China has controlled Tibet for sixty years through an iron fist to achieve stability while restricting basic rights, which has made Tibet one of the world's least free territories.
The situation of ethnic minorities living in China’s border regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia) who face loyalty doubts, has raised neighboring countries' interest in exploiting ethnic conflicts.
Belt and Road Initiative
The BRI functions as China’s leading economic statecraft project that delivers necessary infrastructure development. Human rights concerns exist in relation to this program because it has received criticism for obstructing justice access and maintaining poor transparency levels, and insufficient social and environmental impact monitoring. The Coca Codo Dam project in Ecuador faced labor violations and safety infractions because Chinese officials instructed their workers to disregard these regulations. The highway development in Pakistan operated without transparency while disregarding the local fishermen's worries.
The growing economic strength of China enables political control over other nations through its ‘debt-trap’ strategy. The economic pressure acts as a tool for China to achieve political influence over other countries. China implements its development model through the BRI framework, which provides legal backing for its activities. The dual focus on economic development and state security leads to human rights violations and international standards noncompliance. The ASEAN member states maintain their primary emphasis on state security alongside regime stability instead of alternative security approaches, while economic development stands as their collective goal, which sometimes takes precedence over human rights issues. The pursuit of economic development stands in opposition to maintaining fair standards and protecting affected communities in the current system.
The role of non-state actors and resistance movements
International organizations, together with UN bodies, commonly address human rights issues in the Indo-Pacific region yet their efforts remain intricate and sometimes restricted.
The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and UN Security Council (UNSC) function under China's permanent membership and active participation, which enables the country to shape international human rights conversations. The influence of China over other nations leads to concern about their adoption of Chinese human rights approaches and support for security and development priorities at the expense of human rights. China has actively worked to undermine human rights defenders while dismantling UNHRC cooperation requirements and supporting development and state security measures that compromise human rights.
The UN Security Council has faced obstruction from China because the country opposes essential resolutions that address Belt and Road Initiative development projects, even though these initiatives merge security and development priorities against the established hierarchical framework of security precedence. Through this approach, state leaders can justify their ability to handle human rights abuses as a matter of discretion. The international focus on accountability demands that governments and the global community use legal instruments to prosecute atrocities through international justice frameworks. The UNSC remains unable to discuss Myanmar's human rights abuses because China and Russia veto these discussions by classifying them as socio-economic and humanitarian issues instead of security concerns.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establish human rights standards through international law, but state ratification does not automatically create new norms or ensure genuine commitment to these standards. The effectiveness of shame as a norm enforcement tool and social sanctions decreases when rights lack both clear violation identification and the spread of responsibility.
The existence of international laws does not really simplify the process of state accountability. The UDHR resulted from an uploading process that received input from state actors as well as non-governmental organizations and individual contributions. The involvement of NGOs and individuals in the UDHR process resulted in a document that reflected people’s needs instead of governmental interests. Through their unseen efforts, NGOs both provided proposals and maintained continuous pressure for the implementation of systems.
As a global leader, the European Union works to support human rights by integrating these principles into its external policy framework. Through its policy dialogues, ASEAN engages with two of its bodies: the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children. The EU is mostly seen by outsiders as an economic power rather than a normative or political influence in Asia. The EU adopts a bottom-up method that focuses on civil society engagement with human rights defenders but faces obstacles because different ASEAN countries demonstrate varying levels of civil society involvement.
The EU’s democracy promotion[5] strategy through conditionality agreements shows variable success in Southeast Asia because ASEAN membership operates without political requirements. The EU faces difficulties with its ‘leverage model’ of democracy promotion since ASEAN membership does not require political conditions. The expression of dissent and human rights advocacy through grassroots activism and digital mobilization remains essential in restricted regimes that face intense state suppression.
The Indo-Pacific authoritarian regimes demonstrate growing confidence in their ability to suppress their populations while exporting their repressive methods. The Chinese government used online trolls to suppress dissent in Hong Kong, where millions protested for freedom from coercion. China’s virtual prison state in Xinjiang implements surveillance technology alongside intelligence operatives for control practices that serve as a model for other Chinese regions.
Activists, together with human rights organizations, act as essential sources that expose critical human rights issues while defending marginalized communities by making courageous personal compromises. Radio Free Asia, together with other organizations, works to expose the truth when the Chinese government imposes information blockages.
ASEAN states demonstrate an ‘action-identity gap’[6] because they create regional human rights commitments but violate rights inside their borders. Human rights norms serve political functions in this region since countries use them to build credibility, although they do not accept their inherent value. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights remains unratified by Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore, while these countries show multiple violations of civil and political rights. Although Cambodia, together with Indonesia and the Philippines, has ratified the Covenant, these states demonstrate problematic relationships with rights protection by allowing protest rights erosion and minority rights deterioration, and conducting extrajudicial killings.
Despite this gap, civil society organizations, think tanks, and other non-state actors, categorized as ‘Norm Interpreters’ (Policy Network and Advocacy Coalition), have significantly influenced the institutionalization of human rights bodies like AICHR in Southeast Asia. These actors link international human rights standards with local customs within an environment where Asian Values and ASEAN Way concepts, such as non-interference and state sovereignty, predominate. They utilize different tactics that include official policy suggestions along with issue securitization and public outreach activities while directly influencing government officials. AICHR represents a "compromised" institution that AICHR operates with a promotion-oriented approach to human rights because it blends international and local values.
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)[7] function as independent pluralistic bodies with democratic legitimacy, which maintain strong connections to local groups and activists. These organizations have the potential to create human rights standards that blend international rules with traditional customs found in specific regions. The examples of NHRIs include KOMNAS HAM in Indonesia and SUHAKAM in Malaysia and CHRP in the Philippines, and NHRCT in Thailand. The primary goal of NHRIs is to promote human rights within domestic settings while they function as links between public and private entities. The Belt and Road Initiative presents significant human rights problems alongside its vital infrastructure investment role. Human rights violations, together with international security risks from surveillance-enabled telecom infrastructure and blocked judicial access, and environmental destruction, are among the concerns. BRI projects establish uneven legal agreements between powerful China and nations that lack political or economic strength. The implementation of BRI projects sparks worries about intellectual property denial and military utilization of civil technologies. The BRI training seminars maintain insufficient transparency, especially in cybersecurity areas.
The US government employs sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, together with visa restrictions, as tools to penalize human rights violators and corruption perpetrators while maintaining US corporate ethical conduct and transparency standards. The intellectual property of US businesses remains vulnerable to ‘fusion’ because Chinese entities may confiscate their property or reduce profits and redirect their technologies for undesirable military objectives.
REFERENCES
[1] US Government, ‘ARIA (Asia Reassurance Initiative Act),’ Digital Public Library of America (DPLA), 2020. https://dp.la/item/af7bd4e06fef3412b718ce2792188b49
[2] Dwi Ardhanariswari Sundrijo, Regionalizing Global Human Rights Norms in Southeast Asia, Palmgrave Macmillan, 2021. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-54798-1
[3] Mikkaela Salamatin, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative is Reshaping Human Rights Norms,’ Vanderbilt Law Review 53, 2021. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol53/iss4/6
[4] Anchalee Rüland, Norms in Conflict. Southeast Asia’s Response to Human Rights Violations in Myanmar, The University Press of Kentucky, 2022. https://www.kentuckypress.com/9780813183701/norms-in-conflict/
[5] Laura Reumann, ‘ASEAN and Human Rights: Challenges to the EU’s Diffusion of Human Rights Norms,’ Asia Europe Journal, 2016.https://doi.org/10.1007/S10308-016-0461-2
[6] Matthew Davies, ‘ASEAN and Human Rights Norms: Constructivism, Rational Choice, and the Action-Identity Gap,’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26155983
[7] Andrew Wolman, ‘National Human Rights Commissions and Asian Human Rights Norms,’ Cambridge University Press, Asian Journal of Interenational Law, November 2012. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/asian-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/national-human-rights-commissions-and-asian-human-rights-norms/48529E4690B6BE899C17BFF514711CEF