La democracia liberal experimenta actualmente un desapego ciudadano del que forma parte el populismo, un fenómeno especialmente presente en los países latinoamericanos. Sin embargo, la tesis de que el populismo caracteriza la política en Latinoamérica todavía necesita estudios micro en países concretos. En este artículo, se ofrece una definición operativa de populismo, se propone un código de análisis que recoge las características principales de este fenómeno y se aplica a los spots de los candidatos que llegaron a la segunda y definitiva vuelta en las últimas dos elecciones presidenciales de 2015 y de 2019 en Guatemala. Los resultados confirman la presencia del populismo en los spots, pero la ausencia de algunos de los rasgos lleva a plantear unas campañas de populismo mitigado. Al mismo tiempo, no todos los candidatos recurren a él con la misma intensidad.

This study analyses trust in news and the relevance granted to journalism by different user profiles in three countries (Denmark, Spain and the United States), each from a different media system as identified by Hallin and Mancini (2004). For this research we used two online surveys (2019, 2020) carried out by the Reuters Institute with more than 2000 people in each country. Our results show that users who consume news through newspapers, radios and television trust news more than those whose main source of information are digital devices. Traditionalist users also have a higher degree of satisfaction with the classic functions of journalism: making the powerful accountable (adversarial function), disseminating current information (disseminating function) and explaining current events to the public (interpretative function). There are differences between countries, especially in the evaluation of the adversarial function. Spaniards, who belong to the polarized pluralist system, are the ones who worst value its fulfilment among their country¿s media.

The idea that journalistic work is crucial to the proper functioning of society is deeply rooted in academic and professional circles. However, the profound changes brought about by the digitalisation of the public sphere lead us to question whether this relevance is still present in the daily lives of citizens. For this reason, this research analyses Spaniards' perceptions of the importance of journalism, their trust in news and their assessment of how journalism fulfils its functions. It also examines whether there are differences in these issues between users whose main sources of information are traditional media (print, radio and television) and those who get their information from digital sources (digital media and social networks). The study is based on surveys conducted by YouGov for the Reuters Institute Digital News Report (DNR) in 2019, 2020 and 2021 among a panel of around 2,000 Spanish digital users. Participants are adult internet users who have consumed news in the last month and are representative of the online population in terms of socio-demographic and geographic criteria. The results show that Spanish users whose main sources of information are traditional media tend to value the fulfilment of journalistic roles (disseminating information, interpreting it, and monitoring power) and trust the news more than those who get their information from digital sources. However, these digitalists attach more importance to journalism than traditionalists (70.6% consider it extremely or very important compared to 59% of those who get their information from traditional media). Part of the distrust expressed by digital users is due to the degree to which it fulfils the functions traditionally attributed to journalism. As they feel that they are less well fulfilled, digital journalists have less confidence in a task that they consider important. Finally, Spaniards believe that the media should report with plurality (76%), neutrality (70%) and fairness (62%), although there are no clear patterns between the two types of users.

Este artículo analiza la evolución de la polarización ideológica en el sistema de partidos español desde 1979. Se propone una reformulación del índice de Dalton para medir la polarización en España y se aplica a las 14 elecciones generales celebradas desde la aprobación de la Constitución. Los resultados indican una evolución con dos periodos distintos de siete elecciones cada uno y un claro aumento de la polarización ideológica desde 2015, alcanzando un máximo histórico en la actualidad. La medición de la polarización ideológica se complementa con la volatilidad y la competencia electoral generada por la llegada de nuevos partidos. Los mayores incrementos de la polarización se produjeron en elecciones que encajan en el concepto de elecciones críticas, es decir, elecciones que producen un cambio sustancial y duradero en los alineamientos electorales

Este artículo analiza el uso de Telegram como herramienta de comunicación electoral en España, centrándose en los mensajes enviados por los cinco partidos mayoritarios del país (PSOE, PP, Vox, Unidas Podemos y Ciudadanos) durante las campañas correspondientes a los comicios generales del 28 de abril y del 10 de noviembre de 2019. Una singularidad de este estudio recae en la triangulación metodológica, con la combinación de dos técnicas de investigación empleadas: un tradicional análisis de contenido y, a su vez, un proceso de minería de datos mediante el lenguaje de programación Python. De esta manera, los resultados iniciales, que apuntan a un mayoritario uso de Telegram como herramienta de movilización y de acercamiento del candidato al votante, se refuerzan y contextualizan gracias a la implementación de técnicas de análisis Big Data que permiten profundizar de forma ágil y precisa en las deducciones del estudio.

The purpose of the study is to examine and compare digital users' motivations for news exposure in three European countries (Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom) belonging to each of Hallin and Mancini's media systems. For this research, a cross-national online survey (2020) of over 2,000 people in each country was used. The users' assessment of the preferences for getting news (from sources that share, challenge or do not have a particular point of view) was analysed, as well as the influence of socio-demographic factors and interest in politics on those motivations. Our results show that a majority of digital users prefer unbiased news. With respect to the socio-demographic variables, a clear pattern can be discerned in the age variable, whereby the older they are, the greater the declared preference for unbiased news. On the other hand, those who show greater interest in politics do prefer reinforcing news. In terms of national differences, motivations for news exposure vary depending on the country studied. In Spain, in line with its belonging to the pluralist-polarised system, the preference for reinforcing news is higher than in Germany and in the United Kingdom.

This article explores audience perceptions of different types of disinformation, and the actions that users take to combat them, in three Spanish-speaking countries: Argentina, Chile, and Spain. Quantitative data from the Digital News Report (2018 and 2019), based on a survey of more than 2000 digital users from each country was used for the analysis. Results show remarkable similarities among the three countries, and how digital users identically ranked the types of problematic information that concerned them most. Survey participants were most concerned by stories where facts are spun or twisted to push a particular agenda, followed by, those that are completely made up for political or commercial reasons, and finally, they were least concerned by poor journalism (factual mistakes, dumbed-down stories, misleading headlines/clickbait). A general index of ¿Concern about disinformation¿ was constructed using several sociodemographic variables that might influence the perception. It showed that the phenomenon is higher among women, older users, those particularly interested in political news, and among left-wingers. Several measures are employed by users to avoid disinformation, such as checking a number of different sources to see whether a news story is reported in the same way, relying on the reputation of the news company, and/or deciding not to share a news story due to doubts regarding its accuracy.

This paper seeks to present the state of the art of research on political communication regarding social media from 2008 to 2018. To this end, 357 articles published in four academic Communication journals of the first quartile of the Journal Citation Reports (JCR-WoS) were analysed. In search of clarity, the paper follows the structure of Woltons triangle and explains the main effects that social media have over politicians, media and citizens. In general, the results show that current research is empirical and rarely focuses on comparative approaches. In addition, it puts emphasis on new technologies, placing them at the very core of the academic debate.

There is a new pattern of consumption of political information that has been generating great challenges for electoral campaigning and democracy. Using the spiral of silence theory, this paper compares the willingness to express political opinions of digital users in four Iberoamerican countries (Argentina, Chile, Spain and Mexico). The paper explores patterns on digital users silencing their political opinions as well as the relationship between unwillingness to express their opinions with ideological self-position. The research shows that the users that place themselves at the ideological extremes are those who are less concerned about expressing their true political opinions openly on the Internet. This was found both in fears of the authorities and in fear of social isolation to the same extent. In the four countries studied, men have less willingness to express their political opinions. Fear is greater among young adults (25-34 years), while younger users and those over 45 feel less social pressure.

This article compares the patterns of political information between general voters and the most interested audiences (journalists, academics, consultants and political leaders), focusing on the case studies of three critical elections held in 2015: the last general elections from Argentina, Spain, and Venezuela. The method used compared primary data for specialized audiences (also called "political geeks") with secondary data for normal voters, taken from three different external sources. The research found that the habits and sources of political information of specialized audiences during the electoral campaign differ from those of the general voting public. Specialized publics rely more on social networks as source of political information than general voters, however the gap is bigger on Twitter and narrower for Facebook. Voters in general use Facebook and WhatsApp more than specialized audiences do. In addition, there is a shift of the center of gravity of the campaigns towards the digital world, both in the specialized publics and in the normal electoral population, but digital migration seems to be more accelerated among specialized audiences than among ordinary voters. It was also observed that political information tends to lead to media convergence and a consolidated or "hybrid" communication system. This research also suggests that despite the rapid acceptance of the digital in the information world, it is possible that little journalism, research, or campaigning is being done where the massive audiences really are.

Una reflexión sobre el devenir de una de las áreas profesionales en mayor expansión: la gestión comunicativa ante la nueva configuración social. Ese es el tesoro que guarda El futuro de la comunicación, un manual de necesaria lectura que nace del diálogo académico y profesional de los mejores referentes de nuestro país como son Elena Gutiérrez-García, Jordi Rodríguez Virgili, Ángel Alloza, Luis Arroyo, Carlos Barrera, Jorge del Río, Teresa García, Antonio López, Juan Manuel Mora, Natalia Rodríguez Salcedo, María Rosa Rotondo, Karen Sanders y José Manuel Velasco. «Hemos querido presentar análisis prospectivos, breves pero incisivos, sobre los desafíos de la comunicación corporativa y política con un enfoque multidisciplinar y complementando las visiones académicas y profesionales. Pretendemos expresar las recientes manifestaciones profesionales que, desde la política, la empresa y grupos sociales, supone la gestión de estrategias comunicativas que influyen en la confianza y legitimidad de intereses de todas las partes implicadas», explica Elena Gutiérrez-García, una de las coordinadoras.

In crisis situations, communication becomes the central element that contributes to managing the occurrence. This is not only a question of providing information on the events that have occurred, but also about responding to the concerns of different audiences affected by the crisis at multiple stages, with the aim of providing security and, as far as possible, minimizing the uncertainty that arises. Given that the COVID-19 is a public health crisis, the interdependent relationship between communication and healthcare becomes, if anything, more evident, since communication not only explains to the public the risks to which they are exposed but also aspires to involve them in the solution. This chapter aims to provide an overall analysis of how the Spanish Government managed the crisis caused by COVID-19, focusing on the communication strategy, from the emergence of the virus to recently, after the Spanish population reached a high vaccination rate. The Spanish case is characterized by having two different phases during the crisis. The country moved from a phase of radical lockdown led by a national command through the President¿s leadership to another phase involving a multiplicity of scenarios and solutions led by the regional governments.

Up until a few years ago, disinformation used to be synonymous with ¿lack of information,¿ ascribable to citizens¿ low interest in public affairs. However, since 2016 and especially as a result of the US electoral campaign (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017) and Brexit (Bastos & Mercea, 2019), disinformation also becomes a spoken about factor, above all referring to the deliberate efforts of certain agents to misinform with lies and half-truths, intoxicating and even saturating the citizen, in what have been called ¿disinformation operations.¿ Much of the success of these false news lies in their virality, that is, in their ability to be shared by Internet users throughout different social networks and instant messaging applications. From a broader perspective, disinformation is a modality within what has been called ¿problematic information¿(Jack, 2017), which includes various types of information that are inaccurate, misleading, improperly attributed, or totally fabricated. Although it is true that these contents are not novel¿-their existence goes back to the origins of modern journalism with the yellow press (Campbell, 2001) and to the use of propaganda in the World Wars (Lasswell, 1927), the existing communicational characteristics in the digital age do promote new ways for problematic information to be created, circulated, and received by users, increasing its potential effects (Freelon & Wells, 2020). In the words of Boczkowski (2017):¿fake news [have] been around for as long as real news. But a differentiating element of the contemporary moment is the existence of an information infrastructure with a scale, scope, and horizontality in information flows unprecedented in ¿

La communication politique des élections européennes de 2019 a été paradoxale. Alors qu'il s'agissait des dernières à inclure la Grande-Bretagne avant son départ de l'Union, le Brexit n'y a pris qu'une part marginale. Alors que pour la première fois en quarante ans la participation a augmenté, ce sont les partis populistes qui en ont bénéficié, remettant en cause la culture de compromis établie de longue date. Alors que l'on pensait les pratiques médiatiques disparates, notamment le Nord et le Sud, les comportements électoraux se sont caractérisés par une grande communauté d'usages synchrones des médias traditionnels et des réseaux sociaux. Cet ouvrage met ainsi en évidence le paradoxe suivant: si l'Europe semble traversée par de puissantes forces centrifuges, un électeur européen prend forme.