Oportunidades y riesgos en la fijación de objetivos

Autores: Arellano Gil, Javier Ignacio; Aranda León, María del Carmen
Título de la revista: CONTABILIDAD Y DIRECCION
ISSN: 1887-5696
Número: 17
Páginas: 119 - 139
Fecha de publicación: 2013
The use of variable remuneration systems generally implies the establishment of objectives. Prior literature on management control has identified a phenomenon known as «ratcheting» where objectives defined in the annual budget and that constitute the basis for the incentives system, are ot static, on the contrary, the change depending on the performance achieved in previous periods. Positive (negative) deviations in the performance lead to an increase (reduction) in next period objectives. Important advantages have been attributed to this way of revising the objectives. However, some authors suggest that it can also generate opportunistic behaviours in managers. This paper explains the reasons and consequences of ratcheting and suggests how its limitations can be faced.