Resumen El lugar que tiene la teología dentro de la universidad depende del modo como se conciba la propia universidad. La universidad es una comunidad de personas empeñadas en el incremento del saber, buscado por sí mismo, y en su difusión en las diversas situaciones históricas. La libertad para llevar a cabo esta misión debe hacerse compatible con los condicionamientos que impone el contexto social en que se desarrolla. Además, la empresa del saber, que en nuestros días se ha diversificado y especializado, obliga a repensar la manera de no perder la unidad del saber. La búsqueda vigorosa de esa unidad está precisamente en el origen a la universidad. En esta empresa la teología ocupa un lugar destacado, pero al mismo tiempo discutido. Palabras clave Teología; Universidad; Interdisciplinariedad

In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in particular emotional management, may have opposing explanations depending on the interpretation of the assumed brain architecture, that is, whether a componential computational account (CCA) or a dynamic systems perspective (DSP) is used. According to CCA, cognitive functions are associated with the action of restricted brain regions, and this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP argues that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions between several brain areas, whose engagement in specific functions is temporal and context-dependent and based on neural reuse. We outline the main neurobiological facts about adolescent maturation, focusing on the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional processes associated with adolescence. We then explain the importance of emotional management in adolescent maturation. We explain the interplay between emotion and cognition under the scope of CCA and DSP, both at neural and behavioral levels. Finally, we justify why, according to CCA, emotional management is understood as regulation, specifically because the cognitive aspects of the brain are in charge of regulating emotion-related modules. However, the key word in DSP is integration, since neural information from different brain areas is integrated from the beginning of the process. Consequently, although the terms should not be conceptually confused, there is no cognition without emotion, and vice versa. Thus, emotional integration is not an independent process that just happens to the subject, but a crucial part of personal growth. Considering the importance of neuropsychological research in the development of educational and legal policies concerning adolescents, we intend to expose that the holistic view of adolescents is dependent on whether one holds the implicit or explicit interpretation of brain functioning.

La conciencia inexplicada lleva a cabo una acertada crítica de los intentos por naturalizar la conciencia y una sugerente propuesta acerca del lugar o de la relación de esta última en la naturaleza. Pero estas tesis se encuentran con las dificultades que derivan de identificar la filosofía de la naturaleza con la ciencia moderna y esta con el descubrimiento de la leyes que la rigen. La noción de ley toma adopta tal protagonismo en este libro que condiciona las nociones de naturaleza y de conciencia y oscurece las nociones de causa, en particular la de causa final, y dificulta la comprensión de los seres vivos y de su afinidad con la conciencia. Estas dificultades se notan de un modo particular en el modo de concebir el hábito.

Presentamos, a modo de introducción al número, algunos aspectos que ayuden a enmarcar la aproximación al estudio comparado de las propuestas filosóficas de Xavier Zubiri y Polo. Mostramos la influencia que tuvieron en ambos las corrientes renovadoras del primer tercio del siglo XX y el interés de ambos en continuar y, a la vez, renovar, el pensamiento filosófico anterior, siempre en continuo diálogo con la tradición clásica. Hacemos también mención a las particularidades de la recepción de sus filosofías y a las inquietudes intelectuales comunes ante el problema de Dios, la creación y la persona y su trascendencia.

Presentamos algunos aspectos de la filosofía de Xavier Zubiri que resultan centrales para comprender su acercamiento al problema mente-cerebro y se comentan desde la filosofía de Leonardo Polo: las nociones de viviente y cuerpo y las relaciones psique-organismo y cerebro-intelección. Esta comparación muestra algunos elementos comunes tanto en el planteamiento como en los términos que emplean, que hacen posible un diálogo provechoso, junto con algunas diferencias de método y contenido, que sirven para comprender mejor sus posiciones. Este examen introductorio muestra que un debate en torno a las aproximaciones de estos filósofos comportaría una contribución relevante al debate mente-cerebro.

In the current era, post-humanism usually adopts two forms. One of these is related to postmodern thought and its critique of Enlightenment ideals, while the other, which is usually referred to as `transhumanism¿, declares itself the heir to optimistic belief in the technological progress of modernity. Nevertheless, both seem like new versions of the struggle between an individualist version of liberalism and its critics. In so far as they are ethical proposals, we may hold them to account for the vagueness of their moral objectives, which only seem to advocate ¿each in its own way¿ emancipation and the removal of barriers that may impede an increase in power. This defect is not, though, independent of their rejection of the notion of nature. By contrast, classical ethics does not focus so much on power or emancipation as on the nature of human telos and of his true growth, and it is only from this standpoint that it concerns itself with the means by which this can be achieved

The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a "habit-as-learning". The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term "habit-as-routine", is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as "knowing that x is so"; (2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior ("knowing how to behave"); and (3) technical or learned skills ("knowing how to make or to do")...

Newell & Shanks (N&S) carry out an extremely sharp and static distinction between conscious and unconscious decisions, ignoring a process that dynamically transfers decisions and actions between the conscious and unconscious domains of the mind: habitual decision making. We propose a new categorisation and discuss the main characteristics of this process from a philosophical and neuroscientific perspective.

". Número especial con el título: Mente y cuerpo, para una ontología del ser humano REVISTA: THÉMATA. Revista de Filosofía, 46 FECHA DE PUBLICACIÓN: 2012 NÚMERO DE PÁGINAS: 321-327 ISSN: 0212-8365

ICS Para encontrar el lugar de la tecnología en la vida humana es preciso preguntarse qué es la tecnología y cuál es su relación con el hombre. Tres nociones resultan decisivas para responder a estas preguntas: una concepción de la naturaleza que sirva como criterio normativo de la acción, tal como la comprendieron los griegos, una visión positiva de la producción y la comprensión del hombre como ser personal.

ICS Classic and modern philosophy propose different views on the question of self-knowledge. Ancient philosophy identifies self-knowledge with the knowledge of the soul, which is the principle of unity in man. Modern philosophy is intereseted in subjectivity, but has a problematic view of it. Some currents, like Idealism, consider that a total reflexcion is possible, in which the subjectivity becomes totally present to itself, but others, as Empiricists, are skeptical and even deny the existence of a true subject. The difficulties of the Idealistic project have are uncovered by some contemporary philosophers, like Heidegger and post-modern thinkers. Polo shows how the denial of a reflective and objective knowledge of the person is compatible with the claim that the person is a radical and transcendental act of intellect. The key of this proposal is the affirmation that there are different kinds of acts of the intellect, according to their theme. Las filosofía clásica y moderna tienen concepciones diferentes del autoconocimiento. La filosofía antigua identifica el autoconocimiento con el conocimien-to del alma, que es el principio que da unidad al hombre. La filosofía moderna está muy interesada en la subjetividad, sobre la que, sinembargo, tiene una visión problemática. Algunas corrientes, como el idealismo, consideran que es posible una reflexión total, en la que la subjetividad se vuelve totalmente presente a sí misma, pero otras, como el empirismo, son escépticas respecto

Contemporary Biology shares with modern science the same understanding of knowledge. This implies a reduction in its objectives. Nevertheless, in order to describe properly its object it had to move from a mechanistic model to more refined theories, as cybernetics and theory of systems. This allows us to formulate a better account of the time of living beings. But only philosophy, which exmines reality without restrictions, can really explain biological time. La biología contemporánea comparte el ideal de las ciencias positivas. Esto supone que debe aceptar una reducción en sus objetivos explicativos. No obstante, para describir adecuadamente su objeto ha tenido que desprenderse del mecanicismo y adoptar teorías más ajustadas, como la cibernética o la teoría de sistemas. Esto posibilita planteamientos más respetuosos con la naturaleza del tiempo de los seres vivos. De todos modos, sólo la filosofía, que examina la realidad sin restricciones metodológicas, puede explicar acabadamente el tiempo biológico.

After Hegel, many philosophers thought Hegelian rationalism as a failure, and so the positivism arose. Later, this would have a great influence in the interpretation of scientific activity. The aspiration to the total understanding of life from a positivistic approach would cause the various vitalistic reactions, which often claimed that, if it was necessary to identify thinking and positivity, then life was not thinking at all. This constituted one of the key factors of the irrationalist reactions in the 19th century. The philosophical anthropology founders would discuss this problem in the beginning of the 20th century. Now, the understanding of life is seen differently, directed to resolve the conflict between positive science and a philosophical conception of life. Phenomenology and philosophical anthropology undertake this task with a new inspiration because they think that it is not possible to develop a comprehensive anthropology without the biology. In the words of Plessner, "without a biology, there is not an anthropology". Scheler and Plessner represent two different ways of approaching the problem. It is interesting to compare Hegel's view with their claims, because this throws light upon some aspects of the Hegelian philosophy and of its historic Wirkung

In psychiatry, as in any other medical specialty, the clinician collects information from the patient¿s anamnesis, clinical observation, and diagnostic tests; evaluates these data; and makes a diagnosis. The most common manuals used to assess a patient¿s mental disease according to his or her symptoms are the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). This chapter focuses on the dialogue that philosophy and psychiatry have held for decades to achieve a better understanding of dissociative identity disorder (DID). The outcome of this dialogue is the expression of the diagnostic criteria for DID, as well as other dissociative disorders, in the medical manuals. Thus, we first analyze the evolution of DID across the different versions of ICD and DSM. We then show that the characterization of DID and other dissociative disorders is a lively debate that is far from being settled. We demonstrate that the core of this debate is the understanding of person after John Locke¿s philosophy: a person is defined by the apparent expression of consciousness and memories. This leads to what we have termed a primary conceptual dissociation: the mental qualities of the person are dissociated from the body. We propose an alternative account based on the dynamic nature of identity and the understanding of person as a mind¿body unity. We hope that our proposal, which results from the interdisciplinary dialogue between psychiat

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