Introduction Immune checkpoint inhibitors (ICI) are novel therapeutic strategies in cancer treatment, promoting anti-tumor response by boosting cytotoxic T lymphocytes. Despite their high effectiveness, they can trigger the activation of diverse autoimmune diseases in genetically predisposed individuals. New-onset autoimmune diabetes mellitus type 1 (T1D) is an extremely unusual side effect, described in less than 1% of patients. Case report Here we present a 44-year-old male diagnosed with non-surgical hepatocarcinoma, developing programmed death ligand-1 inhibitor-induced autoimmune endocrinopathies, presented as diabetic ketoacidosis and thyroiditis. After two cycles of atezolizumab and bevacizumab, he consulted the emergency department with abdominal pain and diabetes cardinal features (polyuria, polydipsia, vomiting). Blood tests demonstrated hyperglycemia >800 mg/dL, capillary ketonemia >3 mmol/L, metabolic acidosis (pH 7.24 with HCO3 14 mEq/L). Subsequent studies detected a low level of C-peptide, and positive glutamic acid decarboxylase and insulinoma-associated antigen-2 antibodies. Thyroid examination was compatible with thyroiditis, showing a high free thyroxine level (1.91 ng/dL) with low thyrotropin (TSH) (0.08 mIU/L) and negative anti-TSH receptor antibody. Management & Outcome After reaching metabolic stabilization, treatment with Atezolizumab was restarted, with no further complications showing size stability in the computed tomography control. Discussion T1D related to ICI is a rare condition that presents as a life-threatening emergency and should be recognized and treated early. Blood glucose and glycated hemoglobin determinations should be performed at periodic visits for detection. There are genetic factors that predispose susceptible individuals, but there is no evidence of studies to be performed before the onset of ICI or preventive strategies.

Although in his earlier ethical writings Kant explains the concept of moral feeling, inherited from the British sentimentalists, as a peculiar feeling of respect for the moral law that functions as an incentive for moral actions, the Doctrine of Virtue seems to add complexity to the issue. There, Kant discusses two similar aesthetic predispositions, moral feeling and respect, whose relationship to the feeling of respect is far from clear. This Artículo offers a much needed elucidation of the relationship between these three concepts. In the first part, I show that Kant, in the writings before the Doctrine of Virtue, transforms the British sentimentalists' construal of moral feeling into that of the feeling of respect as the sole moral incentive. In the second part, I argue that, although in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant distinguishes, for a specific reason, between the aesthetic predisposition of moral feeling and that of respect, they are both ultimately identical to the feeling of respect. The conclusion is that nothing of substance changes between Kant's earlier thinking and his views in the Doctrine of Virtue; for Kant there is just one feeling that properly deserves the name of moral feeling, the feeling of respect.

The purpose of this article is to explore John Duns Scotus's thought on Freedom, in order to achieve some elements that might be useful for a systematic study. Starting from the distinction between natural and free active potencies, it shows what is more specific of Freedom. Being a pure perfection, for Scotus, it can be applied to God and creatures as well. After exposing the content and origin of the distinction, the article provides an account of Duns Scotus's thought on Divine Freedom. Insofar as Freedom is infinite, it is compatible with necessity. At the same time, as God is creator of the contingent and finite world, his Freedom is capable of contingent actions. Finally, human Freedom is studied as an important part of the image of God in human beings. The Franciscan's conception of Freedom makes it possible to overcome the idea that it depends either on the imperfection of the contingent world or on the imperfection of our knowledge about it. Moreover, it shows that Freedom has an act of its own and thus it is more than a mere corollary of knowledge.

Este artículo analiza la evolución desde una perspectiva filosófica, contraponiendo los problemas que suscita tanto el neodarwinismo como la teoría del diseño inteligente. En primer lugar, trato algunos problemas que presenta la teoría sintética desde el punto de vista científico, así como los problemas filosóficos implicados en el neodarwinismo de Dawkins, Dennett, Monod y Ruse. Defiendo que el neodarwinismo, aunque se presente como un relato científico, en realidad es fundamentalmente filosófico, y presenta problemas de fondo que lo hacen difícilmente creíble. Por otro lado, discuto el alcance del diseño inteligente como postura filosófica acerca de la evolución de los seres vivos, mostrando sus problemas. Finalmente, propongo un relato filosófico verosímil acerca de la evolución que pretende ir más allá de la lectura científica de los datos de experiencia.

This paper shows how the concept of Natural Right (ius naturale), also in its subjective dimension, is conceived by Hugo Grotius as dependent on a primary relationship with the notion of justice considered in a broad sense. The author contends that the Grotian critical reconstruction of the Aristotelian categories of justice, i.e. corrective-distributive in terms of expletive-attributive respectively, largely determines the way in which the notion of ius might be understood. Accordingly, the content of Natural Right in Grotius' view is not confined to a scope merely articulated by subjective rights, as it is usually presented, but it is extended to a genuine moral field wherein natural law can and must be understood in the light of the demands of virtue, not vice versa.

Frente a los grandes descubrimientos de la ciencia, parece que la filosofía ya no tiene un papel relevante acerca de qué es la vida y cuál es el lugar del ser humano en el cosmos. La ciencia sería la que, mediante un conocimiento objetivo y basado en la experiencia empírica, revela los secretos de la vida y el universo. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que las ciencias son un tipo de relato con un grado de verosimilitud restringido a un campo de aplicación muy concreto. Más allá del nivel de relato descriptivo-mecánico, el ser humano necesita un relato más profundo acerca de la vida y su papel en el cosmos: aquí es donde entra en juego la filosofía, como un tipo de relato diferente, con unos criterios de verosimilitud distintos. Como paradigma del problema de la superposición de relatos, trataré de mostrar algunos problemas que ha suscitado la teoría sintética de la evolución, como una postura científica, pero que a la vez se ha vuelto filosófica.

In this article I argue against some recent interpretations that Plato's doctrine of love in the Symposium and the Phaedrus is not intellectualistic. For this reason I analyze Socrates' speech in the Symposium trying to grasp the relationship between desire and contemplation. I defend that Plato's treatment of eros does not explain love as an act of the will but rather in terms of love as desire. In this sense, many of the critics to Plato's notion of love come from the comparison with Aristotle's notion of philia. I argue that while Plato is treating love as desire (how do I experience love), Aristotle focuses his analysis on the act of loving (to whom should I love).

This paper aims to examine the phenomenon of overqualification by confronting two distinct notions surrounding what constitutes a praiseworthy achievement. On the one hand, the model that operates de facto in the contemporary labor market understands the notion of achievement in instrumental, competitive and individual terms. On the other hand, another model, which lays the foundation for workers¿ demands for recognition, is wider than the former one and considers workers¿ qualifications as standalone achievements. In my view, the experience of overqualification as misrecognition is based on the huge and ever-increasing amount of effort and resources that individuals must invest into their education and training processes, as well as on the fact that social institutions publicly and explicitly regulate, encourage and promote these processes. I conclude with a brief analysis of the main structural cause of this mismatch between demanded and obtained recognition, namely, the system is unable to generate enough social esteem to proportionally recognize the capacities that the system itself pushes workers to develop.

La intencionalidad es el rasgo fundamental de la conciencia humana. Supuesta en la Antigüedad, se tematiza ampliamente en la Escolástica medieval, pero especialmente en el siglo XX ¿de la mano de la fenomenología¿ vuelve a explorarse profundizándose y ampliándose, además, en la dirección de sus dimensiones afectiva, práctica e intersubjetiva.

Some theological interpretations of Amoris laetitia have once again considered separately different elements of action that prevent a correct comprehension of morality in some specially difficult actions. The article reviews the nature of the Pope's call to discernment in its particular moral perspective that in some readings of the Exhortation have been made on the direction of prudential action and judgement. Among these, our own moral analysis perspective is presented, that will let us a unitary consideration of action and moral subject in the affective and intentional process of action generation.

The tooth anniversary of K. Wojtyla might be a good occasion to revisit his philosophical proposal, considering wether it is still significant for the present time. In this article, we start with a simple description of our present mentality, focusing on five values or ideals. Secondly, we consider five concepts which are central to the description of Freedom in the most important philosophical work of the Author, Person and Act, showing how these concepts can be an answer for today's concerns, while, at the same time, make it necessary to enlarge their fundamental conceptions. These five concepts are: Self-Determination, Integration, Personalistic Value, Self-Realization and Participation.

Both in Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger criticized Bergson¿s views on time by affirming that he misunderstood Aristotle¿s traditional exposition from Physics IV. In this paper I will examine Bergson¿s distinction between durée and the time of physics to show its relationship with Aristotle¿s exposition. I will defend Bergson¿s view on time by showing that it does not criticise Aristotle¿s, as Heidegger says, but rather develops a different approach that goes beyond the Aristotelian paradigm. For this purpose, I will briefly analyze Aristotle¿s texts of the Physics and Bergson¿s views on time in his Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (Essai), Creative Evolution (EC) and Duration and Simultaneity (DS). It will be also helpful to make some remarks on the recently published courses he gave in the Collège de France.