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Do expectations have time span?

Título de la revista: AXIOMATHES
ISSN: 1122-1151
Volumen: 23
Número: 4
Páginas: 665 - 681
Fecha de publicación: 2013
If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein¿s claim that the psychological phenomena called `dispositions¿ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at which the expectation is satisfied. However, it seems that we cannot always identify the beginning of an expectation, and in a few cases, its end. If so, the reduction of expectations to neural events or accompanying feelings which spread over time in the usual way seems a hard enterprise, because these processes, much as other physical processes, have a definite and largely measurable time span. Only at a higher level, that is, as part of human life, expectation can be said to be temporal.