Nuestros investigadores

Pablo Cobreros Bordenave

Publicaciones científicas más recientes (desde 2010)

Autores: Cobreros, Pablo;
Revista: SCIENTIA ET FIDES
ISSN 2300-7648  Vol. 4  Nº 1  2016  págs. 61 - 75
If God knew I were going to write this paper, was I able to refrain from writing it this morning? One possible response to this question is that God's knowledge does not take place in time and therefore He does not properly fore-know. According to this response, God knows absolutely everything, it's just that He knows everything outside of time. The so-called timeless solution was one of the influential responses to the foreknowledge problem in classical Christian Theology. This solution, however, seemed to lose support in the recent debate. For example, Pike claims that "the doctrine of God's timelessness entered Christian Theology (only) because Platonic thought was stylish at the time" (Pike, 1970, 190) and Hasker (2001) catalogues this as one of the minor solutions to the problem. One possible source for this general attitude towards timelessness is the thought that the very idea of timelessness is incoherent. In this paper I argue that that the timeless solution to the foreknowledge problem is congenial with the supervaluationist theory of branching time and that this formal framework provides, in fact, a precise characterization of the timeless solution to the foreknowledge problem. The views presented in this paper are in line with those of Kretzmann and Stump (1981), Leftow (1991) and De Florio and Frigerio (2015).
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egré; David Ripley; et al.
Revista: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
ISSN 0022-3611  2015 
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Tranchini, L.;
Revista: THOUGHT: A JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ISSN 2161-2234  Vol. 3  Nº 2  2014  págs. 136 -144
This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Egré, P.; Ripley, D.; et al.
Revista: JOURNAL OF APPLIED NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS
ISSN 1166-3081  Vol. 24  Nº 1-2  2014  págs. 1 - 11
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Egré, P.; Ripley, D.; et al.
Revista: MIND
ISSN 0026-4423  Vol. 122  Nº 488  2013  págs. 841 - 866
This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that T<A> and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egré; David Ripley; et al.
Revista: METAPHYSICA. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
ISSN 1437-2053  Vol. 14  Nº 2  2013  págs. 253 - 264
Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo;
Revista: PHILOSOPHY COMPASS
ISSN 1747-9991  Vol. 8  Nº 5  2013  págs. 472 - 485
Supervaluationism is a well known theory of vagueness. Subvaluationism is a less well known theory of vagueness. But these theories cannot be taken apart, for they are in a relation of duality that can be made precise. This paper provides an introduction to the subvaluationist theory of vagueness in connection to its dual, supervaluationism. A survey on the supervaluationist theory can be found in the Compass paper of Keefe (2008); our presentation of the theory in this paper will be short to get rapidly into the logical issues. This paper is relatively self-contained. A modest background on propositional modal logic is, though not strictly necessary, advisable. The reader might find useful the Compass papers Kracht (2011) and Negri (2011) (though these papers cover issues of more complexity than what is demanded to follow this paper).
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egré; David Ripley; et al.
Revista: STUDIA LOGICA
ISSN 0039-3215  Vol. 100  Nº 4  2012  págs. 855 - 877
In a previous paper (see `Tolerant, Classical, Strict¿, henceforth TCS) we investigated a semantic framework to deal with the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, namely that small changes do not affect the applicability of a vague predicate even if large changes do. Our approach there rests on two main ideas. First, given a classical extension of a predicate, we can define a strict and a tolerant extension depending on an indifference relation associated to that predicate. Second, we can use these notions of satisfaction to define mixed consequence relations that capture non-transitive tolerant reasoning. Although we gave some empirical motivation for the use of strict and tolerant extensions, making use of them commits us to the view that sentences of the form ` p¿¬p ¿ and ` p¿¬p ¿ are not automatically valid or unsatisfiable, respectively. Some philosophers might take this commitment as a negative outcome of our previous proposal. We think, however, that the general ideas underlying our previous approach to vagueness can be implemented in a variety of ways. This paper explores the possibility of defining mixed notions of consequence in the more classical super/sub-valuationist setting and examines to what extent any of these notions captures non-transitive tolerant reasoning.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egré; David Ripley; et al.
Revista: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
ISSN 0022-3611  Vol. 41  Nº 2  2012  págs. 347 - 385
In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, which we call tolerant truth and strict truth. We characterize the space of consequence relations definable in terms of those and discuss the kind of solution this gives to the sorites paradox. We discuss some applications of the framework to the pragmatics and psycholinguistics of vague predicates, in particular regarding judgments about borderline cases.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo;
Revista: MIND
ISSN 0026-4423  Vol. 120  Nº 479  2011  págs. 833 - 843
Though it is standardly assumed that supervaluationism applied to vagueness is committed to global validity, Achille Varzi (2007) argues that the supervaluationist should take seriously the idea of adopting local validity instead. Varzi¿s motivation for the adoption of local validity is largely based on two objections against the global notion: that it brings some counterexamples to classically valid rules of inference and that it is inconsistent with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. In this discussion I review these objections and point out ways to address them not considered in Varzi¿s paper.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo;
Revista: SYNTHESE
ISSN 0039-7857  Vol. 183  Nº 2  2011  págs. 211 - 227
Paraconsistent approaches have received little attention in the literature on vagueness (at least compared to other proposals). The reason seems to be that many philosophers have found the idea that a contradiction might be true (or that a sentence and its negation might both be true) hard to swallow. Even advocates of paraconsistency on vagueness do not look very convinced when they consider this fact; since they seem to have spent more time arguing that paraconsistent theories are at least as good as their paracomplete counterparts, than giving positive reasons to believe on a particular paraconsistent proposal. But it sometimes happens that the weakness of a theory turns out to be its mayor ally, and this is what (I claim) happens in a particular paraconsistent proposal known as subvaluationism. In order to make room for truth-value gluts subvaluationism needs to endorse a notion of logical consequence that is, in some sense, weaker than standard notions of consequence. But this weakness allows the subvaluationist theory to accommodate higher-order vagueness in a way that it is not available to other theories of vagueness (such as, for example, its paracomplete counterpart, supervaluationism).
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egrè; David Ripley; et al.
Libro:  Unifying the philosophy of truth
Vol. 36  2015  págs. 409 - 430
We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Gamma whenever, if all the premises of Gamma hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a unified treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for truth, it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Egré, P.; Ripley, D.; et al.
Libro:  Unifying the Philosophy of Truth
2015  págs. 409 - 430
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egré; David Ripley; et al.
Libro:  Recent trends in philosophical logic
Vol. 41  2014  págs. 75 - 83
In his chapter `Non-transitive identity¿ [8], Graham Priest develops a notion of non-transitive identity based on a second-order version of LP. Though we are sympathetic to Priest¿s general approach to identity we think that the account can be refined in different ways. Here we present two such ways and discuss their appropriateness for a metaphysical reading of indefiniteness in connection to Evans¿ argument.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo;
Libro:  Vagueness in communication
Vol. 6517  2011  págs. 51 - 63
The supervaluationist theory of vagueness provides a notion of logical consequence that is akin to classical consequence. In the absence of a definitely operator, supervaluationist consequence coincides with classical consequence. In the presence of `definitely¿, however, supervaluationist logic gives raise to counterexamples to classically valid patterns of inference. Foes of supervaluationism emphasize the last result to argue against the supervaluationist theory. This paper shows a way in which we might obtain systems of deduction adequate for supervaluationist consequence based on systems of deduction adequate for classical consequence. Deductions on the systems obtained this way adopt a completely classical form with the exception of a single step. The paper reviews (at least part of) the discussion on the non-classicality of supervaluationist logic under the light of this result.
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo;
Libro:  Vagueness and language use
2011  págs. 207 - 221
Autores: Ferrer, U., (Coordinador); Abellán, J. C.; Alarcón, Enrique; et al.
2015 
Autores: Ferrer, U., (Coordinador); Abellán, J. C.; Alarcón, Enrique; et al.
2015 
Autores: Cobreros, Pablo; Paul Egré; David Ripley; et al.
2014