Nuestros investigadores

Markus Kinateder 

Publicaciones científicas más recientes (desde 2010)

Autores: Kinateder, Markus; Merlino, L. P.;
ISSN 1945-7669  Vol. 9  Nº 3  2017  págs. 187 - 212
We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large societies, few players produce a lot; furthermore, networks dampen inequality under cost heterogeneity and increase it under heterogeneity in valuation.
Autores: Elizalde, Javier; Kinateder, Markus; Rodríguez, Ignacio;
ISSN 0929-1261  Vol. 40  Nº 1  2015  págs. 13 - 31
This work performs a comparative welfare analysis of two types of entry regulation in a duopolistic retail market: number of licenses and minimum distance between stores. In a linear (Hotelling) market we show that a minimum distance rule is beneficial for consumers and disadvantageous for the firms when demand is sufficiently inelastic. The distance rule that maximises social welfare is one quarter of the market under which firms will be located at the quartiles. Those locations are also optimal under regulated prices. Moreover, our model of two licenses with simultaneous entry is the first one that performs the horizontal product differentiation analysis using quadratic transportation costs and a binding reservation price. We find that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all the values of the reservation price and, for those values that induce a unique location equilibrium, the distance between the firms ranges from one half of the of the market to the whole market length.This analysis, which is not yet considered in the literature, is motivated by a change of entry regulation in the drugstore market in the Spanish region of Navarre. Since the demand in this market is quite inelastic, the minimum distance rule maybe socially more beneficial than the license rule.
Autores: Galera, Francisco de Asís; Kinateder, Markus; Mendi, Pedro;
ISSN 0931-8658  Vol. 113  Nº 2  2014  págs. 175 - 186
In the presence of a non-constant marginal cost and demand uncertainty, we show that an output increase is no longer a necessary condition for welfare to increase following the introduction of third-degree price discrimination. We thus highlight the existence of an effect that might offset the well known output and misallocation effects of price discrimination. We propose a specific example where this is indeed the case
Autores: Kinateder, Markus; Kiss, H. J.;
ISSN 1572-3089  Vol. 15  2014  págs. 149 - 160
We study the Diamond¿Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information. Our result is robust to several extensions
Autores: Kinateder, Markus;
ISSN 0020-7276  Vol. 42  Nº 1  2013  págs. 283 - 294
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed and finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk theorem extends to this setup. As is shown for an example, for a range of discount factors, the set of perfect public equilibria is reduced under certain conditions and efficiency improves when the players take into account private information. This model applies to many situations in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players' reaction.