En este trabajo sostenemos que cualquier estimación de riesgo de reincidencia en adolescentes basada en algoritmos de «caja negra» y en sus antecedentes delictivos, ignorando la inmadurez de su neurodesarrollo, supone una vulneración del «neuroderecho» a la protección contra sesgos algorítmicos, propuesto por la Fundación NeuroRights, lo cual ubica a dicho grupo etario en una especial situación de vulnerabilidad que lo priva de oportunidades justas de reintegración y socialización. Las herramientas de «neuropredicción» del delito agravan este problema si no se emplean para explorar posibilidades de intervención especializada. El desfase en el neurodesarrollo de los menores constituye un espacio de atención victimológica que viene siendo ampliamente minusvalorado y que debe llevarnos a reflexionar sobre qué aportan a tal efecto las neurociencias y si existe una adecuada protección normativa que blinde sus derechos frente a eventuales usos maliciosos de las neurotecnologías.

What should be the ultimate purpose of punishment in criminal law? Is it possible to apply measures that do not only pursue a simple retributive punishment but, at the same time, can help to: (a) reduce the risk of recidivism by serving as complementary measures to the penalty and (b) reduce incarceration rates without endangering public safety? Our proposal is to conceptualize the risk assessment of recidivism, and of criminal acts in general, from what we call ¿neuroprevention.¿ We argue that the commonly used term of neuroprediction implies a deeply deterministic, even fatalistic interpretation, of individual behavior, that may lead to a stigmatization of the prisoner or probationer. Furthermore, this can lead to a paradoxical, even dangerous interpretation of the legal policies related to recidivism and criminal acts. Neuroprediction becomes paradoxical when it implies that the system gives itself the power to change the course of future events that, at the same time, it considers to be largely inevitable. This is also a dangerous idea because it could be exploited in certain circumstances to legitimize dictatorial practices. However, we are convinced that neuroscientific tools and evidence can contribute to reducing crime rates and to a more efficient use of resources destined for risk assessment and criminal prosecutions. This can be accomplished by renouncing the aspiration to predict crime and replacing it with the intention to prevent it, which we consider more realistic and fair. There is no implicit acceptance of the inevitable here. Rather, the emphasis is placed on anticipating the possible or probable, but never conclusively determining it. The double objective pursued by the neuroprevention paradigm is that measures and strategies can be adopted for not only improving public safety, but also for offering the prisoner or probationer a real, scientifically-based opportunity to reintegrate into society by providing adequate intervention and training. We are convinced that our approach would make it easier for policy-makers and citizens to realize that the advances in neuroscience suggest exciting paths toward a more beneficial, flexible, and humane justice system, one with a more complete and in-depth view of criminal behavior.

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In this article, we analyze the contributions of neuroscience to the development of the adolescent brain and shed additional light on the minimum age of criminal responsibility in the context of Latin America. In neurobiology, maturity is perceived to be complex because the brain's temporal development process is not uniform across all its regions. This has important consequences for adolescents' behavior; in their search for the acceptance of their peers, they are more vulnerable to pressure and more sensitive to stress than adults. Their affectivity is more unstable, and they show signs of low tolerance to frustration and important emotional reactivity, with a decrease in the capacity to self-regulate. Consequently, risky behavior presents itself more frequently during adolescence, and behaviors that transgress norms and social conventions typically peak between the ages of 17 and 19 years. However, only a small percentage of young offenders escalate their behavior to committing crimes during adulthood. In comparative law, there are considerable differences in Latin American countries' legal dispositions regarding the minimum age of criminal responsibility; Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador regard the age of criminal responsibility to be 12 years, while Argentina accepts this to be 16 years. From a legal viewpoint, however, the debate about the minimum age of criminal responsibility is connected to other circumstances that, because they are still at a developmental stage, are attributed to adolescents' rights in their decision-making and understanding of autonomy (e.g., the minimum ages for voting, alcohol consumption, and medical consent). We argue that research on the development of the adolescent brain does not provide definitive answers about the exact age required for different juridical purposes. Nonetheless, the current state of knowledge does allow for reflection on the development and maturation of adolescents and the implications for considering them criminally responsible. It also validates demands for a system that provides adolescents with greater protection and that favors their healthy integral development. In any case, although a specific minimum age is not evident, this study is disposed not to recommend lowering the age of criminal responsibility, but rather increasing it.

La neuroprediccíón consiste en determinar si es posible contar con marcadores neurobiológicos de reincidencia delictiva. El empleo de este término está ampliamente extendido, pero la intención de ¿neuropredecir¿ implica dar por cierto que los hechos delictivos que se aspira a evitar han de suceder. Este enfoque alberga dos dificultades. Por un lado, parece retrotraernos al ya superado concepto de peligrosidad. Por otro, decidir si un delincuente obtiene libertad o no basándose en que su conducta viene determinada supone negarle la capacidad ontológica de decidir sobre el futuro, que, por contra, el sistema si se arroga para sí. Proponemos así introducir el concepto de neuroprevención, en el que la asunción determinista de que un suceso futuro necesariamente ha de ocurrir es sustituida por la idea de anticiparse a un suceso posible o incluso esperable, pero no seguro. Esperamos que dicho término contribuya a una evolución del derecho penal que ha de desplazarse hacia otorgar un mayor valor a la ponderación de derechos.

Cuando se descubrieron las primeras opsinas microbianas, pocos imaginaban que estas proteínas sensibles a la luz serían empleadas para excitar o inhibir neuronas y, en virtud de ello, para explorar posibles tratamientos neurológicos. En este trabajo se explican los fundamentos de esta innovadora técnica, sus aplicaciones actuales y las perspectivas de futuro en cuanto a su uso con seres humanos. Seguidamente, se enumeran los retos éticos que se han empezado a asociar a la optogenética, relacionados con su potencial para modificar la agresividad, la percepción y la memoria. Finalmente, se enmarcan dichos retos éticos en las actuales propuestas de regulación de las neurotecnologías en términos de «neuroderechos».

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En sus libros Gödel, Escher, Bach y I Am a Strange Loop, Douglas Hofstadter defiende varias ideas interesantes en el marco de la filosofía de la mente. Estas ideas giran en torno al concepto de bucle extraño: un fenómeno según el cual un ascenso o un descenso por una sucesión de niveles jerárquicos acaba conduciendo al nivel desde el cual se comenzó. En el primer libro, Hofstadter defiende que tanto nuestra conciencia como nuestro libre albedrío se sustentan en este tipo de bucles, si bien en el segundo libro carga contra la existencia de este último. No obstante, los bucles extraños han sido empleados por Michael Morden para efectuar una defensa compatibilista del libre albedrío.