We study the use of budgets in public organizations with governance shaped by democratic structures. In particular, we examine political variables - electoral cycle, majority government, and ideology - and managerial variables - past performance and peer performance - in the context of city governments. Using data from 170 municipalities over a period of seven years (two electoral cycles), the study documents the simultaneous effect of these two types of variables. We find evidence that budget increases are more pronounced right before and right after elections (political). Furthermore, our findings suggest that ideology affects not only resource allocation decisions but also how municipalities manage the budgeting process; indicating the potential role of ideology in management practices (political). We also find evidence for ratcheting (managerial): the deviation between last period's actual and budgeted performance is associated with upcoming budgets. However, this effect is symmetric, in contrast to the more common asymmetric structure previously documented in for-profit organizations. Relative target setting (managerial) is also present in public organizations and varies with the relative debt level of the city. The findings of this study are also informative to for-profit organizations as they open up their governance to more democratic structures and begin to experience the competing managerial and political logics in interacting with stakeholders.

Ownership transition is an increasingly relevant decision in small businesses because millions of owners in the largest world economies are reaching retirement age without a successor. As a result, entrepreneurship through acquisition-becoming an entrepreneur through the acquisition of an existing business and growing it much like a startup-is likely to accelerate in the coming years. In contrast to traditional entrepreneurship, where the entrepreneur comes up with an idea and then grows it into a company, the idea of entrepreneurship through acquisition is embedded in the acquired company. In this article, we share our findings from a research project that tracked first-time entrepreneurs looking to acquire businesses in four European countries. These entrepreneurs put in sweat equity and used the search fund model, whereby investors funded their search expenses and provided funds for an acquisition. However, implementing the search fund model, originally created in the United States, was not straightforward in Europe. Search funders faced novel challenges in investor-entrepreneur (i.e., principal-agent) relationships and the search process. Our study identifies these challenges, the responses from our search fund sample, the lessons learned, and a novel framework to conceptualize a search fund play book specific to Europe. These experiences hold valuable lessons for those who pursue entrepreneurship through acquisition and help stimulate new research questions for scholars.

Subjective bonuses can reflect implicit contracts entered at the beginning of the period when certain employees commit to more difficult targets and managers use subjective bonuses at the end of the period to reward this commitment. We examine this prediction in a budget-based incentive systems¿ setting. We argue that the presence of these implicit contracts allows managers to adapt targets to the individual characteristics of employees and their units with the purpose of enhancing the motivational structure of budget-based contracts. Using data from 414 branches of a large travel retailer during a four-year period, we find that managers use their discretion to set targets at different levels of difficulty across branches and subjective bonuses are sensitive to the difficulty of these targets. Branches with more difficult targets relative to their peers receive larger subjective bonuses. We also test the motivational effect of larger subjective bonuses and find that they have a positive effect on future performance. In particular, larger target increases (relative to peers) from current to the next period result in larger performance increase (relative to peers) when the branch is rewarded with higher subjective bonuses in the current period. The evidence indicates that subjective bonuses can fulfill roles beyond addressing performance measurement systems¿ limitations. Managers use them to reward employees¿ commitment to target difficulty and to motivate future performance.

This paper examines organizational learning in a target setting. Organizations commonly set targets-explicit and quantitative reference points-for their operational units that reflect top management aspirations for these units. Targets are commonly the outcome of a subjective process where supervisors combine their explicit and tacit knowledge to set performance expectations for their units. Using a proprietary database from a large European travel company during a period of rapid expansion, we document the effect of organizational learning by studying how targets change as units mature. In particular, we examine managers' experiential learning from branches' past performance and their vicarious learning from branches in the same region in determining performance expectations over the life cycle of branches. Our results indicate that, in setting performance targets, managers increase the weight of a branch's past performance and decrease the weight of comparable branches' performance as the branch matures. Vicarious learning, where managers extrapolate the performance of comparable branches to a new branch, dominates in the early years. Over time, this type of learning is replaced by experiential learning as experience accumulates. We document how early on in the life of branches, these two types of learning interact; this interaction disappears as branches mature. Furthermore, we find that managers learn differently from successes and failures early in the lives of the new units, and this learning is affected by the magnitude of the successes and failures.

This study examines the moderating effects of performance measurement systems (PMS), i.e. PMS sophistication (i.e. BSC-like PMS), on the relationships between internal values drivers (internal efficiency, employee commitment, organizational flexibility) and performance outcomes (customer satisfaction, market performance, financial performance). Consistent with arguments of BSC proponents we argue that highly sophisticated PMS help managers to better manage the relationship between less straightforward value drivers and performance outcomes. We find that level of PMS sophistication moderates some of the relationships between internal value drivers and performance outcomes. Specifically, performance effects shift from more straightforward value drivers (internal efficiency), to less straightforward ones (employee commitment and organizational flexibility) when complexity and, thus, PMS sophistication are high. In line with our argumentation, we find a negative moderation effect of PMS sophistication on the relationship between internal efficiency and financial performance, and a positive moderation effect on the relationship between organizational flexibility and financial performance. Moreover, the relationship between employee commitment and market performance is positively moderated by PMS sophistication. Our empirical evidence is based on survey data from 331 electronic equipment-manufacturing companies.

Managers use a variety of information to set performance targets. Using data from 376 branches of a large travel retailer over five years, this study documents supervisors considering the relative performance of comparable units in target setting, which we term relative target setting (RTS). We find evidence of RTS after controlling for individual past performance in the form of ratcheting. Our findings also indicate that RTS partially shapes the use of other information on past performance. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of ratcheting decreases (increases) with RTS for favorable (unfavorable) performance variances, and the asymmetry of ratcheting characterized by different ratcheting coefficients for unfavorable than for favorable variances is significant for large absolute magnitudes of RTS. Managers use the flexibility associated with the subjectivity of the target-setting process to weight peer and individual information differently across different units.

Many startup companies go through the so-called "entrepreneurial crisis" when they reach a headcount somewhere between 50 and 100 employees. At this point, the CEO and her team have to transition from a personal to a professional management style. Management systems play a critical role in managing this transition effectively. Contrary to the popular belief that the development of such systems kills the entrepreneurial spirit, startups that implement these systems are associated with faster growth, larger size, and a lower turnover of their CEOs. Venture capital backed startups are more likely to implement these systems faster. This article also examines why these systems are adopted and the different roles they play in high-growth companies

The article discusses several platforms for corporate growth and sustainability of efficient performance. It explores the significance and challenges of better compensation, high moral, larger skill base, professional growth opportunities, strong competitive position, and other business models. It also elaborates various management styles that are important for the growth of firms, which include proficient negotiations and smart contracting

Entrepreneurs are essential drivers of social and economic progress. In their first 10 years, many entrepreneurial companies launch products and ideas that transform the way people live, work and play. What's more, these companies are now springing up in all corners of the globe. In "Global Entrepreneurship and the Successful Strategies of Early-Stage Companies," Stanford University's George Foster and IESE's Antonio Dávila, among others, examined the strategies adopted by a diverse range of companies. They talked to senior executives about the high points and dark moments they experienced. The authors pinpoint eight growth strategies for new ventures, which they characterize as: wave; new product in a new category; new product in an existing category; redesign of business value chain; research or discovery of knowledge; roll up (aggregation) of existing players; governmental, regulatory or political change; and idea transfer or transplant