Iustitia et ius naturale en de iure belli ac pacis: observaciones en torno a la distinción grociana entre justicia expletiva y justicia atributiva

Resumen:
This paper shows how the concept of Natural Right (ius naturale), also in its subjective dimension, is conceived by Hugo Grotius as dependent on a primary relationship with the notion of justice considered in a broad sense. The author contends that the Grotian critical reconstruction of the Aristotelian categories of justice, i.e. corrective-distributive in terms of expletive-attributive respectively, largely determines the way in which the notion of ius might be understood. Accordingly, the content of Natural Right in Grotius' view is not confined to a scope merely articulated by subjective rights, as it is usually presented, but it is extended to a genuine moral field wherein natural law can and must be understood in the light of the demands of virtue, not vice versa.