[Richard Nephew, The Art of Sanctions. A View from the Field. Columbia University Press. Chichester. New York, 2018. 216 p.]

RESEÑA / Emili J. Blasco

Las sanciones internacionales suelen despertar un vivo debate entre quienes las defienden como un legítimo instrumento de la interacción entre Estados y quienes consideran que su aplicación apenas ha tenido más eficacia que la de aumentar el sufrimiento de enteras poblaciones sin culpa.

A la pregunta de si sirven para algo esas sanciones, que pueden ser de diversa índole pero que sobre todo tienen carácter económico, Richard Nephew responde que depende. Y no es una evasiva, sino en el fondo la defensa que de sus propias herramientas hace un mecánico de la diplomacia estadounidense (Nephew fue director para Irán en el Consejo Nacional de Seguridad y vicecoordinador para sanciones del Departamento de Estado): “Las sanciones no fracasan o tienen éxito. Más bien las sanciones ayudan o no a conseguir el deseado resultado final de un Estado sancionador (...) Las herramientas solo pueden tener un buen desempeño cuando son empleadas con la correcta estrategia; no se puede acusar a la sierra si falla en realizar el trabajo de un destornillador”.

Nephew no es un teórico de las sanciones, sino un “practicante”; el contenido de su libro procede de la experiencia (“Una visión desde el campo” es el subtítulo de la obra). Esa experiencia le hace ser un convencido de la utilidad de esas medidas siempre que se apliquen de modo conveniente. Básicamente pone el ejemplo de dos casos: el de Irak, donde las sanciones no lograron el objetivo buscado debido un mal planteamiento de la presión internacional, que finalmente derivó en guerra en 2003, y el de Irán, donde el régimen de medidas punitivas sobre la República Islámica tuvo su efecto y en 2015 pudo firmarse un acuerdo para frenar el programa nuclear iraní.

Activo participante en la arquitectura sancionadora a Irán, Nephew se extiende especialmente en el caso de las negociaciones con Teherán, tras abordar primero someramente el capítulo de Irak. De todo ello saca conclusiones y presenta sus propios decálogos sobre cómo las sanciones deben abordarse para que puedan resultar eficaces. En las últimas páginas trata de aconsejar cómo conducir un nuevo paquete sancionador sobre Irán, para controlar su programa de misiles y contener su actividad en el exterior a través de proxis, pero sin romper el acuerdo alcanzado (JCPOA) como ha hecho la Administración Trump; cómo gestionar la presión sobre Rusia en relación a Ucrania, y cómo confrontar la actitud de Corea del Norte. No aborda otras situaciones que el debate sobre las sanciones tiene bien presentes, como la dureza de Trump para con Cuba, en el marco de un embargo de décadas que no ha producido cambios en la isla, o el cerco sobre Nicolás Maduro en Venezuela.

Reglas para sancionar con éxito

La principal conclusión de Nephew es que “el conocimiento del oponente de uno, sus tolerancias y sus vulnerabilidades, es el predictor más importante sobre las posibilidades de éxito de una estrategia que se focaliza en sanciones (...) De hecho, para que las sanciones funcionen, uno realmente debe conocer al enemigo mejor que el enemigo se conoce a sí mismo”.

Eso es lo que, en su opinión, falló en Irak. Ciertamente las sanciones fueron efectivas, en tanto que impidieron que Sadam Husein retornara a un programa de armas de destrucción masiva, pero no evitaron una guerra. Y esto porque no se tuvo en cuenta la psicología del mandatario, dispuesto a todo tipo de sufrimiento –que traspasaba a la población, sin miedo a que esta pudiera quitarle el poder–, antes que admitir que no tenía el potente arsenal que supuestamente le encumbraba entre los líderes regionales. La comunidad internacional no entendió qué importante era para él mantener esa simulación, en su pretensión de credibilidad y prestigio, por encima de la presión de cualquier paquete de sanciones.

En el proceso iraquí, además, hubo otras deficiencias, según Nephew: desde el principio se aplicaron sanciones máximas, sin espacio para una política incremental, y a lo largo del tiempo hubo una variación del objetivo, pasando de querer evitar el rearme del régimen a plantear un cambio del régimen mismo (aunque Sadam Husein hubiera aceptado las condiciones que se le planteaban, Washington no hubiera admitido su continuidad en el poder).

Esos errores llevaron a una mayor comprensión de los mecanismos en juego, que se perfeccionaron en el trato con Irán. Nephew indica que a la hora de conocer bien el país objeto de posibles sanciones deben tenerse en cuenta sus instituciones políticas, su sistema macroeconómico y financiero, sus relaciones comerciales, sus valores culturales, su reciente historia, su demografía y el acceso de la población a fuentes externas de información. Eso permitirá identificar las vulnerabilidades y el umbral de dolor que el Gobierno de turno está dispuesto a absorber. Luego tanto las sanciones como las mismas asunciones deben ser continuamente recalibradas, siguiendo una estrategia bien definida. Es importante además que al Estado objeto de las sanciones se le presenten con claridad las condiciones necesarias para que la presión sea levantada, en el marco de una negociación de términos nítidos. Finalmente, hay que tener la disposición a auxiliar al Estado que se presiona a salir de un laberinto cuya salida tal vez no perciba, o incluso a aceptar objetivos más bajos si estos son un resultado también razonable.

El autor afirma que las tres causas más comunes del fracaso de un régimen de sanciones son: quedarse corto, pasarse de largo y objetivos confusos. Estas etiquetas pueden fácilmente aplicarse a procesos pasados, pero no es tan sencillo fijar los pasos de una diplomacia coercitiva de este tipo en conflictos en curso o que puedan ocurrir en el futuro.

Así, el mismo Nephew no tendría plenas garantías de éxito con las sanciones que sugiere para una nueva negociación con Irán con el fin de limitar su programa de misiles y su actuación a través de grupos como Hezbolá. En desacuerdo con la Administración Trump, hubiera preferido mantener el acuerdo sobre el programa nuclear de 2015 (conocido por sus siglas de JCPOA) y el consiguiente levantamiento del régimen de sanciones aplicado previamente, para pasar a otras sanciones distintas que busquen ese otro objetivo. Cierto que está por ver la utilidad del movimiento de Trump, pero es difícil creer que Teherán vaya a renunciar a esas otras actuaciones por una presión que en ningún caso sería tan internacional (China y Rusia solo se prestaron a un frente contra Irán porque en juego estaba que este país se convirtiera en potencia nuclear).

[Amil Saikal, Iran Rising: The survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 2019. 344 p.]

RESEÑA / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Desde su constitución en 1979 la República Islámica de Irán ha sido un actor conflictivo, aislado e incomprendido por la comunidad internacional y en mayor medida por sus vecinos regionales. Su origen, de carácter revolucionario y antagonista del modelo pro-occidental del Sha, cambió por completo la geopolítica de Oriente Medio y el papel de EEUU en la región. Tanto la Crisis de los Rehenes como la sangrienta Guerra contra el Irak de Saddam Hussein dejaron heridas muy profundas en las relaciones de Irán con el exterior. Más de 40 años después de la Revolución, el país sigue en una dinámica que imposibilita la normalización de sus relaciones internacionales, siempre bajo la amenaza de un conflicto armado o sanciones económicas. En este libro, Amin Saikal describe en profundidad la naturaleza ideológica y política del régimen de los Ayatolas con la intención de generar una mejor comprensión de las motivaciones y factores que explican su comportamiento.

En los primeros capítulos se desarrolla el concepto de gobernanza ideado por el Ayatola Imam Jomeini, conocido como Velayat-E Faqih o Gobernanza del Guardián del Islam. Un modelo defendido por una facción no mayoritaria de la revolución que logró imponerse por el carisma de su líder y la enorme represión sobre el resto de los grupos políticos. El sistema político resultante de la Revolución de 1978 trata de confluir las enseñanzas chiitas del Islam y un modelo representativo con instituciones como el Majlis (parlamento) o el Presidente que en cierta medida simula la democracia liberal occidental. Este modelo es único y nunca ha sido imitado a pesar de los esfuerzos de la República Islámica por exportarlo al resto del mundo musulmán.

En la práctica, el sistema ha demostrado someter la política iraní a la esquizofrenia, con una lucha constante entre el poder de los clérigos –Líder Supremo y Consejo de Guardianes– frente al poder ejecutivo y legislativo elegido por medio de elecciones. Esta tensión, denominada como Jihadi-Itjihadi (conservadurismo-flexibilidad) por el propio Jomeini, ha resultado ser un rotundo fracaso. La falta de claridad en las funciones que los grupos religiosos juegan en el sistema deriva en un poder ilimitado para reprimir y eliminar adversarios políticos, como el arresto domiciliario de Jatamí o Moussaoui demuestran. Esta lucha genera duplicidades a todos los niveles con la omnipresencia de la Guardia Revolucionaria Iraní (IRGC) en las fuerzas armadas, inteligencia, servicios sociales y empresas públicas. La falta de transparencia política genera corrupción e ineficiencias que lastran el desarrollo de una economía que no carece de capital humano y recursos naturales para prosperar.

En los capítulos 2 y 3 se trata la evolución del sistema tras el fallecimiento del líder Jomeini en 1988 y el fin de la guerra contra Irak. Este nuevo contexto permitió la entrada de nuevas ideas al debate político iraní. El polémico nombramiento del ultraconservador Alí Jamenei en 1989 como nuevo Líder Supremo supuso reforzar el autoritarismo y la rigidez del poder religioso, pero ahora sin el indiscutible liderazgo que ejercía Jomeini. La presidencia de Rafsanjani, un conservador pragmático, supuso el comienzo de una tendencia dentro de Irán que abogaba por normalizar las relaciones internacionales del país.

Sin embargo, fue Jatamí el que desde 1997 apostó por una reconversión del sistema hacia una democracia real que respetara los Derechos Humanos. Su apuesta personal por mejorar las relaciones con EEUU fracasó al encontrarse con una desconfianza desmesurada por parte de la Administración Bush. Ni tan siquiera la respuesta modélica de Irán a los atentados sobre las Torres Gemelas de Nueva York con una condena oficial al atentado y hasta un minuto de silencio respetado por 60.000 personas en Teherán el 13 de septiembre de 2001 fue suficiente para que G.W. Bush reconsiderara a Irán como parte del famoso Axis of Evil que constituía junto a Siria, Corea del Norte y Sudán. A pesar de lograr un crecimiento económico medio del 5% del PIB bajo su presidencia, la falta de reciprocidad por parte de la comunidad internacional generó una ruptura total entre el presidente reformista y la facción conservadora liderada por el Líder Supremo.

El periodo comprendido entre 2005 y 2013 estuvo marcado por la presidencia del ultraconservador Ahmadinejad, que terminó sin la confianza de Jamenei al fracasar en materia económica y llevar a Irán al borde del conflicto armado. Durante esta etapa el IRGC creció hasta dominar buena parte de los ministerios y el 70% del PIB de Irán. Su controvertida reelección en 2009 con acusaciones de fraude por parte de la oposición generó el movimiento verde, las mayores protestas desde 1979, que fueron duramente reprimidas.

La llegada de Rouhani en 2013 podría haber sido una ocasión histórica al alinear por primera vez desde 1988 la visión de un presidente moderado con la del Líder Supremo. Rouhani, un moderado pragmático, asumió el cargo con los objetivos de mejorar las condiciones de vida de los iraníes, reconciliar las relaciones con Occidente, incrementar los derechos de las minorías y relajar el control sobre la sociedad. En materia de política exterior, el Líder Supremo asumió la necesidad de alcanzar un acuerdo sobre el programa nuclear a sabiendas de que, en su ausencia, una mejora económica en Irán sería muy complicada. El JCPOA, aunque imperfecto, permitía acercar posturas entre Occidente e Irán. La llegada de Donald Trump hizo volar por los aires el acuerdo y con ello la sintonía entre el Líder Supremo Jamenei y Rouhani, que ahora afronta una creciente oposición conservadora al considerar su política exterior un fracaso.

Para el autor, es imprescindible comprender la batalla entre las instituciones electas y las instituciones religiosas. La política iraní funciona como un péndulo entre el dominio de las facciones conservadoras protegidas por los religiosos y las facciones reformistas aupadas por las elecciones. Si se ofrecen beneficios a los moderados reformistas cuando están en el poder, las opciones de generar un cambio político en Irán son mayores que si se trata con la misma dureza que a los conservadores, defiende Amin Saikal en el cuarto y quinto capítulo. Además, existe una correlación entre aquellos que conocen Occidente y los que no. Jamenei y Ahmadineyad, principales representantes de la línea dura jamás visitaron Europa o EEUU, mientras que Rouhani, Jatamí o Sharif dominan el inglés y la cultura occidental.

Con una población menor de 30 años que supone el 50% del total y una creciente modernización de la sociedad en Teherán, las demandas de reformas parecen imparables. Según Amin Saikal, una política intransigente con Irán cuando existe voluntad de apertura solo genera desconfianza y refuerza las posiciones más conservadoras. La política de Trump con Irán, concluye, demuestra la falta de conocimiento y comprensión de su sociedad y sistema político.

From Iranian strategic perspective the Sunni-Shi‘a divide is only part of its larger objective of exporting its revolution.

▲ Escena militar de un altorrelieve de la antigua Persia [Pixabay]

ESSAY / Helena Pompeya

At a first glance it may seem that the most important factor shaping the dynamics in the region is the Sunni-Shi’a divide materialized in the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran over becoming the main hegemonic power in the region. Nonetheless, from the strategic perspective of Iran this divide is only part of its larger objective of exporting its revolution.

This short essay will analyze three paths of action or policies Iran has been relying on in order to exert and expand its influence in the MENA region: i) it’s anti-imperialistic foreign policy; ii) the Sunni-Shi’a divide; and iii) opportunism. Finally, a study case of Syria will be provided to show how Iran made use of these three courses of action to its benefit within the war.

I. ANTI IMPERIALISM

The Sunni-Shi'a division alone would not be enough to rocket Iran into an advantaged position over Saudi Arabia, being the Shi’ites only a 13% of the total of Muslims over the world (found mainly in Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq).[1] Even though religious affiliation can gain support of a fairly big share of the population, Iran is playing its cards along the lines of its revolutionary ideology, which consists on challenging the current international world order and particularly what Iran calls US’s imperialism.

Iran does not choose its strategic allies by religious affiliation but by ideological affinity: opposition to the US and Israel. Proof of this is the fact that Iran has provided military and financial support to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, both of them Sunni, in their struggle versus Israel.[2] Iran’s competition against Saudi Arabia could be understood as an elongation of its anti-US foreign policy, being the Saudi kingdom the other great ally of the West in the MENA region along with Israel.

II. SUNNI-SHI’A DIVIDE

Despite the religious divide not being the main reason behind the hegemonic competition among both regional powers Saudi Arabia (Sunni) and Iran (Shi’a), both states are exploiting this narrative to transcend territorial barriers and exert their influence in neighbouring countries. This rivalry materializes itself along two main paths of action: i) development of neopatrimonial and clientelistic networks, as it shows in Lebanon and Bahrain[3]; ii) and in violent proxy wars, namely Yemen and Syria.

a. Lebanon

Sectarian difference has been an inherent characteristic of Lebanon all throughout its history, finally erupting into a civil war in 1975. The Taif accords, which put an end to the strife attempted to create a power-sharing agreement that gave each group a political voice. These differences were incorporated into the political dynamics and development of blocs which are not necessarily loyal to the Lebanese state alone.

Regional dynamics of the Middle East are characterised by the blurred limits between internal and external, this reflects in the case of Lebanon, whose blocs provide space for other actors to penetrate the Lebanese political sphere. This is the case of Iran through the Shi‘ite political and paramilitary organization of Hezbollah. This organization was created in 1982 as a response to Israeli intervention and has been trained, organized and provisioned by Iran ever since. Through the empowerment of Iran and its political support for Shi’a groups across Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as a regional power.

Once aware of the increasing Iranian influence in the region, Saudi Arabia stepped into it to counterbalance the Shi’a empowerment by supporting a range of Salafi groups across the country.

Both Riyadh and Tehran have thus established clientelistic networks through political and economic support which feed upon sectarian segmentation, furthering factionalism. Economic inflows in order to influence the region have helped developed the area between Ras Beirut and Ain al Mraiseh through investments by Riyadh, whilst Iranian economic aid has been allocated in the Dahiyeh and southern region of the country.[4]

b. Bahrain

Bahrain is also a hot spot in the fight for supremacy over the region, although it seems that Saudi Arabia is the leading power over this island of the Persian Gulf. The state is a constitutional monarchy headed by the King, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, of the Sunni branch of Islam, and it is connected to Saudi Arabia by the King Fahd Causeway, a passage designed and built to prevent Iranian expansionism after the revolution. Albeit being ruled by Sunni elite, the majority of the country’s citizens are Shia, and have in many cases complaint about political and economical repression. In 2011 protests erupted in Bahrain led by the Shi’a community, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates stepped in to suppress the revolt. Nonetheless, no links between Iran and the ignition of this manifestation have been found, despite accusations by the previously mentioned Sunni states.

The opposition of both hegemonic powers has ultimately materialized itself in the involvement on proxy wars as are the examples of Syria, Yemen, Iraq and possibly in the future Afghanistan.

c. Yemen

Yemen, in the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula, is a failed state in which a proxy war fueled mainly by the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran is taking place since the 25th of March 2015. On that date, Saudi Arabia leading an Arab coalition against the Houthis bombarded Yemen.

The ignition of the conflict began in November 2011 when President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to hand over his power to his deputy and current president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi (both Sunni) due to the uprisings product of the Arab Spring.[5]

The turmoil within the nation, including here al-Qaeda attacks, a separatist rising in the south, divided loyalties in the military, corruption, unemployment and lack of food, led to a coup d’état in January 2015 led by Houthi rebels. The Houthis, Shi‘ite Muslims backed by Iran, seized control of a large territory in Yemen including here the capital Sana’a. A coalition led by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-majority nations are supporting the government.

Yemen is a clear representation of dispute over regional sovereignty. This particular conflict puts the Wahhabi kingdom in great distress as it is happening right at its front door. Thus, Saudi interests in the region consist on avoiding a Shi’ite state in the Arabian Peninsula as well as facilitating a kindred government to retrieve its function as state. Controlling Yemen guarantees Saudi Arabia’s influence over the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Baab al Mandeb, thus avoiding Hormuz Strait, which is currently under Iran’s reach.

On the other hand, Iran is soon to be freed from intensive intervention in the Syrian war, and thus it could send in more military and economic support into the region. Establishing a Shi’ite government in Yemen would pose an inflexion point in regional dynamics, reinforcing Iran’s power and becoming a direct threat to Arabia Saudi right at its frontier. Nonetheless, Hadi’s government is internationally recognized and the Sunni struggle is currently gaining support from the UK and the US.

III. OPPORTUNISM

The Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic alliance of six countries in the Arabian Peninsula which fail to have an aligned strategy for the region and could be roughly divided into two main groups in the face of political interests: i) those more aligned to Saudi Arabia, namely Bahrain and UAE; ii) and those who reject the full integration, being these Oman, Kuwait and Qatar.

Fragmentation within the GCC has provided Iran with an opportunity to buffer against calls for its economic and political isolation. Iran’s ties to smaller Gulf countries have provided Tehran with limited economic, political and strategic opportunities for diversification that have simultaneously helped to buffer against sanctions and to weaken Riyadh.[6]

a. Oman

Oman in overall terms has a foreign policy of good relations with all of its neighbours. Furthermore, it has long resisted pressure to align its Iran policies with those of Saudi Arabia. Among its policies, it refused the idea of a GCC union and a single currency for the region introduced by the Saudi kingdom. Furthermore, in 2017 with the Qatar crisis, it opposed the marginalization of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and stood as the only State which did not cut relations with Iran.

Furthermore, the war in Yemen is spreading along Oman’s border, and it’s in its best interest to bring Saudi Arabia and the Houthis into talks, believing that engagement with the later is necessary to put an end to the conflict.[7] Oman has denied transport of military equipment to Yemeni Houthis through its territory.[8]

b. Kuwait

A key aspect of Kuwait’s regional policy is its active role in trying to balance and reduce regional sectarian tensions, and has often been a bridge for mediation among countries, leading the mediation effort in January 2017 to promote dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states that was well received in Tehran.[9]

c. Qatar

It has always been in both state’s interest to maintain a good relationship due to their proximity and shared ownership of the North/South Pars natural gas field. Despite having opposing interests in some areas as are the case of Syria (Qatar supports the opposition), and Qatar’s attempts to drive Hamas away from Tehran. In 2017 Qatar suffered a blockade by the GCC countries due to its support for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and militant groups linked to al-Qaeda or ISIS. During this crisis, Iran proved a good ally into which to turn.. Iran offered Qatar to use its airspace and supplied food to prevent any shortages resulting from the blockade.[10] However as it can be deduced from previous ambitious foreign policies, Qatar seeks to diversify its allies in order to protect its interests, so it would not rely solely on Iran.

Iran is well aware of the intra-Arab tensions among the Gulf States and takes advantage of these convenient openings to bolster its regional position, bringing itself out of its isolationism through the establishment of bilateral relations with smaller GCC states, especially since the outbreak of the Qatar crisis in 2017.

IV. SYRIA

Iran is increasingly standing out as a regional winner in the Syrian conflict. This necessarily creates unrest both for Israel and Saudi Arabia, especially after the withdrawal of US troops from Syria. The drawdown of the US has also originated a vacuum of power which is currently being fought over by the supporters of al-Assad: Iran, Turkey and Russia.

Despite the crisis involving the incident with the Israeli F-16 jets, Jerusalem is attempting to convince the Russian Federation not to leave Syria completely under the sphere of Iranian influence.

Israel initially intervened in the war in face of increasing presence of Hezbollah in the region, especially in its positions near the Golan Heights, Kiswah and Hafa. Anti-Zionism is one of Iran’s main objectives in its foreign policy, thus it is likely that tensions between Hezbollah and Israel will escalate leading to open missile conflict. Nonetheless, an open war for territory is unlikely to happen, since this will bring the UyS back in the region in defense for Israel, and Saudi Arabia would make use of this opportunity to wipe off Hezbollah.

On other matters, the axis joining Iran, Russia and Turkey is strengthening, while they gain control over the de-escalation zones.  

Both Iran and Russia have economic interests in the region. Before the outbreak of the war, Syria was one of the top exporting countries of phosphates, and in all likelihood, current reserves (estimated on over 2 billion tons) will be spoils of war for al-Assad’s allies.[11]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps took control of Palmira in 2015, where the largest production area of phosphates is present. Furthermore, Syria also signed an agreement on phosphates with Russia.

Iran has great plans for Syria as its zone of influence, and is planning to establish a seaport in the Mediterranean through which to export its petroleum by a pipeline crossing through Iraq and Syria, both under its tutelage[12]. This pipeline would secure the Shi’ite bow from Tehran to Beirut, thus debilitating Saudi Arabia’s position in the region. Furthermore, it would allow direct oil exports to Europe.

In relation to Russia and Turkey, despite starting in opposite bands they are now siding together. Turkey is particularly interested in avoiding a Kurdish independent state in the region, this necessarily positions the former ottoman empire against the U.S a key supporter of the Kurdish people due to their success on debilitating the Islamic State. Russia will make use of this distancing to its own benefits. It is in Russia’s interest to have Turkey as an ally in Syria in order to break NATO’s Middle East strategy and have a strong army operating in Syrian territory, thus reducing its own engagement and military cost.[13]

Despite things being in favour of Iran, Saudi Arabia could still take advantage of recent developments of the conflict to damage Iran’s internal stability.

Ethnic and sectarian segmentation are also part of Iran’s fabric, and the Government’s repression against minorities within the territory –namely Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis- have caused insurgencies before. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States aligned with its foreign policy, such as the UAE are likely to exploit resentment of the minorities in order to destabilized Iran’s internal politics.

The problem does not end there for Iran. Although ISIS being wiped off the Syrian territory, after falling its last citadel in Baguz[14], this is not the end of the terrorist group. Iran’s active role in fighting Sunni jihadists through Hezbollah and Shi’ite militias in Syria and Iraq has given Islamist organization a motivation to defy Tehran.

Returning foreign fighters could scatter over the region creating cells and even cooperating with Sunni separatist movements in Ahwaz, Kurdistan or Baluchistan. Saudi Arabia is well aware of this and could exploit the Wahhabi narrative and exert Sunni influence in the region through a behind-the-scenes financing of these groups.

The struggle for power has already started in the Islamic Republic in the midst of US sanctions and ahead a new electoral cycle

▲ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaking to Iranian Air Force personnel, in 2016 [Wikipedia]

ANALYSIS / Rossina Funes and Maeve Gladin

The failing health of Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei, 89, brings into question the political aftermath of his approaching death or possible step-down. Khamenei’s health has been a point of query since 2007, when he temporarily disappeared from the public eye. News later came out that he had a routine procedure which had no need to cause any suspicions in regards to his health. However, the question remains as to whether his well-being is a fantasy or a reality. Regardless of the truth of his health, many suspect that he has been suffering prostate cancer all this time. Khamenei is 89 years old –he turns 80 in July– and the odds of him continuing as active Supreme Leader are slim to none. His death or resignation will not only reshape but could also greatly polarize the successive politics at play and create more instability for Iran.

The next possible successor must meet certain requirements in order to be within the bounds of possible appointees. This political figure must comply and follow Khamenei’s revolutionary ideology by being anti-Western, mainly anti-American. The prospective leader would also need to meet religious statues and adherence to clerical rule. Regardless of who that cleric may be, Iran is likely to be ruled by another religious figure who is far less powerful than Khamenei and more beholden to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Additionally, Khamenei’s successor should be young enough to undermine the current opposition to clerical rule prevalent among many of Iran’s youth, which accounts for the majority of Iran’s population.

In analyzing who will head Iranian politics, two streams have been identified. These are constrained by whether the current Supreme Leader Khamenei appoints his successor or not, and within that there are best and worst case scenarios.

Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi

Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi had been mentioned as the foremost contender to stand in lieu of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. Shahroudi was a Khamenei loyalist who rose to the highest ranks of the Islamic Republic’s political clerical elite under the supreme leader’s patronage and was considered his most likely successor. A former judiciary chief, Shahroudi was, like his patron, a staunch defender of the Islamic Revolution and its founding principle, velayat-e-faqih (rule of the jurisprudence). Iran’s domestic unrest and regime longevity, progressively aroused by impromptu protests around the country over the past year, is contingent on the political class collectively agreeing on a supreme leader competent of building consensus and balancing competing interests. Shahroudi’s exceptional faculty to bridge the separated Iranian political and clerical establishment was the reason his name was frequently highlighted as Khamenei’s eventual successor. Also, he was both theologically and managerially qualified and among the few relatively nonelderly clerics viewed as politically trustworthy by Iran’s ruling establishment. However, he passed away in late December 2018, opening once again the question of who was most likely to take Khamenei’s place as Supreme Leader of Iran.

However, even with Shahroudi’s early death, there are still a few possibilities. One is Sadeq Larijani, the head of the judiciary, who, like Shahroudi, is Iraqi born. Another prospect is Ebrahim Raisi, a former 2017 presidential candidate and the custodian of the holiest shrine in Iran, Imam Reza. Raisi is a student and loyalist of Khamenei, whereas Larijani, also a hard-liner, is more independent.

1. MOST LIKELY SCENARIO,  REGARDLESS OF APPOINTMENT

1.1 Ebrahim Raisi

In a more likely scenario, Ebrahim Raisi would rise as Iran’s next Supreme Leader. He meets the requirements aforementioned with regards to the religious status and the revolutionary ideology. Fifty-eight-years-old, Raisi is a student and loyal follower of the current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Like his teacher, he is from Mashhad and belongs to its famous seminary. He is married to the daughter of Ayatollah Alamolhoda, a hardline cleric who serves as Khamenei's representative of in the eastern Razavi Khorasan province, home of the Imam Reza shrine.

Together with his various senior judicial positions, in 2016 Raisi was appointed the chairman of Astan Quds Razavi, the wealthy and influential charitable foundation which manages the Imam Reza shrine. Through this appointment, Raisi developed a very close relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is a known ideological and economic partner of the foundation. In 2017, he moved into the political sphere by running for president, stating it was his "religious and revolutionary responsibility". He managed to secure a respectable 38 percent of the vote; however, his contender, Rouhani, won with 57 percent of the vote. At first, this outcome was perceived as an indicator of Raisi’s relative unpopularity, but he has proven his detractors wrong. After his electoral defeat, he remained in the public eye and became an even more prominent political figure by criticizing Rouhani's policies and pushing for hard-line policies in both domestic and foreign affairs. Also, given to Astan Quds Foundation’s extensive budget, Raisi has been able to secure alliances with other clerics and build a broad network that has the ability to mobilize advocates countrywide.

Once he takes on the role of Supreme Leader, he will continue his domestic and regional policies. On the domestic front, he will further Iran's Islamisation and regionally he will push to strengthen the "axis of resistance", which is the anti-Western and anti-Israeli alliance between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Shia Iraq and Hamas. Nevertheless, if this happens, Iran would live on under the leadership of yet another hardliner and the political scene would not change much. Regardless of who succeeds Khamenei, a political crisis is assured during this transition, triggered by a cycle of arbitrary rule, chaos, violence and social unrest in Iran. It will be a period of uncertainty given that a great share of the population seems unsatisfied with the clerical establishment, which was also enhanced by the current economic crisis ensued by the American sanctions.

1.2 Sadeq Larijani

Sadeq Larijani, who is fifty-eight years old, is known for his conservative politics and his closeness to the supreme guide of the Iranian regime Ali Khamenei and one of his potential successors. He is Shahroudi’s successor as head of the judiciary and currently chairs the Expediency Council. Additionally, the Larijani family occupies a number of important positions in government and shares strong ties with the Supreme Leader by being among the most powerful families in Iran since Khamenei became Supreme Leader thirty years ago. Sadeq Larijani is also a member of the Guardian Council, which vetos laws and candidates for elected office for conformance to Iran’s Islamic system.

Formally, the Expediency Council is an advisory body for the Supreme Leader and is intended to resolve disputes between parliament and a scrutineer body, therefore Larijani is well informed on the way Khamenei deals with governmental affairs and the domestic politics of Iran. Therefore, he meets the requirement of being aligned with Khamenei’s revolutionary and anti- Western ideology, and he is also a conservative cleric, thus he complies with the religious figure requirement. Nonetheless, he is less likely to be appointed as Iran’s next Supreme Leader given his poor reputation outside Iran. The U.S. sanctioned Larijani on the grounds of human rights violations, in addition to “arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, human rights defenders and minorities” which “increased markedly” since he took office, according to the EU who also sanctioned Larijani in 2012. His appointment would not be a strategic decision amidst the newly U.S. imposed sanctions and the trouble it has brought upon Iran. Nowadays, the last thing Iran wants is that the EU also turn their back to them, which would happen if Larijani rises to power. However it is still highly plausible that Larijani would be the second one on the list of prospective leaders, only preceded by Raisi.

2. LEAST LIKELY SCENARIO: SUCCESSOR NOT APPOINTED

2.1 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

The IRGC’s purpose is to preserve the Islamic system from foreign interference and protect from coups. As their priority is the protection of national security, the IRGC necessarily will take action once Khamenei passes away and the political sphere becomes chaotic. In carrying out their role of protecting national security, the IRGC will act as a support for the new Supreme Leader. Moreover, the IRGC will work to stabilize the unrest which will inevitably occur, regardless of who comes to power. It is our estimate that the new Supreme Leader will have been appointed by Khamenei before death, and thus the IRGC will do all in their power to protect him. In the unlikely case that Khamenei does not appoint a successor, we believe that there are two unlikely options of ruling that could arise.

The first, and least likely, being that the IRGC takes rule. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the IRGC takes power. This would violate the Iranian constitution and is not in the interest to rule the state. What they are interested in is having a puppet figure who will satisfy their interests. As the IRGC's main role is national security, in the event that Khamenei does not appoint a successor and the country goes into political and social turmoil, the IRGC will without a doubt step in. This military intervention will be one of transitory nature, as the IRGC does not pretend to want direct political power. Once the Supreme Leader is secured, the IRGC will go back to a relatively low profile.

In the very unlikely event that a Supreme Leader is not predetermined, the IRGC may take over the political regime of Iran, creating a military dictatorship. If this were to happen, there would certainly be protests, riots and coups. It would be very difficult for an opposition group to challenge and defeat the IRGC, but there would be attempts to overcome it. This would be a regime of temporary nature, however, the new Supreme Leader would arise from the scene that the IRGC had been protecting.

2.2 Mohsen Kadivar

In addition, political dissident and moderate cleric Mohsen Kadivar is a plausible candidate for the next Supreme Leader. Kadivar’s rise to political power in Iran would be a black swan,  as it is extremely unlikely, however, the possibility should not be dismissed. His election would be highly unlikely due to the fact that he is a vocal critic of clerical rule and has been a public opposer of the Iranian government. He has served time in prison for speaking out in favor of democracy and liberal reform as well as publicly criticizing the Islamic political system. Moreover, he has been a university professor of Islamic religious and legal studies throughout the United States. As Kadivar goes against all requirements to become successor, he is highly unlikely to become Supreme Leader. It is also important to keep in mind that Khamenei will most likely appoint a successor, and in that scenario, he will appoint someone who meets the requirements and of course is in line with what he believes. In the rare case that Khamenei does not appoint a successor or dies before he gets the chance to, a political uprising is inevitable. The question will be whether the country uprises to the point of voting a popular leader or settling with someone who will maintain the status quo.

In the situation that Mohsen Kadivar is voted into power, the Iranian political system would change drastically. For starters, he would not call himself Supreme Leader, and would instill a democratic and liberal political system. Kadivar and other scholars which condemn supreme clerical rule are anti-despotism and advocate for its abolishment. He would most likely establish a western-style democracy and work towards stabilizing the political situation of Iran. This would take more years than he will allow himself to remain in power, however, he will probably stay active in the political sphere both domestically as well as internationally. He may be secretary of state after stepping down, and work as both a close friend and advisor of the next leader of Iran as well as work for cultivating ties with other democratic countries.

2.3 Sayyid Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei

Khamenei's son, Sayyid Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei is also rumored to be a possible designated successor. His religious and military experience and dedication, along with being the son of Khamenei gives strong reason to believe that he may be appointed Supreme Leader by his father. However, Mojtaba is lacking the required religious status. The requirements of commitment to the IRGC as well as anti-American ideology are not questioned, as Mojtaba has a well-known strong relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Mojtaba studied theology and is currently a professor at Qom Seminary in Iran. Nonetheless, it is unclear as to whether Mojtaba’s religious and political status is enough to have him considered to be the next Supreme Leader. In the improbable case that Khamenei names his son to be his successor, it would be possible for his son to further commit to the religious and political facets of his life and align them with the requirements of being Supreme Leader.

This scenario is highly unlikely, especially considering that in the 1979 Revolution, monarchical hereditary succession was abolished. Mojtaba has already shown loyalty to Iran when taking control of the Basij militia during the uproar of the 2009 elections to halt protests. While Mojtaba is currently not fit for the position, he is clearly capable of gaining the needed credentials to live up to the job. Despite his potential, all signs point to another candidate becoming the successor before Mojtaba.

3. PATH TO DEMOCRACY

Albeit the current regime is supposedly overturned by an uprising or new appointment by the current Supreme Leader Khamenei, it is expected that any transition to democracy or to Western-like regime will take a longer and more arduous process. If this was the case, it will be probably preceded by a turmoil analogous to the Arab Springs of 2011. However, even if there was a scream for democracy coming from the Iranian population, the probability that it ends up in success like it did in Tunisia is slim to none. Changing the president or the Supreme Leader does not mean that the regime will also change, but there are more intertwined factors that lead to a massive change in the political sphere, like it is the path to democracy in a Muslim state.