Nuestros investigadores

Luis Enrique Echarte Alonso

Departamento

Publicaciones científicas más recientes (desde 2010)

Autores: Orón Semper, José Víctor; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: CUADERNOS DE BIOETICA
ISSN 1132-1989  Vol. 28  Nº 92  2017  págs. 13 - 27
This article explores the hypothesis that while maturation related cognitive abilities reaches maturity around the age of fifteen, maturation related social skills is delayed until well into the twenties. Our goal is to try to define what is the window of opportunity / vulnerability and what is the maturational status of the young in this interval. In this context, we argue how the maturational time of the closing of adolescence has an impact on the valuation of autonomy in decision-making of the person. Particularly, we figure out implications for the assessment of the autonomy of youth in health issues, and also criminal liability. In the conclusion, we offer some educational criteria that may provide guidance for implementing both social policy and educational programs.
Autores: Orón Semper, J. V., ; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: CUADERNOS DE BIOETICA
ISSN 0328-8390  Vol. 28  Nº 1  2017  págs. 13 - 27
This article explores the hypothesis that while maturation related cognitive abilities reaches maturity around the age of fifteen, maturation related social skills is delayed until well into the twenties. Our goal is to try to define what is the window of opportunity / vulnerability and what is the maturational status of the young in this interval. In this context, we argue how the maturational time of the closing of adolescence has an impact on the valuation of autonomy in decision-making of the person. Particularly, we figure out implications for the assessment of the autonomy of youth in health issues, and also criminal liability. In the conclusion, we offer some educational criteria that may provide guidance for implementing both social policy and educational programs.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: SCIENTIA ET FIDES
ISSN 2300-7648  Vol. 4  Nº 2  2016  págs. 155 - 183
In this paper I analyze the affective problem related to interdisciplinary research using, as a guiding theme, some of my autobiographical memories linked to Mariano Artigas. Starting from a theory of feelings that connects emotions closely to reasons, I defend that many problems in developing interdisciplinary research are caused by the current divorce reason/emotion in which many researchers are educated. Secondly, I identify three types of feelings in a hierarchical relationship, whose scope may be very extensive, in my opinion, for the good performance of interdisciplinary dynamic: eureka excitement, narrative catharsis, and ecstatic experience. In the last part of my paper, I offer some suggestions on how to return feelings to academic domains and, at the same time, keeping sources of funding, and avoiding present evils as commoditization of knowledge and students, clientelism, and cynicism.
Autores: Gaitán Mantaras, Leandro Martín; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: TECHNE: RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY
ISSN 0161-7249  Vol. 20  Nº 1  2016  págs. 16 - 33
The present work is developed within the frame of so-called critical neuroscience. The aim of this article is to explain the transition from a kind of neuroscience understood as a strict scientific discipline, possessing a methodology and a specific praxis, to a kind of neuroscience that has been transformed into a meta-narrative with totalizing claims. In particular, we identify and examine eleven catalysts for such a transition: 1) a lack of communication between scientists and journalists; 2) the abuse of information by the sensational press; 3) the acceptance of specific philosophical approaches (like eliminative materialism) by a wide range of scientists; 4) the widespread transmission of two conceptual mistakes: a) an identification between methodological and ontological reductionism and b) the mereological fallacy; 5) the influence of post-Cartesian philosophical thinking in the scientific community; 6) an overwhelming scientific hyper-specialization; 7) the illegitimate transfer of authority from humanities to the sciences; 8) an inbuilt human preference for visual data; 9) economic interests; 10) scientific utopianism; and 11) the new self-help movements and their alliance with neuro-enhancement. Finally, our essay seeks to draw attention to the most damaging consequences for both science and human ways of living.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: SCIENTIA ET FIDES
ISSN 2300-7648  Vol. 4  Nº 2  2016  págs. 155 - 183
In this paper I analyze the affective problem related to interdisciplinary research using, as a guiding theme, some of my autobiographical memories linked to Mariano Artigas. Starting from a theory of feelings that connects emotions closely to reasons, I defend that many problems in developing interdisciplinary research are caused by the current divorce reason/emotion in which many researchers are educated. Secondly, I identify three types of feelings in a hierarchical relationship, whose scope may be very extensive, in my opinion, for the good performance of interdisciplinary dynamic: eureka excitement, narrative catharsis, and ecstatic experience. In the last part of my paper, I offer some suggestions on how to return feelings to academic domains and, at the same time, keeping sources of funding, and avoiding present evils as commoditization of knowledge and students, clientelism, and cynicism.
Autores: Gamboa Bernal, G., ; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: CUADERNOS DE BIOETICA
ISSN 1132-1989  Vol. 27  Nº 1  2016  págs. 13 - 27
Quality of life concepts and scales related to health (QLRH) are beginning to be customary in clinical practice and now play an important role in bioethical discussions, particularly concerning the management of terminal patients. This paper looks at how that concept has evolved and how it relates to the health-illness binomial. We illustrate some important complexities the notion of quality of life (QL) has borne since its inception and that make applicability in the health sciences difficult and, most of all, lead to tremendous biases. In our conclusions, we argue it is necessary to improve the concept of QL by including aspects and factors related to well-being. Although not entirely quantifiable, they give coherence and meaning to the patient data health professionals normally work with.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique; Bernácer María, Javier; Larrivee, D., ; et al.
Revista: FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN 1664-1078  Vol. 7  2016  págs. 117
A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs about the severity of their disease or the nature of its treatment, considering therapy as curative rather than palliative. We propose that this attitude may be understood as self-deception, following the current psychological theories about this topic. In this article we suggest that the reason these patients deceive themselves is to preserve their belief systems. According to some philosophical accounts, the human belief system (HBS) is constituted as a web with a few stable central nodes - deep-seated beliefs - intimately related with the self. We hypothesize that the mind may possess defensive mechanisms, mostly non-conscious, that reject certain sensory inputs (e.g., a fatal diagnosis) that may undermine deep-seated beliefs. This interpretation is in line with the theory of cognitive dissonance. Following this reasoning, we also propose that HBS-related self-deception would entail a lower cognitive load than that associated with confronting the truth: whereas the latter would engage a myriad of high cognitive functions to re-configure crucial aspects of the self, including the setting of plans, goals, or even a behavioral output, the former would be mostly non-conscious. Overall, we believe that our research supports the hypothesis that in cases of terminal illness, (self-)deceiving requires less effort than accepting the truth.
Autores: Grijalba, M., ; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: PERSONA Y BIOETICA
ISSN 0123-3122  Vol. 19  Nº 1  2015  págs. 80 - 98
Antonio Damasio elabora una teoría de la mente humana y de la conducta moral a partir de su hipótesis sobre la evolución de los mecanismos de autorregulación biológicos. En ella, a la capacidad para representar relaciones organismo-mundo se le confiere un importante papel en los cambios organizacionales (y, en último término, normativos) que emergen de los sistemas con un sistema nervioso central. Concretamente, en nuestro artículo analizamos, en primer lugar, la tesis acerca de la doble homeostasis biológicamental que caracteriza a los agentes racionales. Desde su perspectiva, la conciencia es producto y manifestación de complejos procesos del procesamiento de representaciones, los cuales favorecen la regulación no consciente. Además, para entender los procesos conscientes también es clave, según Damasio, conocer cómo la evolución de tales mecanismos está asociada con el desarrollo de áreas neuronales próximas al córtex emocional, especialmente, el giro cingulado. Los argumentos que Damasio utiliza para vincular los procesos representacionales con la particular preocupación humana por los sentimientos de los otros (un fenómeno que identifica en el origen de las normas éticas y, en último término, de lo que denomina homeostasis social) es la segunda cuestión que evaluamos.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: CUENTA Y RAZON
ISSN 1889-1489  Vol. 34  2015  págs. 91 - 101
Autores: Pardo Caballos, Antonio; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: PERSONA Y BIOETICA
ISSN 0123-3122  Vol. 19  Nº 2  2015  págs. 198 - 226
El consentimiento informado en investigación se inscribe en la relación médico-paciente, que ha sufrido, y sigue sufriendo, importantes cambios: desde el planteamiento clásico, como relación de amistad, al planteamiento contemporáneo, como relación entre extraños (enemigos potenciales, siguiendo tesis ilustradas sobre la sociedad), que es regulada por normas éticas y legales. El principal objetivo de estas últimas es conseguir, mediante requisitos formales, que dicha relación no perjudique al paciente. Bajo esta luz, se examina y compara el consentimiento informado en las principales normativas internacionales y en la ley española. Especialmente, nos centramos en la hoja de información al paciente, la comprensión, la voluntariedad, la certificación y la comunicación de los resultados de la investigación. Se concluye con la observación de la seria limitación intrínseca de la que adolecen estas normativas, que impiden, más que favorecen, el trato adecuado al paciente.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique; García-Valdecasas Merino, Miguel
Revista: CUADERNOS DE BIOETICA
ISSN 0328-8390  Vol. 25  Nº 3  2014  págs. 415 - 425
The development of neuroprosthetics has given rise to significant theoretical and practical challenges concerning personal identity. The Extended Mind Theory (EMT) attempts to provide an answer to these challenges by arguing that the mind and the external world are co-extensive to the point that both can make a seamless unified entity. The EMT also proposes that physical states determine the nature of mental states. Here, we propose a non-deterministic and less locationist view of mental states that we will call iEMT. The iEMT articulates, firstly, that the co-extensivity of the mind and the world does not justify the dissolution of the mind in the objects of the external world with which the mind interacts. Consequently, the agent¿s mind is still part of his unique personal identity. Secondly, neural implants cannot be regarded as mere replacement parts in the context of a weak concept of personal identity. Thirdly, there are no compelling reasons to believe or to fear that neuroprosthetics can alter personal identity at the profound level.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique; Carrascal Garchitorena, Elena María
Revista: MEDICINA PALIATIVA
ISSN 1134-248X  Vol. 21  Nº 4  2014  págs. 135 - 140
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: SCIENTIA ET FIDES
ISSN 2300-7648  Vol. 2  Nº 2  2014  págs. 135 - 184
Neuroscientists frequently use two folk psychology terms -self and consciousness- in formulating decision-making process models. According to Daniel Dennett, such notions lead them to dualistic view of brain functions and hence to dead ends or, at least, to less than optimal designs in the research field. Indeed, Dennett's position offers interesting insights that may help neuroscientists to comprehend the distinction between conscious and non-conscious behavior. In this paper, I first explore how habitual behavior could be defined from Dennett's model. Second, taking his view into account, I try to offer a better interpretation of habits. Particularly, I define habits as involving a teleological and preconscious process whose traits and dynamics are indistinguishable from computational ones, but this is so more in their ends than in their origins. Finally, I propose seven lines of experimental hypothesis to support this definition.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique; Gaitán Mantaras, Leandro Martín
Revista: PENSAMIENTO Y CULTURA
ISSN 0123-0999  Vol. 16  Nº 2  2014  págs. 8 - 32
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique; Gaitán Mantaras, Leandro Martín
Revista: PENSAMIENTO Y CULTURA
ISSN 0123-0999  Vol. 16  Nº 2  2013  págs. 8 - 32
Resumen: Los avances de las últimas dos décadas en el estudio del sistema nervioso y en el desarrollo de neuro-tecnología parecen justificar las elevadas expectativas en lo que a este campo concierne. No obstante, cada vez son más los autores que advierten, desde dentro y fuera de la neurociencia, que es excesivo tal grado de optimismo así como perjudicial el neuro-esencialismo que genera. En el presente artículo analizamos el origen y el papel de las expectativas neurocientíficas. En las conclusiones defendemos, primero, que las principales causas no son las evidencias y las teorías científicas, como suele pensarse y, segundo, que precisamente esta generalizada falsa creencia perjudica seriamente el avance científico y el progreso social.
Autores: Gaitán Mantaras, Leandro Martín; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: PERSONA Y BIOETICA
ISSN 0123-3122  Vol. 16  Nº 2  2012  págs. 108 - 129
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: CUADERNOS DE BIOETICA
ISSN 0328-8390  Vol. 23  Nº 77  2012  págs. 37 - 51
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: AJOB NEUROSCIENCE
ISSN 2150-7740  Vol. 2  Nº 1  2011  págs. 53
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: IMAGO HOMINIS : QUARTALSCHRIFT DES INSTITUTS FUR MEDIZINISCHE ANTHROPOLOGIE UND BIOETHIK
ISSN 1021-9803  Vol. 17  Nº 3  2010  págs. 217 - 229
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Revista: LUMIEIRA (A CORUÑA)
ISSN 1696-9707  Vol. 66-67  2010  págs. 11 - 32
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Psychiatry and neuroscience update: a translational approach
Vol. 2  2017  págs. 77 - 103
This chapter explores the phenomenon of inauthentic experiences as a negative consequence of the new trends in cosmetic psychopharmacology, concluding that they are also the psychological manifestation of the tension, in late modernity, between two rival versions for a moral paradigm¿Classic and Modern¿and in which transition, rationality, affectivity, and will are being progressively and consecutively instrumentalized. Moreover, it is argued that this post-emotional scenario poses a threat to mental stability as well as social cohesion. The second general objective of this chapter is analyzing three types of psychological complaints by patients about inauthenticity¿those related to the artificial origin of emotions, to the physical nature of its content, and to its episodic coherence; on the other hand, I present and compare three rival contemporary solutions to the problem of inauthenticity: the psychological, the organic, and the narrative.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Human dignity of the vulnerable in the age of rights. Interdisciplinary perspectives
2016  págs. 123 - 140
This study is framed within the objectives of Clinical Ontology, namely, the formulation of true, coherent and accessible discourses in order to help patients manage unavoidable and destructive experiences about the nature of being, becoming, and its limits. First, I analyze four different inauthentic experiences (IE), which are deeply associated with neuro-technological development, and from which are emerging a new and growing vulnerable group of patients. Second, I propose two basis conditions for a successful ontological treatment: (a) the patient should value the unpleasant feelings of IE negatively; and (b) the patient should believe that a better understanding of reality (or at least, of his or her own life) provides a means to neutralize and replace unpleasant feelings with others that are more enjoyable and fulfilling. Finally, I defend that therapeutic technologies are not the only triggers of IE, hence they should not be the only target of investigation of this field.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Human dignity of the vulnerable in the age of rights. Interdisciplinary perspectives
2016  págs. 141 - 166
In this chapter the author employs Antonio Damasio¿s frame about the three levels of the self in order to understand the general characteristics and dynamics of inauthentic experiences and its biological, social and intellectual bases. This approach also leads me to explain certain fundamental traits of the dynamic between so-called practical identities and moral identities. Parallel to this, I offer a model of how contradictory normative ideas can co-exist at the same level (horizontal dislocation or experiences of alienation) or at that of different levels (vertical dislocation or, strictly speaking, phenomenon of inauthenticity). The main conclusions are that (a) ideals and conflicts may be beyond conscious processing and (b) inadequate social inputs could damage the experience of subjectivity at each of Damasio¿s three levels. The third conclusion, which is derived from the second one, is that, at present, we used to underestimate the powerful effect of technology as well as others¿ opinions on our own system of values. This error (very frequent in individualistic lifestyles) is the major cause of IE and, ultimately, of the emergence of a growing vulnerable group.
Autores: Franck, J. F., ; Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  ¿Determinismo o indeterminismo? Grandes preguntas de las ciencias a la filosofía
2016  págs. 149 - 180
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  To fix or to heal: patient care, public health, and the limits of biomedicine
2016  págs. 84 - 109
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Título: Emociones
Libro:  Diccionario Interdisciplinar Austral
2016  págs. 1 - 15
La cuestión de las emociones ha sido tratada a lo largo de la historia del pensamiento, si bien no siempre bajo la misma luz y en los mismos términos. Es habitual encontrar en estudios filosóficos, psicológicos y neurobiológicos diferentes perspectivas y acepciones del término emoción, además de palabras afines como pasión, sentimiento, afección, apetito, o simpatía, entre otras. Con todo, es posible reconocer en muchos de estos estudios ciertos patrones que, a la vez, sirven para justificar los distintos usos empleados. Esta voz trata de dar cuenta de dichos lugares comunes y, a través de ellos, ofrecer un panorama lo suficientemente amplio e integrador para que sirva como herramienta útil a aquellos investigadores interesados en abordar dicha cuestión desde un enfoque interdisciplinar.
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Emociones y estilos de vida. Radiografía de nuestro tiempo
2013  págs. 261 - 293
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Filosofía de la Biología
2012  págs. 418 - 424
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Inteligencia y filosofía
2012  págs. 567 - 588
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Enciclopedia de Bioética
2011  págs. -
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
Libro:  Trasatlantic encounters: philosophy, media, politics
Vol. 3  2011  págs. 41 - 60
Autores: Echarte Alonso, Luis Enrique
2014