La literatura científica sobre el uso de la biotecnología para la mejora moral suele obviar los fundamentos que sostienen las definiciones de base manejadas. En este artículo identifico y comparo tres concepciones rivales de mejora moral ¿centrada en la conducta, centrada en la libertad y centrada en la naturaleza¿ con miras a ofrecer un mapa de interacciones entre los imaginarios contemporáneos, sus consecuencias y posibles y mejores alternativas. En mis conclusiones defiendo que la biotecnología puede ser útil para el crecimiento moral siempre que esté orientada prioritariamente a reconexión sujeto-naturaleza y en cuanto incluya criterios estéticos en el diseño de las intervenciones. En esta misma línea destaco, en primer lugar, la importancia de la relación entre el concepto de percepción moral y el de mística de lo cotidiano; y, en segundo lugar, la necesidad de fomentar un nuevo tipo de relaciones interdisciplinares de cariz objetivo-subjetivo cuyo centro aglutinador sea la contemplación de la belleza

The neuroethics field emerged in the early 2000s in an effort to face important philosophical dilemmas and anticipate disruptive social changes linked to the use of neurotechnology (Safire, 2002). From very early on, this field grew out of two core issues, namely inquiries into the ethics of neuroscience ¿concerning the moral use of knowledge and technology¿ and inquiries into the neuroscience of ethics ¿on how new brain function evidence can change human self-understanding (Roskies 2002). Similarly, neurolaw is now on a parallel path with two main pillars as Chandler (2018) suggested, (1) ¿self-reflexive inquiry¿ (the neuroscience of law) and (2) ¿inquiry into the development and use of brain science and technologies¿ (the law of neuroscience). In this paper, I suggest that these two lines of research are still excessively disconnected from one another and, to support this claim, I analyze the three potential point-of-no-return risks that Aldous Huxley associated with technological challenges, namely centralization of power, bureaucratic alienation, and scientific idealism. In addition, I show how Huxley shifted analysis of technological problems from a focus on the rights of potential victims to the duties of potential aggressors. Finally, I argue that Aldous Huxley¿s view on how to build a bridge that brings pillars 1) and 2) closer together also helps prevent the technological point-of-no-return. According to Huxley, the key is found in paying particular attention to undeunderstanding contemplative activity, reinforcing its role in the study of reality, and, eventually, returning the romantic gaze updated to academia.

En este trabajo analizo la tesis formulada por Aldous Huxley sobre la importancia de incluir al artista para superar el fenómeno de las dos culturas ¿el divorcio entre las ciencias y las humanidades. Explico, en primer lugar, por qué dicha separación metodológica y de intereses es, para Huxley, expresión de una sociedad de masas máximamente tecnificada y consumista. En segundo lugar, desarrollo su más concreta tesis acerca de cómo el abandono de la dimensión subjetiva/afectiva del saber es la principal causa de separación entre las dos culturas. La última parte del trabajo está dirigida a contextualizar y defender su propuesta acerca de la necesidad de reapasionar la actividad intelectual, una tarea en la que los artistas ¿la tercera cultura¿ cumplen un importante papel.

El concepto de identidad personal es uno de los grandes temas de la filosofía occidental tardo-moderna. Las distintas concepciones de sujeto propuestas comparten, en su mayoría, una particular característica: la importancia que otorgan a la noción de yo. En este artículo abordaremos la relación entre el yo y la persona desde el punto de vista de la hipótesis de la identidad narrativa. Primero estudiamos algunas claves históricas del contexto en el que la cuestión ha tomado forma para, a continuación, identificar los problemas y riesgos derivados de un mismo error categorial: no distinguir entre el yo deíctico, el yo performativo y el yo constativo.

For transhumanism, humanity is a stage which, guided by biological evolution, was preceded by other earlier stages and which will be followed by others that are newer. According to transhumanism, we must break the inertia of blind causes that govern evolution and, through biotechnology, attain what is called a ¿better life¿. Those authors who are supportive of this current of thought develop their proposals by negating the existence of a human nature, but without abandoning the conviction that it will be possible to define what a ¿better life¿ consists in. In this article we will analyze the clarity and rigor with which transhumanists present the ultimate goal of their proposal, the relation between the end and the means proposed for attaining it, and, finally, we will bring to light certain inconsistencies that result from their rejection of the position that human nature could have a normative value.

This article explores the hypothesis that while maturation related cognitive abilities reaches maturity around the age of fifteen, maturation related social skills is delayed until well into the twenties. Our goal is to try to define what is the window of opportunity / vulnerability and what is the maturational status of the young in this interval. In this context, we argue how the maturational time of the closing of adolescence has an impact on the valuation of autonomy in decision-making of the person. Particularly, we figure out implications for the assessment of the autonomy of youth in health issues, and also criminal liability. In the conclusion, we offer some educational criteria that may provide guidance for implementing both social policy and educational programs.

The aim of this chapter is to explore how to teach ethics to scientist students in order for them to achieve a greater understanding of the relevance of ethics for their lives. A valid way to a better internalization and development of this awareness involves reading and discussing literary texts. Reading literature that demonstrates the impact of science on human behavior helps generate ethical engagement in the students of scientific areas. Thanks to their interaction with literature, ethics is no longer seen as an external factor that only places limitations on their work; rather, the reading of literature is the opportunity for the necessary reflection on the social and personal consequences of separating science and ethics. With that end in mind, we analyze Aldous Huxley¿s Brave New World (1932) as a good option to reflect on the consequences of banishing the moral dimension of scientific work. The reflection of this reading allows them to become awake to the relevance of developing virtues and take on a greater responsibility that will allow them to build a better ethical formation during their degrees and to affront in an effective way the dilemmas that their scientific work will present them with in the future.

This chapter explores the phenomenon of inauthentic experiences as a negative consequence of the new trends in cosmetic psychopharmacology, concluding that they are also the psychological manifestation of the tension, in late modernity, between two rival versions for a moral paradigm¿Classic and Modern¿and in which transition, rationality, affectivity, and will are being progressively and consecutively instrumentalized. Moreover, it is argued that this post-emotional scenario poses a threat to mental stability as well as social cohesion. The second general objective of this chapter is analyzing three types of psychological complaints by patients about inauthenticity¿those related to the artificial origin of emotions, to the physical nature of its content, and to its episodic coherence; on the other hand, I present and compare three rival contemporary solutions to the problem of inauthenticity: the psychological, the organic, and the narrative.

This study is framed within the objectives of Clinical Ontology, namely, the formulation of true, coherent and accessible discourses in order to help patients manage unavoidable and destructive experiences about the nature of being, becoming, and its limits. First, I analyze four different inauthentic experiences (IE), which are deeply associated with neuro-technological development, and from which are emerging a new and growing vulnerable group of patients. Second, I propose two basis conditions for a successful ontological treatment: (a) the patient should value the unpleasant feelings of IE negatively; and (b) the patient should believe that a better understanding of reality (or at least, of his or her own life) provides a means to neutralize and replace unpleasant feelings with others that are more enjoyable and fulfilling. Finally, I defend that therapeutic technologies are not the only triggers of IE, hence they should not be the only target of investigation of this field.