Revistas
Revista:
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN:
0014-2921
Año:
2023
Vol.:
152
Págs.:
104378
Players allocate their budgets to links, a local public good, and a private good. A player links in order to free ride on public good provided by others. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, in which large contributors link to each other, while others link to them. If linking costs are sufficiently high, poorer players may contribute more and have more central positions in the network than richer ones do. In large societies, free riding reduces inequality only in networks in which it is initially low. Otherwise, richer players free ride more, as they can afford more links. Finally, we derive the policy implications for income redistribution.
Revista:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN:
0899-8256
Año:
2022
Vol.:
132
Págs.:
316 - 327
We introduce weighted links in a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. We find that the equilibrium predictions are sharper than when links are not weighted. In particular, active players form a complete core-periphery graph, where they are either in the core of interconnected players, or connected to every player in the core. Furthermore, a player's type is tightly related to her public good provision and her position in the network. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Revista:
GAMES
ISSN:
2073-4336
Año:
2021
Vol.:
12
N°:
3
Págs.:
55
In this paper, we propose a game in which each player decides with whom to establish a costly connection and how much local public good is provided when benefits are shared among neighbors. We show that, when agents are homogeneous, Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs. Additionally, we show that the game is a potential game, even when we introduce heterogeneity along several dimensions. Using this result, we introduce stochastic best reply dynamics and show that this admits a unique and stationary steady state distribution expressed in terms of the potential function of the game. Hence, even if the set of Nash equilibria is potentially very large, the long run predictions are sharp.
Revista:
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
ISSN:
1386-4157
Año:
2020
Vol.:
23
N°:
3
Págs.:
873 - 894
In a Diamond¿Dybvig type model of financial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria¿including bank run¿exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and find a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcements.
Revista:
ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN:
0165-1765
Año:
2019
Vol.:
177
Págs.:
43 - 46
We formally show that lump-sum participation fees and per-interaction fees charged by a monopoly platform in a two-sided market are not interchangeable in the presence of price distortions, such as ad valorem taxes. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Revista:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN:
1945-7669
Año:
2017
Vol.:
9
N°:
3
Págs.:
187 - 212
We study a local public good game in an endogenous network with heterogeneous players. The source of heterogeneity affects the gains from a connection and hence equilibrium networks. When players differ in the cost of producing the public good, active players form pyramidal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have more neighbors. When players differ in the valuation of the public good, nested split graphs emerge in which production need not be monotonic in type. In large societies, few players produce a lot; furthermore, networks dampen inequality under cost heterogeneity and increase it under heterogeneity in valuation.
Revista:
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
ISSN:
0929-1261
Año:
2015
Vol.:
40
N°:
1
Págs.:
13 - 31
This work performs a comparative welfare analysis of two types of entry regulation in a duopolistic retail market: number of licenses and minimum distance between stores. In a linear (Hotelling) market we show that a minimum distance rule is beneficial for consumers and disadvantageous for the firms when demand is sufficiently inelastic. The distance rule that maximises social welfare is one quarter of the market under which firms will be located at the quartiles. Those locations are also optimal under regulated prices. Moreover, our model of two licenses with simultaneous entry is the first one that performs the horizontal product differentiation analysis using quadratic transportation costs and a binding reservation price. We find that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all the values of the reservation price and, for those values that induce a unique location equilibrium, the distance between the firms ranges from one half of the of the market to the whole market length.This analysis, which is not yet considered in the literature, is motivated by a change of entry regulation in the drugstore market in the Spanish region of Navarre. Since the demand in this market is quite inelastic, the minimum distance rule maybe socially more beneficial than the license rule.
Revista:
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
ISSN:
1572-3089
Año:
2014
Vol.:
15
Págs.:
149 - 160
We study the Diamond¿Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information. Our result is robust to several extensions
Revista:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN:
0931-8658
Año:
2014
Vol.:
113
N°:
2
Págs.:
175 - 186
In the presence of a non-constant marginal cost and demand uncertainty, we show that an output increase is no longer a necessary condition for welfare to increase following the introduction of third-degree price discrimination. We thus highlight the existence of an effect that might offset the well known output and misallocation effects of price discrimination. We propose a specific example where this is indeed the case
Revista:
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
ISSN:
0020-7276
Año:
2013
Vol.:
42
N°:
1
Págs.:
283 - 294
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed and finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk theorem extends to this setup. As is shown for an example, for a range of discount factors, the set of perfect public equilibria is reduced under certain conditions and efficiency improves when the players take into account private information. This model applies to many situations in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players' reaction.
Nacionales y Regionales
Título:
Diseño de las organizaciones y provisión de incentivos para la innovación
Código de expediente:
PGC2018-098131-B-I00
Investigador principal:
Pedro Mendi Güemes
Financiador:
MINISTERIO DE CIENCIA, INNOVACIÓN Y UNIVERSIDADES
Convocatoria:
2018 AEI - MCIU - Proyectos de Generación del Conocimiento
Fecha de inicio:
01/01/2019
Fecha fin:
30/09/2022
Importe concedido:
43.439,00€
Otros fondos:
Fondos FEDER
Título:
Integración fraccional, procesos de memoria larga y no linealidades en series de tiempo. Evidencia en los países en vías de desarrollo.
Código de expediente:
ECO2017-85503-R
Investigador principal:
Luis Alberiko Gil Alaña
Financiador:
MINISTERIO DE CIENCIA, INNOVACIÓN Y UNIVERSIDADES
Convocatoria:
2017 MINECO RETOS INVESTIGACION. PROYECTOS DE I+D+i
Fecha de inicio:
01/01/2018
Fecha fin:
31/12/2020
Importe concedido:
6.050,00€
Otros fondos:
Fondos FEDER
