Resumen: Husserl's conception of ideal objects convinced some of his early disciples that he was presenting a new form of realism. This impression arises, in my view, from a twofold misunderstanding. First, there was a misunderstanding of the limits of the phenomenological claims of Logical Investigations and, second, an erroneous belief that ideal objects are interpreted in a realist fashion therein. The ultimate source of the first phenomenological schism is not, therefore, so much a reaction to an alleged sudden change in Husserl's position, but rather a misunderstanding of the concept of ideality presented in Logical Investigations. Further, an alleged ¿compatibility¿ between the realist conception of ideality and the Husserlian conception is to be found in one of the ways that Husserl addresses the problem of constitution. However, the Spanish philosopher Antonio Millán-Puelles has shown that the use of terms such as constitutive activity or genesis in a realist metaphysics, to designate the arising of ideal objects¿should not be interpreted in a psychologistic way, as though these objects remained absorbed by the reality of the mental processes they are made present by.