Just as its constitutional development is characterised by frequent change and substantial concentration of power, the Latin American and the Caribbean area is known to host some of the most corrupt countries of the world. A group of countries such as Chile, Barbados and Uruguay, however, report levels of corruption similar to those displayed by most European countries. We ask whether the concentration of power in the executive, as well as in the national parliament in this particular region, affect how corrupt a society is. Using panel data from 22 Latin America and Caribbean countries from 1970 to 2014, we find that constitutional power concentration is in fact a determinant of corruption. Yet, the constitutional provisions allocating powers of government appear only to be consistently important when parliament is ideologically fractionalised.

Using survey data from the World Values Survey and the Comparative Manifesto Project, we empirically study attitudes towards the proposal that government compensation should be provided for individuals adversely affected by globalization. We include roles for personal experience with globalization and ideology of individuals and political parties, noting also the general problem of expressiveness in survey data, where responders who favored compensation did not actually have to pay to help. Findings indicate that attitudes to actual compensation depend on exposure to globalization but are substantially qualified by ideology.