Resumen:
Financial misconduct has come into the spotlight in recent years, causing market regulators to increase the reach and severity
of interventions. We show that at times the economic benefts of illicit fnancial activity outweigh the costs of litigation. We
illustrate our argument with data from the US Securities and Exchanges Commission and a case of investment misconduct.
From the neoclassical economic paradigm, which follows utilitarian thinking, it is rational to engage in misconduct. Still,
the majority of professionals refrain from misconduct, foregoing economic rewards. We suggest fnancial activity could be
reimagined taking into account intrinsic and prosocial motivations. A virtue ethics framework could also be applied, linking fnancial behavior to the quest for moral excellence and shared fourishing. By going beyond utilitarian thinking and
considering alternative models, we ofer a fuller account of fnancial behavior and a better perspective from which to design
deterrence methods.
