The theory of Selected Effects (SE) is currently the most widely accepted etiological account of function in biology. It argues that the function of any trait is the effect that past traits of that type produced that contributed to its current existence. Its proper or etiological function is whatever effect was favoured by natural selection irrespective of the trait's current effects. By defining function with respect to the effects of natural selection, the theory claims to eschew the problem of backwards causality and to ground functional normativity on differential reproduction or differential persistence. Traditionally, many have criticised the theory for its inability to envisage any function talk outside selective reproduction, for failing to account for the introduction of new functions, and for treating function as epiphenomenal. This article unveils four additional critiques of the SE theory that highlight the source of its critical problems. These critiques follow from the fact that natural selection is not a form of work, but a passive filter that merely blocks or permits prior functioning traits to be reproduced. Natural selection necessarily assumes the causal efficacy of prior organism work to produce the excess functional traits and offspring from which only the best fitted will be preserved. This leads to four new incapacities of the SE theory, which will be here analysed: (i) it provides no criterion for determining what distinguishes a proper from an incidental function; (ii) it cannot distinguish between neutral, incidental, and malfunctioning traits, thus treating organism benefit as irrelevant; (iii) it fails to account for the physical work that makes persistence and reproduction possible, and (iv) in so doing, it falls into a vicious regress. We conclude by suggesting that, inspired by Mills and Beatty's propensity interpretation, the aporia of backward causation implicit in anticipatory accounts of function can also be avoided by a dispositional approach that defines function in terms of work that synchronously counters the ubiquitous tendency for organism entropy to increase in the context of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics.

Some philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein's hinges, the centrepiece of his book On Certainty, are the "ungrounded ground" on which knowledge rests. It is usually understood by this that hinges provide a foundation for knowledge without being themselves epistemically warranted. In fact, Wittgenstein articulates that hinges lack any truth-value and are neither justified nor unjustified. This inevitably places them wholly outside the categorial framework of JTB epistemology. What I call the "groundlessness interpretation", inspired by OC 166, understands the fundamental pieces of our cognitive scaffolding this way. The view has been largely successful. I argue that this interpretation is incomplete for two basic reasons: first, it is not based on undisputed evidence; second, by assuming that hinges are committed to reality by epistemic fiat, it looks as if Wittgenstein is asking us to blindly trust them regardless of their actual content. Contrary to this, I argue that Wittgenstein describes hinges as illuminating world-pictures that reflect reality and are answerable to facts in a derivate way. As the book shows, hinges originate in our engagement with reality and, while considered unquestionable, could be challenged, reassessed, and replaced by new ones. This indicates that hinges are both the result of knowledge-acquisition and somewhat continuous with one's set of beliefs. It follows that hinges are ultimately rational, and so, apt instruments to confront scepticism.

In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three reasons: First, non-living self-organising processes like autocatalysis meet the defining features of autopoiesis without being teleological; second, organisational approaches, whether defined in terms of the closure of constraints, self-determination or autonomy, are unable to specify teleological normativity, that is, the individuation of an ultimate beneficiary; third, all self-organised systems produce local order by maximising the throughput of energy and/or material (obeying the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle) and thereby are specifically organised to undermine their own critical boundary conditions. Despite these inadequacies, an alternative approach called teleodynamics accounts for teleology. This theory shows how multiple self-organising processes can be collectively linked so that they counter each other's MEP principle tendencies to become codependent. Teleodynamics embraces - not ignoring - the difficulties of self-organisation, but reinstates teleology as a radical phase transition distinguishing systems embodying an orientation towards their own beneficial ends from those that lack normative character.

We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the 'relational turn' defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of 'relational nature' described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose

Aristotle¿s epistemology has sometimes been associated with foundationalism, the theory according to which a small set of premise-beliefs that are deductively valid or inductively strong provide justification for many other truths. In contemporary terms, Aristotle¿s foundationalism could be compared with what is sometimes called ¿classical foundationalism¿. However, as I will show, the equivalent to basic beliefs in Aristotle¿s epistemology are the so-called first principles or ¿axiómata¿. These principles are self-evident, but not self-justificatory. They are not justified by their act of understanding, but by the arguments that satisfactorily prove them. In addition, these principles are intellectual, rather than perceptual, so that no basic belief that is about our immediate experience or sensory data is apt to provide the required foundation of knowledge. In spite of this, I argue that Aristotle¿s foundationalism has no givens, and that his epistemology resists the objections usually leveled against givens.

The development of neuroprosthetics has given rise to significant theoretical and practical challenges concerning personal identity. The Extended Mind Theory (EMT) attempts to provide an answer to these challenges by arguing that the mind and the external world are co-extensive to the point that both can make a seamless unified entity. The EMT also proposes that physical states determine the nature of mental states. Here, we propose a non-deterministic and less locationist view of mental states that we will call iEMT. The iEMT articulates, firstly, that the co-extensivity of the mind and the world does not justify the dissolution of the mind in the objects of the external world with which the mind interacts. Consequently, the agent¿s mind is still part of his unique personal identity. Secondly, neural implants cannot be regarded as mere replacement parts in the context of a weak concept of personal identity. Thirdly, there are no compelling reasons to believe or to fear that neuroprosthetics can alter personal identity at the profound level.

To mark the 25th anniversary of A. Kenny¿s The Metaphysics of Mind, this article discusses some of the central arguments of this book, in particular, it discusses Descartes¿ dualism, the notion of soul or Aristotle¿s psychê, human and animal language, voluntary action, the self, the mind-brain relation, thinking and intentionality, and determinism and free will. The author holds that, although Kenny¿s book offers valid and substantial arguments inspired in Wittgenstein¿s thought and the Aristotelian tradition, he occasionally fails to appreciate the depth of basic concepts in the Aristotelian tradition such as that of psychê and the immateriality of the human intellect. Despite this, the book constitutes one of the best efforts to break off with Descartes¿ and the empiricists¿ ideas, and to incorporate the Aristotelian tradition to the contemporary philosophy of mind.

Con este libro, la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Navarra rinde homenaje al Profesor Ángel Luis González, catedrático de Metafísica, fallecido el 16 de abril de 2016. D. Ángel Luis impartió su docencia en nuestra universidad a lo largo de 42 años. Dirigió unas 70 tesis doctorales y 90 memorias de licenciatura y tesis de máster. Fue vicerrector, decano de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, y director de nuestro Departamento de Filosofía. Publicó 46 libros -algunos con hasta siete ediciones- y numerosos artículos. Dirigió, entre otras series editoriales, la Colección Filosófica de Eunsa y la de Pensamiento Medieval y Renacentistas, además de los Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico (Serie Universitaria), la revista Studia Poliana y las obras completas de Leonardo Polo. Fue investigador principal en numerosos proyectos de investigación. Invitado por varias universidades de Europa y América, las asesoró respecto a su labor y gobierno. Por sus grandes méritos académicos, la Universidad Panamericana de México le concedió el doctorado honoris causa en 2010. Sean estas páginas muestra de nuestra memoria, de nuestro reconocimiento y admiración al Profesor Ángel Luis González.

Como señala J. Searle, ¿desde Descartes, el problema mente-cuerpo ha tomado la forma siguiente: ¿cómo podemos dar cuenta de las relaciones entre dos géneros de cosas, en apariencia totalmente diferentes?¿. Por un lado, tenemos los fenómenos físicos; por otro, fenómenos subjetivos. La tensión entre unos y otros aparece como consecuencia de considerar las propiedades fenoménicas como irreconciliables, heterogéneas y opuestas a la materia, es decir, de aprobar una cierta forma de dualismo entre lo real y lo intencional. La pregunta que voy enfrentar directamente es: ¿es verdad que ambas clases de propiedades son opuestas e irreconciliables? O lo que es lo mismo: ¿son la conciencia, la intencionalidad y el conocimiento irreconciliables con la realidad física en el sentido de que no toman origen en ella, sino que se constituyen independientemente? Para responder a esta pregunta, presentaré la dificultad inversa al axioma de la intencionalidad tal como la describe L. Polo en su Curso de teoría del conocimiento, I, donde se habla de la la noción de facultad orgánica en el contexto de la vida. Este análisis ofrece una solución novedosa a este problema inspirada en la noción aristotélica de praxis teleía.

El término ¿conocimiento¿ y la disciplina filosófica que lo estudia ¿la teoría del conocimiento¿ han experimentado notables cambios hasta el presente. La teoría clásica concibe el conocimiento en íntima unión con la verdad, como una captación intelectual de realidades necesarias e inmutables. Con la llegada de la modernidad, la difusión de un clima escéptico puso en duda esta pretensión, cuestionando la aptitud misma del conocimiento para la verdad. Esta duda ha presidido toda la modernidad hasta el presente. Para responder al desafío escéptico, las principales corrientes de la llamada epistemología analítica contemporánea han intentado, sin éxito, explorar el carácter justificante del conocimiento. En este intento, han destacado teorías encaminadas a mostrar que el conocimiento recibe su justificación desde un fundamento, como el fundacionismo y el coherentismo; teorías encaminadas a mostrar que el conocimiento recibe su justificación desde sus fuentes, como el externismo y el internismo; y teorías encaminadas a mostrar que la recibe por las facultades cognitivas mismas como instrumentos de conocimiento fiables, como la epistemología de la virtud. Todas ellas generan, a su vez, nuevas paradojas e imponen la necesidad de volver a los fundamentos de esta disciplina, presentes en la teoría clásica, para descubrir la conexión entre conocimiento y verdad, e intentar detener el desafío escéptico.