Nuestros investigadores

Javier Bernácer María

Mente Cerebro
Instituto Cultura y Sociedad (ICS). Universidad de Navarra
Líneas de investigación
Distribución de las interneuronas estriatales en el cerebro humano, Análisis del compartimento estriosomal en el cerebro humano, Modelos tridimensionales de la inervación dopaminérgica y serotoninérgica en el tálamo del primate no humano, Alteraciones morfológicas y funcionales en esquizofrenia, Efectos de la metanfetamina en el aprendizaje por refuerzo y su relación con los síntomas psicóticos, Impacto de la adquisición de hábitos en la actividad cerebral medida por resonancia magnética funcional, Incertidumbre causada por el esfuerzo físico en la toma de decisiones, Estudio interdisciplinar sobre el impacto de la adquisición de hábitos en la toma de decisiones humana
Índice H
12, (Google Scholar, 24/09/2020)

Publicaciones científicas más recientes (desde 2010)

Autores: Musullulu, H.; Bernácer María, Javier; Murillo, J.; et al.
ISSN 0924-9338  Vol. 63  2020  págs. S478 - S478
Autores: Catherine, L. ; Bernácer María, Javier (Autor de correspondencia); Güell Pelayo, Francisco
ISSN 1751-2271  Vol. 14  Nº 4  2020  págs. 322 - 334
Maria Montessori developed an educational program during the first half of the 20th century. Nowadays, the Montessori method (MM) is considered one of the main alternatives to teacher¿paced conventional preschool education. This review aims to open a dialogue between the MM and current understanding of neurodevelopment. Four conceptual pillars of the MM¿the sensitive periods, the education of the senses, the prepared environment, and spontaneous activities through repetition¿are discussed. According to the MM, the teacher provides children with an environment that, leaning on maturational time windows, should promote sensory development through spontaneous repetition. We describe brain changes in 3¿ to 6¿year¿old children due to development and externally¿provided experience. Then, it is discussed whether these pillars are supported by neuroscience. Finally, the influences of Montessori are explained, and we suggest possible lines of research to underpin the neuroscientific grounds of the MM
Autores: Arrondo Ostíz, Gonzalo (Autor de correspondencia); Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio (Autor de correspondencia); Bernácer María, Javier (Autor de correspondencia)
ISSN 0210-0630  Nº 501  2019  págs. 65 - 70
Revisamos la relación entre una visión integradora del concepto de hábito y el trastorno por déficit de atención e hiperactividad (TDAH), a partir de dificultades propias de esta condición para el estudio, la accidentabilidad, la dieta y el ejercicio, o los procesos adictivos. Proponemos que muchas consecuencias del TDAH pueden entenderse como una dificultad para la creación y el mantenimiento de hábitos positivos.
Autores: Ramírez Castillo, David; García Roda, Carlos; Güell Pelayo, Francisco; et al.
ISSN 1664-0640  Vol. 10  2019  págs. 421
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier (Autor de correspondencia); Martínez Valbuena, Iván; Martínez Villar, Martín; et al.
Revista: CORTEX
ISSN 0010-9452  Vol. 113  2019  págs. 96-110
According to the theory of value-based decision making, subjects tend to choose the most valuable among a set of options. However, agents may not be consistent when facing the same decision several times. In this paper, Shannon¿s entropy (H) is employed as a measure of behavioral inconsistency: it is a central measure of information theory that, applied to decision making, allows the estimation of behavioral preferences among a set of options. We scanned (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) 24 young (18-25 year) subjects (14 female) while performing a decision-making task, where monetary rewards were devalued by physical effort (minutes running in the treadmill) and risk. Twenty different pairs of options were presented nine times each, and H was calculated for each pair and subject. Behavioral analyses showed that subjective value (SV) significantly explained agents¿ preferences only in pairs with a low inconsistent response. Averaged response time positively correlated with H, confirming entropy as an indicator of choice difficulty. Group analyses on fMRI data revealed a cluster in the paracingulate cortex as the neural correlate of H. Besides, BOLD signal in the posterior cingulate correlated with the SV of the pair only in consistent decisions, confirming that SV loses its explanatory power on highly inconsistent decisions. Finally, the anterior and central cingulate were especially recruited when predicting a secured effortless reward, compared with a secured re
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier (Autor de correspondencia); Martínez Valbuena, Iván; Martínez Villar, Martín; et al.
ISSN 1053-8119  Vol. 203  2019 
When humans make decisions, objective rewards are mainly discounted by delay, risk and effort. Whereas recentresearch has demonstrated that several brain areas process costs and code subjective value in effort-based decisionmaking, it remains obscure how neural activity patterns change when effort costs are reduced due to theacquisition of healthy habits, such as moving from sedentary to active lifestyles. Here, a sample of sedentaryvolunteers was behaviorally assessed and fMRI-scanned before and after completing a 3-monthfitness plan. Theimpact of effort cost on decisions, measured as the constant defining a hyperbolic decaying function, was reducedafter the plan. A logistic mixed model demonstrated that the explanatory power of effort decreased with time. At aneural level, there was a marginally significant disruption of effort-cost related functional activity in the anteriorcingulate after the plan. Functional connectivity between the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex wasstrengthened after habit acquisition. In turn, this interaction was stronger in those participants with lower effortdiscounting. Thus, we show for thefirst time changes in value-based decision making after moving from asedentary to an active lifestyle, which points to the relevance of the amygdala-cingulate interplay when theimpact of effort on decisions fades away.
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier (Autor de correspondencia)
ISSN 0066-5215  Vol. 52  Nº 3  2019  págs. 650 - 653
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 1355-8250  Vol. 25  Nº 7 - 8  2018  págs. 112 - 134
Scientific research leans on the theoretical assumptions that have been taken for granted through decades of research. Experimental psychology, mostly rooted in experiments with rodents, defines habits as rigid, unconscious, and non-teleological behaviours opposed to goal-directed actions. This definition has been transferred to human research as such, and habits are thus viewed as compulsions, obsessions, slips-of-action, and addictions. From an experiential point of view, however, humans possess habits that go beyond these behaviours. According to Aristotle, habits are dispositions of thought and performance, usually acquired by repetition, which predispose our future actions. This 'new' understanding of human habits would be associated with a brain configuration that goes beyond the rigid carving of motor routines in certain areas. An empirical application of this interpretation is explained. In conclusion, a novel perspective is proposed to study the neural correlates of habits and their impact on behaviour.
Autores: Lecumberri, A.; Lopez-Janeiro, A.; Corral-Domenge, C.; et al.
ISSN 1863-2653  Vol. 223  Nº 4  2018  págs. 1615 - 1625
The striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen and nucleus accumbens) is the main input structure of the basal ganglia. It receives cortical projections from the vast majority of the cortex, as well as from other subcortical structures such as the thalamus and amygdala. Its role in planning, preparation and execution of voluntary movements is known to be fine-tuned by the interaction between projection neurons and interneurons. Since the 1990s, it has been accepted that the proportion of interneurons increases phylogenetically, being about 5% in rodents and 26% in humans. However, these data have not been confirmed with unbiased techniques, such as stereology. In the present report, we have divided the human striatum into functional territories (associative, sensorimotor and limbic) and we have quantified the numerical density of all striatal neurons (using Nissl staining) in each area. Taking into account our past research on the estimation of striatal interneurons, we have calculated the proportion of interneurons in each territory. This value was on average 17.1% for the whole striatum, although interneurons were more abundant in the associative (21.9%) than in the sensorimotor (12.8%) and limbic (11.1%) aspects. Therefore, we demonstrate with unbiased stereology that the overall proportion of striatal interneurons is slightly lower than that reported in previous studies, and that it varies in the functional territories of this structure.
Autores: Barrett, Nathaniel; Schulkin, Jay; Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 0140-525X  Vol. 40  2017  págs. e351
We contest the claim that musically induced sadness cannot be enjoyable in itself. This possibility is supported by closer attention to a musical experience as well as cases of affective reversal, such as the "hedonic flip" of painful feelings. We propose that the affective reversal of sadness in music is due to the high granularity of musically induced emotion.
Autores: Arrondo Ostíz, Gonzalo; Bernácer María, Javier; Díaz-Robredo, Luis
ISSN 1575-1813  Vol. 18  Nº 4  2017  págs. 267 - 269
La conformación de las estructuras anatómicas es compleja en los 3 planos del espacio. Históricamente, la enseñanza de la anatomía se ha hecho a partir de representaciones bidimensionales, de modelos físicos tridimensionales o de cuerpos reales. Solo recientemente ha sido factible crear modelos anatómicos digitales tridimensionales, que pueden ser explorados en línea a través de Internet. El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar 2 de las herramientas en línea más conocidas para la visualización anatómica (Anatomography® y BioDigital® Human), y presentar una experiencia docente de uso en el área de neurociencias. Se crearon imágenes de estructuras cerebrales animadas que se usaron en clase posteriormente, y se preguntó a los alumnos sobre su interés y utilidad. Los resultados indicaron que la utilización de este tipo de recursos es interesante por su flexibilidad, atractivo y coste.
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 2300-7648  Vol. 4  Nº 2  2016  págs. 437 - 445
In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tackle the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately encounter. The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, and the development of optogenetics. Furthermore, the US Government and European Union have launched the BRAIN Initiative and Human Brain Project, respectively, to promote a better understanding of brain functioning and its disorders. Unfortunately, their gates appear sealed for disciplines that pursue a deep knowledge of the mind, such as philosophy or psychology. The most probable outcome of this situation is "promissory materialism", as Sir John Eccles warned several decades ago. I review the multidisciplinary approach of Eccles to the study of the brain and mind, especially through his relationship with Mariano Artigas. Finally, I propose that interdisciplinary research may be improved by a more solid understanding of the discipline one wants to dialogue with, and a multidisciplinary training from the beginning of the research career.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique; Bernácer María, Javier; Larrivee, D.; et al.
ISSN 1664-1078  Vol. 7  2016  págs. 117
A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs about the severity of their disease or the nature of its treatment, considering therapy as curative rather than palliative. We propose that this attitude may be understood as self-deception, following the current psychological theories about this topic. In this article we suggest that the reason these patients deceive themselves is to preserve their belief systems. According to some philosophical accounts, the human belief system (HBS) is constituted as a web with a few stable central nodes - deep-seated beliefs - intimately related with the self. We hypothesize that the mind may possess defensive mechanisms, mostly non-conscious, that reject certain sensory inputs (e.g., a fatal diagnosis) that may undermine deep-seated beliefs. This interpretation is in line with the theory of cognitive dissonance. Following this reasoning, we also propose that HBS-related self-deception would entail a lower cognitive load than that associated with confronting the truth: whereas the latter would engage a myriad of high cognitive functions to re-configure crucial aspects of the self, including the setting of plans, goals, or even a behavioral output, the former would be mostly non-conscious. Overall, we believe that our research supports the hypothesis that in cases of terminal illness, (self-)deceiving requires less effort than accepting the truth.
Autores: Orón Semper, J. V.; Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio; Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 1664-1078  Vol. 7  2016  págs. 1 - 12
In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in particular emotional management, may have opposing explanations depending on the interpretation of the assumed brain architecture, that is, whether a componential computational account (CCA) or a dynamic systems perspective (DSP) is used. According to CCA, cognitive functions are associated with the action of restricted brain regions, and this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP argues that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions between several brain areas, whose engagement in specific functions is temporal and context-dependent and based on neural reuse. We outline the main neurobiological facts about adolescent maturation, focusing on the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional processes associated with adolescence. We then explain the importance of emotional management in adolescent maturation. We explain the interplay between emotion and cognition under the scope of CCA and DSP, both at neural and behavioral levels. Finally, we justify why, according to CCA, emotional management is understood as regulation, specifically because the cognitive aspects of the brain are in charge of regulating emotion-related modules. However, the key word in DSP is integration, since neural information from different brain areas is integrated from the beginning of the process. Consequently, although the terms should not be conceptually confused, there is no cognition without emotion, and vice versa. Thus, emotional integration is not an independent process that just happens to the subject, but a crucial part of personal growth. Considering the importance of neuropsychological research in the development of educational and legal policies concerning adolescents, we intend to expose that the holistic view of adolescents is dependent on whether one holds the implicit or explicit interpretation of brain functioning.
Autores: Güell Pelayo, Francisco; Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 1662-5153  Vol. 9  2015  págs. 59
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Lombo, J. A.; Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio
ISSN 1662-5161  Vol. 9  2015  págs. 468
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 0066-5215  Vol. 48  Nº 3  2015  págs. 575 - 578
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio
ISSN 1662-5161  Vol. 8  Nº 883  2014  págs. 1 - 10
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a "habit-as-learning". The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term "habit-as-routine", is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as "knowing that x is so"; (2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior ("knowing how to behave"); and (3) technical or learned skills ("knowing how to make or to do")...
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Balderas, G.; Martínez-Valbuena, I.; et al.
ISSN 0140-525X  Vol. 37  Nº 1  2014  págs. 21 - 22
Newell & Shanks (N&S) carry out an extremely sharp and static distinction between conscious and unconscious decisions, ignoring a process that dynamically transfers decisions and actions between the conscious and unconscious domains of the mind: habitual decision making. We propose a new categorisation and discuss the main characteristics of this process from a philosophical and neuroscientific perspective.
Autores: Martinez-Valbuena, I.; Bernácer María, Javier
ISSN 1662-5161  Vol. 8  2014  págs. 614
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Corlett, P.; Ramachandra, P.; et al.
ISSN 0002-953X  Vol. 170  Nº 11  2013  págs. 1326 - 1334
Objective Frontostriatal circuitry is critical to learning processes, and its disruption may underlie maladaptive decision making and the generation of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia. However, there is a paucity of evidence directly examining the role of modulatory neurotransmitters on frontostriatal function in humans. In order to probe the effects of modulation on frontostriatal circuitry during learning and to test whether disruptions in learning processes may be related to the pathogenesis of psychosis, the authors explored the brain representations of reward prediction error and incentive value, two key reinforcement learning parameters, before and after methamphetamine challenge. Method Healthy volunteers (N=18) underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning while performing a reward learning task on three occasions: after placebo, after methamphetamine infusion (0.3 mg/kg body weight), and after pretreatment with 400 mg of amisulpride and then methamphetamine infusion. Brain fMRI representations of learning signals, calculated using a reinforcement Q-learning algorithm, were compared across drug conditions. Results In the placebo condition, reward prediction error was coded in the ventral striatum bilaterally and incentive value in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex bilaterally. Reward prediction error and incentive value signals were disrupted by methamphetamine in the left nucleus accumbens and left ventromedial prefrontal cortex, respectively. Psychotic symptoms
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio
ISSN 1664-1078  Vol. 3  2012  págs. 418
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Prensa Sepúlveda, Lucía; Giménez Amaya, José Manuel
Revista: PLOS ONE
ISSN 1932-6203  Vol. 7  Nº 1  2012 
ICSBackground: The afferent projections of the striatum (caudate nucleus and putamen) are segregated in three territories: associative, sensorimotor and limbic. Striatal interneurons are in part responsible for the integration of these different types of information. Among them, GABAergic interneurons are the most abundant, and can be sorted in three populations according to their content in the calcium binding proteins calretinin (CR), parvalbumin (PV) and calbindin (CB). Conversely, striatal dopaminergic cells (whose role as interneurons is still unclear) are scarce. This study aims to analyze the interneuron distribution in the striatal functional territories, as well as their organization regarding to the striosomal compartment. Methodology/Principal Findings: We used immunohistochemical methods to visualize CR, PV, CB and tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) positive striatal neurons. The interneuronal distribution was assessed by stereological methods applied to every striatal functional territory. Considering the four cell groups altogether, their density was higher in the associative (2120 +/- 91 cells/mm(3)) than in the sensorimotor (959 +/- 47 cells/mm(3)) or limbic (633 +/- 119 cells/mm(3)) territories. CB- and TH-immunoreactive (-ir) cells were distributed rather homogeneously in the three striatal territories. However, the density of CR and PV interneurons were more abundant in the associative and sensorimotor striatum, respectively. Regarding to their compartmental organiz
Autores: Horga, G.; Bernácer María, Javier; Nicola, D.; et al.
ISSN 0940-1334  Vol. 261  Nº 7  2011  págs. 467 - 476
Ventricular enlargement is one of the most consistent abnormal structural brain findings in schizophrenia and has been used to infer brain shrinkage. However, whether ventricular enlargement is related to local overlying cortex and/or adjacent subcortical structures or whether it is related to brain volume change globally has not been assessed. We systematically assessed interrelations of ventricular volumes with gray and white matter volumes of 40 Brodmann areas (BAs), the thalamus and its medial dorsal nucleus and pulvinar, the internal capsule, caudate and putamen. We acquired structural MRI ( patients with schizophrenia (n = 64) and healthy controls (n = 56)) and diffusion tensor fractional anisotropy (FA) (untreated schizophrenia n = 19, controls n = 32). Volumes were assessed by manual tracing of central structures and a semi-automated parcellation of BAs. Patients with schizophrenia had increased ventricular size associated with decreased cortical gray matter volumes widely across the brain; a similar but less pronounced pattern was seen in normal controls; local correlations (e.g. temporal horn with temporal lobe volume) were not appreciably higher than non-local correlations (e.g. temporal horn with prefrontal volume). White matter regions adjacent to the ventricles similarly did not reveal strong regional relationships. FA and center of mass of the anterior limb of the internal capsule also appeared differentially influenced by ventricular volume but findings were s
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Güell Pelayo, Francisco
Libro:  Psychiatry and Neuroscience update: from Epistemology to Clinical Psychiatry
Vol. IV  2021  págs. 107 - 119
The attribution of the category of person to a living being is not irrelevant at all, since it indicates who is entitled to rights, dignity, and duties by law. Throughout approximately 15 centuries, since Boethius first defined the term, the most influential philosophers have provided an interpretation on which are the defining features of persons. Current neuroscience, influenced by mainstream utilitarian bioethics, takes John Locke¿s definition of person as starting point: the being with intelligence, self-consciousness, and memory. This notion has been subsequently refined by analytic philosophy and contemporary thinkers such as Daniel Dennett, ending up in a cognitivist conception of person. In this text, we will discuss how current neuroscience has embraced this definition and the subsequent reductionism it leads to. In fact, for some authors, personhood is an illusion held by human beings. We will present other philosophical perspectives on the issue and will concentrate on the phenomenological interpretation to achieve a comprehensive notion of person. From this perspective, the person is understood as an embodied mind where the role of the environment, including interpersonal relationships, is utterly radical. This vision presupposes the inability of neuroscience, or any other individual discipline, to cover by itself what a person is. Thus, the phenomenological approach on the person is presented as a paradigmatic example to promote dialogue between scientific and humanistic disciplines.
Autores: Arrondo Ostíz, Gonzalo; Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio; Bernácer María, Javier
Libro:  Todo lo que necesitas saber sobre el TDAH en la etapa de aprendizaje
Vol. 501  2019  págs. 65 - 70
Autores: Arrondo Ostíz, Gonzalo; Barrett, Nathaniel; Güell Pelayo, Francisco; et al.
Libro:  Psychiatry and neuroscience update: from translational research to a humanistic approach
Vol. III  2019  págs. 83 - 97
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier
Libro:  ¿Quiénes somos? Cuestiones en torno al ser humano
2018  págs. 91 - 95
Autores: Güell Pelayo, Francisco; Arrondo Ostíz, Gonzalo; de Castro Manglano, María Pilar; et al.
Libro:  Psychiatry and neuroscience update: A translational approach
Vol. II  2017  págs. 105 - 116
In psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the clinician collects information from the patient¿s anamnesis, clinical observation, and diagnostic tests; evaluates these data; and makes a diagnosis. The most common manuals used to assess a patient¿s mental disease according to his or her symptoms are the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). This chapter focuses on the dialogue that philosophy and psychiatry have held for decades to achieve a better understanding of dissociative identity disorder (DID). The outcome of this dialogue is the expression of the diagnostic criteria for DID, as well as other dissociative disorders, in the medical manuals. Thus, we first analyze the evolution of DID across the different versions of ICD and DSM. We then show that the characterization of DID and other dissociative disorders is a lively debate that is far from being settled. We demonstrate that the core of this debate is the understanding of person after John Locke¿s philosophy: a person is defined by the apparent expression of consciousness and memories. This leads to what we have termed a primary conceptual dissociation: the mental qualities of the person are dissociated from the body. We propose an alternative account based on the dynamic nature of identity and the understanding of person as a mind¿body unity. We hope that our proposal, which results from the interdisciplinary dialogue between psychiat
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio
Libro:  Before consciousness: in search of the fundamentals of mind
2017  págs. 226 - 246
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Martínez-Valbuena, I.; Martínez, M.; et al.
Libro:  Motivation theory, neurobiology and applications
Vol. 229  2016  págs. 103 - 123
One key aspect of motivation is the ability of agents to overcome excessive weighting of intrinsic subjective costs. This contribution aims to analyze the subjective cost of effort and assess its neural correlates in sedentary volunteers. We recruited a sample of 57 subjects who underwent a decision-making task using a prospective, moderate, and sustained physical effort as devaluating factor. Effort discounting followed a hyperbolic function, and individual discounting constants correlated with an indicator of sedentary lifestyle (global physical activity questionnaire; R = -0.302, P = 0.033). A subsample of 24 sedentary volunteers received a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan while performing a similar effort-discounting task. BOLD signal of a cluster located in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with the subjective value of the pair of options under consideration (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; cluster corrected for multiple comparisons for the whole brain). Furthermore, effort-related discounting of reward correlated with the signal of a cluster in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05; small volume cluster corrected for a region of interest including the ventral prefrontal cortex and striatum). This study offers empirical data about the intrinsic subjective cost of effort and its neural correlates in sedentary individuals.
Autores: Bernácer María, Javier; Giménez Amaya, José Manuel
Libro:  Is science compatible with free will?
2012  págs. 177 - 193
The notion of habit learning in Neuroscience implies the automation of 5 an action, which thus discharges consciousness from the supervision of its perfor- 6 mance and eventually restricts flexibility. It has also been assumed that habit 7 learning is against free will, as it has been suggested for pathological conditions 8 such as obsessive-compulsive disorder. This point of view, which might be contro- 9 versial with other notions of habituation, could be an interesting context to analyze 10 at what extent human actions emerge from free will and are consciously carried out. 11 The well-known experiments performed by Benjamin Libet and replicated by 12 others have led some scientists to deny the concept of free will in the human 13 being. However, we think that these experiments posit further questions that should 14 be tackled from a broader point of view. For example: does the readiness potential 15 univocally point to the initiation of any kind of action? Can it be also found in non- 16 deterministic novel actions? Is it causally related to the action, or is it just a ¿mental 17 rehearsal¿ of the action to come? In this contribution, we will try to make a note on 18 these topics in order to explain the neuroscientific concept of habit learning and to 19 relate it to free will in a broader and more philosophical interdisciplinary framework.