Nuestros investigadores

Javier Arellano Gil

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Universidad de Navarra
Líneas de investigación
La influencia de los incentivos, la disciplina, la educación financiera y la banca digital sobre la estabilidad financiera
Índice H
5, (Google Scholar, 28/12/2017)

Publicaciones científicas más recientes (desde 2010)

Autores: Aranda, María del Carmen; Arellano, Javier;
ISSN 0001-4273  Vol. 60  Nº 3  2017  págs. 1189 - 1211
This paper examines organizational learning in a target setting. Organizations commonly set targets-explicit and quantitative reference points-for their operational units that reflect top management aspirations for these units. Targets are commonly the outcome of a subjective process where supervisors combine their explicit and tacit knowledge to set performance expectations for their units. Using a proprietary database from a large European travel company during a period of rapid expansion, we document the effect of organizational learning by studying how targets change as units mature. In particular, we examine managers' experiential learning from branches' past performance and their vicarious learning from branches in the same region in determining performance expectations over the life cycle of branches. Our results indicate that, in setting performance targets, managers increase the weight of a branch's past performance and decrease the weight of comparable branches' performance as the branch matures. Vicarious learning, where managers extrapolate the performance of comparable branches to a new branch, dominates in the early years. Over time, this type of learning is replaced by experiential learning as experience accumulates. We document how early on in the life of branches, these two types of learning interact; this interaction disappears as branches mature. Furthermore, we find that managers learn differently from successes and failures early in the lives of the new units, and this learning is affected by the magnitude of the successes and failures.
Autores: Aranda, María del Carmen; Arellano, Javier;
ISSN 0001-4826  Vol. 89  Nº 4  2014  págs. 1197 - 1226
Managers use a variety of information to set performance targets. Using data from 376 branches of a large travel retailer over five years, this study documents supervisors considering the relative performance of comparable units in target setting, which we term relative target setting (RTS). We find evidence of RTS after controlling for individual past performance in the form of ratcheting. Our findings also indicate that RTS partially shapes the use of other information on past performance. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of ratcheting decreases (increases) with RTS for favorable (unfavorable) performance variances, and the asymmetry of ratcheting characterized by different ratcheting coefficients for unfavorable than for favorable variances is significant for large absolute magnitudes of RTS. Managers use the flexibility associated with the subjectivity of the target-setting process to weight peer and individual information differently across different units.
Autores: Arellano, Javier; Aranda, María del Carmen;
ISSN 1887-5696  Nº 17  2013  págs. 119 - 139
The use of variable remuneration systems generally implies the establishment of objectives. Prior literature on management control has identified a phenomenon known as «ratcheting» where objectives defined in the annual budget and that constitute the basis for the incentives system, are ot static, on the contrary, the change depending on the performance achieved in previous periods. Positive (negative) deviations in the performance lead to an increase (reduction) in next period objectives. Important advantages have been attributed to this way of revising the objectives. However, some authors suggest that it can also generate opportunistic behaviours in managers. This paper explains the reasons and consequences of ratcheting and suggests how its limitations can be faced.
Autores: Aranda, María del Carmen; Arellano, Javier;
ISSN 1049-2127  Vol. 22  Nº 1  2010  págs. 271 - 299
Autores: Aranda, María del Carmen; Arellano, Javier;
ISSN 1832-5912  Vol. 6  Nº 3  2010  págs. 330 - 358
Autores: Arellano, Javier; Aranda, Carmen;
ISSN 1049-2127  Vol. 22  2010  págs. 271 - 299
For a strategy to be effective it must be communicated and widely understood throughout the organization. Our study addresses which of two Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMSs) approaches is more successful at communicating strategy and generating consensus on strategy among managers: (1) the BSC, which makes explicit the links among measures and categories in a hierarchical mode, and (2) an alternative SPMS design, which splits measures into financial and non-financial, but lacks this hierarchical structure of links. We conducted a field experiment in a savings bank and monitored two groups of middle managers working with each of the two SPMS designs. Our results show that (i) middle managers treated with the BSC exhibit a statistically significantly greater effect regarding consensus with respect to top management than those treated with the alternative SPMS, (ii) this increased consensus is more pronounced as we move down the list of the BSC perspectives, where the majority of non-financial and long term measures are found; and finally (iii) some of the managers treated with the non-linked SPMS experience a loss in consensus. The implications for the SPMS design process are: (1) the reporting of the performance measures links in a hierarchical mode matters when it comes to designing an effective strategy communication device, (2) the dispersion in managers' interpretation of the strategy generated by lacking a linked structure is greater than the tension created by confronting managers' views with the disclosed link structure.
Autores: Redín, Dulce María; Aranda, María del Carmen; Arellano, Javier;
Libro:  Las soluciones a la situación de insolvencia : un análisis jurisprudencial económico
2014  págs. 439 - 460



Contabilidad y finanzas para dirección (ISEM). 
Universidad de Navarra - Instituto Superior de Empresa y Moda.

Contabilidad de Gestión B (F.Económicas). 
Universidad de Navarra - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales.

Contabilidad de Gestión A (F. ECONÓMICAS). 
Universidad de Navarra - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales.