Una de las características principales del mundo en que vivimos es lo que denominamos la presencia de un vitalismo metabólico. En este artículo queremos profundizar en el uso antropológico-cultural de este concepto al relacionarlo con los deseos humanos de felicidad y salvación y las implicaciones de la tecnología para, finalmente, llevar a cabo una conclusión a través de un posible escenario distópico. Sostenemos que la supremacía cultural de este tipo de vitalismo ha llevado al oscurecimiento de una visión natural y unitaria de la experiencia de la caducidad del cuerpo humano y, por tanto, también de la necesidad natural del hombre de ser salvado. Desde un punto de vista antropológico, analizamos que en la base de todo este proceso se encuentra el recorte de los fines naturales de lo que definimos como intencionalidad corpórea, la cual es difícil de entender si no se produce una integración adecuada, teleológicamente, de los aspectos biológicos y espirituales del ser humano.

Una de las características principales del desarrollo de la modernidad ha sido el encubrimiento de los fines naturales de la técnica. En este artículo profundizamos en esa desnaturalización, que ha hecho de la tecnología un elemento susceptible de estar al servicio de un poder deshumanizante. Sostenemos que este proceso ha llevado al oscurecimiento de una visión natural del ser humano que evita fundamentar la integración de su vida con el bien de la sociedad. Por tanto, se percibe en la actualidad un desgajamiento entre los fines naturales de la humanidad y los elementos técnicos que solo puede ser corregido por el potenciamiento de los vínculos dentro de una comunidad. Con este marco, analizamos los problemas que derivan del planteamiento moderno desde las perspectivas antropológica, ética y sociológica.

The university that Alasdair MacIntyre defines as liberal is that which rejects the tradition as something pre-modern and with an impediment for the progress, including the pedagogic one. This university model has been extended in all instances, giving priority to the technical education in a pragmatic way. Thus, the global and sapiential vision of the university has been relegated. This last approach is the key for unifying the knowledge and to pass it onto other people and, therefore, to educate and mold intellectually and morally. However, the professionalization of the philosophy and the criteria of the modern liberalism seem to dominate and inspire most universities in the present day. This situation has plainly shown an inability to become aware of their incompetence to properly educate professors and students alike, in a sapiential and moral manner, threfore deceiving themselves with a naive rhetoric.

This contribution is aimed to emphasise the author's personal contact with Professor Mariano Artigas and, especially, with the Research Group in Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF, in Spanish) which he founded in 2003 at the University of Navarre. In addition, some reflections about the importance of this Research Group in the context of the development of the university studies are pointed out.

ICSBackground: The afferent projections of the striatum (caudate nucleus and putamen) are segregated in three territories: associative, sensorimotor and limbic. Striatal interneurons are in part responsible for the integration of these different types of information. Among them, GABAergic interneurons are the most abundant, and can be sorted in three populations according to their content in the calcium binding proteins calretinin (CR), parvalbumin (PV) and calbindin (CB). Conversely, striatal dopaminergic cells (whose role as interneurons is still unclear) are scarce. This study aims to analyze the interneuron distribution in the striatal functional territories, as well as their organization regarding to the striosomal compartment. Methodology/Principal Findings: We used immunohistochemical methods to visualize CR, PV, CB and tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) positive striatal neurons. The interneuronal distribution was assessed by stereological methods applied to every striatal functional territory. Considering the four cell groups altogether, their density was higher in the associative (2120 +/- 91 cells/mm(3)) than in the sensorimotor (959 +/- 47 cells/mm(3)) or limbic (633 +/- 119 cells/mm(3)) territories. CB- and TH-immunoreactive (-ir) cells were distributed rather homogeneously in the three striatal territories. However, the density of CR and PV interneurons were more abundant in the associative and sensorimotor striatum, respectively. Regarding to their compartmental organiz

Both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have been associated with progressive changes in grey matter (GM) volume. However, the temporal trajectories of these changes are poorly understood. The aim of this study was to assess longitudinal changes in grey matter volume subsequent to the first episode of schizophrenia and of affective psychoses. Adolescent patients with a first episode psychosis (n=26) were scanned twice using magnetic resonance imaging, at first presentation and after a 3-year follow-up period. An age-matched group of healthy volunteers (n=17) was scanned at the same time points. Within-group and between-group changes in regional grey matter volume were examined using voxel-based morphometry. There were significant group by time interactions (p(FDRcorr)<0.05) in the frontal, temporal, parietal, cerebellar cortex, and in the thalamus, mainly reflecting longitudinal reductions in the controls but not in the patients. Subdivision of the patient group revealed that there were similar longitudinal reductions in patients with affective psychoses as in the controls but no volumetric changes in patients with schizophrenia. Psychosis with onset in adolescence or early adulthood may be associated with a delay or a loss of longitudinal reductions in regional grey matter volume that normally occur at this stage of development. These changes may be specific to schizophrenia.

Volumetric brain abnormalities are evident in young adults presenting with a first episode of both affective psychoses and schizophrenia, but there are also significant differences between these two patient groups. Clinical outcome after the first episode may be related to the severity of volumetric abnormalities at presentation.

Como dice en la presentación de esta obra el profesor Javier Sánchez Cañizares, director del Grupo Ciencia, Razón y Fe (CRYF) de la Universidad de Navarra, los autores han tomado sobre sí, cada uno, la plena responsabilidad respecto de las verdades en las que sostienen a diario sus vidas (cfr. García-Baró, M., 2014, p. 11). Han aceptado el desafío de acoger valientemente el empeño de pensar los problemas actuales, de modo interdisciplinar, para intentar iluminar los retos que presenta la sociedad de nuestros días. Por eso el profesor Sergio Sánchez-Migallón señala en el prólogo de este libro que Jorge Martín Montoya Camacho y José Manuel Giménez Amaya, se comprometen con sus páginas porque hablan de lo que nos pasa y de lo que nos espera, así como de lo que nosotros miramos o dejamos de ver. No se habla aquí solo de ideas, ni solo de diagnósticos de algo ajeno al investigador. Se tratan problemas de los que todos somos en alguna medida responsables: y los filósofos no menos que los científicos, ni los creyentes menos que los increyentes.

The notion of habit learning in Neuroscience implies the automation of 5 an action, which thus discharges consciousness from the supervision of its perfor- 6 mance and eventually restricts flexibility. It has also been assumed that habit 7 learning is against free will, as it has been suggested for pathological conditions 8 such as obsessive-compulsive disorder. This point of view, which might be contro- 9 versial with other notions of habituation, could be an interesting context to analyze 10 at what extent human actions emerge from free will and are consciously carried out. 11 The well-known experiments performed by Benjamin Libet and replicated by 12 others have led some scientists to deny the concept of free will in the human 13 being. However, we think that these experiments posit further questions that should 14 be tackled from a broader point of view. For example: does the readiness potential 15 univocally point to the initiation of any kind of action? Can it be also found in non- 16 deterministic novel actions? Is it causally related to the action, or is it just a ¿mental 17 rehearsal¿ of the action to come? In this contribution, we will try to make a note on 18 these topics in order to explain the neuroscientific concept of habit learning and to 19 relate it to free will in a broader and more philosophical interdisciplinary framework.